Bibliography

Adeel, M. A. (2010). *How Do We Deal With Conflicts Between Different World Views If They Are Based on the Same Evidence?* The Edwin Mellen Press.

Alexander, L. and Moore, M. (2016). Deontological Ethics. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2016 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-deontological/.

Ariew, R. (2014). Pierre Duhem. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Fall 2014 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/duhem/.

Atwell, J. E. (1969). Oldenquist on Rules and Consequences. *Mind*, 78(312):576–579.

Audi, R. (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 11(5):475–492.

(2012). A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B., eds., *Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality*, pages 101–121. Cambridge University Press.

(2015). Intuition and Its Place in Ethics. *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 1(1):57–77.

Baker, D. (2021). If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 16:54–79.

Bales, R. E. (1971). Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-making Characteristics or Decision-making Procedure? *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 8(1):257–265.

Baumann, M. (2018). Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 13(3):191–221.

(2019). Consequentializing and Underdetermination. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 97(3):511–527.

(2021a). In Search of the Trinity: A Dilemma for Parfit's Conciliatory Project. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 24(1):999–1018.

(2021b). No Fact of the Matter: The Case of Dirty Hands. *Metaphilosophy*, 52(3–4):466–478.

(2022). Moral Underdetermination and a New Skeptical Challenge. *Synthese*, 200:1–22.

Ben-Menahem, Y. (2016). Poincaré's Impact on Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science. *HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science*, 6(1):257–273.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Berker, S. (2018). The Unity of Grounding. *Mind*, 127(507):729–777.
(2019). The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles. *Noûs*, 53(4):904–936.
Betzler, M. and Schroth, J. (2019). The Good of Consequentialized Deontology. In Seidel, C., ed., *Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems*, pages 115–135. Oxford University Press.
Bliss, R. and Trogdon, K. (2016). Metaphysical Grounding. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2016 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/.
Bonk, T. (2008). *Underdetermination. An Essay on Evidence and the Limits of Natural Knowledge*. Springer.
Bortolotti, L. (2008). *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. Polity.
Boyd, N. M. and Bogen, J. (2021). Theory and Observation in Science. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2021 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/science-theory-observation/.
Boyd, R. N. (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In Sayre-McCord, G., ed., *Essays on Moral Realism*, pages 181–228. Cornell University Press.
Boyle Jr., J. M. (1980). Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect. *Ethics*, 90(4):527–538.
Brandt, R. B. (1959). *Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics*. Prentice-Hall.
Broome, J. (1991). *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time*. Basil Blackwell.
Brown, C. (2011). Consequentialize This. *Ethics*, 121(4):749–771.
Bykvist, K. (2013). Derek Parfit, On What Matters. *Ethical Perspectives*, 20(2):343–349.
Carrier, M. (2011). Underdetermination as an Epistemological Test Tube: Expounding Hidden Values of the Scientific Community. *Synthese*, 180(2):189–204.
Cartwright, N. (2007). Why Be Hanged for Even a Lamb? In Monton, B., ed., *Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, With a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen*, pages 32–45. Oxford University Press.
Chakravartty, A. (2017). Scientific Realism. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Summer 2017 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/.
Chappell, R. (2021). *Parfit's Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.
Chappell, T. (2012). Climbing Which Mountain? A Critical Study of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. *Philosophical Investigations*, 35(2):167–181.
Chrisman, M. (2016). *What Is This Thing Called Metaethics?* Routledge.
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News. *The Philosophical Review*, 116(2):187–217.
(2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. *Philosophy Compass*, 4(5):756–767.
Churchland, P. M. (1985). The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues. In Churchland, P. M. and Hooker, C. A., eds.,

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, With a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, pages 35–47. The University of Chicago Press.

Copp, D. (1985). Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory. In Copp, D. and Zimmerman, D., eds., *Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics*, pages 141–168. Rowan & Allanheld.

