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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Democratic Multiplicity Under Capitalism

Dennis Pilon

Politics, York University, Canada
Email: dpilon@yorku.ca

Abstract

The call to recognize democratic multiplicity, that is, that democracy exists in spaces other than the state, rightly underlines the social dimension of collective governance in modern societies. Capturing this rich diversity of experience and theorizing its impact is an important counter to traditional top-down state-centric democratic theory. Yet there is a danger that in the pursuit of particular spaces of democratic activity, the broader capitalist landscape upon which it is enacted may be obscured. As the state level is a crucial guarantor of the capitalist social relations that condition individual and collective behavior work exploring democratic multiplicity must grapple with the state if it wants to understand the concrete potential and limits of such democratic endeavors. By exploring how capitalism uniquely shapes politics we will see how the multiplicitous spaces of smaller-scale democratic practice are not separate from the state but an entangled element of a broader relational struggle over "actually existing democracy" in a specifically capitalist setting.

Keywords: capitalism; class; democratization; governance; multiplicity

The call to recognize democratic multiplicity, that is, that democracy exists in spaces other than the state, rightly underlines the social dimension of collective governance in modern societies, showing that, through a variety of locales and practices, people essentially contribute to co-governing with state institutions in myriad ways. Capturing this rich diversity of experience and theorizing its impact is an important counter to traditional top-down state-centric democratic theory. Yet there is a danger that in the pursuit of particular spaces of democratic activity, the broader landscape upon which it is enacted may be obscured. That landscape is undeniably capitalist, and under capitalism, the state level is a crucial guarantor of the capitalist social relations that condition individual and collective behavior. Thus, work exploring democratic multiplicity must grapple with the state and its integral relationship to capitalism if it wants to understand the concrete potential and limits of such democratic endeavors. In what follows we'll explore how capitalism uniquely shapes politics and extend the multiplicity focus on bottom-up practice to the state itself, recognizing that so-called "democratic states" are

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not intrinsically democratic by any institutional or process-based measures but instead only relationally democratic, that is, democratic to the extent that social forces in civil society are able to anchor state practices in democratic values while countering fierce and ongoing opposition from anti-democratic forces. By this logic, the multiplicitous spaces of smaller-scale democratic practice are not separate from this but an entangled element of a broader relational struggle over "actually existing democracy" in a specifically capitalist setting.

The backdrop for recent discussions of democratic multiplicity has been over two decades of work from radical democracy scholars and activists shifting the focus from what are perceived as state-centric, less-than-democratic practices like voting in elections and supporting parties seeking state power to more local and horizontal forms of organizing, sometimes rejecting elections and the practice of representation altogether (Little and Lloyd 2009; Sitrin and Azzellini 2014; Van Reybrouck 2018). The various Occupy endeavors still loom large in this democratic imaginary, particularly after the brief revival and subsequent eclipse of more traditional left efforts to influence state-focused political parties, for example, Sanders campaign for the US Democratic Party presidential nomination and Corbyn's leadership of the UK Labour Party (Sunkara 2019; Thimson 2022). We don't lack for contributions claiming that what is needed is a renewal of the grassroots level of politics, with both theoretical and "how to" books sketching out what this might look like (see Nunes 2021; Ganz 2024 for illustrative examples). But most struggle to scale up their efforts beyond a reinvigorated local activist network and specific issue-focused campaigns.

Here, Tully et al.'s recent *Democratic Multiplicity: Perceiving, Enacting and Integrating Democratic Diversity* offers something different. In this edited collection, 21 contributors attempt to recast what we understand democracy to be, drawing on a wide body of political theory and non-traditional democratic practice (Tully et al. 2022). As Tully underlines in his overview chapter, the point isn't to eschew the state-level democratic arena as much as to bring it into dialogue with four other forms of democracy that presently co-exist with it, though often go unacknowledged. Alongside representative democracy at the level of the state, they include indigenous forms of community-based democracy, democracy "beyond the state" in the form of international law and institutions, multiple local and community-based spaces of cooperative self-governing, and the planetary level of Gaia democracy needed to respond to the emerging environmental crisis. The volume's basic insight is that a democracy that appears in multiple places will end up involving the most people and help build their capacities for citizenship by bringing them into contact with others and, in doing so, develop their sense of connection, empathy, and new ways of thinking. What we need to do then is rework the relationship between these different modes of democracy so that the non-state level forms can influence and anchor the state level.

