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Clarifying the Concept of Representation

JANE MANSBRIDGE *Harvard University*

*This response to Andrew Rehfeld's "Representation Rethought" (*American Political Science Review *2009) takes up his criticisms of my "Rethinking Representation" (*American Political Science Review *2003) to advance a more relational and systematic approach to representation. To this end, it suggests replacing the "trustee" concept of representation with a "selection model" based on the selection and replacement of "gyroscopic" representatives who are both relatively self-reliant in judgment and relatively nonresponsive to sanctions. It explores as well the interaction between representatives' (and constituents') perceptions of reality and their normative views of what the representative ought to represent. Building from the concept of surrogate representation and other features of legislative representation, it argues for investigating, both normatively and empirically, not only the characteristics of individual representatives emphasized by Rehfeld's analysis but also the representative–constituent relationship and the larger representative system, including both elected and nonelected representatives, inside and outside the legislature.*

In "Representation Rethought" (2009), Andrew Rehfeld claims that my earlier article in this review (Mansbridge 2003) produces confusing complexity.[1] In this response, I want to preserve the complexity, which I believe reflects reality, and try to clear up any confusion. In addition to responding to Rehfeld's criticisms, this article proposes a more relational and systemic conception of representation that extends the concepts of "gyroscopic" and "surrogate" representation. It proceeds in five sections.

First, I extend my argument on gyroscopic representation by underscoring the inadequacy of the Burkean trustee as an analytic tool for understanding representation today and by suggesting, as a replacement, the broader concept of a "selection model" of principal–agent relations to describe the relationship between representatives and constituents. Second, I argue that conceptual tools should be chosen for their empirical utility in particular contexts. On this basis I argue that although Rehfeld is correct that my concept of gyroscopic representation combines two logically separable features (self-reliant judgment and lowered responsiveness to sanction), these features seldom occur separately in real legislators. Third, I note that the "aim," or "areal focus," of a representative (or his or her constituents) is often linked to perceptions of the degree to which some "whole," however defined, actually has common interests. Fourth, I argue that despite Rehfeld's criticism, it is useful to distinguish between promissory and anticipatory representation when one analyzes the representative–constituent relationship, as I do, rather than the characteristics of individual representatives. Finally, I defend a concept of surrogate representation that combines deliberation and aggregation. Because surrogate legislative representation is a relationship, not a characteristic of an individual representative, it is missing from Rehfeld's analysis. This form of representation is nevertheless crucial for legislative legitimacy in a first-past-the-post single-member electoral system. Like other informal forms of representation that have no base in electoral accountability, such as representation through interest groups, surrogate representation forms part of a larger representative system that should be judged normatively as a whole.

THE BURKEAN TRUSTEE VERSUS THE SELECTION MODEL

Neither Rehfeld nor I is satisfied with the simple trustee/delegate dichotomy that has been standard in political science since Heinz Eulau and his colleagues' (1959) classic empirical treatment and Hanna Pitkin's ([1967] 1972) classic normative and conceptual treatment.[2] Rehfeld focuses on narrowing the application of the term "trustee" to one example among representatives with the three characteristics of being relatively self-reliant in judgment, being less responsive to sanction, and aiming at the good of the whole. I argue for retiring the concept of "trustee" completely from legislative theory and replacing it with a selection model that applies to all forms of principal–agent relations.

The Selection Model

Regardless of whether representatives seek the good of the whole or the part, we can think of those who have the most self-reliant judgment, and are correspondingly less responsive to sanctions, as representing their

Jane Mansbridge is Adams Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (jane_mansbridge@harvard.edu).

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[1] Rehfeld writes that my analysis of representation "introduced more complexity" (Rehfeld 2009, 216), "trades one kind of complexity for another" (217, 220), and "adds to, rather than unpacks" existing complexity (220), and that "such complexity is more likely to introduce confusion than clarification" (221).

[2] Pitkin referred to the "mandate–independence" controversy, although she occasionally used "delegate" to refer to the mandated and "trustee" to refer to the independent representative (e.g., [1967] 1972, 146–47).

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constituents primarily through a principal–agent relation that works through selection rather than sanction (Mansbridge 2009).

A selection model is possible only when circumstances make available a pool of potential agents who are internally motivated and have goals closely aligned with those of a principal. When these conditions are met, however, it is more efficient and productive for the principal to spend time and effort *ex ante*, choosing an agent with aligned goals, than to expend those resources *ex post* monitoring and sanctioning an agent who is influenced only by punishment and reward (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). In management, this is McGregor's (1960) Theory X, requiring a self-motivated employee, in contrast to his Theory Y, requiring only an employee motivated by salary. In academia, it is the theory behind tenure. In ordinary life, it is the theory that leads us to search for someone we think really loves children to care for our child, rather than relying primarily on external rewards and punishments to make the caregiver treat our child well. Having focused on sanctions for many years, economists have increasingly begun to adopt the selection model for appropriate contexts, giving this newly identified principal–agent relationship several different names (Besley 2005, 2006; Brennan 1996; Kartik and McAfee 2007; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004; in political science, Fearon 1999).

