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# Non-human animals and process theodicy

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**Abstract:** **I argue that that the suffering of non-human animals poses some potentially knotty difficulties for process theodicy. To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism or make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims. I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.**

Process philosophers and theologians have advanced a response to the problem of evil that is arguably less open to challenge on its own terms than any available alternative. And a number of process theists have been especially vocal philosophical and theological defenders of the interests of non-human animals.[1] I argue here that that the harms undergone by non-human animals deserve greater attention than they have heretofore received from process philosophers and theologians concerned with the problem of evil, and that the suffering of non-human animals poses some knotty difficulties for process theodicy.[2] To respond satisfactorily to the problem of evil as it involves animals, process theists will, I argue, need either to defend some form of consequentialism – which process philosophers themselves have criticized and which is, in any case, subject to serious objections – or to make a number of potentially plausible but certainly contestable empirical claims.

I begin this internal critique by explaining the nature of the process response to the problem of evil. I proceed to explain how process thought can respond with reasonable effectiveness to the general problem of the suffering of



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non-human animals while highlighting the special difficulty predation might be thought to pose for the process thinker. Then, I elaborate alternative consequentialist and non-consequentialist process accounts of divine goodness in the face of the harm to non-human animals caused by predation. After summarizing my analyses in the conclusion, I underscore the costs associated with these alternatives.

## The nature of process theodicy

Process thought attempts to resolve the traditional problem of evil by affirming that God is omni-benevolent and perfect in power, but that divine power is persuasive rather than coercive. In this section, I provide an overview of process theism's response to the problem of evil as a backdrop to its treatment of animal suffering in particular.

Process philosophy and theology, rooted in the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, respond to the problem of evil by rejecting the traditional understanding of divine omnipotence while holding fast to the conviction that God is unalloyed love.[3] For process theists, God does not prevent all of the world's evils because God can act only by persuasion. Creatures – not only conscious, rational creatures, but all other creatures as well, including sub-atomic particles – can say *no* to God. This is not because God respects creaturely freedom too much to override or eliminate it, but because the only kind of power God *has* is persuasive power. God has the most power it is possible for any agent to have in a cosmos like ours, one full of complex creatures with diverse opportunities for free action. God is supremely, perfectly powerful. But God does not have all the power there is.

Process philosophy maintains that God has always been creating: God has always been persuading finite reality into new patterns. But God has never created *ex nihilo*. At least as long ago as Aquinas, Christian thinkers had acknowledged that the absolute dependence of the world on God's creative power – the *ontological* conception implied in talk of creation out of nothing – did not require that the universe have a beginning in time. It might be the case that there was never a time when created reality was not, simply because God had always been creating it. Process thought has wanted to say more than this, though. It has wanted to say not only that there have always been finite actualities, but also that some world of finite actualities – though not any particular such world – exists necessarily. God can lure these finite actualities from chaos to complexity; without God's persuasive action, they would never assume even the form of subatomic particles. So God's creative activity is essential to the existence of any sort of organized reality. Nonetheless, God does not bring finite being into existence in the first place.

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There are at least five ways in which process thought's understanding of the ultimate constituents of reality differs from the account offered by contemporary popular forms of materialism:

(1) The fundamental constituents of reality are *events*.
(2) Each of these events has an inside. It has experience of a sort. It is a *subject*, and not only an *object*.
(3) Each is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable.[4]
(4) Each is *dynamic* rather than *static*. Time is an essential feature of reality: it goes all the way down.
(5) Each has some limited capacity for spontaneity, for response. Its antecedents do not unilaterally determine its behaviour. It is *agent* as well as *patient*.

The inherent spontaneity of basic events (sometimes called 'actual occasions') is not necessarily a matter of conscious choice. While all constituents of reality have some degree of *experience* and *spontaneity*, only relatively complex realities have meaningful degrees of *consciousness* and *freedom*. When Whiteheadians speak, for instance, of the 'mental pole' of an electron, they're talking about its capacity to respond to earlier events and affect subsequent ones, not about an aspect of its capacity for conscious deliberation.

While process thinkers typically regard themselves as advancing a plausible positive case for the compatibility of divine goodness and the fact of suffering and evil, they do not necessarily thereby commit themselves to the view that the question of theodicy is an empirical one. Nonetheless, theodicy is important for Whiteheadians as a way of understanding the *character* of divine goodness. Not surprisingly, then, process theists have sought to offer a positive account of God's relationship with evil. The capacity of all occasions to take account in non-deterministic ways of the influences that affect them is obviously crucial to process philosophy's resolution of the problem of evil. After all, if God could create *ex nihilo*, we would need to explain God's failure to create new realities out of nothing to prevent various evils from happening. But if God's only choice is to persuade the actualities there are – almost infinitesimally brief and minuscule events – to take on particular forms and adopt particular courses of action, then it is clear that, while God might seek to guide the forest fire away from the fawn, the events making up the fire might or might not respond – or be able to respond – positively to God's promptings.

On a standard process view, a primordial chaos was the only non-divine reality in existence at the beginning of our cosmic epoch. Process philosophers are perfectly aware that God didn't need to persuade this chaos to take any particular form. God didn't need to bring about the existence of increasingly complex creatures – creatures capable of experiencing and causing significant harms.

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They argue, however, that only creatures capable of experiencing and causing significant harms can cause and experience significant goods, both intrinsic and extrinsic. Because of the goods we experience and cause, our having been brought into existence comes with the capacity to experience and cause a variety of harms. Our capacity to experience and cause these harms is correlative with our capacity to experience and cause goods we rightly value. God could not have made creatures able to experience and cause an array of goods as rich as those we can experience and cause while unable to cause or experience comparable harms.

According to a minority of process thinkers, our positive verdict on the worth of our lives can be made even more positive if we grant the possibility of life after bodily death, and thus the capacity of God's creatures to grow morally and spiritually, move beyond potentially destructive losses, and experience greater intimacy with God.[5] Because creatures can live beyond bodily death, these process thinkers argue, suffering and destruction need not have the last word. And God's decision to lure into existence creatures capable of life beyond death is justified in part because of God's awareness that they can be healed and transformed despite the stresses they have undergone.

In addition, the process thinker will emphasize that God's moral credibility is enhanced because God suffers with all creatures. God knows their suffering from the inside. Thus, whenever God brings about a risk for a creature, this is also a risk for God. Any creature's suffering will also be God's own suffering. The point here is not that suffering that would not otherwise be acceptable becomes acceptable because God experiences it too. Rather, for the person who already believes in God, the fact of divine suffering provides evidence that no suffering that does occur as a by-product or consequence of divine providential action has been brought about without good reason, and that the risk that such suffering would probably occur was worth taking. The fact of divine suffering also offers the assurance of the support and comfort of an empathic divine presence.