The ambition behind the democratic multiplicity project is grand and exciting, but it begs the question of what is to be done. The emphasis in the collection is almost exclusively on clarifying our understanding of how the different modes might relate to each other. Tully suggests we tend to take them up in isolation from each other or characterize them in oppositional, zero-sum ways. By contrast, he argues, our work

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should be to "disclose" the many ways the different modes already exist in "entangled, crisscrossing, and overlapping relationships" and, by doing so, find ways for the "families of democracy to coordinate and cooperate as equals" via some form of "democratic integration" (Tully 2022: 3–4). With this framing, it is not surprising that most of the contributions to the volume expend much effort exploring the nature and impact of ideas as they relate to these modes, making a variety of cases that we should change our way of thinking. Cumulatively, the clear implication of so many of the chapters is that "wrong ideas" are where our problems lie, that is, that they are the key barrier blocking the expansion of a democratic multiplicity. The material side of these democratic modes and how they operate within a specifically capitalist setting hardly gets a look in.

In contrast to the ideas-based focus of the contributions to *Democratic Multiplicity*, an approach reckoning with the capitalist setting of our modern world would locate the barriers to greater democracy in material inequality rather than the way we think about it (Jessop 1978; Schwarzmantel 1995; Wood 1995). Tully does gesture toward such themes when he notes how concrete efforts to pursue a democratic multiplicity have often been affected by the coercion of the state-level form of representative democracy (Tully 2022: 3). He even calls for a "democratization of democracy" to alter this state of affairs (Tully 2022: 6). But he says little about just how this could be accomplished or concretely prevent any mode from operating in an undemocratic manner. Only one chapter in the whole collection actually engages with such concrete challenges, namely Boaventura de Sousa Santos' account of plutocrats helping to elect autocrats in Brazil and a host of other countries (Santos 2022).

How the different democratic modes Tully outlines concretely operate is a crucial oversight that threatens to make all the other contributions to *Democratic Multiplicity* a bit beside the point. In other words, their recommendations won't matter much if the material inequalities of power currently defining our world are not problematized and seriously challenged. That means we need to understand how capitalism affects democracy, where our "actually existing democracies" have come from and what conditions their operation, and how such knowledge might be used to advance a democratic multiplicity given such a capitalist context. To that end, the methodological approach pursued here will be to put claims about democracy and capitalism into a broader historical context precisely to assess their substantive impact on one another. In other words, the essay will attempt to gauge to what extent ideal-type definitions of democracy, broadly or narrowly specified, match up with what we know of historical struggles over democratic processes, and assess the ongoing material impact of the inequalities routinely produced by capitalism on such struggles (Pilon 2013). The paper is positioned as a critique of the "ideal type" or definitional approach to assessing both democracy and capitalism, and it contrasts this approach by proffering a materialist focus as a means of explaining and assessing how democracy and capitalism actually work. As "democracy" and "capitalism" are both relational terms—in other words they do not stand in a fixed relation to any internal dynamic of their own or any external forces—they must be appraised contextually, that is, historically, to assess how and why they work as they do and how that changes as the contextual factors working upon them also change (Pilon 2021).

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Multiplicity now

At the level of governance, if not democracy, capitalism is already a multiplicitous form of rule. We can see this clearly when we compare how it operates in comparison to the feudal systems of rule it replaced. As Ellen Meiksins Wood points out, the emergence and entrenchment of capitalism as a totalizing system of social reproduction broke the unity of politics and economics that had defined conservative governance under feudalism in western Europe (Wood 1995). Feudal systems tended to operate via a form of parcellized, localized sovereignty involving clientelistic relations that spread down to a granular level of social control and surveillance. A monarch would grant local lords political control over the reproduction of society in their geographic area, with the power to offer economic privileges to merchants, levy taxes, require peasants to perform periodic free labor, and adjudicate local legal and social disputes. Political and economic power was united in their hands. In terms of the governance process, there could be no "loyal opposition" to the crown and its delegated authorities in this scenario precisely because organizing to oppose specific economic decisions was a direct challenge to the political legitimacy of those making them. The transition from a feudal political economy to a capitalist one occurred gradually and unevenly across western societies, remaking both the process of social reproduction and the rules governing it (Duby 1968; Thompson 1991).

