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Oren Barak

INTRA-COMMUNAL AND INTER-COMMUNAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AND PEACE IN LEBANON

Recent contributions to the study of ethnic conflict, which attempt to explain why and under what circumstances members of ethnic groups, or communities,[1] mobilize and engage in violence, include several works that are inspired by the "security dilemma"—a basic concept of the realist tradition of international theory.[2] Barry Posen, for instance, argues that ethnic groups behave like sovereign states in the international system and are influenced by their proximity to other, similar groups in the same way that states are affected by their neighbors. Because security is the primary concern of these communities, each tries to enhance its security by strengthening its position. The actions the community takes, however, trigger the response of other groups, whose members intrinsically view it as offensive, regardless of its motives. A paradox thus emerges, as "what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure."[3]

This explanation of ethnic conflict, however insightful, overlooks the critical role of "ethnic entrepreneurs"[4]—actors operating within the community itself who mobilize its members hoping to maximize their own, particular gains. Indeed, while one can accept that security is a basic need of any human association (family, ethnic group, nation, state), it can be addressed in many ways. A process of internal competition, bargaining, and sometimes coercion among community members, each of whom has his own interests, positions, and goals, shapes the strategy that a given community adopts to satisfy its need for security. The outcome of this process need not be ethnic mobilization or inter-group conflict. After all, if all communities were inflexible with regard to their security needs, and if these needs could be satisfied only in a single manner—namely, by mobilization and ultimately conflict—why are all communities not engaged in eternal, unremitting quarrels? It is the internal pluralism of these groups, the incessant push and pull among their components, that enables them to fluctuate between coexistence and conflict. Whether they will eventually choose to resort to violence depends on the ability of these "entrepreneurs" to persuade, lure, or coerce their ethnic kin into preferring this path to others. It is at this point that pessimism

Oren Barak is a Fellow Researcher at the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; e-mail: msornb@mscc.huji.ac.il.

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based on a traumatic experience—a "fear of the future, lived through the past"[5]—or hubristic and imprudent optimism assume their critical and, at times tragic, role:

> In formulating political strategies, ethnic leaders anticipate the consequences of their within-group choices for relations with other groups and, in turn, incorporate the effects of their between-group choices into plans for dealing with their ethnic kin. These intergroup and intragroup interactions are intimately and necessarily integrated. Together, the choices made in these two arenas can combine to create a vicious cycle that threatens to pull multiethnic societies into violence.[6]

As far as the Middle East is concerned, these intra-communal "decision-making processes," as well as the interplay between them and the inter-communal arena, are all too often overlooked. Traditionally, studies on ethnicity in the region have focused on the relations between a religious (or national) majority and one or several ethnic minorities. Recent contributions have approached this topic from a broader theoretical and comparative perspective, yielding significant insights, but their attention to the inner complexity of the region's various communities, as well to the processes mentioned earlier and their inter-linkages, for the most part has remained limited.[7]

A case in point is Lebanon, a state that generally has been portrayed as an extreme case of ethnic pluralism and whose intricate intra-communal balance has more often than not been regarded as secondary in importance. This theme persists despite the fact that Lebanon's intra-communal equilibrium—or imbalance—has not only influenced the identity of each of its ethnic groups in itself, but also determined its position vis-à-vis other communities, the state, and regional and international actors. Indeed, while several intra-communal aspects of Lebanon's politics have been elucidated (these are discussed in more detail later), a systematic analysis of this dimension and of its interplay with inter-communal aspects has not been undertaken.

The main goal of this article is to fill this gap by integrating historical analysis and recent contributions to the study of ethnicity, conflict, and peace. My inquiry begins with a discussion of the state of the art on Lebanon's politics, which attests to an abundance of works on its inter-communal aspects and less consideration to its intra-communal dimension and the linkage between these two spheres. I then analyze a previously unexplored episode from the country's history—namely, the return of Fawzi al-Qawuqji to Tripoli on 4 March 1947—that attests to the importance of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics and its relationship with the inter-communal sphere. By discussing other, similar cases—in particular, the two civil wars of 1958 and 1975–90—I demonstrate how a better appreciation of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics, as well as of the close interaction between this aspect and the inter-communal sphere, enhances our understanding of the causes of conflict and peace in this state and particularly the state's "collapse"[8] in recent decades and the efforts to reconstruct it since the late 1980s.

TOWARD AN INTERACTIVE APPROACH

The study of ethnicity, which has reached a peak in recent years, has generated works that tackle this phenomenon in either "primordial" or "instrumental" terms and that attempt to reconcile these two apparently conflicting viewpoints. Proponents of the

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"primordial" perspective treat ethnicity as a cultural phenomenon that reflects basic human needs, and particularly a sense of belonging;[9] "instrumentalists" view ethnicity as a byproduct of man's continuous efforts to maximize his political, economic, and social gains.[10] Those who present a synthesis of these two approaches argue that ethnic groups possess both "primordial" and "instrumental" characteristics: while each group indeed has an "inventory" of shared myths, memories, symbols, and values, these inventories are constantly adapted to changing circumstances by being accorded new meanings and functions.[11]

Yet these perspectives, for all their contribution to the study of ethnicity, fail to take note of the ceaseless competition, bargaining, and sometimes coercion that take place within the ethnic group itself, as well as the considerable influence of intra-communal actors on the identities, positions, and goals of their communities. After all, ethnic groups, whether viewed as a "strategy for pursuing interests" or a "fundamental, primordial aspect of human existence and self-consciousness,"[12] are only rarely uniform entities, or worlds unto themselves. When considered closely, ethnic groups do not "dissolve before our eyes"[13] as one of the noted students of ethnicity and nationalism has cautioned. Rather, they appear to be amalgams, or clusters, of individuals and associations that possess their own beliefs, identities, interests, and goals that they constantly strive to promote and realize, either within the community's boundaries or beyond them.[14]

These last observations seem particularly appropriate to Lebanon, a state that has been generally approached from a primordial-cultural stance, and whose politics have often been explained in inter-communal terms.[15] To historians, including many Lebanese Christians, Lebanon has been a safe haven for persecuted religious sects, whose members found its mountainous terrain hospitable to their unique beliefs and practices.[16] Political and social scientists, for their part, have either complained about the state's "confessional" politics, which have impeded its modernization and political development,[17] or seen its vibrant political system as evidence that democracy based on power-sharing among differing ethnic groups can take root in the new states.[18] These differences of discipline, emphasis, and opinion notwithstanding, students of Lebanon have tended to assume the primacy of the inter-communal dimension of the country's politics and rarely concerned themselves with the ways in which the identities and demands of Lebanon's various communities are debated, negotiated, and formed.

The focus on the inter-communal aspect of Lebanon's political system indubitably stemmed from its accessibility—that is, from one's ability to grasp its dynamics by observing the state's constitution, election laws and formal institutions—where each community is represented according to its proportional strength. To appreciate the significance of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics, by contrast, one not only had to proceed beyond the ever dominant discourse on this state, which was conducted in ethnic (or sectarian) terms. One also had to unravel the myriad networks of relationships between large families and their clientele, as well as the changing alliances and rivalries among their chiefs. Yet when one indulged in such a task, politics and society in Lebanon could be understood in a far more comprehensive manner. After Abdo Baaklini, who focused on the inter-ethnic balance in the Lebanese Parliament during 1943–72, concluded that the increasing number of new members of Parliament (MPs) proved that this institution was changing over time, Samir Kha-

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laf, who explored the social background of all newly elected MPs, discovered that most of these "new faces" were in fact the sons and other close relatives of former MPs, thus demonstrating that the institution had retained its character as a stronghold of the country's large families throughout this period.[19] Indeed, because the quotas for all of Lebanon's communities within Parliament had remained more or less unchanged until the Ta'if Agreement of 1989—which replaced the traditional 6 : 5 ratio between the Christian and Muslim communities with 50 : 50 parity—the identity of the actors within the various groups themselves that were elected was at least as important as their ethnic affiliation.

As this last example suggests, intra-communal aspects of the Lebanese political system did not go entirely unnoticed. In 1968, Michael Hudson described Lebanon as a "precarious republic"—a delicate mosaic of mutually balancing sects, large families, geographical regions, and formal institutions. Although this thesis regarding Lebanon's "precariousness" has been contested, particularly now that Lebanon has managed to reassert itself in the aftermath of the civil war, this multiple balance of power, in which ethnicity represents one among several factors rather than the sole factor, remains the best model of its politics.[20] Other works have also contributed to appreciation of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics, highlighting the linkage between its intra-communal and inter-communal aspects. Crawford Young has argued that, "within the structural frame" of Lebanon's confessionalism, "the dominant pattern is patronage networks and cliques in fluid contention for such resources as are allocated through the formal political structures," whereas "at the summit, within the limits set by the national pact," a degree of consociational, inter-confessional, and non-ideological bargaining takes place.[21] Samir Khalaf, Michael Johnson, and others, in studies of the country's large families, have elucidated the intricate ways in which patronage networks between Lebanon's leaders and their clients are constructed and maintained through the allocation of resources in return for political support, which in turn enhances these leaders' position in the national sphere.[22] Nevertheless, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that an appreciation of Lebanon's "pluralism within pluralism"—the pronounced internal diversity within each of its communities—as well as its implications for the inter-communal dimension of its politics and society was never the dominant theme among the state's many students and observers, particularly before the second civil war.

