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Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci

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Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny's valuable 'Engaging Gramsci: International Theory and the New Gramscians'[1] alerts Anglophone IR scholars to broader debates about Gramsci's theories that are rarely highlighted by scholars in the (somewhat misnamed) 'Italian School'. Just as Germain and Kenny have offered one way to contextualize Gramsci's contributions within the intellectual and social world that was the immediate object of his analysis, it is equally important to put the work of Anglophone 'Gramscian' scholars in its own immediate context in order to clarify why the 'Gramsci' that so many of us have found helpful was the historicist and 'idealist' who, as Germain and Kenny's article suggests, is only one of the *many* Gramscis that can be identified through historically grounded close readings of the Sardinian's words and deeds.

The Gramsci that is relevant to contemporary problems of international relations probably is not, as Germain and Kenny put it, 'above all a theorist who grappled with the discourses and realities of "statism" in the early twentieth century'.[2] He is, instead, the man of thought and action who grappled with the history of Italy's late development as unified state, a man searching for lessons relevant to the Communist Party, an egalitarian social movement bent on the further transformation of that still weakly united social order, one that remained riven by a fundamental geoeconomic division between an industrialized north and an exploited, peasant south, a social order already, in Gramsci's day, faced with the economic and political pressures that would push its absorption into an even larger capitalist political and economic order. I believe that the concept of 'civil society' developed by *this* Gramsci—his views on the emergence of integrated states in which force is shielded by consent and his understanding of struggle as the nexus of social transformation—*is* still relevant to the questions raised by students of international relations. Where this Gramsci's insights are anachronistic it may be worthwhile to identify any changes in the world that have made them so, but as students of international relations we should keep our focus more on understanding *international relations* than on understanding Gramsci.

How Gramsci came to Anglophone IR

Richard Falk argues that Robert W. Cox developed his 'Gramscian' understanding of

[1] *Review of International Studies*, 24:1 (1998), pp. 3–21.
[2] Ibid., p. 4.

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the international system in part as a sympathetic critique of world-systems theory. While, 'Wallerstein's work was critical, historical, holistic, and centered on issues of political economy,' Cox wanted to move beyond its 'static sense of history' and 'disappointing conception of change and discontinuity'.[3] This statement is broadly true of most IR scholars who began to work with Gramsci's ideas something over a decade ago. It is as a consequence of the 'structuralist' failings of world-systems theory that IR Gramscians were initially attracted to interpretations that stressed the historicist and agency-oriented aspects of Gramsci's political sociology.

Wallerstein's work was not the only manifestation of a structuralist global political economy to which scholars responded. I received my graduate education in the empiricist, peace-studies oriented programme at the University of North Carolina where the relevant structuralist exemplars included the early studies by Wallerstein's more 'behaviourist' colleague, Christopher Chase-Dunn,[4] and Nazli Choucri and Robert North's pathbreaking investigation of the political economy of global conflict.[5] My frequent co-author, the late Italian foreign service officer, Enrico Augelli, was an economist whose work took him into the field throughout Africa. For Augelli, what Falk calls 'the other' was the whole range of structuralist development economists[6] who influenced both world-systems theorists and the more progressive of the bilateral aid policies of the 1970s and 1980s.

My turn toward Gramsci began when Edward Azar's Carolina-based research programme uncovered some disturbingly unexpected patterns in the way experts and laymen understood processes of international cooperation. The patterns seemed to be explicable only if one allowed a wide scope for human agency and if one was willing to fuse historical narrative with general models involving structural causation.[7] These conclusions were reinforced by a similar set of somewhat easier-to-summarize paradigm-challenging results of simultaneous research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where Hayward Alker and Roger Hurwitz explored one of the favourite models of peace researchers with an interest in distributive justice. In the 'iterated asymmetrical prisoners' dilemma' the seemingly best outcome that parties can achieve nonetheless maintains a 'distributive imbalance', or economic injustice: the richer party remains richer and the poorer poorer even if parties follow the 'tit-for-tat' strategies that a whole host of social scientists have argued provide the most likely path to a 'peaceful' outcome.

Alker and Hurwitz discovered experimental situations in which parties did not follow tit-for-tat strategies and yet reached equally stable and much more egalitarian

[3] Richard Falk, 'The Critical Realist Tradition and the Demystification of Interstate Power: E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull, and Robert W. Cox', in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 45.