Crisp, R. (2020). Are We Climbing the Same Mountain? Moral Theories, Moral Concepts, Moral Questions. *ZEMO*, 3(2):269–278.

Cummiskey, D. (1990). Kantian Consequentialism. *Ethics*, 100(3):586–615.

(1996). *Kantian Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

Dancy, J. (1981). On Moral Properties. *Mind*, 90(1):367–385.

(2004). *Ethics Without Principles*. Clarendon Press.

Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 76(5):256–282.

Darling, K. M. (2002). The Complete Duhemian Underdetermination Argument: Scientific Language and Practice. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 33(3):511–533.

Darwall, S. (2014). Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. *Philosophical Review*, 123(1):79–105.

Dasgupta, S. (2017). Constitutive Explanation. *Philosophical Issues*, 27(1):74–97.

Depaul, M. R. (1987). Supervenience and Moral Dependence. *Philosophical Studies*, 51(3):425–439.

Devitt, M. (2002). Underdetermination and Realism. *Philosophical Issues*, 12(1):26–50.

Dietrich, F. and List, C. (2017). What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories. *Philosophical Review*, 126(4):421–479.

Dougherty, T. (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. *Philosophical Studies*, 163(2):527–537.

Douven, I. (2008). Underdetermination. In Psillos, S. and Curd, M., eds., *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science*, pages 292–301. Routledge.

Dreier, J. (1993). Structures of Normative Theories. *The Monist*, 76(1):22–40.

(2004). Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 18(1):23–44.

(2011). In Defense of Consequentializing. In Timmons, M., ed., *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, volume 1, pages 97–119. Oxford University Press.

Driver, J. (1996). The Virtues and Human Nature. In Crisp, R., ed., *How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues*, pages 111–129. Clarendon Press.

Duhem, P. (1906). *La Théorie Physique: Son Objet et sa Structure*. Marcel Riviera & Cie. English Translation by P. Wiener, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press [1954].

Dworkin, R. (2011). *Justice for Hedgehogs*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Einstein, A. (1926). Letter to Max Born. In Walker, B.M., ed., *The Born-Einstein Letters*. Walker and Company [1971].

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Elson, L. (2016). Introduction. *Ratio*, 29(4):353–356.

Emet, S. F. (2010). Agent-Relative Restrictions and Agent-Relative Value. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 4(3):1–13.

Enoch, D. (2019). How Principles Ground. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 14:1–22.

Feldman, R. and Warfield, T. A. (2010). *Disagreement*. Oxford University Press.

Fine, K. (1994). Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 8(1):1–16.

(2001). The Question of Realism. *Philosophers' Imprint*, 1(1):1–30.

(2012). Guide to Ground. In Correia, F. and Schnieder, B., eds., *Metaphysical Grounding*, pages 37–80. Cambridge University Press.

Flanagan, O. (2006). Varieties of Naturalism. In Clayton, P. and Simpson, Z., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science*, pages 430–452. Oxford University Press.

Fogal, D. and Risberg, O. (2020). The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 15:170–194.

Foot, P. (1985). Utilitarianism and the Virtues. *Mind*, 94(374):169–209.

Forcehimes, A. T. and Semrau, L. (2020). Relationship Sensitive Consequentialism Is Regrettable. *Social Theory and Practice*, 46(2):257–276.

Forschler, S. (2013). Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged. *Metaphilosophy*, 44(1–2):88–104.

Frankena, W. K. (1973). *Ethics*. Prentice-Hall, second edition.

Godfrey-Smith, P. (2021). *Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. University of Chicago Press, second edition.

Harding, S. G. (1976). Introduction. In Harding, S. G., ed., *Can Theories Be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem–Quine Thesis*, pages ix–xxi. D. Reidel Publishing Company.

Hare, R. M. (1952). *The Language of Morals*. Oxford University Press.

(1997). Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian? In Hare, R. M., ed., *Sorting Out Ethics*, pages 147–165. Clarendon Press.