If governance under feudalism was defined by the unity of political and economic power in the hands of the crown and its lords, then capitalism can be distinguished by how it severed that connection. The key factors driving this process were the development of private property and a change in the character of the state. Property certainly existed in the feudal era, but it was subject to arbitrary treatment by the state and encumbered with a host of social obligations and limits on its use and alienation. Lords could not easily limit peasant use of common lands and estates, which often could not be sold or divided (Thompson 1991). Political reform at the level of the state in this period was designed to free capital and property from such limits by effectively privatizing what were formerly public decisions and rules affecting property decisions (Narizny 2020). Campaigns to limit royal power, establish the rule of law, and redefine property law collectively represented an effort to replace a conservative mode of governance with a liberal order (Dickinson 1977). By juridically defining new limitations on what government could do to affect what was now dubbed "private property," capitalists gained enormous new powers not simply over their businesses and property but, crucially, also over those who worked for them (Wood 1995). At the same time, the powers of the state to enforce these new rules were aided by a dramatic expansion of standing armies, national police forces, and the transport infrastructure to facilitate their deployment across the state (Goldstein 1983). These legal and state-led changes severed economic control from social obligations and contributed to increased inequalities of social power in civil society. Of course, in an important way, this separation of economic power from direct political rule did not really mean the economy was separate from politics, as the state acted as a guarantor and enforcer of capitalist "private property" and the market transactions they dominated (Wood 1995).

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These political reforms meant that capitalist elites and their liberal governing order cared little about what happened to their former peasants, as they had the law declare them not responsible for what resulted from capitalist restructuring (Thompson 2001a, 2001b). The newly empowered military and police forces were then deployed to limit peasant resistance to the elimination of their common rights by forcibly removing them from common lands and allotments (via enclosures) and responding to organized resistance with violence. And yet an unanticipated consequence of the destruction of the feudal order was a radical remaking of civil society, increased urbanization, and structural limitations on the ability of capitalists to keep up surveillance on an emerging working class in these new spaces. As Eric Hobsbawm recounts, the decline of feudalism forced peasants into newly expanding cities where, for the first time, society's lower orders lived separately from the upper classes and their constant supervision (Hobsbawm 1998). It was precisely the anonymity of these new urban working-class spaces that created room to organize opposition to state-led capitalist power (Eley 2002). Here we can see how capitalism actually created a multiplicitous political space, if not by design, then as a consequence of its governing restructuring of property law and the state. Despite the rise in the capacity of mass surveillance in our smartphone/internet era, capitalist societies retain a radically anonymous character in terms of the many available spaces to operate out of elite oversight (Van Noort 2024). This too is a material consequence of capitalism's focus on profits. Surveillance was key to assuring compliance under feudalism, but the capitalist control of private property made such intense forms of social surveillance both less necessary and less possible (with notable exceptions, from a profit-making perspective) (Hobsbawm 1998). These anonymous spaces remain key locales for political organization and democratic innovation.

Unpacking state-centered democracy

The democratic multiplicity approach appears to accept the category of state-centered democracy as a sort of ideal-type—as a recognizable mode of democracy with clear workings and outcomes—seemingly at face value. They name a number of pathologies connected with it (dominance behavior, winner-take-all mentality, etc.) but provide little insight into why it operates this way (Tully 2022: 7–8). They appear to assume that bringing their other modes of democracy into relations with it will somehow alter its behavior and address its shortcomings. But this fails to investigate why so-called state-centered democracy operates as it does, particularly why it is state-centered in the first place.

Historically, we can see that demands for democracy prior to the twentieth century tended to emerge locally, for example, the English Diggers of the 1600s, factions active in the American and French revolutions, the English Chartists of the 1830s, the Paris Commune of 1871, the trade union movement across western Europe and the Anglo-American countries, and so on (Dupuis-Deri 2001). But the experience of the nineteenth-century political struggle pushed democratic campaigns to the state level for a reason. Given the expansion of state power, particularly from 1850 on, both in terms of state repression and its regulation of capitalism, it became clear to democratic activists that the state had the power to decisively affect local

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areas, especially when it focused its might on a specific target. This wasn't an automatic development as much as a learned response. As noted above, what we see in the nineteenth century is a gradual enhancement and expansion of state power with the establishment of standing armies, national police forces, national transport links, etc. These develop as a reaction to ongoing local struggles over property, common rights, and working conditions, culminating in a host of violent confrontations between popular constituencies and the state across Europe (Goldstein 1983; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). The violent state-sponsored defeat of the Paris Commune, where the French Army killed or executed an estimated 15,000–20,000 participants, effectively signaled an end to the era of democratic struggle rooted primarily on a local scale (Eichner 2022: 3; Hazan 2015; Downing 2018). From then on, we witness the emergence of a left-led, working-class-anchored political project aimed at democratizing the state, precisely because that scale was seen to be where power resided (Eley 2002).