In the legislative realm, both sanctions and selection models incorporate the possibility of removal through elections, but the effects are critically different. In the sanctions model, the threat of not being re-elected induces the representative to do what he or she would otherwise not have done. In the selection model, removal replaces one self-reliant representative with another self-reliant representative who has different priorities. Neither representative need be responsive to the threat of sanctions. I call self-reliant representatives who are relatively unresponsive to sanctions *gyroscopic*.[3]

Because no legislative representative or employee is (or ought to be) completely nonresponsive to sanctions, we may think of the principal–agent relation in the selection model as having a "selection core" and a "sanction periphery." Normatively, the relative sizes of the core and periphery should depend on the degree of actual alignment between the interests of the principal and agent. Prudentially, they depend on such factors as the availability of potential agents whose interests are relatively well aligned with those of their principals, the costs of monitoring and sanctioning, and the benefits of giving agents flexibility in making judgments. In electoral politics as elsewhere, many principal–agent relationships have a large selection core and a small sanction periphery.

The normative requirement of actually aligned interests is demanding. In the United States today, the selection of candidates by active party members and their funding by the most intensely motivated, most affluent, and often most extreme sections of the electorate can often produce candidates whose internal motivations are not aligned with those of most citizens, even citizens who identify with the candidates' parties. Voters may desire a gyroscopic representative, but must choose between the gyroscopes that parties put forward. The media, unions, nonprofits, social movements, and other institutions for organizing, reflecting, refining, educating, and distorting public sentiment mediate between voters and candidates in the selection and sanctioning processes in ways that can either conform to or undermine democratic norms. These intermediary institutions can, for example, help candidates portray themselves as gyroscopic when they are actually more induced, or as induced when they are actually more gyroscopic. Democratic norms require as much transparency as possible on this front, even though the features of any particular mix of selection and sanction may be hard for even the representative to discern.[4]

Thinking of representatives who are relatively gyroscopic in this selection framework helps explain why it is often fruitless to track the influence of money in politics by seeking instances where special interests give legislators money to influence their votes. Interest groups usually look for potential representatives who already believe in the policies that the groups favor. The groups then finance their preferred candidates' campaigns. Interest groups generally seek out self-reliant candidates who are relatively nonresponsive to sanctions rather than candidates who can be "bought," because such candidates are less likely to change sides when rival interests try to influence them or public opinion changes. Any distortion of the process that money causes in this situation is not *quid pro quo distortion*, which is illegal and unethical, but *selection distortion*, which is both legal and individually ethical, even though a system that permits it is antithetical to the egalitarian norms at the heart of democracy. The systemic distortion is much harder than the individual one to address in existing law or even democratic theory.

Thinking of representatives in this potentially gyroscopic way also helps explain how George W. Bush's campaign against John Kerry in the 2004 U.S. presidential election could portray Kerry's "flip-flopping" in response to his *constituents*' desires as a negative trait. Many voters want a representative with self-reliant judgment with whom they agree, not a representative who requires constant monitoring. Yet most also reject traditionally worded "trustee" formulations (Eulau et al. 1959; McMurray and Parsons 1965).

[3] A gyroscope, such as a ship's gyroscope, is a disk whose momentum, caused by its spin, allows it when properly mounted to maintain a nearly fixed orientation despite external motion, torque, gravity, or magnetic field.

[4] More normative work is also needed on the relatively homogeneous constituencies with long incumbencies in which the selection model often operates (Mansbridge 2009). Such work would, I believe, include constructing a demanding understanding of consent and a deepened concept of tacit consent, in which silence or low turnout could be taken as consent, but only to the degree that the media, party organizations, interest groups, informal networks, and the citizenry had the incentives, capacity, and opportunity to take contrary action if needed.

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The standard concept of a trustee, and particularly of a Burkean trustee, obscures the underlying dynamics of the selection model. It suggests an abdication of power on the part of the voter rather than the voter's use of power first to select an agent with aligned interests and then, if the voter's or the agent's interests change, to remove that agent. Voters in this model do not give up their power over the *legislature* as a whole by forgoing (in the pure case) their power to induce their *representative*. Instead they may well enhance their power over the legislature by selecting a self-motivated agent who can pursue their interests flexibly, adaptively, and with internal commitment.

The metaphor of a principal with the power to hire an agent who exercises independent judgment captures the understanding of at least some U.S. legislators. One member of Congress told Richard Fenno, "To me, representative government means you *hire a guy to use his own judgment*; and if you don't like what he does, you fire him. But you don't keep after him all the time. If it isn't my function to use my judgment, then what the hell is my function? And if that's not my function, I don't want the job" (Fenno 1978, 170; my emphasis). An Illinois state representative whom I interviewed in 1982 similarly imagined saying to a constituent, "You *hired me to use my judgment* about things [that] you can't even know about yet, and I plan to use that judgment, and if you think that I have been wrong on a kind of consistent basis then you certainly have an obligation to move me out of office the next time round" (my emphasis). Both of these legislators linked the use of their own self-reliant "judgment" to being "hired." Both saw themselves as exercising their judgment until such time as the voters decided to remove them. They describe the features of their employment in such parallel language as to suggest a common perception. Those features evoke a selection model.