The outbreak of the conflict—particularly of its first phase (1975–76), the high point of the discourse of enmity, fear, and violence—seemed to remove all doubts about the preponderance of the inter-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics.[23] In a typical piece from this period, Bernard Lewis rejected earlier notions that the conflict in Lebanon could be interpreted as one between opposing political and socio-economic positions, as certain participants and observers had suggested. Instead, Lewis argued that the conflict was in fact a war between Muslims and Christians whose beliefs were incompatible.[24] Others concurred, particularly those in the Phalanges Party, who, like other intra-communal players, pinned their hopes on regional and international support for their cause and argued that the war was being

> waged between Lebanon's Muslims and its Christians. . . . In our view, the underlying causes for this war, its distant–close, absent–present factor, is the violent push-and-pull between two

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fundamentally opposing positions: that of the Muslims, who are consciously allowed to live only in an Islamic state ruled by Muslim law, whose ruler is Muslim, with its Christians as second-class citizens (and Lebanon, thanks to its composition and its *raison d'être*, is not an Islamic state), and that of the Christians, who vehemently object to being second-class citizens.[25]

Even Hudson, who had earlier outlined the multi-faceted balance of power in the state in such eloquent terms, now argued that Lebanon's political system was "designed to cope with one problem above all others: Christian–Muslim hostility."[26] Others soon followed suit, claiming that Lebanon's enduring predicament inevitably stemmed from its creation as a multi-ethnic state in 1920,[27] or explaining its tragedy in terms of the conflicting historical narratives of its communities.[28] However, additional studies either highlighted peaceful periods in the country's earlier history,[29] or pinned its mishaps, old and new, primarily on the actions of foreigners who formed alliances with its communities to attain self-interested goals.[30] But the permutations of the ongoing conflict made it much more difficult to persist in interpreting Lebanese politics exclusively in inter-communal terms. By 1976, in his critique of the pre-war literature on Lebanon, Albert Hourani had underscored that:

> [Lebanon's] "communities" are not, beyond a certain limit, solid bodies having a single interest or attitude, and the division into religious communities is not the only division which can be made of the population of Lebanon, and in some ways may not be the most significant. We can now see that it is necessary to ask, exactly who in each community profits from the position it has in the political system?[31]

As the rival camps of the "two years' war" (1975–76)—inaccurately referred to as "Christian" and "Muslim," despite the fact that both included members of all ethnic groups in the state—gradually disintegrated, intra-communal power struggles were waged throughout the country and soon overshadowed most inter-communal rivalries.[32] In Beirut and elsewhere, traditional Sunni leaders were ousted by their former lieutenants, who now became leaders of powerful militias, as well as by other radical players, and their Shi'i counterparts in the south and the Biqa' lost their grip on their clients and were brushed away by the more radical, and blatantly rival, Amal and Hizballah. Meanwhile, Maronite-led parties, militias, and units of the Lebanese army engaged in bitter power struggles that abated only when the conflict in the country came to an end.[33]

These developments, which characterized the greater part of the conflict in Lebanon, rendered the inter-communal dimension of its politics insufficient as an explanation and elicited renewed interest in its intra-communal aspects and their effects on the inter-communal sphere.[34] Later developments—particularly the Ta'if Agreement, which facilitated the end of the war and the beginning of a process of reconstruction of the state and its formal institutions—have all demonstrated the remarkable diversity within the country's communities, and, one must add, would have been completely unattainable in its absence. Even the success of Syria, the only foreign actor that both could and would intervene continuously in Lebanon since 1976, in attaining its goals there is best explained by its leaders' ability to rally the support of many intra-communal actors rather than pin their hopes on an alliance with only one of its communities.

What follows from this discussion is a need for more attention to the intra-communal dimension of Lebanese politics, both in the present and in earlier periods of the

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country's history, which would employ recent contributions to the study of ethnicity and the causes of ethnic conflict and coexistence. By following this path, we would be able to balance—and complement—the extensive work done on Lebanon's inter-communal aspects and better appreciate the interactive and mutually nourishing relationship between these two dimensions. In the remainder of this paper, I will demonstrate how this need can be addressed.

AN ANATOMY OF INTRA-COMMUNAL CONFLICT

To capture the dynamics of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics, shed light on the workings of communal solidarity in Lebanon, and ultimately highlight the interplay between intra-communal and inter-communal aspects of its public life, I turn now to an analysis of a previously unexplored episode from the country's history: the return of Fawzi al-Qawuqji to Tripoli on 4 March 1947 and the ensuing clash between the supporters of two Sunni families, Karami and Muqaddam, who at the time were the prominent political actors in the city.

First, however, a clarifying remark is needed. Past attempts to read the world in small events[35]—that is, to investigate a certain event to deduce something about broader political or social phenomena—have elicited criticism concerning the difficulty of inferring an entire reality from a single instance or text.[36] What I will do here, by contrast, is analyze a historical episode using all the available evidence about it to arrive at initial observations about a certain socio-political phenomenon that I believe it represents. By looking into other, similar episodes, and employing theoretical tools, these observations can be tested and, if shown to be valid, form a basis for a more general theory of the phenomenon.

A Hero's Homecoming

On the morning of 4 March 1947, the city of Tripoli in northern Lebanon was preparing to welcome one of its best-known sons, Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who was returning home after more than two decades abroad. Ceremonial arches were erected in the streets in his honor, and groups of visitors from the Syrian cities of Homs and Hama poured in, carrying arms.[37]

This enthusiasm stemmed from the prestige Qawuqji had acquired during his long absence from the country and his reputation as a prominent Arab national leader. Born in Tripoli in 1887, Qawuqji was attracted to army life from his childhood and began his career in the military academy in Istanbul, graduating in 1912. He served in the Ottoman army during World War I, participating in several battles in Iraq and Palestine, and after the war's end returned to his hometown. Shortly thereafter, however, he joined Faisal's forces, where he served until their defeat by the French army in the battle of Maysalun in 1920. Qawuqji then joined the French local forces, but when the Druze–Syrian revolt erupted in the mid-1920s, he defected and, thanks to his military expertise, became deputy commander. He fought the French throughout the Levant and was captured and sentenced to death, but he managed to escape to Hijaz, passing through Amman, Jerusalem, and Cairo on his way. He then began to train the Saudi army, but in 1932, under suspicion as a spy, he left for Baghdad, where he

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became an adviser to King Faisal and an instructor at the Iraqi military academy. In August 1936, a few months after the outbreak of the Palestinian revolt, Qawuqji entered Palestine in command of a volunteer force of Iraqis, Transjordanians, and Syrians. He was recognized as the commander in chief of the revolt by local leaders, helped organize their forces, and fought several battles against the British, but he had to leave after the General Strike was called off by the Arab Higher Committee in October of the same year.[38]

By then Qawuqji had become so popular as an Arab national hero and symbol of the struggle against colonialism and Zionism that he could openly visit Damascus in October 1936, despite the death sentence issued against him there. The French military authorities demanded his immediate arrest, but the High Commission objected, fearing riots, and he left the country unhindered.[39] Local representatives of other Western powers did not overlook Qawuqji's rising popularity, particularly after the outbreak of World War II, and began considering how to make use of him. In September 1939, the British consul in Damascus, Gilbert Mackereth, reported that Qawuqji, now living in Baghdad, had received a large sum of money from the German legation to raise an armed force secretly in the outskirts of the capital, strike at the pumping stations of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and the H&T (Haifa and Tripoli) pipelines, and perhaps attack Syria. Mackereth concluded his telegram with the following proposition: "Al Kawokji [*sic*] is a good soldier, he is idle, and as the devil [i.e., Germany] may well find work for his idle hands, there might, therefore, appear to be grounds for finding regular employment for him."[40]

Two years later, Qawuqji again commanded a group of volunteers, who fought on the side of Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani's anti-British and anti-Hashemite rebellion in Iraq, which was supported by Germany. Wounded during an air raid, he was evacuated to Syria and flown by military plane to Berlin, where he remained until the end of the war. When the Nazi capital fell to the Allies, the Red Army took Qawuqji prisoner.[41] Four years earlier, in June 1941, after the Kaylani revolt had already been suppressed and its initiators had fled in all directions, the Iraqi government suggested to the British that Qawuqji might be employed against the Germans in Syria, given his public appeal and record as an ardent Arab nationalist. Qawuqji, it was argued, might be helpful in countering the weight of Palestinian Mufti Hajj Amin al-Huseini, his bitter rival and Germany's prominent ally in the Near East. It is noteworthy that British officials, especially those familiar with Qawuqji's reputation, were prepared to forgive him for his past activities against them in return for his cooperation.[42] But he had left the country at the beginning of the month, and the British recaptured Vichy-ruled Syria and Lebanon, paving the way for direct contacts with the local leadership.[43]

The Political Setting

After the war ended in Europe, Lebanese politicians began to show renewed interest in Qawuqji's fate, and efforts were made to bring him home. Senior officials, including President Bishara al-Khuri, his brother-in-law Foreign Minister Henri Pharoun, and former prime ministers ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami and Saʿdi Munla, both from Tripoli, sought to secure his release and return. They were joined by several Lebanese newspapers, which launched a campaign to clear Qawuqji of all accusations of cooperation

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with the Nazis, portraying him as a hero of the national struggle against imperialism.[44] These efforts bore fruit on 2 March 1947, when Qawuqji flew to Beirut from Cairo with his wife after having escaped from the Russian-occupied sector of Berlin to Paris, perhaps with the assistance of the French consul-general. In Paris, he received a Syrian passport from the Syrian legation and a visa to Egypt from its Egyptian counterpart, and from there he traveled to Egypt via the Lydda airport in Palestine.[45]

Before going into the details of the events that followed, a sketch of Lebanon's political scene on the eve of Qawuqji's return is in order. The last French soldier had left the country a few months earlier, and authority over the state's institutions had passed from the Mandatory power to its government. Like its neighbor Syria, Lebanon managed to secure unconditional French withdrawal, despite Paris's aspirations for a bilateral treaty that would grant it future privileges on Lebanon's soil. Having completed this task, Lebanon's leaders turned to carry out the first parliamentary elections in the era of independence, scheduled for late May 1947. The elections were to serve as a test for the country's senior politicians, who hoped to pack the chamber with loyal MPs. Maronite leaders such as President Khuri, Minister Camille Chamoun, and former Minister Hamid Frangieh—but also Minister Pharoun, a Greek Catholic[46]—were already vying for the presidency in 1949, when Khuri's term was scheduled to expire, and hoped to benefit from a sympathetic legislature that would elect them. To increase their chances, they contacted Sunni leaders who considered themselves candidates for the prime ministership, forming nuclei for broad multi-communal and multi-regional coalitions that were—and still are—a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for success in the Lebanese political system.