Process theism's response to the problem of evil stresses the persuasive character of divine power and highlights the values God seeks to realize in creation. It does not depend, in general, on specific empirical data. Rather, it points to highly general features of reality and makes clear why, in light of these features, the traditional problem of evil need not be a problem. Process theists do not deny the sheer awfulness of much of reality, but they suggest that this awfulness need not call God's perfect goodness or perfect power into question. Because God cannot coerce, divine power cannot unilaterally prevent creatures from suffering or causing harms. And because of the nature of divine power, God cannot bring about valuable states of affairs without risk: creatures capable of realizing great value are creatures that can cause and suffer great harm. God suffers with suffering creatures, and creatures that suffer and

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experience bodily death are quite possibly capable of life beyond death, so that their suffering and death cannot finally destroy or vanquish them.

## Process theodicy and animal suffering

Process theism responds to the suffering of non-human animals in much the same way as it responds to the suffering of human animals. The process response to most instances of animal suffering is as clear and, if one accepts the process theist's premises, as satisfactory as the process response to human suffering. But process treatments of the problem of predation raise troubling questions.

### *Process theism's general response to the problem of animal suffering*

How does process theodicy address the problem of animal suffering? We can begin by reflecting on the way in which a process thinker might regard God's role in a violent human–human encounter. Suppose that Sid initiates an attack on Roger. What is the goal of God's persuasive power? Presumably God is seeking to persuade Sid to end her attack and to persuade Roger successfully to resist or flee. To make complete sense of the fight between Sid and Roger, we would need to tell a comprehensive story that made sense of Sid's motives and Roger's and made clear in what sense God might empathize with Sid. In the final analysis, though, the process theist will want to say that God's will is not done if Roger is unable to flee or resist, or if Sid continues her attack unabated. The attack will pose no serious 'problem of evil' for the process theist, since it will be clear that creatures often don't do God's will, and that this may well be simply another occasion when God's purposes for the world are thwarted by creaturely sin.

The process thinker may wish to offer a similar analysis should Sid attack a non-human animal – say, a deer, Bambi, who poses no threat to her or any other creature. God's persuasive power will be used to lure Sid to end her attack and to prompt Bambi to escape. Again, God may empathize in some way with Sid (perhaps with her desire to demonstrate her hunting prowess or with the pleasure she takes in well-cooked venison). But the bottom line, it seems to me, is that God will oppose the behaviour of the hunter and seek to facilitate the flight of the victim. If the process theist concludes that God disapproves of Sid's attack on Bambi, she will presumably judge that this, too, is an instance of the thwarting of God's will by creaturely choice. While the process thinker will find the attack troubling, she will not suppose that it creates any special 'problem of evil'.

This presupposes, of course, that the process thinker regards the killing of non-human by human animals as, under ordinary circumstances, wrong. It is obviously open, in principle, to a process thinker to maintain that there is,

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in fact, nothing wrong with Sid's action. Perhaps non-human animals lack any moral standing, though it is hard to see on what basis a Whiteheadian, convinced of the continuity between human and non-human creatures, could argue for this view. Or perhaps their moral considerability is such that there are many routine uses to which Sid would be free to put them. In either of these cases, of course, the animal suffering caused by human beings will be of no particular concern to the process theist.

Suppose Bambi is trapped in a forest fire.[6] Here, again, the process theist need experience no particular concern. If the fire as a whole, or as it affects Bambi, is an unequivocally bad thing, its continuation and its destruction of Bambi is a reflection of the less-than-surprising unresponsiveness of the events making up the fire to God's persuasive influence. Again, alternatively, if the process thinker regards Bambi's death in the fire as, all things considered, a good thing, she won't be troubled in any case, though it seems unlikely that she would do so. (Perhaps she might think of the fire as a means of natural population control.) In any case, if she does not, as she likely will not, regard the fire's effect on Bambi as God's will, she will have no difficulty in offering an account of the events surrounding Bambi's death that makes it clear that God's intention has, unavoidably, not been realized.

If she sides with the minority of process thinkers who affirm the possibility of life after death – and with the even smaller number of those who have regarded it as possible for non-humans – she will also be able to maintain that Bambi may be able to experience life after death. This does not, obviously, provide an exhaustive response to the problem of Bambi's suffering. It could serve to *justify* only those *instances of suffering* without which it would not have occurred, and, on the process view, no instance of suffering on Bambi's part is necessary to Bambi's capacity to live beyond death. However, the process thinker could plausibly argue that because creatures like Bambi are capable of life beyond death, it was less risky, and so more reasonable, for God to bring such creatures into being in the first place. Further, the process thinker will emphasize that God experiences all of Bambi's suffering with her, and so takes no risk for Bambi that God's own self will not bear as well.

### *Process theodicy and predation*

The harms suffered by non-human animals do not, in general, pose a serious problem for process theodicy. The one exception to this generalization is the set of harms caused by other non-human animals. The greatest challenge facing a process theodicy may well be the challenge of accounting for predation.

On one level, of course, predation need pose no more serious problem for the process theist than any other putative evil. Much happens in the world that is not God's will – why should we not simply regard predation as one of

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those phenomena contrary to God's will, as something that occurs despite divine counter-persuasion?

This is a perfectly acceptable argumentative strategy as far as it goes. But it is difficult to square with other things process theists often want to say. Process thinkers have often regarded the evolutionary process as directional, as leading toward greater complexity and greater richness of experience.[7] Evolution has been seen as worthwhile, despite the suffering and death it has involved, because it has led to the creation of creatures like us. And predation has been seen as an integral part of that evolutionary process, as a factor prompting the emergence of life forms capable of increasingly rich and complex experience. Call the emergence of such life forms *evolutionary advance*. Presuming this evolutionary advance reflects and embodies God's creative intention, and that predation is integral to evolutionary advance, the process theist seems to be committed to the view that many instances of predation are not opposed but actually encouraged by divine persuasion.

The process thinker taking the kind of position I have imagined might well say that evolutionary advance only occurs if God also encourages prey to escape predators: after all, passive prey will not develop strength and stamina, but will simply be eliminated, and they will provide no spur for the development of predators. Nonetheless, while the process thinker need not maintain that God is simply opposed to the interests of the prey, she must, if she is to take the kind of position I am imagining, maintain that God also wills the predatory activity of the carnivore, at least on some occasions.

This will not be a problem, of course, if one believes that it is acceptable to kill other life forms for food. If humans can kill other animals to eat them, there seems no reason to think that the same shouldn't be true of lions. The process theist who regards the killing of animals to provide food for humans as appropriate need not find predation troubling. This need not be because – implausibly for a Whiteheadian – she believes non-human animals have no moral standing. It will simply be, I suspect, because she believes in the existence of a hierarchy of value such that limited harms to lower life forms may be justified by virtue of the benefits they confer on higher ones.