The Hierarchical Implications of "Trustee"

In contrast to the concept of the representative as being hired and the congruent concept of voter as boss, the concept of a trustee, particularly a Burkean trustee, implies a hierarchy in which the representative has more wisdom, intelligence, or prudence than the voter. In its most common usage today, the word "trustee" means someone who administers a trust for others—usually minors—who are perceived to be incompetent or insufficiently prudent to manage their finances on their own. The word strongly connotes an agent who knows better than the principal what is in the principal's interest. Burke himself, like many of his peers, had reservations regarding the capacities of "the people." He famously called one group, and possibly by implication the people as a whole, "a swinish multitude" (Herzog 1998, 508–14). For Burke and many others at this time, including many framers of the U.S. constitution, electoral representation implied what Bernard Manin calls "the principle of distinction"—that representatives "should rank higher than their constituents in wealth, talent, and virtue" (Manin 1997, 94). Hanna Pitkin considered this conception of representation "elitist" and anchored it in a theory of "natural aristocracy" (Pitkin [1967] 1972, 168–69). Yet none of these connotations of incompetence or aristocracy is logically entailed by the three factors of low responsiveness to sanction, self-reliant judgment, and seeking the good of the whole. Although Rehfeld takes the Burkean trustee as his example in the cell defined by these factors, this term does not and should not define that cell.

The selection model eschews such hierarchy. Not only do some relatively gyroscopic representatives describe themselves as having been "hired," with an implicit comparison of voters to principals whom the representative serves as an agent; just as tellingly, many representatives in the United States who fit the three requirements of the cell in Rehfeld's table that he uses a "Burkean trustee" to exemplfy see themselves as "like" their constituents, in demographic characteristics, political attitudes, or both. This is a relatively egalitarian stance. I first encountered it when a rural Illinois legislator told me unselfconsciously that he did not have to consult his constituents because "I come from my district, and they were brought up the same way that I am, or was, and worked the same way I always have" (Mansbridge 1986, 152). In much the same spirit, a member of Congress told John Kingdon, "I grew up with these people and I guess I reflect their thinking" (Kingdon 1981, 45). The stance is not unusual.[5] It applies regardless of whether representatives seek the good of the whole or of their district, and it assumes no greater wisdom (although often more information) in the representative than in the constituent.

Many voters consciously prefer a representative who resembles them. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election a sizable number explained their approval of vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin by saying that she was "like me" (e.g., Shipman 2008). The movement for term limits promotes the ideal of the "citizen-legislator," in which "average Americans . . . leave their jobs in the private sector for a very short period of time, serve their country, and then return to their ordinary lives" (Garrett 1996, 631). Term-limited citizen–legislators are supposed to be both like their constituents and also less responsive to sanctions (because they will often not be running for re-election).[6]

[5] For other examples, see Mansbridge (1999). In a 1963–64 survey of 87 randomly selected members of the House of Representatives, 59% agreed with the statement, "I seldom have to sound out my constituents because I think so much like them that I know how to react to almost any proposal" (Davidson 1969, 115). An analysis of interviews in 1977 with 154 nonrandomly drawn nonfreshman members of the House of Representatives revealed a smaller group, "perhaps one-tenth of the sample," in which, under scrutiny, "there simply was no relevant difference between the views of the district and their own views. As one of these members phrased it, 'my philosophy is generally consistent with theirs. . . . I think there's a selection process. I'm a product of the district. I grew up there. My father grew up there'" (Cavanaugh 1982, 121).

[6] Will (1992), for example, argues that term limits insulate elected officials from their constituents, thus promoting independent deliberation. Critics see such insulation as a problem. The expectation of "likeness" from citizen–legislators discounts the great advantages

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In short, representatives who are less responsive to sanctions, more self-reliant in judgment, and more likely to seek the good of the whole can be conceived in a way that is distinctly not elitist and may be antielitist. In legislative contexts, therefore, let us drop the term "trustee" with all its misleading connotations.

CONCEPTS WITH EMPIRICAL UTILITY: DEFINING GYROSCOPIC REPRESENTATION

With a selection model in mind, we can see why it makes sense in practice (and need not cause confusion) to combine two of Rehfeld's logical categories—lowered responsiveness to sanction and greater reliance on one's own judgment—even though they are analytically distinguishable. Because the first characteristic is intrinsic to the selection model and the second is a prerequisite for its success, my article described what I called a gyroscopic representative as having both (Mansbridge 2003, 520–21). As Rehfeld rephrases it in his criticism, in my treatment "the gyroscopic representative is not merely less responsive to sanctioning, but *also* looks to herself as her own source of judgment and basis for determining the proper ends of legislation" (2009, 221, his emphasis).[7]

Nonresponsiveness to sanction and self-reliant judgment occur together in practice because they are causally linked, and the relationship runs in both directions. Self-reliant agents tend to sort themselves away from sanction-based principal–agent relationships (cf. Besely and Ghatak 2005). Conversely, when control through sanctions is difficult (e.g., when good work is not easily predictable in advance or individually identifiable in retrospect), principals try to select agents who will use their own judgment.