[4] Christopher Chase-Dunn, 'The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: A Cross-national Study', *American Sociological Review*, 40:4 (1975), pp. 720–38; and 'Core–Periphery Relations: The Effects of Core Competition', in Barbara H. Kaplan (ed.), *Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy* (Beverly Hills, CA, 1978), pp. 154–76.

[5] Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, *Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence* (San Francisco, 1975).

[6] The structuralists are well summarized in J. G. Palma, 'Structuralism', in John Eastwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (eds.), *The New Palgrave: Economic Development* (New York, 1989), pp. 316–22.

[7] See Edward E. Azar and Thomas N. Havener, 'Discontinuities in the Symbolic Environment: A Problem in Scaling Events', *International Interactions*, 2:2 (1976), pp. 231–46.

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outcomes. This finding suggested a need for greater attention to human agency outside of the structural constraints that the game had been assumed to create. Moreover, the only way to explain those results (without resorting to the assumption that the parties involved were irrational) was to refer to the narratives that the parties told to themselves as they planned their moves; the only workable explanatory method was historical. Finally, Alker and Hurwitz discovered that, to a significant degree, the multiple paths to 'egalitarian and peaceful' outcomes were unique; they did not fit easily identifiable general patterns, in contrast to the paths to conflictual outcomes.[8] These were also the key findings that Azar's group had reached.

These findings left the different members of the Carolina team searching for historicist and agent-centred conceptual frameworks. Two Carolina graduates from a slightly earlier era, when the epistemological foundations of the research programme had appeared a bit more stable, Herbert G. Reid and Ernest Yanarella, had reflected on the more troubling, relatively ineffective praxis of the peace research community and suggested that a Hegelian reading of Gramsci could form what they called an 'intelligible core' for a 'critical theory of peace research in the United States'.[9] To some of us their argument seemed to be reinforced by the intellectual trajectory of Partha Chatterjee's exemplary work. Chatterjee closed his Althusser-inspired *Arms, Alliances, and Stability* with a nod to a structuralist Gramsci, but then became more and more attracted to a historicist and 'idealist' interpretation as it became clear how futile was Chatterjee's original hope to develop a comprehensive model of *change* in international relations on the basis of static, rational-choice models of historically distinct systems.[10] Finally, Cox's persuasive example and my earliest conversations with Augelli convinced me to follow the path first illuminated by Yanarella, Reid, and Chatterjee.

Augelli's work on combating the effects of the Sahelian drought of the early 1980s had led him to criticize the structuralist development theories that failed to anticipate *either* the unusual creativity, independence, and success of *some* deeply aid-dependent communities *or* the persistent and seemingly irrational role of free-market and engineering ideologies in shaping the responses of many donors. To answer the critical questions that those anomalies raised, Augelli turned to a version of Gramsci's social theory that shaped the historical analysis of two Italian colleagues interested in the development of twentieth-century European and Atlantic political and economic integration, Daniela Rossini and Gian Giacomo Migone.[11] (The latter is an American studies professor at the University of Turin,

[8] See Hayward R. Alker, Jr, 'Beneath Tit-for-Tat: The Conflict of Political Economy Fairy Tales within SPD Protocols', in *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 303–31.

[9] Herbert G. Reid and Ernest Yanarella, 'Toward a Critical Theory of Peace Research in the United States: The Search for an "Intelligible Core"', *Journal of Peace Research*, 13:4 (1975), pp. 315–41.

[10] Contrast Partha Chatterjee, *Arms, Alliances, and Stability: The Development of the Structure of International Politics* (New York, 1975) with *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, 1986).

[11] See, e.g., Daniela Rossini, *La rivoluzione informatica: elementi per un nuovo progetto sociale europeo* (Milan, 1987); Daniela Rossini (ed.), *From Theodore Roosevelt to FDR: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy* (Keele, 1995); and Gian Giacomo Migone, *Gli Stati Uniti e il fascismo: alle origini dell'egemonia americana in Italia* (Milan, 1980).

