A complement for *vena* needs to supplied,[8] and I suggest *clara* ('an obvious vein') on the basis of Anon. Lat. 53 (2.73.6–7F): *sed et venae clarae et enormes intextae cervici idem quod nervi indicabunt*. Cf. Ad. B21 (1.367.7–8F): καὶ οἱ μεγάλα δὲ ἀγγεῖα περὶ τῷ τραχήλῳ πεπλεγμένα ἔχοντες ἐμφανῆ σκαιοί, and B34 (1.388.3–6F): εἴ τις καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν αὐχένα φλέβας καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς κροτάφοις οἰδούσας ἔχει, ὡς ἐμφανεῖς εἶναι καὶ αἱματώδη ἔχειν τὴν χρόαν.

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[8] In J. André, *Le vocabulaire latin de l'Anatomie* (Paris, 1991), 126–9, there are no examples of *vena* occurring without definition or description. Raina (n.1) translates *quibus vena in brachiis est*: 'che hanno ben in vista la vena nelle bracchia', with a note that Anon. Lat. seems to have a particular vein in mind, to which Hippocrates also refers: *Οὗ ἂν ἡ φλὲψ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀγκῶνι σφύζῃ, μανικὸς καὶ ὀξύθυμος·* (2.5.16). This reinforces the argument that some form of qualification along the suggested lines is required.

LUCRETIUS' *DRN* 1.926–50 AND THE PROEM TO BOOK 4

The almost verbatim repetition of verses 926–50 from the first book of Lucretius' *DRN* to the proem to Book 4 in the middle of the work has been a perplexing and controversial issue for Lucretian scholarship.[1] It has often been discussed with reference to and in connection with the transmission of the text and the stage of its completion. The answer, however, as to the transposition of the above verses may not lie in the area of didactic repetition or textual criticism but rather in the Lucretian beliefs about poetics as can be deduced from the poet's own text. Lucretius, in writing his *DRN*, actually transforms into verse the Epicurean doctrine and the philosophic principles on poetry and poetics shared by other Epicureans and in particular by his own contemporary Philodemus of Gadara.

It has been shown that one of the literary principles which characterizes Philodemus' thought is the idea of *ἀμετάθετον,* that is the impossibility of *metathesis* in poetry.[2] According to this idea, the transposition of verses (or their minor

[1] The repetition of verses in Lucretius is a hackneyed subject and has been variously addressed. For the bibliography and discussions see e.g. W. B. Ingalls, 'Repetition in Lucretius', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 227–36; A. Schiesaro, 'Problemi di fomularità lucreziana', *MD* 24 (1990), 47–70, who distinguishes between repetition and formulae; M. Gale, *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius* (Cambridge, 1994), and ead., 'Lucretius 4,1–25 and the proems of the *De rerum natura*', *PCPhS* 40 (1994), 1–17; R. D. Brown, *Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura 4.1030–1287* (Leiden, New York, Copenhaven and Cologne, 1987), 5ff. and n. 3 for further references; L. Canfora, 'I proemi del *De Rerum Natura*, *RFIC* 110 (1982), 71–7; E. J. Kenney, *Lucretius*, G&R, New Surveys in the Classics 11 (Oxford, 1995), 7f.

[2] N. A. Greenberg, *The Poetic Theory of Philodemus* (Harvard PhD Diss., 1955; repr. New York and London, 1990), 169–76, 275–6; and id., 'Metathesis as an instrument in the criticism of poetry', *TAPhA* 89 (1958), 262–70; D. Armstrong, 'The impossibility of metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius on form and content in poetry', in D. Obbink (ed.), *Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus, and Horace* (Oxford, 1995), 210–32 is an important study on *metathesis* and its effects on literary texts as presented by Philodemus and Lucretius.

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components, the words or even the letters[3]) in a poetic work should be considered impossible for the reason that the metathesized elements affect the whole poem and its thought, thus creating a different poetic work.