It is always useful for some purposes to make distinctions, with finer and finer distinctions as the occasion demands. There will thus certainly be moments when it is useful in practice to distinguish, as Rehfeld does, between self-reliant judgment and lowered responsiveness to sanctions, just as there will certainly be moments when it is useful to distinguish within self-reliant judgment between self-confidence and arrogance, or between "self-motivation" (Besley 2006) and self-reliance. Yet I resist Rehfeld's conclusion that it is confusing to bring together the two components of self-reliant judgment and a lesser responsiveness to sanctions in one word, "gyroscopic." In order to insist on "separating the . . . distinctions and keeping them separate" (221, section heading), Rehfeld redefines my term "gyroscopic" to mean only low responsiveness to sanctions, excluding the feature of self-reliant source of judgment. I would prefer to keep the term as I defined it, with both components, because I cannot find many empirical instances in the legislative realm in which these two logically independent features are in fact separate.

The next two paragraphs discuss the two ways in which the two analytic components of gyroscopic representation might possibly be separated in fact. In one version of the separation we should find legislative representatives who are relatively nonresponsive to sanctions but nevertheless rely on the judgments of their constituents. Rehfeld produces no examples of legislative representatives of this sort, and I can think of none. Gyroscopic legislative representatives can and often do have good moral or other reasons for taking constituents' judgments into account, but they use their own judgment about when this is appropriate.

In the other version of the separation we should find legislative representatives who are very responsive to sanctions but nevertheless rely on their own judgment. In Rehfeld's words, this is the "representative who uses his or her judgment to decide what the good is, but . . . is extremely responsive to electoral sanctions" (224). He offers two versions of this combination, one aiming at the good of the whole, the "Madisonian lawmaker," and the other aiming at the good of the part, for which he gives a nonlegislative example, but could presumably give legislative ones. In the legislative realm, he invites us to imagine that Madisonian lawmakers decide what is good and act upon that judgment not because they want to or think it is best but because they are responding to the threat of sanctions. The constituency in effect says to the representative, "We want you to act for the good of all as you see it, not as we see it. If you do not, we will not re-elect you."[8] I interpret this to mean that if self-interest (e.g., money or ambition) tempts such representatives to deviate from their best judgment about the good of the whole, these representatives might expect their constituents to replace them, a threat that holds them to their best judgment. In my analysis such threats act as the sanction periphery of a selection model (in which a largely gyroscopic representative also responds in part to sanctions). I find it hard to imagine legislators being held to their own best judgment primarily by the threat of constituent sanction, and equally hard to see why Madison would have recommended this.[9]

of independent income in facilitating holding such an office; see Prewitt 1970. On "likeness," see also the Anti-Federalists, e.g., "Brutus" in Storing (1981, 380). Cultures differ on this dimension, with, e.g., Swedes preferring likeness and Nigerians distinction, at least in the form of ostentation, in their representatives (Chabal and Duloz 2008).

[7] Looking to the self for source of judgment is, strictly speaking, only one internal characteristic of the self-directed gyroscopic representative. I wrote that such a representative "looks within for guidance," has "internally determined" preferences, and is "self-propelled and self-directed" (Mansbridge 2003, 520–21). Several components in the concept of self-direction, although usually occurring together, can also be distinguished analytically. "Self-direction," "self-reliant judgment," and "self-motivation" are related but not identical.

[8] I thank Andrew Rehfeld (personal communication) for clarification on this question. On first reading I interpreted the cells in Rehfeld's table that describe representatives both "relying on their own judgment" and being "more responsive to sanction" to mean that the legislator *decides* what the good is (self-reliant judgment) but does not *act* on this judgment, instead responding more to the sanctions of the constituency, which has another judgment of the good or what they want.

[9] Rehfeld cites his book (Rehfeld 2005, 98–104) to explain the title "Madisonian lawmaker," but although that work has an excellent discussion of Madison's view of the diminished influence of local

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TABLE 1. Schematic Conceptual Space of Three Distinctions

	Less Responsive to Sanction (e.g., Gyroscopic)		More Responsive to Sanction (e.g., Induced)	
	Self-reliant Judgment	Dependent Judgment	Self-reliant Judgment	Dependent Judgment
Republican Aims (**Whole**)	A. Burkean Trustees	B. Civil Servants	C. Madisonian Lawmakers	D. Anti-Federalists
Pluralist Aims (**Part**)	E. Volunteers	F. Ambassadors	G. Professionals	H. Pared-down Delegates

Note: Adapted from Rehfeld 2009, Table 2: "Schematic Conceptual Space of 3 Distinctions." I have eliminated much of the descriptive language and added my own words "whole" and "part."

