New Books

The Literary Wittgenstein
Edited by John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer
Routledge, 2004, xi+356pp., pb £18.99.

This handsome, well-edited, and stimulating collection is divided into four main parts: Philosophy as a kind of literature/Literature as a kind of philosophy; Reading with Wittgenstein; Literature and the boundaries of self and sense; Fiction and the *Tractatus*. These are bracketed by an epilogue (where Joseph Margolis reflects sceptically on attempts to apply Wittgenstein's methods to aesthetics), and an introduction by Wolfgang Huemer. The latter is clear and useful although he makes the surprising claim that '[poets] provide short carefully crafted texts' and that '[poetry] cannot, of course, develop long-winded stories rich in unnecessary detail ...[6]' We have only to consider Byron's *Don Juan*, Browning's *The Ring and the Book*, Scott's *The Lady of the Lake*, and, perhaps closer to home, Heine's *Deutschland-Ein Wintermärchen* to see that this is obviously false. It is strange to begin a collection devoted to exploring the borderlands between literature and philosophy by presenting a such a contracted conception of poetry (promoted in Anglo-American circles by people like Pound and Hulme in the first third of the Twentieth Century) as a universal truth.

There are eighteen contributions to this collection, and I cannot discuss all of them. I shall therefore concentrate on two that teased me into thought. The first, Stanley Cavell's, 'The *Investigations*' Everyday Aesthetics of Itself' [21–33] is an example of an essay that tries to understand how a literary approach to Wittgenstein can also be intrinsically philosophical. The second, James Guetti's, 'Monologic and Dialogic: Wittgenstein, *Heart of Darkness*, and Linguistic Scepticism' [251–66] shows how Wittgenstein can help interpret a major work of literature.

I

The main issues about a literary approach to Wittgenstein could not be more helpfully set out than they are at the beginning of

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Cavell's essay: 'If you conceive of philosophy as, let's say, argumentation, then it will be as easy to admire as to dismiss the writing – to admire it, perhaps, as a kind of ornament of the contemporary, or near contemporary, scene of professional philosophy, hence as something that lodges no philosophical demand for an accounting. But if you cannot shake an intuition, or illusion, that more is at issue than ornamentation (not that that issue is itself clear), and you do not wish to deny argumentation, or something of the sort, as internal to philosophy, then a demand for some philosophical account of the writing is, awkwardly hard to lose; [21] Cavell goes on to say that he does 'not seek an aesthetic concern of the text that is separate from its central [philosophical] work,' [21] and that he knows no aesthetic theory that can provide such an understanding.

In the remainder of the article, he begins to develop some materials which might provide a basis for understanding how the *Investigations'* literary quality can be an essential part of its philosophical quality. Specifically, he compares Wittgenstein's demand that philosophical explanations should result in a perspicuous overview of the phenomena to be explained, with Wittgenstein's insistence that formal proofs in mathematics should also be perspicuous. Noting that such explanations ought to end in 'completeness, pleasure, and the sense of breaking something off ...'[28] Cavell argues that the style which best achieves this result in the less formal context of philosophy is 'the aphoristic' [28]. This allows him to give some sense to Wittgenstein's thought, 'I often wonder whether my cultural ideal is new, i.e. contemporary, or whether it comes from the time of Schumann.' [30] because Cavell recalls that aphorism was a natural literary medium for German Romantic thinkers. This section of the article ends by quoting nine pairs of related aphorisms from Wittgenstein and F. or A.W. Schlegel, and one from Wittgenstein and Emerson, which allow the reader to experience the authors' affinities of outlook and effect.

These are stimulating suggestions but they have their problems. First, although the word 'aphorism' ['Aphorismus'] was available to Wittgenstein he did not use it, but referred to the numbered sections in part I of the *Investigations* as 'remarks' ['Bermerkungen']. Second, aphorisms and formal proofs stand at some intellectual distance from one another, and I'm not sure that Cavell's remark, '[the] concept of the perspicuous, governed by the criteria of completeness, pleasure and breaking off, is surely invited by contexts of aphorism as it is by those of proof ...' [29] is sufficient to establish a convincing link. Third, even though the

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term 'aphorism' has a slightly broader meaning in German than it does in English, it is surely necessary that aphorisms should be free-standing, memorable, and not depend on having a certain order. If Wittgenstein intended his text to be judged by these criteria, then much of it simply fails. Section 77, for example, reads: 'And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp picture *can* resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness ...' Wittgenstein's numbering system clearly indicates that the order is important, and the quoted remark is neither memorable nor fully intelligible outside its context.

