these changes is neither to suggest a process or Americanization nor one of modernization. Immigrant women, it seems, can live in two worlds.

———Caroline B. Brettell

Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, by Karen Barkey. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1994.

This work makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of state formation, banditry, and peasant movements. Most models of state formation are built upon analyses of European cases. The Ottoman Empire usually is ignored or is addressed in a summary and therefore distorted way. Barkey has steeped herself in the primary sources for seventeenth-century Turkey; her efforts pay off in the rich texture and subtlety of her rigorous arguments.

Barkley finds, contrary to the misconceptions of many historians and sociologists, that the Ottoman Empire of the seventeenth century was not in crisis. The regime successfully met the challenges posed by foreign powers, a doubling of the empire's population in the sixteenth century, and the consequent economic stagnation and impoverishment of much of the peasantry in the seventeenth century. The regime did not "breakdown" in the seventeenth century. Several succession crises did not disrupt the continuity of Ottoman rule; military and judicial elites carried out their duties without interruption. The main source of armed insurrection came from bandit armies which either were defeated by the official army or were pacified with offers of government positions and favors.

Barkey widens our understanding of the range of strategies that states can adopt to extract revenues from civil society and to subdue challengers to a regime's authority. The Ottoman Empire did not expand its twin, military and judicial, bureaucracies in the seventeenth century. Rather, it solidified its rule by disorganizing both elites and peasants. Elites were kept from establishing local or regional bases of power in the manner of European aristocracies by being rotated frequently in and out of offices and from province to province. Barkey documents how military officers were given the right to collect taxes (to support themselves and troops under their command) in widely disbursed villages to prevent the establishment of cross-class alliances with peasants that could (and in France did) provide the bases for anti-state coalitions. Peasants, too, were kept off balance by Ottoman policies. Peasant production was carried out by autonomous family units, limiting opportunities for village solidarity. Peasants also were divided along orthodox-heterodox religious lines. Markets were regulated to limit contacts across villages.

While Ottoman policies precluded rebellion as an option for impoverished peasants, the state did encourage disaffected and ambitious peasants to take up arms. Peasants provided a pool of men available for military service when the

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empire faced foreign challenges. When troops were demobilized they were allowed to keep their arms. Often unemployed military companies transmogrified into bandit gangs, looting the countryside. The state allowed local officials to hire bandits as tax collectors while turning a blind eye to simultaneous bandit looting. Bandit terror was another obstacle to peasant agency. If bandit atrocities threatened legitimate tax collection, then the state would send in its own soldiers to chase off the bandits and thereby win the gratitude of the peasantry. If Ottoman armies were otherwise engaged, the state would arm peasants to fight the bandits, a policy that created even more armed men and yet another pool of potential bandits.

Barkey finds that Ottoman bandits were not class-conscious "primitive rebels." Unlike Hobsbawm's Mafiosi, Ottoman bandits were totally divorced from their villages of origin and returned only to rape and pillage. The goal of bandits and their leaders was not to challenge the state or overthrow class relations; rather, the bandits wanted to win concessions and offices within a state they regarded as legitimate. Bandits were most likely to achieve their goals when the empire was under foreign pressure and the regime could not spare troops from the front to suppress bandits.

Barkey tells a rich and convincing story of Ottoman statecraft and the social forms, most notably banditry, that state strategies created. This book deserves wide readership among sociologists interested in the state and in class relations. Barkey teaches us that states can develop and persevere in a variety of class formations. State formation need not be a march toward internal order. State rulers may enhance their power and legitimacy by creating multiple sites of armed force and privilege. Disorder, in some settings, can be a better protector of state and class power than can regularized law and order. This work alerts us to the dangers of drawing simplistic generalizations about state and class formation and of applying European measures of rebellion and crisis to quite different social formations. Barkey offers a model of careful theory-building and draws useful comparisons built upon genuine historical understanding.

———Richard Lachmann

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