She may well argue, indeed, that it is easier to defend non-human animals' killing of other non-human animals in search of food than it is to justify humans' hunting behaviour, given that non-human animals rarely take more than they need and that death usually comes swiftly and with relatively little suffering to their prey.[8] At any rate, whatever the precise justification she offers, she need not find the existence of 'nature red in tooth and claw' a particular blot on divine goodness. Since predation in general is not morally troubling, God's permission or, indeed, encouragement of predatory activity will be understood as quite consistent with divine goodness. To the extent that predation is, in some particular instance, undesirable, all things considered, it will be understood

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as a violation of God's intentions and will be judged to have occurred despite God's counter-persuasion. In neither case will predation pose a problem for the process theodicist.

By contrast, the process theist may not regard the killing of non-human animals for food or other reasons as generally acceptable.[9] Call the process thinker who regards the killing of non-human animals for food as (usually) morally wrong a *zoophile*.[10] Even if the zoophile regards human beings as more capable of experience and insight than another animals, and as therefore more valuable than other animals, she may regard non-human animals as moral patients. She may well not regard predatory animals as full moral agents; she will then have no reason to see their killing of other animals for food as itself morally wrong, because predators are not themselves subject to moral assessment. But she may still find it difficult to square *God*'s encouragement of predation with an attractive account of divine goodness. To preserve such an account, she will need to offer some sort of justification for God's promotion of predation (or else explain why, contrary to appearances, none is needed). And whatever justification she adopts will come with a price for process theodicy.

The shape of a process thinker's account of animal pain will depend on her general view of moral goodness. Consequentialist and non-consequentialist process thinkers will offer different accounts of the compatibility of divine goodness and the suffering of non-human animals. The consequentialist account is relatively straightforward and simple, but accepting it commits the process thinker to a view of divine goodness process theists and others may find unattractive. A non-consequentialist account can preserve the process thinker's commitment to an appealing view of divine goodness, but only if she is willing to make and defend some contestable empirical claims in ways that give hostages to fortune, leaving her uncertain about the merits of her position and vulnerable to refutation by evolutionary biologists.

A moral theory may, of course, incorporate both consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements: the process thinker is not required to choose definitively between the two. However, to the extent that the process thinker who is also a zoophile reasons as a consequentialist about non-human animals and their interests, whether or not she does so about humans and *their* interests, she will face the problem that consequentialism appears problematic as a moral theory, and that the goodness of a God who acts as a consequentialist with respect to animals is not perhaps overly attractive morally. Since my purpose here is not to refute or undermine consequentialism, I can only beg the reader's leave to rely on intuitions at this point. Obviously, the reader who reasons, or thinks it appropriate for God to 'reason' (whatever this means in God's case) in consequentialist fashion *about animals* (whether or not she does so about humans) need not find any cause for concern in this approach to squaring the reality of predation with the goodness of God.

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## Consequentialism, predation, and process theodicy

A process theist who is both a consequentialist and a zoophile can argue that God's goodness is not called into question even if God lures some predators to engage in predatory acts. On her view, such acts can contribute to evolutionary progress and the profusion of value in the world. Such a view will obviously make it difficult for the process thinker to maintain that God loves non-human animals *as individuals* and will be subject, in any case, to standard criticisms of consequentialism.

The consequentialist zoophile's view of predation will likely track her view of the killing or manipulation of non-human by human animals. As a consequentialist, she may reject humans' killing of animals for food or clothing except *in extremis*, and in all cases for play, while regarding killing for other reasons as sometimes acceptable.[11] She might defend killing to cull a population she regards as out of control, for instance. If so, she might plausibly argue that predation plays a similar role. While individual instances of predation may be undesirable (and, if so, opposed by divine counter-persuasion), on the whole predation may be necessary to keep populations under control.

She may also have another sort of reason for regarding predation as a good thing. She may believe that it fosters positive evolutionary change. She may suppose that the production of increasingly complex life forms – most recently, of human beings – is a good thing. She may believe that evolutionary development is objectively regarded as progressive because it leads increasingly to the emergence of life forms capable of richer and more complex experiences. She may suppose as well that predation is a vital contributor to this evolutionary advance, and that the great good of this advance justifies God in fostering the emergence of predatory behaviour. Perhaps only in this way, she might argue, can increasingly higher life forms come into being: the need to survive in the face of predation will serve as a necessary spur toward upward evolutionary development, which is so great a good that it warrants the introduction of the harms caused to individual sentients by predation. Thus John Cobb (a quasi-zoophile) argues:

> If we examine how higher intensities of experience have come to be, we see that the predator-prey relation has played a major role. It leads to greater intelligence on the part of both, along with greater sensitivity. Herbivores whose development is not checked by carnivores seem to deteriorate as a species. Human hunting tends in the same direction, since humans … [seek] the prime members of a species to kill whereas carnivores go after the weak, the sick, and the old.[12]

Similarly, Cobb maintains:

> Is the claim that God is at work compatible with the natural evils that abound in the process of cosmic expansion? I think so. God's persuasive work with individual entities

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> has no effect on the movements of the stars. It has negligible effect on the falling of a stone. It is trivial with most electronic occasions. To effect the breakthroughs that are so important in cosmic history, it took a lot of luring! Even with living things, God's persuasion does not work to limit their mutual destructiveness. If a lion is chasing a gazelle, I assume that God is encouraging the gazelle to escape and the lion to capture and kill it. Predation is part of that process that brings into being more complex creatures capable of greater enjoyment.[13]

On this view of course, individual instances of predation which are not necessary – directly or indirectly – to cull populations or to foster putative evolutionary advances would violate God's will and would not need explaining any more than other creaturely events inconsistent with divine intentions.

In *God and the World*, Cobb offers a somewhat different explanation. 'God seems to call every living thing to a self-actualization in which immediate satisfaction looms large. That means that God values intensities of feeling even at the price of endangering harmony and order.'[14] Here, the implication seems to be that when God decides in which direction to lure a particular organism, God's concern is with the welfare of that organism alone. The values God seeks to realize in any situation would then be severely individual ones. Thus, along similar lines, Cobb and Charles Birch maintain: 'Life favours all living things, and precisely for that reason does not take sides in our inevitably competitive existence. Life favours both the fox and the hare, supporting the success of both hunter and hunted. Life favours all the runners in the race, and hence has no favourites.'[15]

But it is not clear that this individual-by-individual focus is quite what Cobb has in mind. For, after highlighting God's concern with individual intensities of feeling, he seems to explain this concern in consequentialist terms: 'In the long run, future entities can themselves achieve higher values only when this risk [the risk of endangering harmony and order] is taken.'[16] The only way to achieve higher values, then, is to sacrifice individuals in the present. The only way for God to bring about the emergence of creatures capable of caring for others is for God actively to disregard those others in the short term. Only organisms of a certain kind of complexity, possessed of a sufficiently high level of awareness and freedom, can look beyond narrow self-concern. Such creatures will never come about at all absent considerable evolutionary development, and such development will not occur if the ancestors of these creatures are not, in general, very self-concerned. Ironically, then, altruism must rest on a history of self-interest and, indeed, predation. Of course, Cobb's argument is not, *per se*, that the possibility of altruism *justifies* the evolutionary creation of human beings through a process of conflict and death. It is the substantive values that more complex creatures, equipped for richer and subtler varieties of experience, are capable of realizing that make bringing these creatures into being worthwhile.