Cavell explicitly addresses the last of these problems. He points out that the aphorisms he selects for comparison with the Romantics are not drawn from the *Investigations* but from *Culture and Value*. And at one point, he suggests why examples from the *Investigations* would be less suitable: '[In] the *Investigations* the aphoristic does not on the whole take the form of free-standing aphorisms ... but is most directed ... to reflecting details of its methodicalness, its searching out criteria, articulating grammar, spelling out fantasies ...' [29] Earlier, he implicitly acknowledges a related problem when he picks out a number of remarks from the *Investigations* as especially brilliant and memorable [24]. But if these are the genuine aphorisms, what are the less brilliant and memorable sections?

If the bulk of the book does not consist of failed aphorisms or bad aphorisms then this would seem to leave two options. First, the majority of the text could consist of some other kind of writing. This is evidently Timothy Gould's position. While discussing Cavell's views in 'Restlessness and the Achievement of Peace' [75–91], Gould writes 'The aphorism [in the *Investigations*] emerges at a moment in an all but unnoticed narrative. It is a striking moment to be sure, but a moment that requires the narrative for its full force ...'[80] This suggests that the 'unnoticed narrative' does not consist of aphorisms; and we shall naturally want to know what kind of writing this narrative is. Second; one could argue that writing can be aphoristic without consisting of aphorisms. But an intelligible use of "aphoristic" must bear some relation to what we ordinarily understand by "aphorism" and writing which is not free-standing; memorable and independent of order is surely too remote from aphorisms to make "aphoristic" appropriate. The bulk of the writing in the *Investigations* thus remains uncharacterized.

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I think that the difficulties Cavell and Gould find themselves in can be resolved by considering the influence on Wittgenstein of Goethe's conception of style and method. Although this has been extensively discussed in Europe and America over the last thirty years; it is still not as well known as it ought to be. The pioneering article is Joachim Schulte's "Chor und Gesetz: Zur "morphologischen Methode" bei Goethe und Wittgenstein" reprinted in his *Chord und Gesetz* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; 1990); pp.11–42. But there is a good deal about the influence in Ray Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (London: Cape, 1990); and there is now a book on the topic: *Seeing the World's Unity in its Variety: Goethe and Wittgenstein*, edited by F. Breithaupt and R. Raatzsch (Berlin: Peter Lang; 2003).

Let me sketch why the influence is essential for understanding Wittgenstein's conception of style and explanation. In Newtonian science, the aim is to arrive at a theoretical account of phenomena by means of experiment, and when the theoretical account is complete it can simply be passed on to another (he does not have to repeat the experiments again). Goethe believed this conception of science was harmful because theory leads us to overlook the full variety of particular cases, and produces an outlook where the mind became entirely detached from the physical world. To counter this, he developed a new kind of scientific investigation based on the *Gestalt* ('form'). The aim is to isolate the simplest manifestation of a given phenomenon; Goethe calls this an Ürphanomen (which may not actually exist in the physical world). The investigator has then to use his senses and intuition to see how the complex manifestations are related to the Ürphanomen, often by constructing intermediate cases. When the connections between the simple and the complex are seen, the investigator has arrived at an 'Übersichtliche Darstellung'—a perspicuous overview.

To bring this about in his Farbenlehre (*Theory of Colours*), Goethe adopts a special literary form. The non-polemical part of the book consists of 920 numbered sections: some of these consist of several pages, some of only a sentence or two; and, as regards content, some describe experiments which the reader should make on himself, some consist of sections of longer argument, some of summaries, some are observations, some rise to the condition of aphorism etc. The aim is not to inform, but to prompt the reader into seeing. And although the literary surface is apparently multifarious and fragmentary, it should prompt the reader into seeing all the connections between simple and complex cases which

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constitute a perspicuous representation. The resulting understanding cannot simply be summarized and passed on to another; he has to go through the same observations, processes and experiments himself.