TABLE 2. Schematic Conceptual Space of Two Distinctions

	Less Responsive to Sanction/ Self reliant Judgment (**Gyroscopic**) "Trustee"	More Responsive to Sanction/ Dependent Judgment (**Induced**) "Delegate"
"State-oriented" (**Whole**)		
"District-oriented" (**Part**)		

Note: Adapted from Eulau et al. 1959, Table 4: "Areal-focal and Representational Role Orientations in Four States." For parallelism I have dropped their middle categories and added descriptors from Rehfeld 2009 along with my own words "whole" and "part," "gyroscopic" and "induced." Eulau et al.'s category titles appear in quotation marks.

Rehfeld's distinction between response to sanctions and source of judgment is a useful logical exercise, and it may have considerable practical use in some contexts. But the tight empirical link between lowered responsiveness to sanctions and self-reliant judgment among legislators is, I suspect, why neither Heinz Eulau et al. (1959), in the first major empirical study of the role of the representative and the applicability of Edmund Burke's theory, nor the many empirical political scientists who have investigated representation since then have ever adopted this distinction.[10]

If, for the specific purpose of studying U.S. legislative representatives, we decide not to use Rehfeld's distinction, then his eightfold table collapses into the simpler fourfold table that Eulau et al. advanced 50 years ago and that empirical political scientists have been using ever since. Like Rehfeld, Eulau et al. (1959) pointed out that Burke elided representatives who aimed at the good of the whole with those who exercised independent judgment, and accordingly developed their table around these two separate dimensions.[11] Adapted versions of both Rehfeld's and Eulau et al.'s tables appear here as Tables 1 and 2. I have placed my suggested future wording for the variables in boldface.

The most important substantive difference between the two tables is the distinction between responsiveness to sanction and self-reliant judgment, which I have argued has low utility for empirical researchers in the legislative field. The utility of that distinction for democratic theorists and in other instances of representation remains to be explored, and perhaps Rehfeld or others will take on this subject in future investigations.

Conceptually, however, Rehfeld's Table 1 makes some significant advances. For reasons explained earlier I consider the distinction that I initiated between "gyroscopic" and "induced" an improvement over Eulau et al.'s "Burkean" language of "trustee" and "delegate."[12] For reasons to be explained below I consider Rehfeld's distinction between "republican" and "pluralist" an improvement for many purposes over the more limiting "areal focus."

AIM AND AREAL FOCUS: INTEGRATING EMPIRICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE AND NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY

It is a mark of the disciplinary disjunction between normative and empirical work that Eulau and his colleagues' conceptual point undoing Burke's elision

interests in a large district, it does not address the unusual conjunction of self-reliant judgment and extreme responsiveness to sanctions.

[10] A referee for this article put it this way: "I could refer to tomatoes+sugar+salt+vinegar, or I could refer to 'ketchup.' There seems to be something useful—something that helps me to grapple with the world as it is—in having the 'ketchup' concept at hand, given that this substance does seem to appear often in everyday life, whilst other combinations of those ingredients do not."

[11] They suggested that Burke combined these two dimensions "for polemical reasons" (Eulau et al. 1959, 745), but also demonstrated that the two dimensions have a fairly strong empirical correlation (756).

[12] Burke himself did not use these terms to distinguish between forms of electoral representation.

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between representational role and areal focus, their use of the longstanding distinction between the part and the whole to categorize areal focus, and the lines of empirical research flowing from their concepts of representational role and areal focus have had little effect on normative and conceptual studies of representation. Reciprocally, the long line of normative theory on commonality versus conflict, which Rehfeld summarizes in his treatment of "aim," has had only minimal effect on empirical studies in the field. Bringing these together reveals that the state-oriented vs. district-oriented areal focus and the Republican vs. Pluralist aim are conceptually distinct but conceptually and empirically related.

Eulau and his colleagues's term "areal focus" and its specific components "state-oriented" and "district-oriented" have strong territorial connotations. Yet the authors make it clear that the subject of areal focus is not always territorial. As examples of "other than geographical interests," they give "political parties, pressure groups and administrative agencies," pointing out also that "different foci of representation need not be mutually exclusive" (Eulau et al. 1959, 744–45). In the terminology that I favor, either the *part* or the *whole* can be a functional as well as a territorial–jurisdictional entity. The part can also be an economic class, an ethnicity, or even a policy priority defended on the basis of its benefits for one group (e.g,, the "partial" aims of opposing abortion and lowering taxes in Mansbridge 2003, 522). Territorially, the part can be a nation in the context of the globe.