Lucretius, following the same views, clearly states in his text that the same atoms (*eadem primordia rerum*, the same first-beginnings, 2.1007) may participate in different forms and in various ways in the making of the universe (1.817–22). Crucial to this, which is repeatedly stated in the *DRN*, is the idea of the position of elements: When these *elementa* are put in a different order and their position and constituency are changed, the end result will change too. The Roman poet further stresses this view by analogically applying this idea to his own verses.

> Quin etiam refert **nostris in versibus ipsis** 1013
> cum quibus et quali sint ordine quaeque locata;
> namque eadem caelum mare terras flumina solem
> significant, eadem fruges arbusta animantis;
> si non omnia sunt, at multo maxima pars est
> consimilis; verum positura discrepitant res.
> sic ipsis in rebus item iam materiai[4]
> **concursus motus ordo positura figurae**
> cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent. 1022
> (2.1013–22)[5]

What Lucretius says here is that whatever happens to the elements in nature also takes place in his own text; the unseen and imperceptible movement of the natural elements can be easily apprehended by way of analogy when we, the readers, observe the changes effected by the transposition of the letters (his textual *elementa*) which result in the formation of different words.

In Book 1 Lucretius stresses—next to the arrangement and motion—the importance of the small addition or subtraction of elements (*demptis paucis paucisque tributis, / ordine mutato et motu*, 1.800f.). A few verses below, in order to clarify his argument, he relates the phenomenon by analogy once again to his text and asks his reader to see that changes in words and verses affect both their meaning and sound:

> Quin etiam passim nostris in versibus ipsis
> multa elementa vides multis communia verbis,
> cum tamen inter se versus ac verba necessest 825
> confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti.
> tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo.
> (1.823–7)

The discussion on *metathesis* in antiquity seems to go back, according to Aristotle (*Metaph.* 985b12–19, *Gen. corr.* 315b6–15) to the atomists Democritus and Leucippus. Aristotle also sees the drastic effect *metathesis* has on the plot (μῦθος) of the story: μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον (when any part is transposed or taken away, the whole [work] is disjointed

[3] According to Armstrong [(n. 2), 221], Philodemus, unlike Lucretius, did not seem to apply to the level of letters the principle of *metathesis*. But see D. Obbink, 'How to read poetry about gods', in Obbink (n. 2), 198, citing Phld. *On Piety* 534–6: κα[ὶ γὰρ] | παραγραμμίζ[ουσι] | τὰ τ[ῶ]ν θεῶν [ὀνόματα] ('For they transpose the letters in the names of the gods') and his commentary in D. Obbink, *Philodemus on Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary* (Oxford, 1996), on 535.

[4] Line 1020 *intervalla vias conexus pondera plagas* deleted by Lachmann.

[5] See also 1.792–802; 1.823–5= 2.688–90; 1.909–14; 2.1013–21.

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and changed, *Poet*. 1451a).[6] The same discussion was going on at the time of Philodemus and beyond[7] and it seems that Philodemus and Lucretius supplement each other on the idea of *metathesis* as it was held by the current Epicurean literary theory.[8]

This view may assist our understanding as to the repetition of lines 1.926–50 at the beginning of Book 4 (1–25). These verses in the first book are part of the digression (1.921–50) which is a distinct and complete unit of thought.

The passage of 1.921–50 is repeated with minor but very important changes, the first one being the exclusion of the five first lines of the unit (921–5). There, the text reads:

> nunc age, quod superest cognosce et clarius audi. 921
> nec me animi fallit quam sint obscura; sed acri
> percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor,
> et simul **incussit suavem** mi in pectus **amorem**
> **Musarum**, quo nunc instinctus mente vigenti 925
> avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante
> trita solo. . . .