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But is this consequentialist argument persuasive? If research in natural history or evolutionary biology revealed that no instances of predation, or very few, were necessary to achieve evolutionary advances, the consequentialist zoophile would simply have to conclude that predatory impulses were ingrained in life forms for reasons unrelated to their role in promoting the development of richer forms of experience. It might then be incumbent on her to offer some general account of what these might be. She would need to explain, that is, why if predation serves no divine purpose it seems so frequent. If God didn't need predation to effect the goal the consequentialist zoophile imagines God as pursuing, then why is there so much of it? In a sense, then, she has an easier time of it if there is some link between predation and evolutionary advance (presuming evolutionary advance can be identified as a very valuable good on process grounds).

A few Whiteheadians have argued that the prey as well as the predator might experience life after death. But even if this minority view is accurate, the fact that it is will not help the consequentialist zoophile's case. A given animal that suffers or dies because of the predatory behaviour of another animal may be capable of life after death. But if the act of predation resulting in this animal's suffering and death were justified on consequentialist grounds, the possibility of the prey's life beyond death will not add to the justification of this predatory act. The predatory act will not result in more value (of whatever sort the consequentialist regards as important) because the prey is somehow resurrected into God.

And if a predatory act could not be justified on consequentialist grounds apart from belief in the possibility of life beyond death for the prey, it is unclear how belief in this possibility would help. The post-death utility experienced by each animal might, because each lived forever (or for a vastly long time), be essentially equal and infinite, in which case it is irrelevant and only the pre-death utilities of the predator and the prey matter, and life after death adds nothing to the equation. Alternatively, the utility function of each might differ significantly in ways that mirrored its pre-death utility. In this case again, the post-death utility wouldn't change the consequentialist zoophile's calculation. The possibility of life after death would make her case stronger only if having been a victim of predation had the potential to increase the victim's post-mortem utility, or if having been a predator had the potential to the increase the predator's post-mortem utility beyond what it would otherwise have been. Neither possibility seems at all likely.

In any case, the problem for the consequentialist zoophile is not that predation is unjustifiable on consequentialist grounds: it is that consequentialism offers an unattractive picture of the moral life generally and of divine love in particular. Consequentialism is, as is widely acknowledged, a problematic moral theory.[17] And, despite the affinity of some process thinkers for consequentialism and

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the consequentialist flavour of some process-influenced moral reflection,[18] process philosophers themselves have often highlighted key difficulties with consequentialism and sought to distance themselves from it. David Griffin, for instance, sharply differentiates what he suggests is Whitehead's moral theory from utilitarianism, noting that Whitehead's view can ground special obligations to friends and family members, moral reference to the past, and strict negative duties not subject to suspension on consequentialist grounds.[19] And Franklin Gamwell emphasizes the non-consequentialist character of his rigorously developed Whiteheadian moral and political philosophy.[20] Having challenged consequentialism, process thinkers may find it difficult to opt for what Robert Nozick has acidly termed 'utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for humans'.[21]

It does, to be sure, seem, at least initially, as if this is the sort of position for which Cobb wants to opt. While his own position seems to be rule-consequentialist in nature, he clearly believes that God is on the side of the oppressed, the victim. Whatever evolutionary advantages might arguably follow from human-on-human predation, he does not envision the preferences of the murderer and the murdered, the rapist and the raped, as equally worth honouring. Process thinkers can rightly agree that God values the goods realized in any situation. But it borders on the obscene to suggest that God enjoys the pleasure the rapist takes in dominating his victim, or that God impels the rapist to overcome his victim with an eye to the potential evolutionary advantages that might accrue, should he impregnate her. Even while valuing the rapist as a person, God must choose against the rapist's violence.

Consequentialism provides a simple explanation for predation that allows the process thinker to affirm God's promotion of predation in at least some instances without calling divine goodness – consequentialistically conceived – into account. The consequentialist zoophile may maintain that God fosters predation, at least on occasion, because it serves the interests of animal populations and ecosystems and promotes evolutionary progress. But she seems committed to a view that makes God more interested in aggregate value than in the actual, and incommensurable, wellbeing of particular individuals, and thus to an understanding of divine goodness that seems difficult to square with the Christian vision of a God of infinite love, a God concerned with each falling sparrow, even though it is this vision that many process thinkers have sought to render more credible. To identify divine goodness as consequentialist goodness is to ignore telling criticisms of consequentialism by morally sensitive persons, to fly in the face of leading process theists' rejection of consequentialism, and to redefine divine goodness in a way that may render it apparently no longer worth defending. The zoophile process thinker may thus prefer to explore a non-consequentialist alternative.

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## Non-consequentialism, predation, and process theodicy

The zoophile process thinker may opt for a non-consequentialist account of divine goodness. If she does, however, she will need to account for the extent of predation, given what she must suppose are God's persuasive efforts to discourage predation, or else explain why God does *not* seek to discourage predation in a way that does not treat God as identifying with the harms done by predators to prey animals. She will also need to offer an understanding of what some process thinkers have maintained is the advance in the richness and complexity of creaturely experience fostered by predation that does not depend on God's intentional promotion of predation as a condition of its occurrence. In both cases, she will need to give hostages to fortune – to make and defend more detailed empirical claims than are necessary to support process theism's understanding of human and non-human animal suffering in general.

### *The non-consequentialist's claim*

On the account of predation offered by the process theist who is a zoophile but not a consequentialist, God does not will any instance of predation. God may also seek, on this view, to persuade predators to avoid predation where possible.[22]

There are, of course, numerous non-consequentialist positions. The kind of non-consequentialism with which I am concerned here is one which treats the hallmark of wrong action as intentionally causing harm.[23] On this view, an agent may sometimes acceptably bring about some harm *indirectly*, as a (foreseen but unintended) side effect or by-product of an act whose purpose is not to harm (when she kills in personal self-defence, for instance, or in a just war, she need not intend the death of her attacker). But if she *intends* some harmful outcome that flows from her act, she has *identified* with that harmful outcome, making endorsement of it a part of her character.