Here we see the struggle side of the "democratic struggle" that is often referred to in accounts of the transition from "not democracy" to democracy in western countries. A considerable amount of research highlights that democratic breakthroughs in western states were less the product of gradual evolution or enlightened responses from ruling elites than concessions made in the face of organized threats from the underclasses and trade unions, typically facilitated amid unstable historical events, for example, economic crisis, war, invasion, etc. (Dahlum et al. 2019; Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023; Przeworski 2008; Therborn 2020). Geoff Eley notes how the rise of working-class organizations, be they unions or mass political parties, was the catalyst for these changes given their laborious organizing efforts throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Eley 2002; Mor and Boix 2024). Still, conventional political elites tenaciously resisted moving in a democratic direction the whole time and only conceded to a minimally democratic opening in the face of the catastrophic social upheaval that accompanied World War I (Dupuis-Deri 2001; Losurdo 2024). In western Europe, the threats involved an increased labor militancy that accompanied the widespread mobilization of the civil society for the war effort, a constant threat of invasion and occupation, and elite fear of a possible contagion effect from the 1917 Russian revolution moving across the war-ravaged continent (Therborn 2020; Lacher and Wamsley 2023: 1060). In the Anglo-American sphere, the direct impact of war was more distant but still impacted the balance of class forces, as making war had mobilized the working class and farmers to a much greater degree. The end result was that by the war's end (or shortly thereafter) nearly all western countries now claimed to be democracies, opening the vote to all working men (sometimes also working women) and/or parliamentarizing their executives (i.e. making government dependent on elected representatives) (Cottrell-Sundevall and Kristjánsdóttir 2024; von Beyme 2000; Pilon 2013).

What is important to underline at this point is that these procedural concessions about who could participate in elections or how governments would respond to electorates did not represent a wholesale conversion to democratic rule, especially amongst traditional ruling elites. In fact, the political shifts that occurred across western Europe during the interwar period make clear just how opposed anti-democratic forces were

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to this new reality, given how quickly they were able to reverse it in countries like Italy, Germany, and Spain, and seriously limit what it could do elsewhere (Pilon 2018). Thus, the struggle over democracy didn't really end with the achievement of nominally democratic states across the west roughly around World War I; it carried on being contested through the 1920s and 1930s before gaining ground again amid similar wartime pressures in World War II that had granted it standing in the previous world war (Streeck 2015).

Following the flow of these historical events can allow us to gain crucial insight into the workings of state-centered democracy and its important relationship to capitalism. The shifts for and against procedural democracy before and after World War I, and again over a more substantive democracy after World War II, reveal how it is the stark inequalities created by capitalism that continually feed into the political struggles that emerge regularly over time. What we see again and again is that capitalists prefer a liberal or property-centered form of governance and will use their resources to mount campaigns to limit and sometimes topple these limited democracies (Pilon 2018). This is the pattern we saw in the interwar period throughout the west and then beyond the west it in the postwar period (for instance, in Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, and Chile 1973) (Chomksy 1991). And even where these so-called state-centered democracies didn't actually fall, they remained highly restricted in how they responded to genuine democratic aspirations, particularly from the working class. To grasp this effectively requires attention to the materialism of democratic struggle. Politics costs time and money, both of which capitalists have and working people do not. Empirical studies of comparative western elections and political parties underline the decided advantage that parties with capitalist financial support and the support of capitalist-owned private media have versus parties that rely on unions or social movements (Chomsky 1989; Ferguson 1995; Nichols and McChesney 2013; Mutch 2014). On the more democratic side, the material struggle was waged by working-class parties (often with the support of trade unions) that mobilized mass levels of support, both voting and financial, which at various historical junctures were able to wield that to achieve genuine, if partial and temporary, democratic breakthroughs (Eley 2002; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Sassoon 1996). For instance, Wolfgang Streeck argues that the unique configuration of postwar welfare capitalism was not the product of "skillful social engineers or concerned citizens" choosing from a range of options but instead an "historical compromise between a then uniquely powerful working class and an equally uniquely weakened capitalist class that was as never before on the political and economic defensive …" (Streeck 2015: 53).