Khuri, for instance, was an ally of Prime Minister Riad Sulh of Beirut, his partner in the National Pact of 1943; Pharoun, one of the most powerful men in the country, was a rival of Sulh and an ally of the latter's rivals, former Prime Minister ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami, ʿOmar Bayhum, ʿAbdallah Yafi, and the Shiʿi leader Ahmad al-Asʿad from the south; Frangieh, from the northern town of Zagharta, was also close to Sulh but at odds with Pharoun and Karami, the latter being his regional rival; Chamoun, unlike other candidates from his community, did not have prominent Sunni allies but cooperated with Kamal Jumblat, a Druze leader from his region who advocated administrative reforms.[47]

Lebanon, having just won its independence, was thus in a political whirl of constant maneuvering. Alliances and coalitions formed and dissolved in preparation for the political struggles that lay ahead. These struggles were to be waged not only on the national level, or, thanks to the power-sharing settlement that accorded each community its proportional share in the state's institutions, on the inter-communal level, but also in the intra-communal and regional arenas. Many of the politicians mentioned earlier were leaders of large families and regional chiefs, whose dominance within their domain, as well as their position within their clan and community, depended on their ability to rally support and defeat their rivals. In many cases, these rivals were members of their own ethnic group.

From Cairo to Beirut

When Fawzi al-Qawuqji reached Cairo, the local authorities refused to let him in because his name appeared on a blacklist. He contacted Lebanese Consul-General

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Halim Abu ʿIzzeddin, whom he knew from Baghdad and who immediately came to his aid. In his memoirs, Abu ʿIzzeddin, later secretary-general of Lebanon's Foreign Ministry, recalls that he went to the airport and phoned Egyptian Prime Minister and Interior Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi. The prime minister, unlike his subordinates, had information about the newcomer, although it was "incomplete," and was initially hesitant to lift the ban on his entry. After persistent lobbying, he relented. The British ambassador reports that Abu ʿIzzeddin first contacted ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAzzam, secretary-general of the Arab League, who was "taken completely by surprise" by Qawuqji's arrival and instructed the airport officer to issue him a twenty-four–hour visa. ʿAzzam then called the prime minister, who was "furious" about Qawuqji's arrival and refused to allow him to stay, demanding that he leave at once. ʿAzzam pointed out that Egypt could not impose such treatment on "one who is regarded as a national hero," and the prime minister agreed to allow Qawuqji to stay for four days. The visitor set out for Cairo, where he remained for about ten days.[48]

As soon as Qawuqji entered Egypt, contacts were begun to facilitate his return to Lebanon. However, the available information about these contacts yields several contradictions. Qawuqji recalled that Pharoun informed him, through the local consulate, that there were apprehensions in Lebanon about his arrival because of his popularity there; it was thus preferable for him to enter Lebanon without prior notice.[49] Abu ʿIzzeddin writes that he phoned Pharoun and told him that Qawuqji had arrived in Egypt and was eager to return to Lebanon. The minister asked him to persuade the visitor to postpone his arrival because of the internal situation in Tripoli, which had become tense in view of the coming elections. When Qawuqji did arrive in Lebanon, Abu ʿIzzeddin adds, it was after the government had agreed to let him in, "believing the situation in Tripoli had already calmed."[50] However, on 1 March Houston-Boswall of the British Legation in Beirut reported that Qawuqji was expected to land in Beirut the following day. An official would meet him at the airport, and he would be taken directly to the home of Minister Pharoun, "who will tell him that he must behave himself and that he must not go to Tripoli (his home) where I understand large competing receptions (i.e., by opposing factions) are being prepared in his honour."[51] The situation in Tripoli was apparently not calm on the eve of Qawuqji's arrival in Lebanon, and tensions were rising.

As Qawuqji left Cairo by plane and landed in Beirut, rumors about his arrival spread quickly, and Munla and Karami, apparently after a briefing by Pharoun, hurried to welcome him at the airport. Karami, a powerful leader in Tripoli and northern Lebanon and one of the main figures in the Sunni community, offered the war hero a gold-plated antique sword, saying, "It is a humble gift, and I beg you to accept it. May he who masters the sword have the sword."[52] One source claims that Pharoun had asked Karami to welcome Qawuqji officially on behalf of the government,[53] and this partly supports the British report cited earlier. *Al-Diyar* added a conspiratorial flavor, reporting that Pharoun had given his ally Karami the exact time of Qawuqji's arrival and thus enabled him to reach the airport first and outmatch his rivals.[54] This claim is partly supported by Qawuqji himself, who later recalled that the news of his arrival in Lebanon had spread "in a strange manner." In his memoirs, however, Bishara al-Khuri writes that when Qawuqji arrived at the airport, "a large number of his fellow townsmen" and "some of his old friends," first among them Karami, "hurried

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to greet him,"[55] giving the impression that what took place there was spontaneous. In any case, after the reception at the airport, Qawuqji held several meetings with government officials, including Khuri, Sulh, and Pharoun. The possibility of his going to Tripoli was raised in these talks, but despite the tensions there, which by now were common knowledge, none of his hosts took serious steps to prevent it.[56]

Showdown in Tripoli

The period following the defeat of Faysal's forces by the French army at Maysalun and the subsequent formation of Greater Lebanon in response to the far-reaching demands of several leaders in the Maronite community, was a time of crisis for Tripoli, a city whose population had intimate political, social, and economic ties with the regions that would later make up Syria, and that was portrayed by many of its sons—and observers—as a defiant bastion of Arab nationalism.[57] Overshadowed by Beirut, the flourishing and cosmopolitan city that was now officially proclaimed the capital of Greater Lebanon—and, following the 1926 constitution, the capital of the Lebanese Republic—and harboring strong irredentist feelings toward the Arab hinterland, Tripoli's elites and masses were compelled to adjust to new political, social, and economic realities, and they did so only gradually and not without apprehensions.[58]

On the intra-communal level, too, Tripoli was ill at ease at this time. Its two largest and most powerful families, Karami and Muqaddam, both Sunni, were engaged in a long power struggle, and each mobilized its own "family party"—consisting of its members, allies, clients, and supporters—as its primary tool.[59] Members of the Karami family, considered the strongest in the city, were engaged in commerce and were property holders, and several of them held public office. ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami, the family's prominent leader during this period, was chief mufti of the city, like other members of his family before him, and a respected Arab national leader. His brother Mustafa was head of the city municipality, a post occupied before him by a third brother, Muhammad. The Muqaddams were also property holders, but although members of the family sometimes occupied the post of mufti, they could not match the religious and national prestige of their adversaries. They did, however, take part in politics and sent deputies to the Lebanese Parliament in 1933 and again in 1939.[60]

The rivalry between the two families was occasionally accompanied by violence, including clashes between their supporters, bombings, and assassination attempts directed at their prominent leaders. In June 1935, ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami shot ʿAbd al-Majid Muqaddam after the latter had beaten him with a stick and knocked off his turban, but thanks to his lawyer Bishara al-Khuri, the future president, Karami was acquitted on the ground of self-defense. Despite this ruling, conflict between the two families ensued.[61] In 1944, Karami, now Lebanon's prime minister, escaped an assassination attempt, allegedly made by members of the Muqaddam family; the perpetrators, who may have been assisted by the French, sought refuge in the Alawi region in Syria.[62] As the May 1947 date for elections drew nearer, the youth movements supporting the two families became involved in the struggle, hurling bombs at each other; conflict between the two parties reached its peak.[63]

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The blood feud in Tripoli was infamous, and regional and international actors became involved in it. In August 1935, after the incident described earlier, Palestinian Mufti Hajj Amin al-Huseini visited the city at the urgent request of Syrian nationalist leaders to attempt to bring about a settlement between the two families, "both supporters of the national cause." The contesting parties were reported to have settled their dispute out of court, with the Karami family agreeing to pay "blood money" to its opponents.[64] Representatives of the European powers were also drawn in. During the Mandate period, French authorities arrested ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami and deported him for Arab nationalist activity, while the British arrested Rashid Muqaddam, whom the French supported, for trying to suborn some of their personnel to smuggle drugs from Turkey. Spears, the British representative in the Levant in the early 1940s, writes that Muqaddam was handed over to the French, who tried him "with unusual expedition" and acquitted him not long before the 1943 parliamentary elections. The British reacted by sending troops to arrest Muqaddam, but the French made it clear that their men would be ordered to "resist by force of arms" if he was arrested, and that they would have Camille Chamoun arrested, as well, because "whereas Mukkadem [*sic*] was the French candidate for the elections in Tripoli, Camille Chamoun was the British candidate for another district, and such unfairness could not possibly be allowed."[65]

By the time Qawuqji arrived in Tripoli, the French and British were no longer in the country, but the two rival families in the city were still competing for hegemony. Learning that Qawuqji was expected, each side wanted to outshine the other by becoming the sole sponsor of someone symbolizing, and completely identified with, Arab nationalism. The altercation between the two parties over the privilege of hosting Qawuqji resulted in the following incident, described by a journalist from the *Bayrut* daily who seems to have been an eyewitness:

> The motorcade of the hero Fawzi al-Qawuqji drove . . . in the direction of Tripoli [in] a long column of cars. . . . National cries and songs were [heard] as it made its way to [Tripoli, Qawuqji's] birthplace and the city that has been engraved by an Arab sword and is now sharp and slashing in the face of Imperialism and Zionism in all their shapes. . . . [V]illagers along the way blessed al-Qawuqji, threw flowers at him and praised him until he reached al-Bihsas . . . where members [of youth organizations] awaited him with bands, flags, and all the people of Tripoli. When the motorcade arrived, the masses became elated and began applauding the Arab hero with cheers rising to heaven. Al-Qawuqji paused . . . and praised the honorable Arab people with both his hands and his eyes shed tears of joy and happiness—he, the hero who waged battles without fear. . . . Amidst this, no one noticed the glances of enmity exchanged by Mazhar al-ʿOmari [a Karami supporter] and Muhammad Hantur [a Muqaddam supporter] and the curses they poured upon each other. . . . The motorcade proceeded . . . until it reached Bab al-Raml, where the martyrs are buried . . . and the hero recited the al-Fatiha to the spirits of his heroic brothers. Then it renewed its journey . . . until it reached the al-Tall square in front of the Serail . . . bullets roared from all directions and were joyfully shot in the air, and again there were words exchanged by Mazhar al-ʿOmari and Hantur, and since the two men were pointing their pistols at each other shots were fired simultaneously and they fell rolling in blood in front of the eyes of the hero al-Qawuqji. Nafidh Muqaddam, who rode in the car behind Qawuqji, was also hit by two bullets in his chest and died in the hospital. A muddle ensued and shots were fired indiscriminately, and instantly 14 persons fell dead and 68 were wounded, and the magnificent festival turned into a bloody battlefield.[66]