Obviously, the non-consequentialist zoophile will be appropriately wary of treating God as a moral agent of just the same sort as creaturely moral agents. But, attempting to make allowances for the relevant differences, the non-consequentialist, as I understand her position here, will conceive of God as declining to *intend* harm. God will be aware that many harms will follow from divine creative and providential acts. But, because God will not make identification with any harm a constituent of the divine character, God will not act *in order* to bring these harms about – for their own sake or as means to other divine ends. Thus, God will not intend that any sentient die or experience any other harm. In particular, then, God will not intend that any sentient be harmed by an attack by another sentient.[24]

The non-consequentialist zoophile will understand God as willing the wellbeing of predators and as appreciating their excellences. In *this* sense,

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she will understand God to be on the side of every creature.[25] But she need not suppose that God encourages each creature to pursue its self-interest without regard to the wellbeing of others. She may, instead, believe that God's persuasive influence on a given creature is exercised with a view to the wellbeing not only of that creature, but also of the others affected by that creature's actions. Thus, she will not find it appealing to suggest that God has intentionally encouraged (at least some) predatory acts in the interests of evolutionary advance. If she believes that intending the death of a sentient is never justified, she will not be able – even if she regards evolutionary advance as a good thing – to envision God as pursuing it by intentionally encouraging individual acts of predation.

Part of her response to the problem of predation might be to attribute at least some moral responsibility to predators. She might argue that they act wrongly when they kill other animals, that they are, in fact, capable, at least sometimes, of making moral choices and that they err morally when they prey on others. However, she need not regard predators as moral agents to make her case plausible. She must simply judge that God, at any rate, is not willing the violent death of any animal, that God is not persuading any predator to attack, and that indeed God seeks to persuade predators not to attack. For God to will the death of any creature would be for God to identify with the act of harming that creature. The non-consequentialist will presumably not wish to understand God as choosing in this way – as, to put it vulgarly, choosing evil. Thus, confronted by a potential instance of predation, God, as understood by the non-consequentialist zoophile, will never seek to persuade a predator to attack.

While the non-consequentialist's process God could not intend that a predator attack, could God thus conceived decline to attempt to persuade the predator *not* to attack? A failure to exert this kind of persuasive power would not necessarily entail God's identification with the harm done by the predator to the prey. God might have innumerable reasons to decline to persuade a predator not to attack a prey animal. However, the non-consequentialist zoophile cannot reasonably conceive of God's allowing an act of predation to go unchallenged *because* of some good that would be brought about by the death of the animal – say, a useful reduction in the size of a group pf prey animals that had exceeded the carrying capacity of its environment. In this case, God would be acting *purposefully* to foster some good by means of the death of the prey animal. God would intend, and therefore own, identify with, the means to an admittedly good divine end. Except when declining to persuade a predator not to attack another animal would *not* be a means to achieving some good end that might be brought about by the attack on the prey animal, the non-consequentialist zoophile must conceive of God as using persuasive power to discourage predation.

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***Two problems for the non-consequentialist zoophile***

The non-consequentialist zoophile can maintain that God does not will any instance of predation and will often seek to persuade predators to respect other animals. Predation need not pose any formal problem for her view. But her view faces two problems at this point. She must explain the extent of predation, given that God must be thought often to oppose it, and she must respond in one way or another to evidence for apparent evolutionary advance, which mainstream process theists have maintained is God's goal in the evolutionary process and to which predation might be thought necessary.

The extent of predation might be thought to pose a problem for the non-consequentialist zoophile, given that she will expect God often to engage in counter-predatory persuasion. Of course, it will be a problem only if God is thought frequently to engage in counter-predatory persuasion. But perhaps there are often good reasons for God not to persuade predators not to attack other animals other than the good arguably brought about by attacks on these animals. If this is the case, if declining to persuade carnivores not to prey on others is something God might regularly be expected to do, then the extent of predation will be less surprising from the non-consequentialist zoophile's perspective. The difficulty here will be to advance plausible empirical hypotheses about predator–prey interactions and the environments in which these interactions take place which explain why counter-predatory persuasion would be unlikely. If such hypotheses can be satisfactorily framed and defended, the non-consequentialist zoophile's position need not be threatened by the extent of predation.

Suppose the non-consequentialist zoophile cannot frame and defend such hypotheses. She must then imagine that God does engage in counter-predatory persuasion. In this case, she must seek to show that there is good reason to believe that such persuasion is not, perhaps could not be, effective enough to reduce the incidence of predation below the frequency we observe.

If God seeks frequently to persuade creatures not to engage in predatory behaviour, why, again, is there so much of it? For the non-consequentialist zoophile, the problem is much greater than it is for the consequentialist, given that the consequentialist will need to explain only the occurrence of those harms that do not seem conducive to the great good of evolutionary advance, and that the consequentialist may find it reasonably easy to show that many instances of predatory harm might be thought to contribute to evolutionary advance. By contrast, the non-consequentialist obviously cannot argue that God encourages predation as a means of fostering evolutionary advance.

The non-consequentialist zoophile can seek to show why predators might be especially resistant to God's counter-predatory persuasion, why they might find it especially difficult to overcome predatory impulses and to respond to God's lure toward co-operation and non-violence. She might even, in this case,

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seek to show that, while persuading counter-predatorily in all particular instances, God might, nonetheless, have been justified in fostering evolutionary developments for other reasons that might render predatory impulses deeply ingrained. The existence of such impulses might, that is, be a foreseen but unintended consequence, a by-product, of creative persuasion directed toward some other objective.[26] She might also provide evidence designed to show that predation is relatively rare, and would likely be more common in the absence of divine counter-persuasion.

Indeed, Cobb suggests something of this kind. Human beings can be moved by 'inclusive goals' and can take the good of others into account in their deliberations. 'But at all lower levels of the hierarchy of living things the capacity for concern beyond immediacy of satisfaction is far more limited. The malarial mosquito is incapable of concern for the man and hence unsusceptible to persuasion to spare human life at its own expense.' And, more generally, among non-human animals 'the aim beyond individual immediate satisfaction has narrow limits, and the welfare of other organisms, colonies, or species appears to be virtually irrelevant'.[27] The idea, then, would be that the predator is simply *incapable* of responding to a divine lure that calls it to care significantly for any creature other than itself. God does not call the predator to attack its prey, but God's counter-predatory persuasion is almost certain to be ineffective.[28]

It is clear that this is not quite Cobb's position. He seems evidently to believe that the pressures imposed by predation serve a positive good, at least as long as concern for others isn't realistically possible, and that such concern isn't possible except on the part of a complex and sophisticated creature incapable of emerging except as the product of an evolutionary process *driven* by predation. On his view, apparently, because God offers each occasion a set of options ranked in light of what is realistically possible for the occasion, God *will* encourage predatory behaviour on the part of a given animal in circumstances in which no more optimal behaviour for the animal is possible. God doesn't seek to persuade a creature in a given situation, on this view, to adopt a course of action that it is not realistically conceivable the creature will choose under the relevant circumstances. But a non-consequentialist zoophile could invoke the limitation on concern for others to which Cobb alludes as an explanation for the extent of predation without committing herself to the use Cobb makes of it. She could emphasize the inherent limitations on creaturely concern that make counter-predatory divine persuasion likely to be ineffective.