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member of the scientific committee of the Gramsci Institute, a Senator from the Democratic Party of the Left, and chair of the Senate committee concerned with foreign relations.) Their version of Gramsci was that of Migone's Turin colleague, Norberto Bobbio, who, as Germain and Kenny put it, seems to argue 'that Gramsci completed the inversion of the Marxist understanding of the base–superstructure metaphor, prioritizing civil society as the realm in which identities were shaped and the dominance of social elites secured under capitalism'.[12]

Augelli's and my experience are typical of those of others Germain and Kenny consider: we were attracted to a particular interpretation of Gramsci's work due to specific intellectual/empirical problems with less historicist and less agency-centred critical theories of the global political economy. Two points need to be emphasized: (1) We were not working out problems in Marxist or neo-Marxist theory; we were working out intellectual and practical problems of international relations. To the extent to which Gramsci's theory helped us understand IR, we saw it as worth pursuing; to the extent to which Gramsci's theory was not particularly helpful, we were quite willing to part company with Gramsci. (2) The interpretation of Gramsci's work that first attracted us was determined by the methodological conundrum that bothered us; other interpretations of Gramsci would not have been as helpful; moreover, other theories might have been just as helpful with the original problems. Consider how faced with similar intellectual problems some of Augelli's colleagues moved toward the 'compensatory liberal' development paradigm that is often associated with the UN Development Programme,[13] or how Alker was further spurred toward his major original contributions to methodology,[14] or Azar toward theories rooted in social psychology and cultural anthropology[15] and Azar's various graduate students toward a feminist phenomenological anthropology, Foucault, Giddens, and the Frankfurt school.[16]

Finally, a third, perhaps less central, point: (3) As our research has progressed, some of us have been drawn to other, perhaps more 'Marxist' versions of Gramsci, often spurred on by the critical work of other IR Gramscians. It is a testament to the richness of Gramsci's thought that what began for many of us as an attempt to use a very small part of his conceptual framework to amend theories already prevalent within Anglophone IR has evolved into a number of distinct theories of international relations each of which share a great deal with Gramsci's overall perspective. One reason that Gramsci's thought has proven to be so rich is that Gramsci, as an Italian faced with the problem of the emancipatory transformation of his own society during the Second Industrial Revolution, developed concepts that 'fit' with some of the characteristics of the current age at a more 'global' level.

[12] Germain and Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci', p. 9.
[13] See, e.g., Enzo Caputo and Roberta Rabelloti, 'The Instructive Parenthesis of Structural Adjustment and the Relaunch of Research *cum* Action on Strategies and Development Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa', in Enzo Caputo (ed.), *Which Cooperation with Africa? (*Rome, 1989), pp. 35–77.
[14] The central focus of Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*.
[15] See, e.g., Edward E. Azar and Steve Cohen, 'Peace as Crisis, War as Status Quo', *International Interactions*, 6:2 (1980), pp. 159–84.
[16] See, e.g., Belgin Tekçe, Linda Oldham, and Frederic Shorter, *A Place to Live: Families and Child Health in a Cairo Neighborhood* (Cairo, 1994).

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Why Gramsci's ideas about civil society are relevant to the current era

Germain and Kenny explicitly contest some of the ways in which IR Gramscians have attempted to find analogies between Gramsci's world and our own. Specifically they argue that 'while Gramsci could possibly conceive of a state shorn of civil society . . . he could not entertain the reverse', although that appears to be exactly what many IR Gramscians are doing.[17] This is, I believe, a slight misunderstanding both of Gramsci and of the scholars whom Germain and Kenny criticize. In analysing Italian unification, Gramsci considered a situation in which elements of a national civil society *preceded* formation of a national state proper at the same level. In examining today's emergent world order(s), IR Gramscians look at political/cultural spaces in which both coercive and consensus-forming elements of an *emergent* state are ill-formed, and may never form, but in which both 'international civil society' and any emergent 'international state proper' (e.g., the coercive elements of the American informal empire) exist in an identifiable, real relationship with each other.