Rehfeld's terms "Republican" and "Pluralist" usefully bring into play a longstanding normative disagreement between the civic republican focus on the common good of the whole and the pluralist insistence on conflict and difference among parts. This disagreement plays out in different ways in different eras. The Federalists in some ways advocated for the whole but were in other ways pluralists. The Anti-Federalists in some ways advocated for the parts, but were in other ways civic republicans. Much earlier, Aristotle argued against Plato's presumed espousal of unity that "the nature of the state is to be a plurality" made up of "different kinds of men" (Aristotle [c. 335–322 BC] 1988, 1261a); yet his factual insistence on plurality did not undermine his normative goal of working for "the common interest" (1279a). The contrasts between part and whole, plurality and unity, conflict and commonality thus do not involve the same conceptual entities. Yet these contrasts have some affinities and in specific contexts imply normative stances.

In the arena of legislative representation, for example, the normative aims of political actors are deeply entwined with their perceptions of empirical reality. Representatives and presumably also their constituents differ in their perceptions of the degree of common and conflicting interests in their states and in their nation.[13] In 1982 I began a set of interviews with Illinois legislators by reading the famous quotation from Edmund Burke beginning, "Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests . . .," and asking, "To what extent would you say this is true about the state of Illinois—that the legislature here is a deliberative assembly of one state, with one interest, that of the whole?" The answers I got back ran from "It certainly ain't true of the *Illinois* legislature!" to "I think we *are*. . . . [We reach] a deliberative decision based upon the results of the input of many different backgrounds into what we feel is eventually the good of the whole state, of all the people."[14] These beliefs about the world tended to be intertwined with the legislators' normative stances, probably through reciprocal causation. Those who saw the state of Illinois primarily as a conglomerate of conflicting interests often thought they ought to represent primarily the interests of their districts. Those who saw the state as having significant common interests often thought they ought to represent primarily the state as a whole. (One cannot represent the interest of the whole without thinking the whole *has* common interests). Both perceptual and normative considerations could change from issue to issue. The legislators' normative aims varied by their (and perhaps their constituents') perceptions of the reality of conflicting versus common interests both by issue and in general.

Why agents and their principals believe what they do is an important part of how we evaluate such agents and their relationship with their principals both normatively and empirically. In the United States, constituents as well as their representatives may perceive the nation as having more common interests than the states, because foreign affairs and military policy direct attention to the national interest in ways that have little parallel at the state level. Or they may perceive the states as having more common interests than the nation, because the states are relatively smaller and more homogeneous. Empirical political scientists might thus ask in what contexts and on what issues constituents see their state or the nation as having a "good of the whole" and to what degree, if any, this perception is linked with a desire for relatively gyroscopic rather than induced representation.[15] Normative theorists might ask, with more attention to empirical context than has been the

[13] On the role of common versus conflicting interests in democracies, see Mansbridge (1980); see also Putnam 1973 (a study worth replicating today) on British and Italian legislators' perceptions of common versus conflicting interest and the correlation between their perceptions of reality and their normative ideologies.

[14] Unpublished interviews on file with the author. Of the 25 legislators who gave definite answers to this question, half (12) said that Burke's ([1774] 1889) statement was simply not empirically true of the Illinois legislature—many quite decisively, with statements such as "No; definitely not; just the opposite!" A quarter (6) thought it true; the other quarter (7) considered the situation mixed. After further consideration, every legislator concluded that the state had common interests on some issues and divided interests on others, with estimates of the proportions ranging from 90% to 10% common interest. (Several emphasized the great proportion of noncontroversial bills on relatively trivial matters of common interest, such as a bill allowing cousins over 65 to marry.)

[15] Within a state or nation, some constituents may be more oriented toward policies that they see as being good or bad for all and others toward benefits for themselves, their groups, or their districts. These differences possibly vary, perhaps interactively, by class, urbanism, regional culture, or gender.

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case in the past, when, if ever, citizens should perceive, try to perceive, or try to create a good of the whole.

PROMISSORY AND ANTICIPATORY VERSIONS OF INDUCED REPRESENTATION

A somewhat inductive attention to the empirical context also generated in my original discussion (2003) a distinction within the category of induced representation between "promissory representation," in which constituent control works through the representative's campaign promises, and "anticipatory representation," in which constituent control works through the representative's anticipation of the voters' desires in the next election. Both concepts, I think, are immediately recognizable by empirical researchers. Promissory representation seems to be the understanding of representation most often held by members of the public. They want representatives to look backward to their promises in acting out the representative relationship, and they think of accountability in these terms. Anticipatory representation is a more sophisticated hypothesis advanced by empirical political scientists (e.g., Arnold 1990), who point out that in practice representatives often look forward to the next election, anticipating the desires of the future voter, and that accountability often works through this mechanism.[16] My point was that the two concepts had different normative implications. In promissory representation, as the name suggests, normative attention focuses on whether the representatives keep their promises or have good explanations for any change. In anticipatory representation, the norms are less clear. I suggested that those norms should focus on the quality of communication between representatives and their constituents, both when representatives try to change the views of the voters they will face in the next election and when constituents try to communicate to the representative (often by explicit threat) the concerns they will consider important in the next election.