Obviously, however, the non-consequentialist zoophile would not in this case face a significantly greater burden than in the case of human evil. After all, the extent of human evil is a problem, too, since God must be supposed to be opposing it at every turn. Once it's granted that predatory impulses God opposes do, in fact, obtain, the fact that non-human creatures sometimes act contrary to God's intentions needs no special explanation from a process point of view.

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The problem will simply be to explain why they should have these impulses in the first place. Confronting this question will challenge the process thinker to ask in turn whether predation is essential to evolutionary advance and, if so, whether God has promoted evolutionary advance by fostering predatory impulses.

Mainstream process thought alleges that God seeks to promote evolutionary advance, understood as the emergence of richer and more complex forms of experience. But predation, a critic may maintain, is crucial to the existence of any sort of developed life. God must will acts of predation, the objector will say, because such acts are essential to the creation of any complex life at all. To say that God opted for complexity is to say that God willed predation.

Whether this is so will depend, though, on the correctness of two assumptions: that increased complexification does depend on predation, and that God could not have willed other developments that made predation highly likely without willing acts of predation themselves. If either of these assumptions is undermined, then the process thinker can maintain that God pursued complexification without willing predation. It certainly seems as if environmental factors other than the need to prey on others can reward increased intelligence and richness of experience. And empirical enquiry could certainly reveal characteristics of which predatory impulses might be side effects which God might be thought to will.

If she does not wish to maintain that God wills at least some instances of predation, the non-consequentialist zoophile has three options. She may maintain:

(a) that God does not, in fact, seek evolutionary advance;
(b) that God *does* seek evolutionary advance, but that it does not depend on predation, and that the instances of predation on which it depends have occurred despite divine counter-predatory persuasion; *or*
(c) that God seeks evolutionary advance, that it depends on predation, but that God does not seek it by promoting predation, and that the instances of predation on which it depends have occurred despite divine counter-predatory persuasion.

In the first case, she must explain why evolutionary advance has occurred if God has not sought it. In the latter two cases, the she must provide some reason to believe either that predation is not essential to evolutionary advance at all or that, while necessary, it is a likely side-effect of God's action in furtherance of non-predatory goals.

The non-consequentialist zoophile who selects option (a) will face a substantial difficulty. It will be hard to see why evolutionary advance has occurred if God has not willed it. Such advance must be explained as a by-product of some other goal. But it will be difficult, even if not impossible, to specify an alternative goal that does not involve the increasing complexification and richness of

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experience that are constitutive of evolutionary advance. This option does not, then, seem very promising.

The non-consequentialist who selects option (b) must adduce plausible empirical evidence for the claim that increasing complexification and richness of experience do not depend on the challenges associated with being or escaping a predator. She will point out that the need to survive and the desire to thrive will encourage the complexification of organisms and the enrichment of experience even in the absence of predation. She will need to highlight one or more mechanisms that might foster evolutionary advance apart from predation. She will obviously confront the problem discussed in the previous section, namely that the extent of predation may seem surprising if God is persuading counter-predatorily. But presuming she can resolve this problem, option (b) would leave her free to understand God as pursuing evolutionary advance without characterizing God as willing predation.

The non-consequentialist who selects option (c) must adduce plausible empirical evidence for the claim that, in order to promote increasing complexification and richness of experience, God has no choice but to promote predation – unintentionally but foreseeably. She will thus need to specify how God's pursuit of evolutionary advance will necessarily promote predation as well. In this way, too, presuming the problem of the effectiveness of counter-predatory providence can be overcome, she could understand God as pursuing evolutionary advance without characterizing God as willing predation.

Options (b) and (c) are both perfectly feasible, in principle. But the process thinker who wishes to select either faces an obvious difficulty. Both depend on potentially quite contestable evolutionary stories about the sources of evolutionary advance. Confirming these stories will require ongoing, detailed engagement with the work of evolutionary biologists, animal behaviourists, and others. There is nothing in principle wrong with this. But given the lack of confidence with which any such story can be affirmed, the non-consequentialist cannot choose either option without giving hostages to fortune.

### *Divine suffering, life after death, and the non-consequentialist*

Divine suffering will not *justify* otherwise unjustifiable creaturely suffering resulting from predation. But the victim will have the comfort of the presence of an empathic God, and it will be evident that God has taken no predation-inducing risk that is not a risk for Godself as well as for predation's immediate victims. Similarly, for the non-consequentialist zoophile, the possibility of life after death would not, of course, make it appropriate for God to *will* any act of predation. It might, however, contribute in other ways to her response to the problem of predation. The possibility of life after death will help to explain why the risks associated with the creation of animals capable of predation or of suffering the harms resulting from predation might have been worth taking. It might also

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contribute in a limited way to the non-consequentialist zoophile's explanation of the extent of predation.

Recall that the non-consequentialist zoophile will want to say that predation is so common because predators are generally incapable of responding meaningfully to divine counter-predatory persuasion. Divine providence will bring about the evolutionary emergence of the factor or factors that render creatures relatively insensible to such persuasion – in full view of the likelihood that these factors will have this effect. Even though the emergence of these factors will be an unintended consequence of divine persuasion, it will be a foreseen consequence, and God's goodness would be called into question were the risk of bringing about – for other reasons – creatures' relative immunity to counter-predatory persuasion not justified.

The possibility of life after death for predation's victims can help here. The goodness of the purposes of God's persuasive origination of those factors that militate against responsiveness to counter-predatory persuasion would not, of course, depend on the possibility of life after death. Either these purposes are worth pursuing or they are not. But the non-consequentialist can say, nonetheless, that the actual harm caused by predation to its victims will be less if, given the reality of life beyond death, it does not have the last word on their lives. Whether there is life after death or not, God will not, for the non-consequentialist, be justified in willing any act of predation. And life after death will not likely be *necessary* to the justification of the risks taken by God that have led to the emergence of creatures who are generally insusceptible to counter-predatory persuasion. But the reality of life after death will make these risks more tolerable.

## Conclusion

Process thought can respond effectively to the challenge of animal suffering, even that caused by predation. But it can do so only at a price. Process thinkers can account straightforwardly for animal suffering in general in much the same way as they can account for human suffering: creatures do not respond as God would like to divine persuasion. And they can say much the same thing about the suffering resulting from predation. They can do so, however, only if they are willing to take one of several options, each of which has associated costs.