Democracy then is not a "one and done" kind of thing but must be assessed relationally. What is called state-centered democracy is less a permanent state of being or accomplished, agreed-upon fact than a continually contested space where organized groups bring to bear material resources in civil society by a variety of means to compete for state power and then affect how state power is used (Pilon 2018). Attention to these material roots of struggle over this "actually existing democracy" at the state level is key to understanding why it is so often coercive and subject to "dominance behavior" and a winner-take-all mentality.

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Achieving democratic multiplicity under capitalism

One needn't research very deeply to discover that what passes for democracy across western countries is pretty thin gruel. Taking in dominant media and political discourse—as well as a good many academic contributions—we are supposed to believe that a vote every few years for parties that most voters have little influence over (even when they support them) is enough to qualify our societies as sufficiently democratic (Dahl 2020; for a critical view of this approach, see James 2024). Again, a material focus underlines how weak such assertions are when employment, education, home life, and a variety of civic spaces remain defined by dramatic economic and social inequalities and rarely bother upholding even a pretense of being democratic (Asara 2020). Thus, the calls for greater democratic multiplicity are welcome and, if accomplishable, would undoubtedly enrich our broader society. But the patterns of political developments over the past few decades, despite considerable mobilization along democratic multiplicity lines, appear to be running very much counter to getting there.

Let's be clear, the call for democratic multiplicity is just the latest in a long line of proposals to make the promise of democracy in western societies more substantive. Going back to the immediate postwar period, the key demand emerging out of World War II from working-class parties was that the state should now respond to their social and economic needs. And the combination of wartime mobilization aiding working-class political organization with the historic (and momentary) weakness of a political right tarnished by its pre-war dalliances with fascism meant that postwar states were pushed in a more substantively democratic direction, providing full employment and more robust welfare states to varying degrees (Sassoon 1996). But public involvement in these democratic western states remained distant, limited largely to voting. Calls for a more participatory democracy emerged in the 1960s (Pateman 1970) and were given a new impetus in the 1980s and 1990s as the political right regained momentum and launched a number of anti-democratic initiatives (Cuevas Ingram 2012; Ellis 2009). Since then, we've seen a host of proposals for democratic reform come and go, from the institutional (referenda, voting system reform) to the participatory (participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies) (Della Porta 2013; Santos 2005; Warren and Pearse 2008). Their failure has been rooted in their ideas-based approach, as if the problem is to just find the "right" set of rules or process for decision-making. The real problem is inequality and the potential danger democracy poses, even a very limited form of it, to maintaining and furthering it. The challenge to democracy of any sort has always been from those who do not want any democracy at all, as the pattern of struggle over democracy over the past century makes clear (Pilon 2018).

Here, Boaventura de Sousa Santos has the most clear-eyed analysis of any of the *Democratic Multiplicity* authors about where the blockages to democracy really are. He argues that money has infiltrated "electoral processes and democratic deliberations at an alarming rate" (Santos 2022: 83). Specifically, he points to how changes in campaign finance and social media have unlocked some of the previous limits on wealth to influence what happens in contemporary democracies, aided by a politicization of the courts that has boosted anti-democrats. The US Supreme Court's decision in the Citizens United case in 2010 struck down what few limits existed in that country on

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how the wealthy could influence and control politics, with devastating impact over the past 15 years. While somewhat more limited in other western states, money has come to have greater influence there too, affecting both who runs for office (mostly upper-middle-class people) and who increasingly fails to turn out to vote (mostly working-class people) (Hemingway 2020; Nadeau et al. 2019; Solt 2008; Westheuser and Della Porta 2022). Changes in political communication also reflect the increasing influence of money as the now dominant social media companies design secret algorithms that promote consumption by focusing on conflict without any accountability for the circulation of fake news, something that has disproportionately benefited the political right (Santos 2022: 84–85). He also cautions that hopes that some allegedly impartial mediator like courts can intervene to correct this are misplaced. His narrative about how the American FBI and Department of Justice conspired with the Brazilian judiciary to prevent the Workers Party candidate and former President Lula from running again in 2018 underlines how naïve it is to ignore how the supposed institutional safeguards for liberal democracy can be used against it (Santos 2022: 89), if money and imperial influence can be brought to bear.