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Analysis

The available sources on the clash in Tripoli conflict on almost every point and do not enable one fully to comprehend its details. Apart from the chaos characterizing the affair, this vagueness could be attributed to the fact that none of the parties involved was interested in getting to the truth. The Commission of Inquiry officially appointed to investigate the shooting claimed that the instigators "killed each other."[67] The president held that "the two sides . . . opened deadly fire on each other,"[68] a contention later echoed later by Qawuqji himself, as well as by other narrators of the clash.[69] Diplomatic reports were likewise inconsistent, each claiming that the other family had opened fire first, either to avenge an insult to its honor (Muqaddam) or to settle an open account (Karami).[70] Given this situation, one observer has noted that the compromise settlement that concluded the affair "provides for a complete 'white-wash' for most of those involved, except the dead."[71] The handling of this episode by the government, which was hardly superlative,[72] as well as the lack of sufficient evidence, leaves the particulars of this event unresolved. And yet, as far as the workings of Lebanon's political system are concerned, some important observations can be made.

Qawuqji's arrival in Lebanon, and his subsequent return to Tripoli, were encouraged by several intra-communal actors who sought to enhance their own position in the Lebanese political system by mobilizing the support of the Sunni population in the city and beyond. President Khuri, serving in a post allotted to a Maronite Christian according to the power-sharing settlement introduced in 1943, needed massive Muslim support to ensure his re-election, which was unconstitutional and required an amendment ratified by two-thirds of Parliament.[73] Thanks to his alliance with Riad Sulh, the powerful Sunni leader from Beirut, Khuri was less in need of support from other members of this community but seems to have encouraged the rise to power of Nafidh Muqaddam, Karami's local adversary, together with Sulh.[74] Minister Pharoun, a wealthy banker who led a "formidable, multi-sectarian coalition embracing notables of North Lebanon, the Biqa, and Beirut,"[75] considered himself a candidate for the presidency after Khuri's term expired, despite his ethnic affiliation (see earlier). To achieve this end, as well as to bolster his coalition, he urgently needed Sunni support, and his main ally in this community was former Prime Minister Karami, the influential leader from the north. Pharoun was therefore interested in seeing Karami elected to Parliament in 1947 and was reinforcing his position in the regional and national arenas so that they could both make their pitch for the two most important offices in the state or continue to play a key role in its politics.[76]

Karami himself also had good reasons for adding Qawuqji to his team. The political campaign orchestrated by his family had encountered serious difficulties. Several of the family's members, including Karami's brother Mustafa, head of the municipality, were involved in scandals and corruption. Karami's own opposition to President Khuri and his government led him to cooperate with "controversial" Lebanese figures such as former president Emile Eddé, a long-time supporter of France, and Ignatius Mubarak, the Maronite bishop of Beirut who had ties to the Zionist movement, both anathema to Arab nationalists. The campaign directed against the Sulh family and its party, the National Call (*al-Nida' al-Qawmi*), which opened a branch in Tripoli in 1944 in defiance of Karami's position there, proved futile. And finally, the violence used by

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Karami's lieutenants had alienated several local leaders, enabling his rivals to organize and effectively challenge his position.[77] Bringing Qawuqji into Karami's camp, would significantly boost his family's stumbling campaign and, perhaps, secure its victory in the elections. After all, was Qawuqji not a symbol of Arab nationalism? Had he not resisted imperialism and Zionism in all their forms? Did he not move freely throughout the Arab states, defying "artificial" borders and overcoming French, British, and Egyptian officials? Had he not repeatedly raised armies of volunteers to serve the national cause? Was he not returning now to his home, to write another glorious chapter in Arab national history? The power of the myth surrounding Qawuqji was already evident when he openly arrived in Damascus in 1936 and entered Egypt in 1947, as supporters and rivals alike were forced to yield to his prestige. This is neatly captured by Hassan Hallaq, who writes that, while "Lebanese political forces, including those in Tripoli, were trying to pull him to their side to attain political gains" from the upcoming elections, Qawuqji himself was preoccupied with winning Palestine.[78] A distinction is thus drawn between the leader symbol, who possesses a strategic, comprehensive vision, and the local politicians whose only consideration is the attainment of his immediate goals. Using Arnold Hottinger's phrase, one could argue that the latter were trying to utilize Qawuqji—the leader and the symbol—to mobilize communal identities that would "cement" their clientele and, at the same time, extend their influence beyond it.[79]

When pondering the events that preceded the violence in Tripoli, one can understand how the city's intra-communal balance was upset. Qawuqji's meetings with the leaders in Beirut—including the president, prime minister, foreign minister, Karami, and others—had completely disregarded the Muqaddams, dealing a blow to their political and social status. Although some high officials may have tried to dissuade Qawuqji (and Karami) from going to Tripoli, fearing a confrontation between its two rival factions, he proceeded with his plans. A few days after the clash, Pharoun expressed regret that Qawuqji "had not accepted his advice to spend several days in a quiet mountain resort."[80] But other sources suggest that it was the foreign minister himself who ensured that the visitor met the "right" people in Beirut—that is, his ally Karami and Munla, but not the Muqaddams. To a British diplomat Pharoun explained that "internal politics were the cause of the incident which did not owe its origin to Fawzi's arrival in any way: that was only an occasion for the inevitable clash."[81] It seems, however, that the events surrounding Qawuqji's arrival and stay in Beirut, in which the foreign minister himself played a part, had upset the delicate balance in Tripoli. It paved the road to renewed conflict between its leading families, whose leaders were determined to make the most of Qawuqji's homecoming or, alternatively, prevent their rivals from doing so.

Finally, the events in Tripoli caused considerable embarrassment to the Lebanese government, which was seen as incapable of controlling outbursts of internal strife. The re-establishment of order in the city required the arrival of Interior Minister Sabri Hamadeh, and the vulnerability of the police and gendarmerie, whose officers were also targeted during the clash, made it all the more necessary to deploy the army in the city. In addition to the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry, whose ambivalent conclusions were discussed earlier, the governor of the northern district, a Karami foe and Muqaddam supporter, was dismissed, along with Mustafa Karami.[82] This last step

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had already been considered—but not implemented—in January of the same year, after an earlier clash between supporters of the two families.[83] It is noteworthy that, although Qawuqji was privately asked by a gendarmerie officer to leave Tripoli after the funerals out of fear of renewed violence, both Prime Minister Sulh and President Khuri insisted that he had left the city willingly, "as would every intelligent and experienced man who loves his country."[84]

DISCUSSION

The intra-communal dimension of Lebanese politics, of which the events in Tripoli are an illustration, suggests that conflict in this state was by no means limited to the inter-communal sphere. However, one must also consider the role of Lebanon's intra-communal pluralism in facilitating the efforts of members of its communities to negotiate political agreements. In 1943, the intra-communal dimension of the state's politics was evident—and even crucial—during the quest for the National Pact, the inter-communal compromise that laid the foundations for Lebanon's political system for decades to come. Indeed, one could argue that the pact reflected, and emerged out of, internal power struggles within the Maronite and Sunni communities, the two most powerful ethnic groups in the state. As I pointed out earlier, broad multi-communal and multi-regional coalitions have been a necessary condition to bid for political power in Lebanon, and these could be assembled only by an agreement among several powerful intra-communal actors to work hand in hand, at least temporarily.

Yet the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics was also detrimental to the internal stability of the state, particularly since its independence in the mid-1940s. While intra-communal rivalries were evident in earlier periods, as well, the state and its institutions offered greater stakes and new opportunities for gaining and distributing public positions and resources. The destabilizing repercussions of intra-communal power struggles were felt several times in Lebanon's history. In 1952, violence again broke out between the Karami and Muqaddam families, this time over an impending visit to Tripoli by President Chamoun, which was believed to be aimed at reinforcing Rashid Karami, ʿAbd al-Hamid's son and heir, and weakening the Muqaddams. The same year, supporters of the Jumblat and Arslan families, two Druze clans whose struggle for dominance has been the hallmark of this community's politics for decades, clashed in Mount Lebanon.[85] In June 1957, on the eve of the parliamentary elections, members of the Frangieh and Duwayhi families, two rival Maronite clans from Zgharta, engaged in a shootout in a church in the nearby town of Mizyara, leaving many dead and wounded. As in Tripoli, this was the apex of a long power struggle over regional hegemony, exacerbated by rivalries on the national level (Father Samʿan Duwayhi, who was targeted during the clash, was supported by Chamoun, and the Frangiehs were the president's rivals). This rivalry abated only in the mid-1960s when the number of parliamentary seats allotted to the Maronites in the region was increased, enabling more family leaders to be represented there.[86] A struggle to dominate the region, become the prominent speaker of the community, and play a key role in the national arena—while enhancing one's position within one's own family—was evident in all these cases, and structural remedies could not always reduce its intensity.[87]

The significance of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics supports

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Hudson's early model of a multiple balance of power among large families, sects, regions, and institutions. It also calls attention to a significant weakness in the power-sharing settlement that was introduced in the 1940s: parliamentary elections, which were held every four years, had to take into account not only the interests of all of Lebanon's communities but also the aspirations of its powerful regional actors and large families. However, Lebanon's electoral system, which divides parliamentary seats among districts, then allots them to the various communities in each district according to their proportional strength, too often was incapable of meeting this onerous challenge. In the cases discussed earlier, this system, originally designed to reduce inter-communal conflict, instead encouraged an intra-communal struggle over the seats allotted to each constituency, occasionally leading to violence. Indeed, while inter-communal tensions were reduced through the formation of local lists of candidates representing several communities and broad, inter-communal coalitions on the national level, actors representing the same community were, in fact, pitted against one another. In 1943, during the efforts to reach a power-sharing settlement, this factor facilitated the formation of a multi-ethnic government whose members were united in their call for independence. In Tripoli in 1947, as in the other cases presented earlier, however, the elections intersected with intra-communal rivalry, which had already become a "zero-sum game," leading to violence and chaos. In these instances, the elections became an ultimate test of power and prestige to the contesting families, who were also the major political actors in their respective regions and therefore eager to win at all costs. It is against this backdrop that the Karami and Muqaddam families' efforts to mobilize the Sunni community in Tripoli should be explained. It also explains the violence between their supporters, who, like the Frangieh and Duwayhi families a decade later, were determined to deprive each other of victory.