The difference is obvious. The five lines opening the paragraph in Book 1 inevitably draw the reader's attention. There, the poet not only acted under the influence of his quest for renown, but also *because* of his love for the Muses which in turn led him to traverse the *avia Pieridum.* The *amor* for the Muses put the poet under their spell and they became his driving force. The exclusion, however, of these five lines from the beginning of Book 4 drastically alters the context of the remainder: Lucretius now has a free hand to form his own poetry by not being *instinctus* any more.

The verb *peragro* (4.1), now, prominently placed in the middle of the very first line of the proem, serves Lucretius' poetic intention better, if it is seen not as a mere crossing but rather as a penetration of a new literary space. His self-praise matches his implicit desire to demonstrate his personal contribution to Latin literature. This thought, triggered by the first person singular verb of the proem (*peragro*) is enhanced by the numerous metapoetic signs Lucretius is using in the immediately following verses.[9]

The second minor, but important, change between the two sections concerns the end of the seemingly transposed passage. It also discloses Lucretius' intentions. In Book 1 the unit 1.921–50 ended as follows:

> si tibi forte animum tali ratione tenere
> versibus in nostris possem, dum perspicis omnem
> naturam rerum qua constet compta figura.
> (1.948–50)

[6] Armstrong (n. 2), 222 sees a difference in the application of the term between Aristotle and Philodemus.

[7] Greenberg (n. 2, 1958).

[8] Armstrong (n. 2), 214ff.

[9] Gale (n. 1); S. Kyriakidis, 'Middles in Lucretius' *DRN*: the poet and his work', in S. Kyriakidis and F. Martino (edd.), *Middles in Latin Poetry* (Bari, 2004), 27–49. Also G. B. Conte, 'Proems in the middle', in F. Dunn and T. Cole (edd.) *Beginnings in Classical Literature, YClS* 29 (Cambridge, 1992), 158f.

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In Book 4 the end of the proem is altered to:

> dum percipis[10] omnem
> naturam rerum ac persentis **utilitatem**[11]

The word *utilitas*—usefulness, profit, advantage—by which Lucretius ends his proem to Book 4, also appears in previous Greek didactic. I am referring to Hesiod's *Works and Days* and to Aratus' *Phaenomena*, where the corresponding word ὄνειαρ—profit, advantage—is also placed at equally emblematic points of these works, namely at the beginning of the epilogue of the former (αἵδε μὲν ἡμέραι εἰσιν ἐπιχθονίοις μέγ' ὄνειαρ, 'these days are of great profit for men on earth', 822) and at the end of the proem to the latter (χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ, 'Hail father, great wonder and advantage to mankind', 15). In the Hesiodic text the word refers to the subject of the work, i.e. the days, whereas in Aratus, it is the attribute of father Zeus to whom the main section of the proem is dedicated and with whom the invocation of the poet begins (15). Considering, however, that Zeus, the father-deity who helps men in their daily life (*Phaen.* 4–9), has created the constellations—the subject matter of the poem—which give the most clear signs throughout the year (*Phaen.* 10–14) the invocation to Zeus[12] as μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ could also be taken as meaning that the great benefit to mankind is the very knowledge of these signs which Zeus has provided.[13] Consequently the word ὄνειαρ, appears prominently in both works and suggests by its meaning their didactic nature.

It comes as no surprise therefore, that Lucretius chose the word *utilitas* in order to conclude his proem in the middle. With it he enhances the didactic nature of his work and alludes to his generic precursors. Furthermore, the same word constitutes a basic quality of the philosophical discourse and thematically ties nicely with the poet's intentions. Usefulness was considered by Epicurus and his successors as one main advantage the philosophical discourse had over poetry in the search for the truth.[14] Lucretius seems to have claimed for his own poetry this quality and, in a way, he now claims for himself the qualities that the philosophers considered their own. It is the poet who will elucidate through his clear verses (*lucida carmina*)[15] the difficult discoveries of philosophy. Moreover, his subject invests his work with the usefulness that other poetry lacks. Naturally, this topic of usefulness concerns the subject of the whole work but it is made here, in the eminent position of the middle.