Wittgenstein makes frequent references to Goethe's ideas (e.g. *Remarks on Colour*: 22, 51; *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*; I, 950), and 1 think it is clear that the *Investigations* applies to language and philosophy the same method and the same literary form which Goethe applies to the physical world and science. Goethe's central theoretical notions are invoked at certain key moments in Part 1: 'A perspicuous representation ['Übersichtliche Darstellung'] produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions.' Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases' [PI: 122]; 'Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look to what happens as a primary phenomenon' ['Ürphanomen']. [PL654] The longest section in the book, the 35 pages of Part II section xi, is devoted to 'seeing-as,' not just because Wittgenstein is interested in ambiguous figures, but because *Gestalten* are, for Wittgenstein, the bedrock of explanation, including philosophical explanation.

The book not only discusses these ideas, it embodies them. The form of non-propositional explanation used throughout (e.g. the establishing of connections between the extremely simple language games at the beginning and the more developed cases that we want to explain) is exactly Goethe's, as is the stress on avoiding theories, not being interested in anything hidden, developing a respect for the particular case, looking rather than thinking, and so on. This is the method by which we come to see perspicuous representations; the method which brings peace, and allows us—legitimately—to break off our investigation.

The foregoing, I believe, solves several problems raised by Cavell and Gould. For Goethe, the scientist uses exactly the same powers of observation and synthesis as the poet. (Goethe calls it intuition, 'Anschauung'.) This connection also begins to make some sense of Wittgenstein's claim, quoted so many times in this collection that it almost becomes an *ideé fixe,* that 'philosophy ought to be written only as a form of poetry' [e.g. 38, 56, 76] and that aesthetic and conceptual investigations are linked. [CV:25 and 79] Indeed, I believe the best analogy for the Wittgensteinian philosopher or the Goethean scientist is that of the literary critic struggling to make us see patterns and connections.

Goethe's practice shows that he thinks a correct understanding of phenomena is best conveyed in print by a series of numbered

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remarks, and if the reader works hard, he should find this apparently fragmented surface will prompt him to see the deep unity which constitutes a perspicuous overview. What Wittgenstein calls 'remarks' (especially numbered remarks) are a unique literary form developed to induce a unique kind of understanding. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that they cannot comfortably be described as 'aphorisms.' Goethe's aesthetic theory is, I believe, the aesthetic theory which can best explain the *Investigations*' form and style, precisely because it is not just an aesthetic theory but part of a developed epistemology. Goethe's theory of explanation illuminates the 'aesthetic concern of the [*Investigations*] that is not separate from its central work.' [21] In addition, unlike the connection between aphorisms and formal proofs, the intellectual connection between Goethe's conception of explanation and his literary form of numbered remarks could not be closer.

Gould argues that the passage (quoted by Cavell) where Wittgenstein says his cultural ideal derives from Schumann's time 'has tended to darken rather than clarify the philosophical significance of the literary affiliations of his work.' [77] But if his conception of form and explanation comes from the presiding literary genius of Schumann's youth' then some of the darkness begins to lift. Cavell is right to direct our attention to the era of the German Romantics, but Wittgenstein's closest links are found with the man who considered Romanticism a sickness.

II

I now turn to Guetti's article. He argues that in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* there is 'something amiss with language' and that 'Wittgenstein's most insistent and admonitory distinctions—between working 'meaning' and merely idling 'sense' or 'logic'—may fit perfectly with Conrad's own linguistic apprehensions ...' [251]. He shrewdly points out that whatever is wrong with language is shared by both Kurtz (the chief of the Inner Station the expedition is supposed to rescue) and Marlow (the seaman who narrates the story); a certain eloquent, high-flown mistiness, and a lack of direct, crisp statement is found in both. The Wittgenstein-inspired diagnosis that Guetti offers, is that both Kurtz and Marlow speak almost exclusively in protracted *monologues*, and that language, deprived of its natural place in dialogue, begins to lose its sense and purchase on reality [261–5].

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I share both Guetti's sense that Heart of Darkness is a book which is centrally concerned with a certain kind of linguistic failure, and that Wittgenstein is just the man to help us diagnose it, but I feel that the monologic/dialogic distinction is not the most fruitful place to look for an explanation.