To understand the importance of parliamentary elections to the intra-communal players in the Lebanese political system, as well as the occasional primacy of bullets over ballots, one must take into account the complex system of patronage that emerged between leaders and their supporters in the country. Victory in the elections offered the winner access to resources—funds from the state's coffers and jobs in the administration—that could be distributed among followers to reinforce the winner's power and influence. An electoral defeat, by contrast, could deprive a certain party of the spoils of government, thus weakening its position for some time. In the case of ʿAbd al-Hamid Karami, a landslide victory in the elections could have resulted in his inclusion among the *mustawzirīn*, the group of politicians from which government ministers are appointed, possibly leading to his renewed nomination as prime minister and the enhancement of his stature not only as the prominent leader of Tripoli and northern Lebanon but also in relation to other leaders in his community—particularly those from Beirut. Defeat, particularly by a list headed by a less prestigious family, would not only exclude Karami and his allies from the parliamentary seats allotted to their constituency, thus depriving him of the ability to hand out benefits to his present and potential supporters. It would also have devastating effects on his status in the country, the region, his community, and even within his own family.

With so much at stake, one can understand how the balance of power among intra-communal players often deteriorated into mutual hatred, encouraging them to use all means at their disposal to prevent their adversaries from attaining a decisive advan-

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tage. In the case of Tripoli in 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji's prestige as a national Arab leader was believed to have influence on the Sunni population, and his inclusion in—or sponsorship of—one of the competing lists of candidates headed by the two families could give it a substantial edge by mobilizing its members. This explains the city's patrons' race to the airport to be the first to greet him on his arrival, and the subsequent struggle over the privilege to serve as his host and welcome him in his hometown. It also explains their supporters' readiness to open fire when the situation seemed to be turning against one party's interest and in favor of the other's.

Having pinpointed the significance of the intra-communal dimension and its importance in Lebanon's politics, I will now examine its role in the two major conflicts that the country has known since its independence. As I will demonstrate, in both cases intra-communal rivalries encouraged and fueled inter-communal tensions. As David Lake and Donald Rothchild explain, "Within groups, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs may make blatant ethnic appeals and attempt to outbid moderate politicians, thereby mobilizing members, polarizing society, and magnifying the intergroup dilemmas."[88] However, in both cases, as in 1943, intra-communal differences also enabled the termination of the conflict and the re-establishment of peace.

The first civil war in 1958 is often explained in terms of regional rivalries in the Middle East between the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership, on the one hand, and the monarchies of Iraq and Jordan and the Lebanese Republic, on the other, as well as against the backdrop of the Cold War. It is better understood by referring to the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's political system and the interplay between the intra-communal and inter-communal realms.[89] Thus, following the parliamentary elections in 1957, which resulted in the defeat of several prominent leaders by their competitors and, consequently, challenges to their supremacy within their own communities and regions, a rebellion broke out in West Beirut (a stronghold of Saʾib Salam), Tripoli (Rashid Karami), the Biqaʿ (Sabri Hamadeh), the south (Ahmad Asʿad), and the Chouf Mountains (Kamal Jumblat), in protest of what was seen as an orchestrated effort by President Chamoun to lay the groundwork for his re-election and consequently to dominate the political system.[90] Leaders of the opposition, who regarded their electoral defeat as emanating from foul play on Chamoun's part, tried to overturn this outcome using whatever means they could. They proclaimed de facto autonomy in their regions; mobilized their clans, clients, and supporters; and organized militias that fought against the government and its allies.[91] In addition, they forged an alliance with the UAR, whose charismatic leader was highly popular among their followers and had been at odds with Chamoun for some time.[92] As the conflict escalated, both sides effectively manipulated communal solidarities to consolidate their supporters. Whereas the president and his aides—in particular, Foreign Minister Charles Malik—appealed to Christians' fears of domination by Nasser's alleged Pan-Arab schemes, as manifested in the UAR's establishment in 1958, the opposition tried to prove that Chamoun was unpopular in every community in the country, including his own.[93] Its members also applied continuous, and at times violent, pressure on his key Muslim supporters, Emir Majid Arslan (Druze), who served as minister of defense, and Sami Sulh (Sunni), a traditional leader from Beirut who was Lebanon's prime minister, to resign their posts, to dismantle the government

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and undermine the president's claim to be a national leader—that is, one who can speak in the name of all of Lebanon's communities and regions.[94]

A recent biography of Majid Arslan published in *al-Mukhtara*—the stronghold of the Jumblat family—suggests how this goal was attained. According to this account, Arslan and his armed supporters were advancing toward the Chouf on 12 May 1958, with the purpose of defeating his intra-communal rival, Kamal Jumblat. Before reaching its destination, however, the group came to a halt. Realizing that "he had fallen victim to an act of deceit designed to split the community," Arslan turned back and "hastened to return to Beirut."[95] What is significant about this account is the insight it gives us regarding the "politics of ethnic solidarity" in Lebanon—that is, the way in which actors could employ the collective identity of their community to outweigh their competitors, and, consequently, enhance their own position. In this case, a leader of one clan managed to deter another from forging an alliance with his rival and carrying out an attack against his regional base not only by virtue of his military superiority but also by appealing to a "higher authority" accepted by both leaders: the solidarity of their ethnic group. By portraying Arslan's actions during the 1958 crisis as illicit, because they could fracture the Druze community, Jumblat's own stance during this period was accorded legitimacy.

The unfavorable regional and international circumstances of the crisis in 1958 served only to exacerbate the internally based tensions in the country, as did the unrestrained pleas for outside support on the part of both sides.[96] This is illustrated by the fact that, after Chamoun's re-election plans were finally thwarted and the interests of the opposition leaders, as well as those of the president's allies, were again satisfied, most actors readily rejoined the political game after laying down their arms and dismantling their militias.[97] A new multi-communal and multi-regional coalition soon emerged that brought together the following actors:

> The Kataib [Phalanges], which found a meeting ground with the other groups in a common desire for moderate political improvements and which also wanted power; the Armenian Tashnaq; the Assaad [As'ad] bloc in South Lebanon; the Jumblat–PSP [Progressive Socialist Party] bloc in the Chouf and parts of Beirut and the Biqa; the Dustour [Khuri's Constitutional bloc]; the Sunni notables of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida (although their support was not uniform); and various "giants" of outlying regions, like S[u]leiman Frangieh (brother of Chamoun's rival), René Moawad, Fuad Ghusn, and Sabri Hamadeh.[98]

The underlying causes of the second civil war that plagued Lebanon in many respects were similar to those that had generated earlier conflicts in the country. The Palestinian national movement, which reasserted itself in the mid-1960s, particularly following the Arab–Israeli war of 1967, had an enormous impact on many Lebanese—reminiscent of Qawuqji's influence in Tripoli in 1947 and of Nasser's appeal in 1957–58—and traditional Muslim leaders and leftist and Pan-Arab movements began to outbid one another by offering it their unequivocal support. Whereas the more traditional Muslim leaders tried to "cement" their patronage networks with their communities by aligning with the Palestinian cause, their intra-communal competitors hoped that an alliance with the armed Palestinian factions would help them out-maneuver the traditional leaders, thus facilitating their own participation in politics.[99]

At the same time, other political actors, particularly in the Christian communities,

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began to warn that the armed presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in various areas in Lebanon jeopardized the country's sovereignty. When the government in Beirut proved unable to meet their demands to restore law and order throughout the state—as was the case during the 1969 and 1973 clashes between the PLO and the Lebanese army, which led to the bilateral Cairo Agreements and its annexes enabling the Palestinian factions to operate in many of its areas—these actors began to mobilize their communities to compensate for its ineffectiveness.[100] As the grievances of the Muslims, by then the majority in Lebanon, seemed to mesh with the military power of the Palestinians and the radical platform of their factions, these groups strove to become political forces in their own right by playing on the mounting fears of their communities, whose political supremacy in the state was under challenge. When the war began, they put their efforts into "sectarianizing" the conflict, a tactic that proved extremely successful.[101] More conservative actors who wanted to retain their relevance felt compelled to adopt uncompromising positions, as well. But as the conflict escalated, deepened, and lingered, the radicals outweighed the moderates, and a new generation of military chiefs, who claimed to be champions of the Maronite, Christian, and Lebanese causes, chipped away at the bases of their power.

Lebanon's Shiʿi community, whose members were firmly in the palm of their leadership's hand until 1975, also underwent what amounted to an internal revolution during this period. New actors, Amal and Hizballah, sought to represent it and posed an effective challenge to the government in Beirut. Here again, communal identities were exploited outwards, against an "oppressive" government that disregarded Lebanon's "majority," and inward, against the traditional leaders who failed to attend to their communities' needs.[102] As was the case almost everywhere else, however, these newcomers were soon at odds: unable to establish its own "canton" because of the geographical dispersion of the Shiʿi community, Amal supported the restoration of central authority in Lebanon, presented a non-sectarian political platform that called for social justice, and forged a political alliance with Damascus. Hizballah, by contrast, promulgated an Islamic program with a distinctive Shiʿi flavor and, although it was a local non-state actor, maintained its close ties with Iran. It is thus not surprising that these two movements repeatedly clashed and tried to outbid each other by adopting hardline positions toward the government and resisting Israel's occupation of the south.