Harman, G. (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. *Philosophical Review*, 74(1):88–95.

(1977). *The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics*. Oxford University Press.

Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P. (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. *Philosophy of Science*, 15(2):135–175.

Herman, B. (1993). *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Harvard University Press.

(2011). A Mismatch of Methods. In Scheffler, S., ed., *On What Matters, Volume Two*, pages 83–115. Oxford University Press.

Hoefer, C. and Rosenberg, A. (1994). Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination, and Systems of the World. *Philosophy of Science*, 61(4):592–607.

Hooker, B. (2000). *Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality*. Oxford University Press.

(2010). On What Matters. *The Philosopher's Magazine*, 50:66–67.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

(2020). Parfit's Final Arguments in Normative Ethics. In McMahan, J. and Campbell, T., eds., *Essays in Honour of Derek Parfit: Normative Ethics and Personal Identity*, pages 1–21. Oxford University Press.

Horwich, P. (1991). On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment. *Philosophy of Science*, 58(1):1–14.

Howard, C. (2021). Consequentialists Must Kill. *Ethics*, 131(1):727–753.

Huemer, M. (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 25(1):368–392.

Hurka, T. (2011). Common Themes from Sidgwick to Ewing. In Hurka, T., ed., *Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing*, pages 6–25. Oxford University Press.

Hurley, P. (2013). Consequentializing and Deontologizing: Clogging the Consequentialist Vacuum. In Timmons, M., ed., *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, volume 3, pages 123–153. Oxford University Press.

(2014). Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 88(1):225–232.

(2017). Why Consequentialism's 'Compelling Idea' is Not. *Social Theory and Practice*, 43(1):29–54.

Joyce, R. (2005). Moral Fictionalism. In Kalderon, M. E., ed., *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, pages 287–313. Oxford University Press, New York.

Kagan, S. (1989). *The Limits of Morality*. Clarendon Press.

Kalderon, M. E. (2005). Introduction. In Kalderon, M. E., ed., *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, pages 1–13. Oxford University Press, New York.

Kalokairinou, E. (2011). *From Meta-Ethics to Ethics: An Overview of R. M. Hare's Moral Philosophy*. Peter Lang.

Kamm, F. M. (2000). Nonconsequentialism. In LaFolette, H., ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, pages 205–226. Blackwell.

Kelly, T. (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J., eds., *Oxford Studies in Epistemology*, volume 1, pages 167–196. Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In Kitcher, P. and Salmon, W., eds., *Scientific Explanation (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 13)*, pages 410–505. University of Minnesota Press.

(2001). Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy. *The Philosophical Review*, 110(2):151–197.

Kosso, P. (1992). *Reading the Book of Nature*. Cambridge University Press.

Kovacs, D. M. (2023). Varieties of Grounding Skepticism. *The Monist*, 106:301–316.

Kroon, F. (2011). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. *Philosophy Compass*, 6(11):786–803.

Kukla, A. (1998). *Studies in Scientific Realism*. Oxford University Press.

(2001). Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses. *Philosophy of Science*, 68(1):21–35.

Ladd, J. (1952). Ethics and Explanation. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 49(15):499–504.

Ladyman, J. (2002). *Understanding Philosophy of Science*. Routledge.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Larmore, C. (2013). Morals and Metaphysics. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 21(4):665–675.

Laskowski, N. (2018). Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Vol. 3. *Ethics*, 128(2):496–505.

Laudan, L. (1990). Demystifying Underdetermination. In Savage, C. W., ed., *Scientific Theories*, pages 267–297. University of Minnesota Press.

Laudan, L. and Leplin, J. (1991). Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 88(9):449–472.

(1993). Determination Underdeterred: Reply to Kukla. *Analysis*, 53(1):8–16.

Lazar, S. (2017). Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options. *Ethics*, 127(3):579–609.