Repeatedly in *Heart of Darkness*, we hear aspects of Marlow's experience described as delusory, incomprehensible, dream-like or unreal. The central reason for this is that the concepts the Europeans are trying to apply to Africa lack the context necessary for them to make sense. Consider the early passage about Marlow's steamship journey along the African coast [*Heart of Darkness* (HD), Everyman, 1993:17–19]. One of the ship's purposes is to land customs-house officials and soldiers to protect them. But the central difficulty, which everyone but Marlow appears not to have noticed, is that the notion of a customs-house official only makes sense if you have a customs house, and that notion only makes sense if you have a concept of a nation and national boundaries. All of these are lacking in the African context. Consequently, you are left with something called 'a customs house', but which is actually only 'a tin shed and a flag-pole lost in it'. [HD:17]

Similarly, the cannibals who work on the riverboat are 'paid wages': '[They] had given them every week three pieces of brass wire, each about nine inches long; and the theory was they were to buy provisions with that currency in river-side villages.' [HD:57] Again, transforming brass wire into currency requires a complex background of institutions which are not present, and for this reason (and several others) the cannibals start to starve. Lastly, the heads on poles, which Kurtz has had placed around his hut, are described as those of 'rebels'. Marlow's response to this information is immediate: 'I shocked him excessively by laughing. Rebels! What would be the next definition I was to hear? There had been enemies, criminals, workers — and these were rebels.' [HD:82–3] The concept of 'rebel' and 'criminal' can only be correctly applied where there is a notion of an established government and a legal system, but here there are only uncomprehending natives and white men trying to enslave and rob them.

The failure of western concepts to take hold in Africa is parallelled by the failure of the company's employees to achieve anything by their labours, and the repeated failures of western technology. The brick-maker produces no bricks, the accountant's immaculate books map a chaos, the workers simply die; the warships guns go 'Pop' and nothing happens, a boiler wallows in

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the grass, a bucket leaks, the employees' gunfire is ineffective, the drain-pipes are smashed, rivets strew the ground, the blasting is 'objectless' [HD:20] Marlow is only saved from the sense of nightmarish unreality when ends have their required means, when work achieves its purpose, and technology functions. It is for this reason that he becomes so enthusiastic about an old book he finds called *An Inquiry into Some Points of Seamanship* (a passage whose importance Guetti emphasizes [260]). 'The simple old sailor [its author] with his talk of chains and purchases, made me forget the jungle and the pilgrims in a delicious sensation of having come upon something unmistakably real'.[HD:52–3]

Throughout his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein complains about Europeans trying to apply inappropriate concepts ('belief', 'opinion', 'error,') to practices they do not understand. But in the *Philosophical Investigations* he also speaks of philosophical misunderstandings as fantasies or delusions. This is because the central words at issue ('reality', 'time', 'knowledge') have floated free of the criteria by which they are correctly applied. At several points he illustrates this situation by analogies that are closely connected with Conrad's. At PI: 194 he inverts the situation in *Heart of Darkness* when he remarks: 'When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.' And in several later passages he draws analogies between linguistic failure and mechanisms which fail to function (271. '... Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism'). And tasks which look like they ought to succeed but don't because the correct institutional background is lacking (268. 'Why can't my right hand give my left hand money?').

Heart of Darkness shows us that a pervasive sense of unreality and insanity can be a product of conceptual mismatch, and that this failure is akin to failures of work, intention and mechanism. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* shows us that a failure to understand our concepts can have a similar result, and can be illustrated by similar analogies. It is this, rather than the debilitating power of monologue (about which Wittgenstein says virtually nothing), that seems to me the central insight shared by Wittgenstein and Conrad.

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III

For the rest, I particularly enjoyed David Schalkwyk's,' Wittgenstein's 'imperfect garden': the Ladders and Labyrinths of Philosophy as *Dichtung*' [55–74] which may well be the gem of the collection. In less than twenty condensed pages, he manages to say interesting and important things about Wittgenstein translation, his imagery, his relationship with Freud, on poetry, ineffability, and—in a particularly expert and stimulating section—on inner and outer in *Hamlet*. Joachim Schulte writes enlighteningly on 'the life of the sign' [146–64] and Carry Hagberg contributes a particularly clear and helpful paper on solipsism and first-person privacy—part of his continuing exploration of autobiography and its philosophical implications. [228–50]

All in all, a thought-provoking volume on an important topic. I only noticed two (trivial) errors: Anthony Kenny did not write *The False Prison* [249]; and Schubert did not write a Quintet in C Sharp [39].