A central project in Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* is the attempt to understand Italy's late development as a nation-state. He is concerned with why Machiavelli's vision failed, with the role of Italian intellectuals in the formation of a national will, and with the specific economic, class/organizational, and political/military transformations that finally united the state and which also constrained Italy's further development in the first era of mass production. In gathering notes and in beginning to analyse this history, Gramsci found himself writing about identity movements, about voluntary associations, and emergent 'parties' that often had, he noted, an 'international' character even though the only-now-visible end toward which they organized was the Italian state.[18] The 'civil society' about which Gramsci wrote (in this instance) was the voluntary realm between the economy and the state proper as conceptualized by Hegel or Tocqueville.[19] In Italy, 'There existed a clear disjunction between the *state* (legality) and *civil society* (reality) [sic] . . . This same *civil society* was something shapeless and chaotic and remained so for many decades; it was therefore possible for the *state* to dominate it, overcoming each time the contradictions that presented themselves in a sporadic, localized form, without any national nexus.'[20]

By Gramsci's day, the national space had been consolidated under a coercive state proper and, as Germain and Kenny emphasize, the institutions of civil society had become, in Reid and Yanarella's words, 'the less visible sources of elite power and

[17] Germain and Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci', p. 15.
[18] See, e.g., Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg, tr. Joseph A. Buttigieg and Antonio Callaria (New York, 1992–), notebook 1, notes 19, 44, 45, 130, 138.
[19] See ibid., note 47. Sue Golding, *Gramsci's Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-liberal Democracy* (Toronto, 1992), pp. 84–131. Gramsci was, of course, critical of the idea advanced by Tocqueville that the spontaneous free associations of the 'middle classes' either assured social progress or were a model for the political strategy of more progressive social forces. See Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci's Thought and the Question of Civil Society in the Late Twentieth Century', paper presented at the Conference on Gramsci, Modernity, and the Twentieth Century, Cagliari, April 1997.
[20] Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, notebook 1, note 130.

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mass quiescence'.[21] Gramsci certainly saw civil society as a site of the consolidation of power in twentieth-century states even as he continued to view civil society as the space in which the collective being of a people arose. Gramsci certainly worked to awaken the dormant democratic potential, the 'national will', of the Italian people-nation. But he was also too careful and honest an observer of events in his own country *not* to notice that some of the real events that had begun to awaken the democratic will of the 'Italian people' contradicted the easy assumption that the early-twentieth-century nation-state would remain the ultimate unit of progressive politics. Consider, for example, the peculiar phenomenon of Woodrow Wilson's reception in Italy on his way to Versailles. As Daniela Rossini's current research emphasizes, Wilson's visit served as the catalyst for awakening the popular masses in central and southern Italy to the possibility of democratic self-governance, and Wilson's catalytic role was prepared for and followed up by the activities of the international voluntary associations, notably the YMCA, which already appeared to Gramsci as part of an American, Atlantic-bridging hegemonic project.[22]

Gramsci hypothesized that forces at the base of capitalist economies might be working to aid that American hegemonic project, perhaps even to make it inevitable. Although Gramsci was self-critical of his limited understanding of technological forces operating at the level of the means of production, he regularly monitored works dealing with the forces moving capitalist economies toward larger, more inclusive units. He noted the ways in which demands of an increasing scale and scope of production, which seemed to be correlated with new waves of what we would now call 'lead industries', prepared the way for the nineteenth-century German and Italian customs unions, which, in turn, formed the economic spaces of the late-emerging nation-states. Gramsci hypothesized that Briand's idea of a Pan-Europe (or Wilsonian Atlanticism) could emerge through an intermediate stage that we now might recognize as 'imbedded liberalism'.

> The world market . . . would come to be made up of a series of markets—no longer national but international (inter-state)—which have organized within their borders a certain stability of economic activities, and which enter into relations on the basis of the same system. This system would be more mindful of politics than of economics, in the sense that within the economic field it would attach greater importance to finished goods industries.[23]

[21] Reid and Yanarella, 'Toward a Critical Theory', p. 325. Interestingly, contrary to Germain and Kenny's expectation that the immediate Fascist context of Gramsci's conceptual innovation would make IR Gramscians somewhat blind to the specific legal/liberal-democratic ways in which supremacy is secured within civil society, this seminal Gramscian contribution to IR continues, 'These reside not only in the force and agencies of violence of the "topdogs", but also in the element of subservience or consent stemming from the hegemonic influence of Lockean-liberalism vis-a-vis society's "underdogs" '. Although there is no doubt a great deal of parochialism to the American 'critical legal studies' movement, it has provided an ongoing, critical updating of Gramsci's understanding of the sources of consent as developed through the institutions of law in pluralistic societies. This work often serves as an unacknowledged background to some arguments made by American IR Gramscians. Susan Silbey ' "Let Them Eat Cake": Globalization, Postmodern Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice', *Law and Society Review*, 31:2 (1997), pp. 207–35, shows how *directly* relevant the most recent developments in this tradition have become to the questions raised by Germain and Kenny.