[10] The verb changes from *perspicis* (1.949) to *percipis*.

[11] The context here seems to relate the *utilitas* to all the philosophical material contained in the work. There is, however, the view that the word refers to the usefulness of the two central books of the *DRN* and in particular to Book 3; Brown (n.1), 6. In this part of the work, in the proem to the middle, that is, the poet is interested to show the *quale* of the work—and hence the *utilitas*—rather than the *quid* which he had somehow stated with the *qua constet compta figura* at 1.950. See Conte (n. 9), 147ff.

[12] Kyriakidis (n. 9), 45.

[13] See also D. Kidd, *Aratus Phaenomena*, Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 34 (Cambridge, 1997), on 1–18 and 1: 'A. begins with Zeus because his whole poem illustrates the presence of Zeus as sky and weather god'; also on 15.

[14] E. Asmis, in Obbink (n. 2), 22ff. has an extensive discussion on philosophic clarity and usefulness; she also examines the development of the Epicurean thought as to poetry from Epicurus down to Philodemus. The section on Lucretius, however, relies solely on the passage of Book 1 and inevitably leaves Lucretian *utilitas* out of the discussion. Also on the usefulness of poetry R. Janko, *Philodemus on Poems, Book One* (Oxford, 2000), mainly 137f., 447, n. 4 and General index, s.v. *utility*.

[15] For the meaning of the term *lucidus* in Lucretius see G. Milanese, *Lucida Carmina: comunicazione e scrittura da Epicuro a Lucrezio* (Milan, 1989), 107–14, also index s.v. *lucidus*.

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To sum up: the much discussed repetition of a cluster of verses, therefore, seems never to have taken place, at least in the complete form in which they appear in Book 1, since a number of important points in the beginning and at the end of the initial unit prove to be totally different in the proemial form the poet gave to his verses in Book 4. These changes contextually alter the character and the design of the unit involved in the middle proem of the *DRN*. They highlight the difference in function between the two passages and enhance the Lucretian view of intransferability of things as the latter appears in the Latin poet's work.

Many, if not all, of the cases considered as repetitions in the *DRN* may perhaps owe their presence in the Lucretian work on similar grounds to the ones discussed here. In other words, the repeated passage should not be examined *per se*, isolated from its textual environment, but rather be seen in relation to the literary context of the textual unit in which it is embedded.

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CATULLUS 51: A SUITABLE CASE FOR TREATMENT?*

Ille mi par esse deo uidetur,
ille, si fas est, superare diuos,
qui sedens aduersus identidem te
spectat et audit

dulce ridentem, misero quod omnis
eripit sensus mihi: nam simul te,
Lesbia, aspexi, nihil est super mi
< >

lingua sed torpet, tenuis sub artus
flamma demanat, sonitu suopte
tintinant aures, gemina teguntur
lumina nocte.

otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est:
otio exsultas nimiumque gestis;
otium et reges prius et beatas
perdidit urbes.

In lines 5—6 Catullus says that Lesbia's sweet laughter deprives him of all his senses:[1] since *miser* is an adjective which is regularly used in contexts of disease and illness,[2] *misero* is an integral part of the medical language of these two lines[3] and is being

* I am extremely grateful to Prof. A. Chahoud for her comments on earlier drafts of this note.

[1] In other words, the antecedent of *quod* is *dulce ridentem*; many scholars (perhaps the majority) wrongly believe the antecedent to be the whole of the picture described by *qui . . . ridentem*. Outside Catullus, the expression *sensus eripere* seems to be found only in Cic. *Clu.* 171 and *Acad.* 2.103 (each passage concerned with natural philosophy).

[2] *TLL* 8.1103.32ff.

[3] Many readers are led by A.W. Allen's influential article ('Elegy and the classical attitude toward love: Propertius I,1', *YClS* 11 (1950), 253—77, esp. 258—60) to believe that *misero* here is

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