The process thinker can opt for a consequentialist account of divine goodness and respond to the fact of predation along consequentialist lines. Thus, she can maintain that acts of predation can contribute to evolutionary advance, that God wills at least some such acts to foster evolutionary advance, and that God's decision to do so is consistent with belief in God's goodness, provided that this goodness is understood along consequentialist lines. In so doing, however, she

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commits herself to an understanding of divine goodness in tension with belief in God's particular love for each sparrow or each human being, a kind of goodness of which none of us might like to be the recipient.

Alternatively, she can opt for a non-consequentialist construal of divine goodness – and thus deny that God wills any instance of predation. She must, however, offer an account of the evolutionary process that explains why creatures are so constituted that they regularly resist divine counter-predatory persuasion, or else why God often declines to engage in such persuasion. In either case, she must engage carefully, not only with a general philosophical account of providence and evolution, but also quite possibly with fairly specific details of evolutionary biology. The persuasiveness of her account will thus depend, in a way that her arguments about other facets of the problem of evil do not, on quite detailed and contingent scientific facts.[29]

She will also need to determine what to say about putative evolutionary advance. If she wishes, she can agree with mainstream process thinkers that value is proportionate to the richness and complexity of experience. In this case, she can maintain that God wills the emergence of human beings – and, subsequently, we may assume, more advanced creatures – to ensure the realization of greater values than would be possible if the evolutionary process had ended with the arrival on the scene of (arguably) less advanced creatures. Then, however, she will have to come to grips with the claim that predation contributes directly or indirectly to the occurrence of evolutionary progress.

She *cannot* maintain simultaneously that predation is a side effect of some other divine goal, that predation is essential to evolutionary progress, and that God wills evolutionary progress. For if predation is essential to evolutionary progress, then if God wills evolutionary progress, then God must also will predation. In this case, therefore, she would be committed to the view that God directly intends predation. Since she believes that, while predation may be a foreseen but unintended side-effect of God's action, God cannot intend predation without identifying with it, she must deny that God directly intends predation. Rather, she will need to argue either that evolutionary progress does not depend on predation or that God does not will evolutionary progress.

If she wishes to maintain that God seeks evolutionary progress, she must reject the argument that predation is essential to such progress and offer an alternative account. Otherwise, she will not be able to explain how God has sought the divine goal of evolutionary advance without promoting predation. And again she will need to give hostages to fortune by making her account dependent on the accuracy of a theory, or family of theories, regarding the dynamics of evolutionary change. Alternatively, she can maintain that God does not will evolutionary progress. In this case, she can maintain that predation is a by-product or side effect of God's providential pursuit of some other goal. But she will need to offer, again, a credible evolutionary story that explains what this

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goal is and why predation might occur as an unintended consequence of God's pursuit of this goal. She will also need to explain why the pursuit of this goal justifies God in permitting the emergence of predation. And she will need to reject the general account of value that lies at the root of much process thinking about the problem of evil and about God's action in the world more generally.

This approach makes things slightly easier for the process thinker. God need not be seen as invested in predation, even indirectly. Even if it turns out that predation played a crucial role in our arrival, this may be seen as contrary to the divine will rather than as a product of God's intentions. It will be less necessary to explain our appearance on the scene despite God's counter-predatory persuasion. However, in this case, process thinkers will still need to offer some empirical evidence that can explain the emergence of predatory impulses as a by-product of God's encouragement of the evolution of other impulses and, given God's counter-predatory persuasion, the emergence of *so much* predation in the world. And they will need to abandon the view that the emergence of creatures more like us constitutes evolutionary progress. Given that the process thinker needs to give some moral weight to the interests of non-human animals, if the evolutionary stories required to warrant the non-consequentialist's account of divine goodness prove unjustified, the process thinker will be forced to adopt a broadly consequentialist understanding of God's love for the world. Empirical evidence will have undermined an attractive vision of divine love and required its replacement with one that process thinkers and others will likely find unappealing.

Process thought offers a response to the problem of evil that is exceptionally easy to defend provided one finds the process account of divine power acceptable. Even the problem of animal suffering poses fewer problems for a process theodicy than for many alternative positions. But the problem of predation poses real difficulties for process thought, as it does for any position with an unequivocal commitment to divine goodness. To render an account of predation consistent with belief in divine goodness, process thinkers must either redefine that goodness in consequentialist terms, or adopt non-consequentialist accounts of predation which they can defend only at the price of investing significantly in contestable theses in evolutionary biology.[30]

## Notes

1. For stylistic reasons, I will refer at various points in this paper to 'animals' and to 'non-human animals'. Even when I do not add the qualifier 'non-human', the reader should be aware that I know that human beings are animals.
2. Among process thinkers who have helpfully addressed the problem of non-human animal illbeing in relation to theodicy are Jay B. McDaniel and Brian Henning. See Jay B. McDaniel 'Can animal suffering be reconciled with belief in an all-loving God?', in Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (eds) *Animals on the Agenda* (London: SCM, 1998), 161–170. Compare McDaniel's earlier *Of God and Pelicans: A*

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*Theology of Reverence for Life* (Louisville KY: Westminster/Knox, 1989), 33–49; and Brian G. Henning *The Ethics of Creativity: Beauty, Morality, and Nature in a Processive Cosmos* (Pittsburgh PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).