[22] Daniela Rossini, personal communication. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, notebook 1, note 61.

[23] Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, notebook Miscellaneous 1, note 125. See also notebook Miscellaneous 1, note 12 on the implications of issues of scale and scope in the shipping industry.

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Not surprisingly, given these hypotheses, Gramsci also collected information on developments in regions like Scandinavia and the Baltic states where international economic integration was essential if competitive industrial economies were to be maintained,[24] on the expansion of the American empire (informal as well as formal),[25] and on the international public and private organizations that might be the shapeless and chaotic civil society of a larger, economically concrete, social order, and that certainly promoted such an order—the League of Nations' economic agencies, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Council of Churches, the ILO, and various international fraternal orders.[26]

It is in this form that most IR Gramscians write of an 'international' civil society. I believe we tend to have clearer (although varied) understandings than Gramsci did of the forces of 'globalization' that push the core processes of capitalist economies beyond the boundaries of the political communities and of the 'people nations' that exist at any one time.[27] The existence of those 'globalizing' economic forces, and the existence of a realm of civil society that can be considered 'international', does not necessarily mean that the primary site of progressive political action has somehow now become 'global'.[28] When we refer to the 'internationalization of the state', we usually refer to the slightly different issue of current national governments creating institutional imperatives that force national societies to respond to the logic of capitalism operating at a more global level. We have somewhat different, but generally overlapping, views about the real-world, concrete, less-than-global but larger-than-nation-state economic/political orders that combine institutions of force and consent. For example, Gill and van der Pijl both tend to focus on an Atlantic or a Trilateral world that existed in the 1980s. Augelli and I tended to describe a world in the 1980s divided among four large social systems, a 'Free World' or informal American empire of the OECD and its true economic and political dependencies, the Soviet system, the Chinese system, and a system consisting of India and its dependencies. All of us tend to agree that the current moment of world economy is one in which economic and governing elites in the world outside the Atlantic or 'Free World' are struggling over whether their societies should attempt to enter that core of 'American', 'Atlantic', or 'Trilateral' supremacy.[29] None of these conceptions are quite the same as the potentially boundary-less view of international or global civil society shared by those scholars who look at transnational voluntary associations divorced both from concrete geoeconomic changes and from political

[24] Ibid., note 40.
[25] Ibid., notes 16, 120.
[26] Ibid., notes 37, 46, 135; notebook 3, notes 26, 27; notebook 5, notes 2, 17, 61.
[27] Consider Robert W. Cox, 'Global *Perestroika*', in Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 296–331, and Craig N. Murphy, 'Globalisation in Comparative Historical Perspective', in Roland Axtmann (ed.), *Globalisation in Europe* (London, 1997).
[28] Cox's careful region-by-region analysis of the progressive and non-progressive aspects of various institutions of civil society in different parts of the world is a model of the sort of work that is needed to determine which sites hold the most promise and why. See Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci's Thought and the Question of Civil Society in the Late Twentieth Century', in Cox, *Approaches*.
[29] Stephen Gill, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Liberalism', *Millennium*, 24:4 (1995), pp. 399–423. Kees van der Pijl, 'Transnational Class Formation', in Gill and Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation*, pp. 118–33. Craig N. Murphy, 'Freezing the North–South Bloc(k) After the East–West Thaw', *Socialist Review*, 90:1 (1990), pp. 25–46. Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, 'La nuova teoria della pace delle Nazioni unite', in Gian Giacomo Migone and Olga Re (eds.), *A cinquant'anni dalla nascita delle Nazioni unite*, a special issue of *Europa/Europe*, 4:4 (1995), pp. 97–121.