M. W. Rowe

Deeper than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art
by Jenefer Robinson
Clarendon Press, OUP, 2005

Many great philosophers of the past wrote extensively on the emotions: Aristotle, Hume, Descartes and Spinoza, for example. (Kant, on the other hand, wrote little about them, and what he did write was hostile to them: they were distractions, and liable to lead us away from doing our duty. We would be better off without them.) But for many years what these philosophers said about the emotions was usually passed over in silence, and thought of as mere armchair psychology. Compare, for example, the attention paid in the philosophical literature to Books 1 and 3 of Hume's Treatise with the lack of attention given to Book 2, which is on "the passions". Then, from about 40 years ago, there was a revival of philosophical interest in the emotions. Influenced by Wittgenstein, philosophers, such as Anthony Kenny in *Action, Emotion and Will*. criticised the great philosophers of the past for taking emotions to be private, knowable only to their owners. But, Kenny and others argued, emotions are not mere sensations, like tickles or itches, but

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are intentional states—are, that is, *about* something. Emotions have objects: when one is angry, one is angry about something or *with* someone; when one is in love, one is in love with someone. And the intentionality of emotions means that they essentially and necessarily involve beliefs, and in this way can be (partly) subject to the will and open to moral judgement. If I am pleased, I must be pleased about something, and if that something is, for example, that I have won the lottery, then, in order for me to be said to be pleased that I have won the lottery, I must believe that I have won the lottery. If it turns out that I discover that I haven't, my pleasure disappears.

This theory has become known as the Cognitive Theory of Emotions, and has been generally accepted for the last 30 or 40 years. Jenefer Robinson starts her impressive new study of the emotions by attacking the theory, which she labels the "Judgement". Even though the Cognitive Theory seemed to mark an important advance in thinking about the emotions, the claim by its advocates that the great philosophers of the past all held the same crude "Feeling Theory" (as Robinson entitles it in her) was misleading. For Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and Hume wrote subtly and with great insight on the emotions and their place in human life. Indeed, they made precisely the same points about the intentionality of emotions that the Cognitive Theorists produced with a flourish in attacking them, and thus makes them, too, targets of Robinson's attack on the Cognitive Theory. Her main criticism in the Part One of her book is, however, directed at contemporary theorists of emotion such as Robert Gordon, Gabriele Taylor, Robert Solomon, William Lyons, Martha Nussbaum and Peter Goldie. Emotions, Robinson argues, are certainly not identical with judgements. Furthermore, if animals can be said to have at least some emotions (which they surely can), then those emotions cannot have as an essential component judgements those animals are incapable of making.

Robinson's main purpose in this elegant, richly detailed and welcome study is to offer a new theory of emotion, grounded in recent psychological work, and then to see how this theory affects our understanding of the role of emotion in the arts. Her unifying theme is that emotions are processes, not states, as they are often thought to be, and that these processes start with, are caused by non-cognitive "appraisals". These appraisals are immediate (they occur within a few thousandths of a second of a stimulus) and instinctive. They are, Robinson says, appropriating a phrase from Edith Wharton, the American novelist and friend of Henry James,

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"deeper than reason". These appraisals cause physiological changes, and tend to lead to actions, after which there is often "cognitive monitoring" of the whole process. Emotions are thus not caused by judgements or beliefs about a situation, as (she says) the cognitive theorists would claim. These instinctive appraisals help to explain a great deal that has been found puzzling about the emotions, especially in connection with our emotional responses to art.

Perhaps her attack on the Cognitive Theory is not so fierce as she makes out. She says, p. 90, that judgement theorists claim that "an emotion either is or is caused by a judgement or a cognitive evaluation with an intentional object. I deny both claims". But not all, indeed, very few, of those who have held the cognitive theory have wished to claim that emotions *are* judgements. Furthermore, the Cognitive Theorist's claims about the intentionality of emotions are not claims about the cause of the emotion. The cause and the object can be quite distinct. Thus the object of my delight in on a particular occasion may be the appearance of my fingernails, and the cause may be the drug I have unwittingly been given. Robinson's denial of the claims of the Cognitive Theorists is somewhat weakened, too, by the fact that she readily allows that judgement does play an essential role in the process of emotion, at any rate for humans, and by her claim, p.95, that "our emotion words—jealousy, anger, etc—have derivative uses where they refer not to emotional responses per se but simply to the evaluations themselves". It might be thought, too, that the idea that emotions are caused by judgements or beliefs, which Robinson so forcefully rejects, isn't so far from the idea that they are caused by 'appraisals', which she so forcefully accepts—though these latter are, as she emphasises, immediate and below the level of consciousness.