The Druze community, by contrast, was continuously dominated by the Jumblat family, led by Kamal Jumblat and, following his assassination in 1977, by his son Walid. Throughout the war, the PSP, the family's political and military arm, strove to lead the opposition to the prevailing political and socio-economic order in Lebanon, as it did in the previous conflict, while drawing its support from an effective blend of communal–regional solidarity, a defiant leftist and Pan-Arab stance, and alliances with foreign forces (first the Palestinians and later Syria). Thanks to this policy, the Jumblats were again able to marginalize their primary intra-communal rivals, the Arslans, whose leaders played only a minor role during this period, and could speak in the name of their community in an uncontested manner.[103]

It was this remarkable intra-communal diversity, however, that made the ending of the Lebanese conflict and the restoration of peace attainable. Just as the leaders of families, parties, and militias could mobilize members of their own communities to engage in conflict, either on the intra-communal or on the inter-communal level, by adopting

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uncompromising positions that would offset those of their competitors, these leaders could later do the opposite. They could persuade their public that the time had come to disengage from the conflict, and ultimately demobilize it, when it suited their interests and, more important, when the benefits of a political settlement could be presented as exceeding the war's costs. Indeed, as new opportunities loomed for the termination of the conflict, particularly after the "constitutional vacuum" of 1988, which was a "mutually hurting stalemate" for all sides, moderate positions again appeared to provide the means to gain access to government resources. By adopting them, one could try to become part of the new political system, leaving one's rivals to struggle with the regional and international forces, including Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Arab League, and the United States, that were strenuously pushing for a swift end to the conflict.

Amal, for instance, was eager to take part in the political game, but this was unthinkable so long as the conflict lingered and the state's highest posts were occupied by traditional leaders or remained vacant altogether. Once the war was brought to an end, however, Amal immediately became a political actor, and its leader, Nabih Berri, was elected speaker of Parliament, a post previously held by traditional Shi'i leaders. Hizballah, Amal's main rival in the community, could not afford to lag. After parliamentary elections were scheduled for 1992, it decided to participate in politics, as well, jettisoning its revisionist dreams with respect to the Lebanese state. In other communities, too, those actors that decided to take part in the post-war system had a decisive edge over those that had chosen not to play by the new "rules." During the first parliamentary elections, for instance, several groups speaking in the name of the Christian communities decided not to participate in protest of Syria's massive influence over Lebanon and the continued presence of its army on its soil. But the result was that candidates who accepted the new political reality won the seats allotted to their communities in all districts, leaving the hard-liners out of power. Opposition leaders were forced to rethink their position, and in the subsequent elections in 1996 and 2000, more players decided to take part.

But this moderating characteristic of the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's political system—the encouragement of pragmatism and realpolitik among its actors—should not lead one to discount the harmful consequences of intra-communal rivalries for the stability of the state before the recent conflict and its contribution to its collapse. Indeed, the process of ethnic radicalization in Lebanon, initiated by players who sought to mobilize their communities to pave their way into the political arena and thereby depose their ethnic kin, made it much more difficult to alleviate the conflict. Having committed themselves to uncompromising positions ("A Christian Lebanon," "An Islamic State"), Lebanese leaders were unable reach common ground without being tarred with the brush of "selling out" their communities. They had to wait until the war became so unbearable that a change of positions became legitimate again.[104]

CONCLUSION

More than a decade after the end of the civil war in Lebanon, there are many explanations for the collapse of the state and its recovery, but there is little consensus regard-

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ing their causes. In an effort to add to this ongoing debate, this article has focused on a factor that contributed significantly to conflict in Lebanon but that was also crucial to its resolution. Unlike other explanations for the civil war of 1975–90 and other instances of conflict in Lebanon's modern history, which stress the inherent incompatibility of its various communities, the failed efforts to modernize the state, or the disruptive actions of foreign actors, I have chosen an alternative path. Viewing Lebanon's communities as dynamic arenas for debate and bargaining, I have demonstrated how the state's various intra-communal actors, in their efforts to maximize their own attainments, attempted to represent their groups and dissuade or outbid their competitors, thus promoting inter-communal coexistence but also enhancing inter-communal discord. The advantages of this approach are that it underscores ethnic mobilization as a dynamic process, avoiding the pitfall of essentialism—that is, of regarding ethnic groups as rigid, homogeneous, and unchanging entities—and that it helps explain the motives for intercommunal conflict and cooperation.

My inquiry into the intra-communal dimension of Lebanon's politics since its independence suggests that this aspect has not only had substantial bearing on the inter-communal sphere but that it also has been an important source of political tension—and, at times, accommodation—in itself. Indeed, while the power-sharing arrangement and its devices allayed the friction between Lebanon's communities by introducing mechanisms that enabled its political system to work smoothly during 1943–75, they also encouraged intra-communal struggles for hegemony in various regions, occasionally leading to violence. During the first part of this period, intra-communal rivalries enabled the formation of inter-communal and inter-regional coalitions, thus encouraging moderation and pragmatism. Later, however, this feature became extremely destabilizing, as new actors tried to penetrate the tightly knit political arena by adopting radical positions that undermined the dominant position of the more traditional players. A discourse of fear, violence, and hatred has thus developed among Lebanon's communities, rendering compromise more difficult than ever before,[105] and the conflict could be brought to an end only after all its participants were totally, and indubitably, exhausted.

NOTES

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[1]In *Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 190, Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff define ethnic groups as "composed of people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on shared experiences and cultural traits. They may define themselves, and be defined by others, in terms of any or all of the following traits: lifeways, religious beliefs, language, physical appearance, region of residence, traditional occupations, and a history of conquest and repression by culturally different peoples." According to Gurr and Harff, ethnic groups are also called communal groups. In this paper, the terms "ethnic groups" and "communities" are used interchangeably.

[2]*Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael Brown (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). For a critique, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 95.

[3]Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, 104.

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[4]Nelson Kasfir, "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation," *World Politics* 31 (1979): 365–88.

[5]David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict," in idem, *International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, 7.

[6]Ibid., 9.

[7]Albert H. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947); *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East*, ed. Ronald D. McLaurin (New York: Praeger, 1979); *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*, ed. Milton Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); *Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East*, ed. Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes, and Collin Campbell (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in the Arab World," *International Social Science Journal* 156 (1998): 230–42; *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Leonard Binder (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999); Moshe Maʿoz, *Middle Eastern Minorities: Between Integration and Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999); *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*, eds. Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Exceptions are Roger Owen, "The Politics of Religion," in idem *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1992), 166–96, and Ian S. Lustick, "Hegemony and the Riddle of Nationalism," in Binder, *Ethnic Conflict*, 332–59.

[8]I. William Zartman, Collapsed States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[9]For recent primordialist approaches to ethnicity, see Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16 (1993): 373–89; Steven Grosby, "The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of Primordiality—A Response to Eller and Coughlan," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (1994): 164–71.

[10]For instrumentalist approaches, see Hudson Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 12 (1989): 309–28; Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (New Delhi: Sage, 1990); Robert H. Bates, *Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1999). For an instrumental approach to ethnicity in Lebanon in the post–civil-war period, see Sami Ofeish, "Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 21 (1999): 97–116.

[11]James McKay, "An Exploratory Synthesis of Primordial and Mobilizationalist Approaches to Ethnic Phenomena," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5 (1982): 395–420; Barbara B. Lall, "Perspectives on Ethnicity: Old Wine in New Bottles," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6 (1983): 154–173; Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); George M. Scott, Jr., "A Resynthesis of the Primordial and Circumstantial Approaches to Ethnic Group Solidarity: Towards an Explanatory Model," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (1990): 147–71; James Kelass, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991); Milton Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); Richard Jenkins, "Ethnicity *Etcetera*: Social Anthropological Points of View," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (1996): 807–22.

[12]Lall, "Perspectives on Ethnicity," 154; Jenkins, "Ethnicity *Etcetera*," 811.

[13]Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 2.

[14]See, for example, I. McAllister, "Class, Region, Denomination, and Protestant Politics in Ulster," *Political Studies* 31 (1983): 275–83.

[15]Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. idem (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 293–97; *Politics in Lebanon*, ed. Leonard Binder (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Iliya F. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (1972): 303–23; Abdo Baaklini, "Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Lebanon," in *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*, ed. William McCready (New York: Academic Press, 1983), 17–56; Hilal Khashan, *Inside the Lebanese Confessional Mind* (Lanham, N.Y.: University Press of America, 1992); Joseph Abu Khalil, *Lubnan . . . Limadha* (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbuʿat, 1993); Walid Phares, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[16]Phillip K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History* (London: Macmillan, 1957); Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965); Iliya F. Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968).

[17]Leila T. Meo, *Lebanon: Improbable Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," in Binder, *Politics in Lebanon*, 187–212; Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic* (New York: Random House, 1968); Elie A. Salem,

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Modernization Without Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). Adherents of Pan-Arab, Pan-Syrian, and various leftist doctrines also objected to Lebanon's "political sectarianism," which they saw as a superficial factor impeding the realization of their goals: cf. Anis al-Sayigh, *Lubnan al-Taʾifi* (Beirut: al-Siraʿ al-Fikri, 1955).

[18]Gerhard Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon," in *Consociational Democracy*, ed. Kenneth D. Mcrae (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), 90–97; David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism* (New York: Elsevier, 1975); Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

[19]Abdo I. Baaklini, *Legislative and Political Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1976); Samir Khalaf, "The Parliamentary Elite," in *Electoral Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Jacob Landau, Ergun Ozbudun, and Frank Tachau (London: Croom Helm and Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 243–71.

[20]Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 3–13. For a critique, see Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993).

[21]Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 420–21.

[22]Samir Khalaf, "Changing Patterns of Political Patronage in Lebanon," in *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977), 185–205; Michael Johnson, "Political Bosses and Their Gangs: Zuʾama and Qabadayat in the Sunni Muslim Quarters of Beirut," in ibid., 207–24, and idem, *Class and Client in Beirut* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986); Wade R. Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon, 1943–1976* (London: Ithaca Press, 1985); Michael Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996).