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programmes aimed at the consolidation of the power of particular classes or 'ethnoclasses'.[30]

The larger challenge that Germain and Kenny offer

Germain and Kenny question whether the nation-state focus of so much of Gramsci's work allows his analytical tools to be useful in a world in which power is being consolidated at levels above the nation-state. Due to the history of the particular nation that most concerned the Italian Marxist I am less worried about that potential problem. Germain and Kenny suggest that it may be necessary to go beyond Gramsci and to go outside Marxist political economy in order to account for contemporary developments in IR. I agree. The short history of Anglophone 'Gramscian' IR scholarship suggests that there is little reason to fear that scholars employing his ideas will contort themselves into Marxist boxes as they try to answer new questions about international affairs. Shortly before Augelli's death in 1996 he joked that while he was pleased that our collaboration had helped introduce Gramsci to scholars in ISA and BISA, he was just as happy that we had helped reinforce the importance of the work of scholars like Ernst Haas to the analysts associated with Rome's Gramsci Institute, the think-tank founded by the Communist Party.[31] His point, of course, was that not only had US social science long been irrationally blinkered by the Cold War, but the same was to some extent true of the social science of the European left. More broadly, and more significantly, the recent collection edited by Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman in which many of the IR Gramscians are represented clearly demonstrates a willingness to try to create coherent syntheses of Gramsci's insights with those of an extremely wide range of scholars spanning six centuries and more than a dozen research programmes. Eclecticism rather than orthodoxy is probably the abiding sin of the scholars who are the subject of Germain and Kenny's friendly critique.

Where they are right on target is, unfortunately, where they make their most fundamental point by questioning whether Gramsci's historicism really allows us to overcome the subject–object dualism that 'so bedevils modern social science'. The methodological/epistemological issue can be located slightly differently by arguing (as both Sue Golding and Reid and Yanarella do) that Gramsci preserves an open-ended, fully participatory democratic space (as both the only ultimate base of knowledge and the ethical end of political action) only by 'accepting as teleological an abstract analytical category',[32] social class. To be more precise, Gramsci is apt to reify 'the working class' and the structure of capitalist society that gives the working class its inherent interest in and aspiration to establish that democratic space. Yanarella and Reid describe one of the (many) potential dilemmas thus created:

[30] J. M. Blaut's useful concept introduced in *The Colonizer's Model of the World* (New York, 1993), p. 33, to foreground the racial aspect of dominant communities in the modern world economy. Cf. Randall Persaud, 'Frantz Fanon, Race, and World Order', in Gill and Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation*, pp. 170–84.

[31] What evidence there is for this assertion would include articles throughout Migone and Re (eds.), *A cinquant'anni.*

[32] Golding, *Gramsci's Democratic Theory*, p. 132.

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Gramsci accepts 'as the cost of liberation in women (and men) the institutionalization of more intensified forms of discipline over the human body and sexual desire as the latest phase in the industrialization process'.[33] Must we follow Gramsci to the extent of conceiving of gender equality (or any other form of equality) as dependent on a single path of development of economic relations? Yanarella would say we need not do so, because there are alternative conceptions that save much of what is valuable in Gramsci's analysis:

> Laclau and Mouffe have largely succeeded in thematizing a hegemonic politics informed by the radical unfixity and constant deferral of every social identity and the excess of every symbolic articulation. While some may surely shrink from the world of politics implicit in their work and demand safe havens from the implications of this outlook for identity and political action, others will recognize this world as *their* world—the world within which the risks and hazards of political action must be chanced if its benefits and rewards must be tasted.[34]

Others may simply be willing to accept that, when looked at closely, the metaphysical foundations of any theory are bound to contain lacunae, contradictions, or both. Perhaps we need to accept on faith that it is better to work with some knowledge of those contradictions and gaps than it is to remain blind to them. Given the predilection toward eclectic combinations of theory that most IR Gramscians share, the potential for contradictions may be even greater, which is one reason why critical analyses like Germain and Kenny's are so important.

[33] Ernest J. Yanarella and Herbert G. Reid, 'From "Trained Gorilla" to "Humanware": Repoliticizing the Body–Machine Complex between Fordism and Post-Fordism', in Theodore Schatzki and Wolfgang Natter (eds.) *The Social and Political Body* (New York, 1996), p. 209.

[34] Ernest J. Yanarella, 'Wither Hegemony?: Between Gramsci and Derrida', in John Paul Jones, III, Wolfgang Natter, and Theodore R. Schatzki (eds.), *Postmodern Contentions: Epochs, Politics, Space* (New York, 1993), p. 94.

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