Lazari-Pawlowska, I. (1991). The Deductive Model in Ethics. In Geach, P., ed., *Logic and Ethics*, pages 225–240. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

de Lazari-Radek, K. and Singer, P. (2016). Parfit on Objectivity and "The Profoundest Problem of Ethics". In Singer, P., ed., *Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity*, pages 279–296. Oxford University Press.

Leibowitz, U. D. (2009). Moral Advice and Moral Theory. *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, 146(3):349–359.

(2011). Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation. *Noûs*, 45(3):472–503.

Leibowitz, U. D. and Sinclair, N. (2016). Introduction: Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics. In Leibowitz, U. D. and Sinclair, N., eds., *Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics*, pages 1–20. Oxford University Press.

Lillehammer, H. (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. *Philosophy*, 86(2):175–200.

Louise, J. (2004). Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 54(217):518–536.

Mackie, J. L. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Penguin.

Matheson, J. (2015). Disagreement and Epistemic Peers. *Oxford Handbooks Online*.

Maxwell, G. (1962). The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. In Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G., eds., *Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, pages 3–27. University of Minnesota Press.

McKeever, S. and Ridge, M. (2006). *Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Idea*. Oxford University Press.

McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P. (1991). Agent-Relativity and the Doing–Happening Distinction. *Philosophical Studies*, 63(2):167–185.

Mill, J. S. (1871). *Utilitarianism*. Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer. Edited by R. Crisp, Oxford University Press [1998].

Moore, G. E. (1942). A Reply to My Critics. In Schilpp, P. A., ed., *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, pages 535–677. Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, S. (2009). Can There be a Kantian Consequentialism? In Suikkanen, J. and Cottingham, J., eds., *Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters*, pages 39–60. Wiley-Blackwell.

Nebel, J. (2012). A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 6(2):1–10.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Needham, P. (2000). Duhem and Quine. *Dialectica*, 54(2):109–132.
Nguyen, C. T. (2010). Autonomy, Understanding, and Moral Disagreement. *Philosophical Topics*, 39(2):111–129.
Norton, J. D. (2008). Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory? In Carrier, M., Howard, D., and Kourany, A., eds., *The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice*, pages 17–44. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Basil Blackwell.
Okasha, S. (2002). Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 52(208):303–319.
Oldenquist, A. (1966). Rules and Consequences. *Mind*, 75(298):180–192.
Otsuka, M. (2009). The Kantian Argument for Consequentialism. In Suikkanen, J. and Cottingham, J., eds., *Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters*, pages 61–78. Wiley-Blackwell.
Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Clarendon Press.
(2011a). *On What Matters, Volume One*. Oxford University Press.
(2011b). *On What Matters, Volume Two*. Oxford University Press.
(2017a). *On What Matters, Volume Three*. Oxford University Press.
(2017b). Responses. In Kirchin, S., ed., *Reading Parfit: On What Matters*. Routledge.
Park, S. (2009). Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science. *Journal for General Philosophy of Science*, 40(1):115–124.
Peterson, M. (2013). *The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk*. Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, P. (1997). The Consequentialist Perspective. In Baron, M., Pettit, P., and Slote, M., eds., *Three Methods of Ethics*, pages 92–174. Blackwell.
Pietsch, W. (2012). The Underdetermination Debate: How Lack of History Leads to Bad Philosophy. In Mauskopf, S. and Schmaltz, T., eds., *Integrating History and Philosophy of Science*, pages 83–106. Springer.
Portmore, D. W. (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 86(1):95–113.
(2007). Consequentializing Moral Theories. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 88(1):39–73.
(2009). Consequentializing. *Philosophy Compass*, 4(2):329–347.
(2011). *Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality*. Oxford University Press.
(2014). Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 88(1):209–216.
(2022). Consequentializing. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Fall 2022 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/consequentializing/.
Psillos, S. (1999). *Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth*. Routledge.
Putnam, H. (2004). *Ethics Without Ontology*. Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. *Philosophical Review*, 60(1):20–43. Reprinted in from a Logical Point of View, (1953).
(1960). *Word and Object*. MIT Press.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