Santos underlines the material basis of the struggle over democracy, that money is the crucial component fueling the transmission of ideas and people's perceptions about what ideas are current or dominant, which then in turn affects their willingness to support different ideas. The circulation of ideas in capitalism is not separate from capitalist profit imperatives, as both conventional commercial media and the more recent global social media empires make clear (Ferguson 1995; Schradie 2019). Thus, not identifying capitalism as a major problem for pursuing democratic multiplicity means we are left with no way to understand the constant cycle of economic and social instability or how they linked to our democratic struggles. Such an oversight denies us an ability to effectively parse the social conflicts that are being fomented on a bedrock of financial insecurity, be they class, racial, immigrant, ability, gender, or sexuality focused. Critical scholars from a variety of traditions have demonstrated empirically capitalism's consistent tendency toward inequality and its deleterious impact on the quality of democracy (Piketty 2022; Wood 1995).

Relatedly, suggesting that we can just create islands of democratic multiplicity within the scope of capitalist states gravely misunderstands how capitalism functions as a totalizing system that does not tolerate the existence of logics foreign to its own, that is, cooperation versus competition. As we have seen repeatedly, capitalists have been able to use the state to target such opposition as it emerges when they deem it threatening (Barrow 2016; Riley 2021). Attempts to do an "end run" around the competitive imperatives of the capitalist state are, at best, usually only temporary. Countless examples showcase how the anonymity of social space within capitalism creates both room for experiments and real limits because when such experiments start to succeed, they gain a greater public profile and the predictable capitalist opprobrium. The local planning initiative created by the Greater London Council in the early 1980s is a good example of how success can breed unwanted state and capitalist attention. As this progressive endeavor worked against the grain of the anti-democratic reforms being pursued by Thatcher's Conservative government, her solution was to simply abolish it (Kosecik and Kapucu 2008). On the other hand, we can find examples of democratic innovation surviving in states where the state representative process is one that

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prevents state capture by a narrow capitalist coalition. In Spain, the use of proportional voting at the national and regional level prevents a single party from totally controlling state power, leaving space for publicly popular democratic experiments like the participatory city planning in Barcelona to survive (Evans 2023: 10–12). The point is that struggle and context work together, and efforts to expand democratic multiplicity require attention to both the project of engagement and the thinking animating it, as well as the broader structure of state power and its relations with civil society, with particular attention to how capitalist interests can either coalesce or be contested and potentially divided by the impact of popular mobilization.

Conclusion

Radical democracy theorists like Jim Tully et al. have shaken us out of our state-centered institutional formalism, reminding us that democracy is a plastic, bendable, relational concept. How we think about democracy matters. But acting on those thoughts takes us into the material realm where just thinking differently will not be enough to challenge the undemocratic forces actively working to limit efforts at creating a democratic multiplicity. Capitalism crucially shapes the political terrain upon which we struggle for democracy. Unlike feudal governance, where economic and political power was publicly fused and wielded by the king or his representatives, capitalism appears to sever this connection and effectively privatize control over the economy by granting capitalists near exclusive control over their property and decisions about how to use it. Of course, the link between politics and the economy remains at the level of the state, which acts as guarantor of capitalist power over economic matters (and any politics intended to interfere with it), a fact obscured by the ferocious competition and rivalry amongst capitalists that capitalism tends to produce. Meanwhile, capitalism also inadvertently produces spaces and actors that can try to take advantage of these divisions amongst capitalists to push for political openings and genuine democratic governance. But there is nothing automatic or deterministic about such developments. What we call representative or state-centered democracy has been a contingent historical accomplishment, typically enacted amidst great social upheaval and elite uncertainty, and it is one that has remained consistently contested by those preferring a more liberal, property-centric form of rule. Democracy's opponents tend to have more money, a greater ability to mobilize their resources, and control most aspects of the modern economy and communications systems. This is what a campaign for democratic multiplicity is up against, and appreciating the magnitude of the challenge is essential to making it more than just talk.

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Dennis Pilon is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics at York University. His research focuses on Canadian and comparative politics, political institutions, democratic struggle, and the role of class in all of the above.

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