[23]Authors who stress the role of fear in the process of ethnic mobilization in Lebanon are Wadi Haddad, *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors* (New York: Praeger, 1985), and Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon.* This view is similar to Posen's inter-ethnic security dilemma.

[24]Bernard Lewis, "Right and Left in Lebanon," *New Republic*, 10 September 1977, 20–23. Lewis later observed that the collapse of the state in Lebanon has led to the breakdown of identities "from national to ethnic to tribal, from patriotic to regional to local, from religious to sectarian to factional": idem, *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 98.

[25]Amin Naji (Antoine Nijm), *Lan Naʿish Dhimmiyyin* (Beirut: al-Matbaah al-Haditha, 1979), 6.

[26]Michael C. Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 5 (1976): 114.

[27]Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[28]Kamal S. Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988).

[29]Engin D. Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[30]Marwan Buheiry, "External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770–1982," in *The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World*, ed. Laurence I. Conard (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1987), 129–39; Kirsten E. Schulze, *Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon* (Houndmilles, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998); Farid el-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967–1976* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

[31]Albert Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City," in *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, ed. Roger Owen (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 34.

[32]Antoine Nasri Messarra, "Maʿdalat al-Musawaa wa-al-Musharaka fi Andhimat al-Hukum al-ʿArabia: al-Hala al-Lubnaniyya," *al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi* 119 (1989): 65; Ibrahim, "Ethnic Conflict and State-Building," 234.

[33]These included the violent struggles between the Phalanges led by the Gemayel family and Frangieh's al-Marada in 1978; the confrontation between the Phalanges and Chamoun's National Liberal Party and its Tigers militia in 1980; the conflicts within the Lebanese Forces (LF) in 1985–86; and the clashes between the LF and the Christian-dominated units of the Lebanese army under the command of General Michel Aoun in 1989–90.

[34]See, for example, Richard H. Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon," *Comparative Politics* 10 (January 1978): 256; Johnson, *Class and Client*; Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Karim Baqarduni, *Laʿnat Watan* (Beirut: ʿAbra al-Sharq,

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1991). See also Meir Zamir, *Lebanon's Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926–1939* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).

[35]Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 417–53; Robert Darnton, "Workers Revolt: The Great Cat Massacre of the Rue Saint-Séverin," in idem, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 75–104; Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2–5.

[36]Roger Chartier, "Text, Symbols and Frenchness," *Journal of Modern History* 57 (1985): 682–95; Robert Darnton, "The Symbolic Element in History," *Journal of Modern History* 58 (1986): 218–34; Harold Mah, "Suppressing the Text: The Metaphysics of Ethnographic History in Darnton's Great Cat Massacre," *History Workshop Journal* 31 (1991): 1–20.

[37]*Bayrut*, 5 March 1947; ibid., 6 March 1947; Bishara Khalil al-Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3 vols. (Daroun-Harisa: Awrak Lubnaniyya, 1960), 3:23; Akram al-Hawrani, *Mudhakkirat*, 4 vols. (Cairo: Madbuli, 2000), 1:628.

[38]Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 2 vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 2: 215, 349–50; Hassan Hallaq, *Mawqif Lubnan min al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya* (Beirut: Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1982), 38, 161; Halim Sa'id Abu 'Izzeddin, *Tilka al-Ayyam* (Beirut: al-Afaq al-Jadida, 1982), 246–47; Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 171–73, 546–48.

[39]Gilbert Mackereth, Foreign Office (hereafter, FO), 31 December 1936, in *Despatches from Damascus*, ed. Michael G. Fry and Itamar Rabinovich (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University and University of Southern California, 1985), 162.

[40]Ibid., 26 September 1939, in Fry and Rabinovich, *Despatches from Damascus*, 221. For Qawuqji's activities against the Iraqi government in the summer of 1940, see Sir B. Newton, FO, 19 July 1940, 6 August 1940, in *Arab Dissident Movements, 1905–1955*, 4 vols. ed. A. L. P. Burdett, (London: Archive Editions, 1996), 3:279–80.

[41]Hallaq, *Mawqif Lubnan*, 161. The Palestinian mufti published a booklet criticizing Qawuqji's activities in Iraq, claiming he was not Arab and denouncing him as a British agent: *Tarjamat Hayat al-Batal Fawzi al-Qawuqji* (Berlin: Maktab al-Mufti al-Akbar, n.d.); *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, ed. Khayriyya Kasimiyya (Beirut: al-Quds, 1975); *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, ed. Khayriyya Kasimiyya (Beirut: Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya and al-Quds, 1975); Fawzi al-Qawuqji, "Memoirs, 1948," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 1 (1972): 27; *Bayrut*, 13 February 1947.

[42]Commander-in-chief of forces in the Middle East–Prodrome, Baghdad, n.d., Baghdad, FO, 10 June 1941; Sir Harold Macmichael, Secretary of State (hereafter, SOS) for Colonial Affairs, 13 June 1941, Baghdad, FO 13 June 1941, Public Records Office (hereafter, PRO), FO 371/27334.

[43]Baghdad, FO, 29 June 1941, PRO 371/27334.

[44]Bertel E. Kuniholm, State Department (hereafter, SD), 4 March 1947, in *Lebanon's Struggle for Independence*, 2 vols., ed. Walter L. Browne (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980), 2:155–56; *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 114, 121; Bertel E. Young, FO, 20 February 1947, W. E. Houstoun Boswall, FO, 24 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138. According to Akram al-Hawrani, during this period Qawuqji approached Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam to secure his return: *Mudhakkirat*, 1:629.

[45]Qawuqji was not detained by the local British authorities because of negligence, despite the fact that they had ample grounds to detain him. Although no deportation order from Palestine or arrest warrant had been issued against him, his name appeared on a list of people to be arrested immediately on entering Palestine. This embarrassed the British government, but in response to inquiries by opposition MPs, the colonial minister informed Parliament that the government had no intention of demanding Qawuqji's extradition: Sir Alan Cunningham, SOS of Colonies, 20 February 1947; Berlin, FO, 3 March 1947; Berlin, FO, 8 March 1947; Berlin, FO, 15 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138. The High Commissioner in Palestine reported that "Quwajji" and his spouse carried Syrian passports and transit visas issued to "Mr. and Mrs. Kaouski Fouazzi," thus deceiving the authorities: Cunningham, SOS of Colonies, 24 February 1947, 25 February 1947, 28 February 1947, 2 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138; *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 116–17; *Bayrut*, 13 February 1947; *The Times of London*, 5 March 1947.

[46]In this period, the allocation of higher government posts to members of the Maronite, Sunni, and Shi'i communities was still not as rigid as it would later become. In 1946, for instance, a Greek Orthodox,

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Habib Abu Shahla, was elected speaker of Parliament, a post reserved for a Shiʿi. On Pharoun's position, see also Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 131, 138–39.

[47]Houstoun Boswall, FO, "Summary of Events in the Lebanon During the Year 1947," 25 February 1948, PRO FO 371/68495. See also Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 149.

[48]Abu ʿIzzeddin, *Tilka al-Ayam*, 251; Hallaq, *Mawqif Lubnan*, 161; Campbell, FO, 25 February 1947, and Talbot, FO, 28 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138. The diplomatic reports suggest that the two Egyptian officials' surprise and fury were "staged," given that their own consulate in Paris had issued Qawuqji a visa.

[49]*Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 121; Hallaq, *Mawqif Lubnan*, 161.

[50]Abu ʿIzzeddin, *Tilka al-Ayam*, 251.

[51]Houstoun Boswall, FO, 1 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[52]*Bayrut*, 4 March 1947; Kuniholm, SD, 4 March 1947, in Browne, *Lebanon's Struggle*, 2:155–56.

[53]"On Qawuqji," 12 March 1947, Israel State Archives (hereafter, ISA) 2569/19.

[54]*Al-Diyar*, 6 March 1947.

[55]Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:23.

[56]Ibid.; Kuniholm, SD, 4 March 1947, in Browne, *Lebanon's Struggle*, 2:155–56.

[57]Rizq Rizq, *Rashid Karami* (Beirut: Mukhtarat, 1987), 3–4, 18; Shawqi Kheirallah, *Mudhakkirat* (Beirut: al-Jadid, 1990), 438. Robert De Caix, a French journalist whose views played a central role in formulating his country's policy in the Levant during this period, strongly opposed Tripoli's annexation to Grand Liban, describing it as a "Sunni Muslim centre, somewhat fanatical, with no wish to be incorporated into a country with a Christian majority": as quoted in Zamir, *Formation*, 92.

[58]Muhammad Nur al-Din ʿArif Miqati, *Tarablus fi al-Nisf al-Awal min al-Qarn al-ʿIshrin* (Tripoli: Dar al-Insha', 1978), 156–60. It is noteworthy in this regard that Lebanon's first Sunni prime minister, Kheir Eddin al-Ahdab, was from Tripoli, and that his acceptance of this position elicited criticism among other leaders of the community: Salibi, *House of Many Mansions*, 183.

[59]Richard Pearse, *Three Years in the Levant* (London: Macmillan, 1949), 161–63; Raphael Patai and Fahim I. Qubain, "The Town," in *The Republic of Lebanon*, 2 vols., ed. Raphael Patai (New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), 1:242–44; John Gulick, *Tripoli: A Modern Arab City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 34, 177–83.

[60]Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:23; Samih Wajih al-Zayn, *Tarikh Tarablus* (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1969), 378; Malcolm B. Russell, *The First Modern Arab State* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1985), 28.

[61]Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 1:193; *al-Ahram* (Cairo), 6 March 1947.

[62]George Wadsworth, SD, 24 January 1945, in *Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: Lebanon 1945–1949* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), microfilm. A British agent who was in the city at the time claims that the pro-French "Omary" family was responsible for the attempt: Pearse, *Three Years in the Levant*, 161.

[63]*L'Orient*, 5 October 1946.