(1966a). On Mental Entities. In *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, pages 208–214. Random House.
(1966b). Posits and Reality. In *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, pages 233–241. Random House.
(1966c). The Scope and Language of Science. In *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, pages 215–232. Random House.
(1969). Speaking of Objects. In *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, volume 31, pages 5–22. Columbia University Press.
(1975). On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World. *Erkenntnis*, 9(3):313–28.
(1981). Empirical Content. In *Theories and Things*, pages 24–30. Harvard University Press.
(1991). Two Dogmas in Retrospect. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 21(3):265–274.
Rawls, J. (1951). Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics. *Philosophical Review*, 60(2):177–197.
(1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Harvard University Press.
(1974). The Independence of Moral Theory. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 48(1):5–22.
Ridge, M. (2009). Climb Every Mountain? In Suikkanen, J. and Cottingham, J., eds., *Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters*, pages 79–96. Wiley-Blackwell.
Roeser, S. (2006). A Particularist Epistemology: 'Affectual Intuitionism'. *Acta Analytica*, 21(1):33–44.
Rosen, G. (1994). What is Constructive Empiricism? *Philosophical Studies*, 74(1):143–178.
(2005). Problems in the History of Fictionalism. In Kalderon, M. E., ed., *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, pages 14–64. Oxford University Press.
(2017). What is a Moral Law? *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, 12:135–159.
Ross, J. (2009). Should Kantians be Consequentialists? In Suikkanen, J. and Cottingham, J., eds., *Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters*, pages 144–153. Wiley-Blackwell.
Ross, W. D. (1930). *The Right and the Good*. Clarendon Press. Edited by P. Stratton-Lake, Clarendon Press [2002].
Rowland, R. (2017). The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement. *Philosophy Compass*, 12(2):1–16.
Sachs, B. (2010). Consequentialism's Double-Edged Sword. *Utilitas*, 22(3):258–271.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). *What We Owe to Each Other*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Scanlon, T. M. (2003). Rawls on Justification. In Freeman, S., ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, pages 139–167. Cambridge University Press.
(2011). How I Am Not a Kantian. In Scheffler, S., *On What Matters, Volume Two*, pages 116–139. Oxford University Press.
(2014). *Being Realistic About Reasons*. Oxford University Press.
Scheffler, S. (1982). *The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions*. Clarendon Press.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Schroeder, M. (2007). Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and 'Good'. *Ethics*, 117(2):265–295.

Schroeder, S. A. (2017). Consequentializing and its Consequences. *Philosophical Studies*, 174(6):1475–1497.

Sen, A. (1982). Rights and Agency. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 11(1):3–39.

(1983). Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12(2):113–132.

Setiya, K. (2018). Must Consequentialists Kill? *The Journal of Philosophy*, 115(2):92–105.

Shafer-Landau, R. (2012). *The Fundamentals of Ethics*. Oxford University Press, second edition.

Shaver, R. (2011). The Birth of Deontology. In Hurka, T., ed., *Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing*, pages 126–145. Oxford University Press.

Sidgwick, H. (1981). *The Methods of Ethics (seventh edition)*. Hackett.

Singer, P. (2011). One Mountain. *The Time Literary Supplement (May 20)*.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2015). Consequentialism. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2015 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/.

Sklar, L. (1975). Methodological Conservatism. *The Philosophical Review*, 84(3):374–400.

Skorupski, J. (2018). Review: On What Matters, Volume Three. *Mind*, 127(506):602–611.

Smith, B. (2010). *Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, H. M. (1988). Making Moral Decisions. *Noûs*, 22(1):89–108.

(2012). Using Moral Principles to Guide Decisions. *Philosophical Issues*, 22(1):369–386.