Rehfeld criticizes a host of particular points in my discussion of anticipatory and promissory representation,[17] but I infer that his main complaint is that this distinction ("complexity") is unnecessary. That may be true if one is analyzing, as he does, representatives' individual characteristics. But the distinction has utility in an analysis of the relationship between voters and representatives. A focus on past promises conveys a different type of relationship from a focus on anticipating future voters' desires.

SURROGATE REPRESENTATION: AGGREGATIVE AND DELIBERATIVE

A relational and systemic approach also gives a central normative role to what I called "surrogate representation," or representation of a citizen by someone elected from another district. Rehfeld writes that this concept

> is simply a reformulation of "virtual representation." Mansbridge resists that term because she objected to Burke's elitism that she associates with the term. But Burke's "elitism" was attached to his view of *representation* and *not* to what made any case of it "virtual." Here, for Burke (and the many others who use the term), the critical point of "virtual" was precisely, only, and no more than Mansbridge's own definition of the surrogate: "representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship" (2009, 221; citing Mansbridge 2003, 522).

This characterization is incorrect. My concern with elitism was relevant to another concept of Burke's: his concept of the trustee. Turning to surrogate representation, my article cursorily specified four ways in which surrogate differs from virtual representation,[18] but spent far more time on the most fundamental difference between virtual and surrogate representation: aggregation. Burke's virtual representation applies *only* to deliberation. Surrogate representation applies to *both* the aggregative and the deliberative function of democracy. It is therefore subject to both aggregative and deliberative norms.

For deliberative functions, a strict Burkean would be normatively content with what Kymlicka (1993) calls "threshold representation"—that is, one individual who could voice the perspective and interests of a particular group in a deliberation.[19] For aggregative

[16] The two forms can come together when elected representatives anticipate future voter interpretations of promises made in the first election (I thank one of the referees for this suggestion).

[17] He notes first that in promissory representation the representative is "both responsive to the voter's power *and* non-responsive to it" (2009, 220, his emphasis). This is true, and no contradiction, because in my simplified theoretical model the voter exercises power only to enforce the promises that the representative has a nonresponsive duty to keep. Thus the representative's duty (to keep promises) and interest (in avoiding sanction) coincide. Rehfeld next makes my words "relatively unmediated" into another condition of promissory representation, but that implication was unintentional; the words were intended as a description, not a requirement. He points out that I wrote "forward looking intentionality," when intentionality and power are always forward looking. My stating the obvious here simply foreshadowed a contrast with anticipatory representation in which, I wrote, "what appears to the representative to be a 'power relation' . . . works not forward, but 'backward'"—a statement about "the *beliefs* [in italic] of the representative at Time 2 about the future preferences of the voter at Time 3" (512). Finally, he makes the point that in promissory representation "the terms of the agreement are set by the candidate or the party in the form of campaign promises," and I agree; not all the power in this relation is exercised by the voter.

[18] "Burke's concept focused on morally right answers, wisdom rather than will, relatively fixed and objective interests, and the good of the whole" (Mansbridge 2003, 522). Pitkin ([1967] 1972, 168–89, esp. 174) reports disagreement over the relation of some of these factors to virtual representation, and associates virtual representation primarily or only with the third: relatively fixed and objective interests. I did not engage with this controversy then and need not do so now, as none of these features, including fixed and objective interests, characterize surrogate representation. Although Pitkin considers the first two factors part of what she calls Burke's "elitism" (168–72), it was not the elitist character of these factors that made me distinguish surrogate from virtual representation.

[19] Pitkin writes of Burke's virtual representation, "Apparently one member [speaking as a virtual representative] is just as good as a dozen" ([1967] 1972, 186) and "the number of representatives from any particular place or interest does not matter" (188; see also 184). For a normative argument that deliberation itself demands more than such threshold representation, see Mansbridge (1999).

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functions, however, the appropriate norm is arguably the proportional representation of interests.[20] First-past-the-post single-member-district electoral systems must look to surrogate representation to help them approach that proportional regulative ideal. Surrogate representatives may be conscious of their surrogate role, take it as an obligation, and even communicate with their surrogate constituents (often to appeal for funds). Or they may play their surrogate role unconsciously, making arguments and casting votes that represent the interests of individuals outside their districts simply by chance.[21] Either way, because surrogate representation describes a relationship between the representative and constituent and not the characteristics of an individual agent, Rehfeld's table excludes both this form of representation and the normative role it plays in partially legitimating some major representative democracies.