[64]Mackereth, FO, 1 October 1935, in Fry and Rabinovich, *Despatches from Damascus*, 110.

[65]Sayigh, *Lubnan al-Ta'ifi*, 144; Edward Spears, *Fulfillment of a Mission* (London: Leo Cooper, 1977), 221–22; "Record of a Meeting Held in Secretary of State's Room, FO, July 14, 1943," PRO FO 371/35179; Wadsworth, SD, 16 August 1943, in *The Political History of Lebanon, 1920–1950*, ed. Walter L. Browne, 2 vols. (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1977), 2:404–405; Asher Susser, "Western Power Rivalry and Its Interaction with Local Politics in the Levant, 1941–1946" (Ph.D. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1986), 322; A. B. Gaunsen, *The Anglo-French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940–45* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 114–16.

[66]*Bayrut*, 5 March 1947. See also *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 121–22; Kuniholm, SD, 4 March 1947, in Browne, *Lebanon's Struggle*, 2:155–56; Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:23–24; "On Qawuqji"; Houstoun Boswall, FO, 5 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138. Among the dead and wounded were several visitors from Hama: Hawrani, *Mudhakkirat*, 3:628; Miqati, *Tarablus*, 171; Muhammad Kamil al-Baba, *Tarablus fi al-Tarikh* (Tripoli: Jurrus Press, 1995), 314–19.

[67]Lowell C. Pinkerton, SD, 7 May 1947, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*; Baba, *Tarablus fi al-Tarikh*, 318.

[68]Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:24.

[69]*Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 122; Hawrani, *Mudhakkirat*, 3:628–29; Baba, *Tarablus fi al-Tarikh*, 318; Miqati, *Tarablus*, 171.

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[70]According to the American report, a member of the Muqaddam clan offended the Karami family, whose follower fired the first shot: Pinkerton, SD, 7 May 1947, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*. See also "The Electionary Situation in the North Lebanon District," 29 April 1947, PRO FO 1018/26. Another report claims that the Muqaddam clan, offended by Pharoun's refusal to let them host Qawuqji, opened fire first: "On Qawuqji."

[71]Pinkerton, SD, 7 May 1947, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*.

[72]The civil war in 1958 ended with a formula of "neither victor nor vanquished" and amnesty for all crimes committed during its course. A similar arrangement terminated the 1975–90 conflict, paving the way for the inclusion of most militia leaders in the Government of National Reconciliation. In peacetime, too, offenders enjoyed the mercy of the authorities. In 1947, Chief Justice Alfred Thabit, president of the Court of Appeal, complained that he and his colleagues were "under constant pressure" from government officials to quash indictments, postpone sentences, impose minimum punishments, facilitate appeals, and attenuate judgments "in the entire gamut of law-breaking from misdemeanors to serious crimes": Pinkerton, SD, 7 May 1947, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*.

[73]This was finally achieved in 1948, during the first Arab–Israeli War.

[74]Miqati, *Tarablus*, 170.

[75]Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 138.

[76]Wadsworth, SD, 10 September 1945, Mattison, SD, 29 January 1946, Pinkerton, SD, 19 March 1947, 12 April 1948, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*; Kuniholm, SD, 4 March 1947, in Browne, *Lebanon's Struggle*, 2: 155–56; Young, FO, 20 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[77]Miqati, *Tarablus*, 84, 186; Wadsworth, SD, 17 February 1945, in *Lebanon 1945–1949*; "Conditions in Tripoli," 2 June 1947, "The Electionary Situation in the North Lebanon District," 29 April 1947, PRO FO 1018/26; *al-Diyar*, 21 January 1947; Eyal Zisser, *Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 131.

[78]Hallaq, *Mawqif Lubnan*, 38; See also Hawrani, *Mudhakkirat*, 1:629.

[79]Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective" in Binder, *Politics in Lebanon*. 96. Quoted in Roger Owen, "The Political Economy of Grand Liban," in idem, *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon*, 25.

[80]Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:23–24; Houstoun Boswall, FO, 5 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[81]Houstoun Boswell, FO, 5 March 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[82]*Bayrut*, 5 March 1947; Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:24; "Lebanon: Summary No. 8," 6 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[83]"Lebanon: Weekly Summary No. 3," 6 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[84]*Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, 122; Khuri, *Haqa'iq Lubnaniyya*, 3:24; "Lebanon: Summary No. 8," 6 February 1947, PRO FO 371/62138.

[85]Harold B. Minor, SD, 22 October 1952, 10 December 1952, box 6, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford (hereafter, CLS). Another clash took place in 1953: Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 278.

[86]*Al-Hayat*, 9 September 1958, 11 November 1958; Heath, DS, 19 June 1957, box 34, 22 June 1957, box 35, CLS; D. M. H. Riches-Morris, 24 April 1965, PRO FO 371/180767; Sami al-Sulh, *Mudhakkirat* (Beirut: Maktabat al-Fikr al-ʿArabi, 1960), 445–46; Jonathan C. Randal, *Going All the Way* (New York: Viking, 1983), 125–27; Kamal Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War* (New York: Caravan, 1976), 48.

[87]In some instances, violence was the product of a power struggle within the family itself: see, for example, Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 253. The rivalry between Sami Sulh and Riad Sulh is also a case in point, although it did not culminate in violence.

[88]Lake and Rothchild, "Spreading Fear," 8.

[89]On the crisis, see Nadia Karami and Nawwaf Karami, *Waqiʿ al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyya* (Beirut: Matbaat Karam, 1959); Kamal Jumblat, *Haqiqat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Nashr al-ʿArabiyya, 1959); Fahim I. Qubain, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1961); Camille Chamoun, *Crise au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963); Meo, *Lebanon: Improbable Nation*; Hudson, *Precarious Republic*; N. J. Ashton, "'A Great New Venture'? Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 4 (1993): 59–89; Erika G. Alin, *The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994); Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 20 (1996): 27–54.

[90]This is corroborated by a report sent by Robert Murphy, President Eisenhower's special envoy to Lebanon, who traveled to the Chouf Mountains to meet Kamal Jumblat, leader of the PSP. According to

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Murphy, Jumblat came to greet him, together with his deputy, an Orthodox, and told him that during the 1957 elections President Chamoun had gone out of his way to exclude important leaders from Parliament, including himself, even though his family had been represented there for four generations: McClintock, SD, 25 July 1958, box 35, CLS. See also Goria, *Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon*, 40–44.

[91]The government employed the police and gendarmerie but could not count on the army, whose units remained neutral in most regions. Other supporters of Chamoun included his militia (later known as the Tigers), the Phalanges, and the Syrian National Party (PPS).

[92]Desmond Stuart, *Turmoil in Beirut* (London: Allan Wingate, 1958). The author resided in West Beirut during the conflict and was close to Saʾib Salam.

[93]*Facts Behind the Lebanese Crisis*, booklet, Lebanon, n.d. The booklet includes biographies and statements of Chamoun's rivals from the country's various communities and regions.

[94]Sulh was not invited to religious gatherings of his community, his house was set on fire, and an attempt was made on his life: Middleton, FO, 15.6.1958, PRO FO 371/134122; Malcolm H. Kerr, "Lebanese Views on the 1958 Crisis," *Middle East Journal* 15 (1961): 211–17; Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 115.

[95]Muhammad Khalil al-Basha, *Muʿjam Aʿlam al-Duruz*, 2 vols. (al-Mukhtara: al-Markaz al-Watani lil-Maʿlumat wa al-Dirasat, al-Dar al-Taqaddumiyya, 1990), 1:162l. See also "Nahnu Baʿda al-Ahdath al-Akhira," *al-Duha* 7–8 (1958): 364–69.

[96]Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis," 255. As part of the intra-communal–inter-communal "game," Chamoun considered appointing Fawzi al-Qawuqji as prime minister during the conflict: McClintock, SD, 21 May 1958, 22 May 1958, 30 May 1958, in *Foreign Relations of the United States* 11 (1958–60), ed. John P. Glennon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 72, 81. It is noteworthy that the initiators of the abortive coup d'état attempt staged in Lebanon three years later considered doing the same: Fuad ʿAwad, *al-Tariq Ila al-Sulta* (Firn al-Shubbak: Qadmus, 1973), 172.

[97]Owen, "Political Economy of Grand Liban," 29.

[98]Hudson, *Precarious Republic*, 301.

[99]Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis," 117–18. These were Mustafa Saʿd's Popular Nasserite Organization in Sidon; Ibrahim Qleilat's *al-Murabitun* in Beirut; and the 24 October Organization in Tripoli, led by Faruq al-Muqaddam, son of the late Nafidh Muqaddam.

[100]Frank Stoakes, "The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 11 (1975): 215–36. Other groups were the Guardians of the Cedar, al-Tanzim, and the Maronite League. It is noteworthy that some intra-communal actors in the Maronite community, including the army commander General Emile Bustani and President Charles Helou, presented the Cairo Agreement as an achievement.

[101]Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis," 117; Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, 190; Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, 550.

[102]Maktab al-ʿAqida wa al-Thaqafa, Harakat Amal, *Dirasat fi Mithak Harkat Amal* (n.p., n.d.).

[103]Because they had no serious rivals within their community, the Jumblats could be affected only by undermining the legitimacy of their leader, as was done before Kamal Jumblat's assassination in 1977, or by applying direct pressure on the PSP, as was done by Syria in 1976 and in the late 1980s. Personal pressure, this time on Walid Jumblat, has also been applied during the current strain in Lebanese—Syrian relations: *Daily Star*, 8 November 2000, 13 November 2000.

[104]Salim el-Hoss captured this predicament most trenchantly when he stated that "one side could not give" (the Christians who feared the loss of their prerogatives) and "one side could not take" (the Muslims who could not accept less than a revision of the political settlement): Salim el-Hoss, "Lubnan baʿda Ittifak al-Taʾif: Halka Dirasiyya," *Al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi* 165 (1992), 68.

[105]Samir Khalaf, "From a Geography of Fear to a Culture of Tolerance: Reflections on Protracted Strife and the Restoration of Civility in Lebanon," in *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World*, ed. Paul E. Salem (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997), 354–83.

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