Smith, M. (2009). Two Kinds of Consequentialism. *Philosophical Issues*, 19(1):257–272.

Sorell, T. (2000). Politics, Power, and Partisanship. In Rynard, P. and Shugarman, D. P., eds., *Cruelty and Deception: The Controversy Over Dirty Hands in Politics*, pages 67–86. Broadview Press.

Stanford, P. K. (2001). Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously? *Philosophy of Science*, 68(3):1–12.

(2006). *Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives*. Oxford University Press.

(2017). Underdetermination of Scientific Theory. In Zalta, E. N., ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter 2017 edition. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-underdetermination/.

Stangl, R. (2020). Review: Derek Parfit, On What Matters: Volume III. *Utilitas*, 32(4):1–5.

Stratton-Lake, P. (2011). Eliminativism About Derivative Prima Facie Duties. In Hurka, T., ed., *Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing*, pages 146–165. Oxford University Press.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

(2016). Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding. In Shafer Landau, R., ed., *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, volume 11, pages 29–44. Oxford University Press.

Suikkanen, J. (2009a). Consequentialism, Constraints and The Good-Relative-To: A Reply to Mark Schroeder. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 3(1):1–9.

(2009b). Introduction. In Suikkanen, J. and Cottingham, J., eds., *Essays on Derek Parfit's On What Matters*, pages 1–20. Wiley-Blackwell.

(2014). *This is Ethics: An Introduction*. Wiley-Blackwell.

(2021). Ethical Theories as Methods of Ethics. In *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, volume 11, pages 247–269. Oxford University Press.

Tännsjö, T. (2002). *Understanding Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory*. Edinburgh University Press.

(2006). Understanding Through Explanation in Ethics. *Theoria*, 72(3):213–220.

Tenenbaum, S. (2014). The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 88(1):233–240.

Tersman, F. (1998). Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 48(192):359–365.

Timmermann, J. (2005). Why Kant Could Not Have Been a Utilitarian. *Utilitas*, 17(3):243–264.

Timmons, M. (2013). Introduction. In Timmons, M., ed., *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, volume 3, pages 1–12. Oxford University Press.

Trogdon, K. (2013). An Introduction to Grounding. In Hoeltje, M., Schnieder, B., and Steinberg, A., eds., *Varieties of Dependence*, pages 97–122. Philosophia Verlag.

Tropman, E. (2014). Varieties of Moral Intuitionism. *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 48(2):177–194.

Tulodziecki, D. (2012). Epistemic Equivalence and Epistemic Incapacitation. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 63(2):313–328.

(2013). Underdetermination, Methodological Practices, and Realism. *Synthese*, 190(17):3731–3750.

Vallentyne, P. (1988). Gimmicky Representations of Moral Theories. *Metaphilosophy*, 19(3–4):253–263.

Van Dyck, M. (2007). Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination. In Monton, B., ed., *Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, With a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen*, pages 11–31. Oxford University Press.

van Fraassen, B. (1980). *The Scientific Image*. Oxford University Press.

(2002). *The Empirical Stance*. Yale University Press.

(2007). From a View of Science to a New Empiricism. In Monton, B., ed., *Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen*, pages 337–383. Oxford University Press.

Väyrynen, P. (2006). Ethical Theories and Moral Guidance. *Utilitas*, 18(3):291–309.

(2013). Grounding and Normative Explanation. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 87(1):155–178.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014

Walzer, M. (1973). Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 2(2):160–180.

Woodard, C. (2013). The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act-Utilitarianism. *Utilitas*, 25(2):246–265.

Woodward, P. A. (2001). Introduction. In Woodward, P. A., ed., *The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Principle*, pages 1–4. University of Notre Dame Press.

Wright, C. (1992). *Truth and Objectivity*. Harvard University Press.

(1995). Truth in Ethics. *Ratio*, 8(3):209–226.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 15 Nov 2026 at 22:01:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009492454.014