Perhaps because it can encompass both the aggregative and the deliberative, perhaps because it does not come with the Burkean baggage over which scholars disagree, or perhaps simply because its nomenclature is more transparent, the term "surrogate representation" seems to have proven more useful to today's empirical political scientists than "virtual representation." It has been taken up by scholars studying women and politics, African American politics, and American legislative politics, as well as in normative theory.[22]

The concept of surrogate representation begins to expand the normative and empirical study of representation beyond the relationship of constituents with their elected representatives to the entire representative system. From a systemic perspective, citizens are represented in the legislature both by their own elected representatives and by surrogate representatives from other districts. In a broader understanding of the larger representative system, each citizen is represented throughout the system by nonelected, nonlegislative representatives in parties, interest groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the media, and the citizenry, with varying degrees of formal and informal accountability.[23] Indeed, some who consciously claim to represent others in this way bring constituencies into being through that claim (Saward 2006) and, in doing so, affect the way citizens conceive of themselves.

In the largest social sense we represent others, often unintentionally, any time a third party takes some feature of our existence or self-presentation as a guide to others' intentions, capacities, preferences, or other characteristics. In regard to governmental decisions, we as citizens informally represent others whenever we write a letter to an editor, send money to a party or NGO, or attend a political meeting.[24] In these processes we rarely consider ourselves as representing others and even more rarely respond to formal processes of accountability. In a few instances, such as a town meeting or referendum, we make binding collective decisions for others without seeing ourselves as representatives or having formal relations of accountability to others. Normatively, it is worth parsing out more fully the spectrum between formal and informal representation, the attendant strong through weak claims that "constituents" can make on their "representatives," and the judgments that third parties can make on the system. An articulated spectrum of this sort might capture both the intuitive force of Rehfeld's statement, "In the case of a direct democracy, citizens are not political representatives because they are not standing in for anyone but acting as themselves" (2009, 228), and also the ways in which those who attend a town meeting and make binding collective decisions that affect those who are absent do in some way stand in for the absentees, even if that is not their intent.

A full treatment of the larger representative system in politics would take account of these many contested and overlapping formal and informal, legislative and nonlegislative relationships. Inequalities in some realms might counterbalance those in others, although in practice inequalities tend to cumulate. Normatively, the reigning aggregative ideal is that, all told, each citizen's interests should be represented in the final decision, and perhaps in the processes leading to the decision, in proportion to the numbers of citizens in the polity holding those interests. The deliberative ideal is that important and relevant perspectives should be represented in the debate. Contests over these normative ideals will inevitably be bound up with empirical research mapping the elements of the representative system in various polities.

CONCLUSION

After a period of relative neglect in which many scholars, including myself, focused on direct, participatory

[20] For an empirical political scientist's use of this norm, see Weissberg's (1978) "collective representation." For contest over the norm, see, e.g., Bietz 1989.

[21] For largely unconscious descriptive representation, see Burden's (2007) report that representatives who smoke or who have children in public school are more likely than others to vote for tobacco or public school interests. Without some source of (legitimate or illegitimate) distortion in the system, the conscious or unconscious ideological and descriptive forms of surrogate representation should appear in the legislature in approximate proportion to their appearance in the population. The normative issues involve the legitimacy of any distortion and the problems involved in redressing illegitimate distortions.

[22] E.g., Gamble 2007; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008; Rubenstein 2007; Tremblay 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008.

[23] For recent normative theory on nonelected representation, see Urbinati and Warren 2008; papers for the September 2008 American Political Science Association annual meeting panel, "Bono and Beyond: The Democratic Functions of Non-elected Representatives" (Montanaro 2008; Rubenstein 2008 Saward 2009); and papers for the December 2008 workshop, "Beyond Elections: The Democratic Legitimacy of New Forms of Representation," Center for Human Values, Princeton University (e.g., Pettit 2008). For citizens informally representing other citizens, see Mansbridge 1980, 250.

[24] Pitkin defines representation as "the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact" ([1967] 1972, 8–9). When, for example, a member of Congress takes my letter as typifying the views of other constituents, I am to that degree making the other constituents present in the mind of that member. (I thank a reviewer for this suggestion.) See also Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Section II on "Participation and Representation."

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democracy, the normative study of representation is accelerating sharply (Urbinati and Warren 2008). Normative and conceptual questions regarding the relationship of constituents to their legislative representatives have come under new scrutiny. This article, in addition to responding to Andrew Rehfeld's criticisms, extends my earlier ideas in three ways. It suggests replacing the trustee concept of representation with a selection model based on the selection and replacement of gyroscopic representatives who are both relatively self-reliant in judgment and relatively nonresponsive to sanctions. It explores briefly the interaction between representative (and constituent) perceptions of reality and their normative views of what the representative ought to represent. Even more briefly, it suggests taking a more systemic view of representation, investigating the entire representative system as well as the characteristics of individual representatives, in a way that includes nonelected as well as elected representatives.

Normative political theory and empirical political science are more intertwined today than at any time in the past half century. Our understanding of democratic deliberation has already been enriched by the interpenetration of normative theory and empirical work (Thompson 2008). On the subject of representation the future is bright, as normative and conceptual political theorists begin to read more empirical work and empirical political scientists begin to develop operational measures of the communicative and consent-based norms implicit in different forms of representation. Only the first iteration of this subject has been "rethought." It will need a lot more rethinking.

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