CHRYSIPPUS ON PSYCHOLOGY

T. TIELEMAN: *Chrysippus' On Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation*. (Philosophia Antiqua 94.) Pp. xii + 346. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Cased. ISBN: 90-04-12998-7.

This is an important and original study of a major topic in Hellenistic–Roman philosophy. The treatise *peri pathôn* (*On Affections*) by the main Stoic theorist Chrysippus was, evidently, a work of substantive significance on psychology and the emotions. Our knowledge of it is largely based on Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (*PHP*), 4–5, which thus serves as the core material for modern accounts of the nature and history of the Stoic theory. T. offers the first sustained attempt to reconstruct Chrysippus' treatise; he also provides a powerful critique of Galen as a source and an innovative reading of both Chrysippus' and Posidonius' ideas. Since the Stoic theory of emotions is a subject which is currently arousing intense interest among philosophers as well as historians of ancient thought, T.'s book has a lot to offer to current debate.

T.'s reconstruction of Chrysippus' work is highly systematic and displays an impressive methodology. It starts (Chapter 1) with a careful examination of Galen's aims and methods, which draws on T.'s earlier study of Books 2–3 of *PHP* (*Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul*, Leiden, 1996), but is focused on the issues raised by Books 4–5. T. gives special attention (Chapter 2) to the influence on Galen's thinking on psychology of the doxographical (handbook) tradition, making use of important recent work in this area by Jaap Mansfeld and others. He then offers an attempted reconstruction of Books 1–2 of Chrysippus' *On Affections* (the theoretical books, Chapter 3) and the fourth 'therapeutic' book (Chapter 4); evidence is lacking for Book 3. His account maps out the main topics and arguments, citing salient sources (in translation and Greek), with extensive discussion; a useful appendix (pp. 325–6) outlines his reconstruction. The evidence of Galen is supplemented by other sources wherever possible, especially Cicero's *Tusculans* Books 3–4 (the subject of Chapter 6). T. also offers (Chapter 5) a re-examination of Galen's account of Posidonius' alleged rejection of Chrysippus' theory, together with discussion of earlier Stoics, including Cleanthes and Diogenes, who are sometimes thought to have diverged from Chrysippus' approach.

One of the most striking features of T.'s book is his root-and-branch critique of Galen as a source for Stoic theory and debate. He stresses that Galen is far from being a neutral reporter of the Stoic theory. On the contrary, Galen is a deeply antagonistic and often tendentious participant in an ongoing debate about human psychology. Thus, to use Galen's evidence requires critical engagement with his material, checking Galen's claims against (among other things) his own verbatim quotations of Stoic thought, considered against the background of Galen's own conceptual objectives and methods. As T. acknowledges (pp. 7–8, 199–201), he is not the first to question Galen's judgement and accuracy on this subject; there are important revisionary treatments of Posidonius, especially by Janine Fillion-Lahille and John Cooper. But T. goes further in this direction than any previous study and in a more thoroughgoing way. Tieleman's view is in sharp contrast with, for instance, Richard Sorabji's account of the Stoic debate in *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, Part 1 (Oxford, 2000), which largely accepts Galen's picture.

What picture of the Stoic theory emerges from T.'s book? His view is that there is much more consistency between the approaches of different Stoic thinkers than Galen

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claims. According to Galen, Chrysippus' theory represents an extreme expression of a cognitivist or intellectualist conception of emotions. It went further than Zeno in this respect and was largely rejected by the later Stoic Posidonius, who adopted a version of Plato's tripartite psychology. Tieleman is sceptical that there was any real difference between Zeno and Chrysippus; Galen's claims on this point seem to be based on earlier doxographical statements rather than first-hand scrutiny of Zeno's treatise (pp. 85–6). As regards Posidonius, T. argues that Galen has completely misrepresented his views. What Galen presents as the full-scale critique and rejection of Chrysippus' ideas is better understood as an extension of Chrysippus' own work (in Book 2 of *peri pathôn*) in exploring—and then resolving—problems raised by his theory. Even what has previously been taken to be Posidonius' main innovation, the idea of 'affective movements', can be taken as simply supplementing Chrysippus' own thinking on the psychological inertia (which he compared to 'running legs') involved in affections or passions. What Galen presents as the adoption of Platonic psychology is better regarded as commentary on Plato's ideas, made from an explicitly Stoic standpoint, of a type that (as other scholars have recently stressed) seems to emerge as a new feature of the later Hellenistic period.

T. also offers a fresh interpretation of what is distinctive and new in Chrysippus' theory of the affections—that is to say, in the Stoic theory in general. He disputes Galen's claim that Chrysippus' account of human psychology is narrowly intellectualist; rather it is presented as unified or holistic, giving a coherent rôle both to beliefs and psychophysical reactions. Through comparison with the Stoic theory of determinism, T. shows how emotions are explained by reference to long-term dispositions and localized responses to situations. T. also stresses the strong physiological or quasi-medical strand in the Stoic theory (understated both by Galen in *PHP* and Cicero in *Tusc.* 3–4). This anticipates Galen's own approach, as Galen himself acknowledges in *Quod Animi Mores*, Chapter 4, which is in sharp contrast to his negative and contentious treatment in *PHP*.

As I have stressed, this is a highly innovative study, whose conclusions run counter to much previous scholarship, especially on Posidonius. Personally, I found Tieleman's thorough treatment of source-criticism and his analysis of the Stoic theory very convincing, though, of course, one might want to argue about detailed points. Other scholars may find more to disagree with. But, by any standards, this seems to me to be a major contribution to research in this area, with far-reaching implications for our understanding of the nature and history of Stoic thinking on psychology.

University of Exeter CHRISTOPHER GILL
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FROM ARCHIMEDES TO OMAR

R. NETZ: *The Transformation of Mathematics in the Early Mediterranean World: From Problems to Equations*. Pp. x + 198, figs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Cased, £45, US$70. ISBN: 0-521-82996-8.

The subtitle of this excellent monograph identifies the precise character of the transformation that takes place in the history of mathematics between the Greek and Arabic traditions. Reviel Netz adopts an original approach to the current debate as to

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