3. For standard accounts of process thought's response to the problem of evil, see David Ray Griffin *God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy*, 2nd edn (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1991), and *Evil Reconsidered: Responses and Reconsiderations* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1991). For briefer statements of Griffin's position, see his 'Creation out of nothing, creation out of chaos, and the problem of evil', in Stephen T. Davis (ed.) *Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy*, 2nd edn (Louisville KY: Westminster/Knox, 2001), and David Ray Griffin *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 218–230.
4. Thanks to David Larson for reminding me to include this point.
5. See John B. Cobb, Jr 'The resurrection of the soul', *Harvard Theological Review*, **80** (1987), 213–227; Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki *The End of Evil: Process Eschatology in Historical Context* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1988), 81–134; David Ray Griffin 'Postmodern animism and life after death'; Griffin *God, Power, and Evil*. On life after death as a possibility for non-human animals, see McDaniel 'Can animal suffering be reconciled with belief in an all-loving God?', 169–170.
6. William Rowe has made this paradigmatic instance of non-human evil famous. See William L. Rowe 'The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism', in Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.) *The Evidential Argument from Evil* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1996) 1–11, and Rowe's subsequent essay, 'The evidential argument from evil: a second look', in *ibid.*, 262–285. For the use of 'Bambi' as the fawn's name, see William P. Alston 'The inductive argument from evil and the human condition', in *ibid.*, 97–125.
7. Process thought presupposes the essential correctness of contemporary evolutionary biology. This internal critique does not address process theism's understanding of evolution.
8. Daniel Dombrowski has rightly observed, in correspondence, that if non-human animals are not moral agents, even if they are moral patients, they need not justify their acts of killing. But this doesn't, I think, eliminate the problem of understanding the nature of *God*'s persuasive influence on the interactions between predators and prey. What needs justifying is not so much the act of the predator but God's decision, on the consequentialist view, to permit or encourage predation.
9. See Daniel A. Dombrowski *Hartshorne and the Metaphysics of Animal Rights* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1988); *idem Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases* (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997); *idem The Philosophy of Vegetarianism* (Amherst MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984); compare *idem Not Even a Sparrow Falls: The Philosophy of Stephen R. L. Clark* (East Lansing MI: Michigan State University Press, 2000). For Hartshorne's own (rather more sceptical) views, see his 'Ethical rights of non-human animals', in his *Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1987) 117–130.
10. For this term, see Stephen R. L. Clark *The Moral Status of Animals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
11. A standard consequentialist view of the moral status of non-human animals is Peter Singer *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*, 2nd edn (London: Cape, 1990).
12. John B. Cobb, Jr ['Animal Rights'] http://www.ctr4process.org/pandf/cobbfaq/animals.htm.
13. *Idem* ['Natural Evil'] http://www.ctr4process.org/pandf/cobbfaq/natevil.htm.
14. *Idem God and the World* (Philadelphia PA: Westminster, 1969), 94.
15. Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr *The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 198. (Life here serves as a cipher for God.)
16. Cobb *God and the World*, 94.
17. For criticisms of consequentialist approaches, see Alasdair C. MacIntyre *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, rev. edn (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 61–63, 67–68, 185; John M. Finnis *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 111–119; *idem Fundamentals of Ethics* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 80–108; John M. Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr, and Germain G. Grisez *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 177–296; Germain G. Grisez and Russell Shaw *Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom*, 3rd edn (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Bernard A. O. Williams *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); *idem* 'A critique of utilitarianism', in John J. C. Smart and Bernard A. O. Williams *Utilitarianism: For and*

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*Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 77–150; Gilbert C. Meilaender *Faith and Faithfulness: Basic Themes in Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 89–113.

18. Compare Timothy L. S. Sprigge *The Rational Foundations of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1987).
19. Griffin *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism*, 306 ('the central objection typically raised against utilitarianism does not apply to Whitehead's principle'). Griffin does not discuss value commensurability, without which consequentialism couldn't get off the ground, and to which vulgar interpretations of Whitehead might be prone.
20. Compare Franklin I. Gamwell *Democracy on Purpose: Justice and the Reality of God* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 140.
21. Robert Nozick *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York NY: Basic Books, 1974).
22. This need not mean the end of predatory animals. 'True carnivores kill as they must, and very often live on berries or on carrion'; Clark *The Moral Status of Animals*, 176. For a true story of a vegetarian lion, see Georges H. Westbeau *Little Tyke* (Mountain View CA: Pacific Press, 1956).
23. For examples, see Finnis *Natural Law and Natural Rights*; *idem Fundamentals of Ethics*; Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez *Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism*; Grisez and Shaw *Beyond the New Morality*; Alan Donagan *The Theory of Morality* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Charles Fried *Right and Wrong* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).
24. There are, of course, non-consequentialist approaches that do not take this view, but which instead regard some instances of intentional harming as appropriate. Two good examples are Fried and Donagan. But non-consequentialist theories that do allow someone to be harmed intentionally characteristically do so when the target is a formal or material aggressor, or has otherwise forfeited the right not to be harmed by engaging in threatening or harmful conduct. Even if the non-consequentialist zoophile opted for one of these less restrictive non-consequentialist approaches, however, she would still presumably conceive of God as not willing predatory harms, because prey animals are not plausibly thought of as – at least characteristically – aggressors vis-à-vis predators or as engaging in otherwise threatening or harmful conduct that might make it appropriate for God to seek to harm them intentionally. It is worth noting as well that non-consequentialist affirmations of the appropriateness of some intentional harms often conceive of these harms as punitive; but only full moral agents are appropriately punished, if anyone is, and prey animals are almost certainly not full moral agents.
25. When a predatory animal pursues her or his prey, God must be thought to be '"on the side" of both creatures, to the exclusion of neither. At least this is the case if we assume that God's love, like human love, involves a desire that the interests of living beings, in surviving with satisfaction, be realized'; McDaniel 'Can animal suffering be reconciled with belief in an all-loving God?', 163.
26. The non-consequentialist zoophile thus analyses divine action using something like the traditional principle of double effect. On this principle, see Germain Grisez 'Toward a consistent natural-law ethics of killing', *American Journal of Jurisprudence*, **15** (1970), 64–96; Joseph M. Boyle 'Toward understanding the principle of double effect', *Ethics*, **90** (1980), 527–538.
27. Cobb *God and the World*, 94–95. Daniel Dombrowski has noted in correspondence that Cobb's statement needs to be qualified, insofar as animals of various kinds sacrifice themselves for their young.
28. Compare Clark *The Moral Status of Animals*, 176: 'I do not think it is impossible that something like moral corruption can be found amongst the non-human, that much of the present way of the world is consequent upon the past choices (or 'choices') of living creatures; but certainly it seems likely that non-human carnivores can now do little to change their habits.' Of course, it need not be the case that counter-predatory divine persuasion must appeal to concern for other organisms on the part of the predator. God could presumably seek to influence creatures to avoid engaging in predatory behaviour by encouraging them to redirect their attention, or to meet one or more needs related directly to their own self-interest.
29. Her inquiry into predation and evolutionary biology might begin with sources including Christopher McGowan *The Raptor and the Lamb: Predators and Prey in the Living World* (New York NY: Holt, 1997); Eberhard Curio *The Ethology of Predation* (Berlin & New York NY: Springer, 1976); Michael E. Gilpin *Group Selection in Predator–Prey Communities* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Robert J. Taylor *Predation* (New York NY: Chapman, 1984); Michael Patrick Hassell *The Dynamics of Competition and Predation* (London: Arnold, 1976); Manfred Peschel and Werner Mende *The Predator–Prey Model: Do We Live in a Volterra World?* (Vienna & New York NY: Springer, 1986);

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C. K. Brain *Do We Owe Our Intelligence to a Predatory Past?* (New York NY: American Museum of Natural History, 2001); Franklin Russell *The Hunting Animal* (New York NY: Harper, 1983); Martin E. Feder and George V. Lauder (eds) *Predator–Prey Relationships: Perspectives and Approaches from the Study of Lower Vertebrates* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Michael J. Crawley (ed.) *Natural Enemies: The Population Biology of Predators, Parasites, and Diseases* (Oxford & Boston MA: Blackwell, 1992); Paul L. Errington *Of Predation and Life* (Ames IA: Iowa State University Press, 1967).

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