She believes that what many philosophers have been trying to do in the past in talking about emotions is to try to explain how we should use emotion terms in language. But that, she says, can better be studied by looking at great literature. Her discussion in Part Two of the book focuses on the 19th and early 20th century novel: works which achieve perhaps the greatest psychological subtlety and complexity of any art. To be experienced properly, Robinson persuasively argues, these novels must be experienced emotionally. It might be suggested, she says, p. 107, that "it's possible to come to the same understanding by a more cerebral engagement with the text". But, she says, "this is not true: nothing else can do the job that emotions do. Without appropriate emotional responses, some

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novels simply *cannot* be adequately understood". The emotional understanding of a novel (as of life) is something distinct from cognitive understanding—understanding a series of propositions. It is a form of *bodily* understanding. Furthermore, through a detailed discussion of Edith Wharton's *The Reef*, she shows that reading great novels is an education of the emotions. They evoke immediate, instinctive, bodily responses in us, which develop into emotions, which we then come to consider in a more cognitive way.

Robinson shows how understanding that emotions begin with instinctive appraisals helps in the discussion of some well-known problems in aesthetics, such as, among other things, the paradoxes of fiction (why are we upset by the lives of people we know do not exist?) and of tragedy (why don't we avoid works of art with unpleasant content?), puzzles about authorial intention, and whether there is one correct way to understand a novel, and the notions of disinterestedness and the 'aesthetic attitude'. She has illuminating points to make about all of these problems.

In Part Three, Robinson discusses R. G. Collingwood's theory of artistic expression, and shows how Alan Tormey's generally accepted demolition if it fails. There are, indeed, fatal difficulties with Collingwood's theory, as Robinson points out, and she provides a revised and more plausible theory of what artistic expression is.

The art that perhaps best communicates emotions, but does so in a way that most philosophers have found profoundly puzzling, is music. Music, because it is non-conceptual, has often been seen as a particular problem for the Cognitive Theory, for how can emotion be involved in music if there is no cognitive content to it? If music is said, for example, to be angry, then what is it angry about? The final part of Robinson's book is devoted to a discussion of how music expresses emotion, and how it arouses emotion in us. One attempt to solve the puzzle that has been popular in recent musical aesthetics (for example, in the writings of Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies) is to say that music doesn't actually express emotion at all, but only gives the appearance of doing so, "much as the sad face of the St. Bernard or basset-hound is an appearance that has nothing to do with the expression of any actual emotion the dog might be feeling". Robinson argues, against this "doggy theory", that some music, and especially Romantic music, *is* the expression of emotion.

In discussing the emotional expressiveness of music, writers have often sought to interpret the meaning of different notes of the scale, or of particular musical phrases, or of the major and minor scales. But what such analyses fail to do is to give any idea of how

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emotion is expressed in a whole piece. They remain atomistic and fragmented interpretations: here joy, here triumph, here sadness, here death. Robinson, who views emotions themselves as ever-changing processes and our emotional life as a stream, or series of streams, is in a far better position to explain how a piece of music itself a series of processes occurring in streams, can express our fluctuating emotions. Robinson argues her case by detailed analyses of Brahms's song "Immer leiser wird mein Schlummer" and his Intermezzo Opus 117, no. 2, for piano.

Developing the work of Edward T. Cone, Robinson sees the emotion expressed in such music as that of a "persona", who can sometimes be identified with the composer, and sometimes with a character created by the composer, and that this is true both of vocal and of purely instrumental music. Robinson again illustrates her argument with an extensive discussion of an example, Shostakovich's Tenth Symphony, and shows how in this work the 'persona' in question can plausibly be said to be Shostakovich himself. Robinson concludes that music can express "cognitively complex emotions" that "are much more specific than mere sadness or joy" and "far more complex than anything permitted by the doggy theory". (p320)

Robinson's book is long, but richly rewarding. It is a major contribution to contemporary aesthetics. As well as extensive discussions of well-known aesthetic theories of the past, there are also excellent treatments of more contemporary theorists, which should cause many to rethink their positions on some of the main problems in aesthetics. But perhaps the most interesting sections of all are the discussions of individual works of art. As well as Wharton's *The Reef*, and the Brahms and Shostakovich examples; there are illuminating analyses of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, Keats's *Ode to a Nightingale*, Shakespeare's *Macbeth* and his *Sonnet 73*. Matthew Arnold's *Dover Beach*. Beethoven's Eroica Symphony, and the paintings of Delacroix and of Caspar David Friedrich. These works ("some of the greatest achievements of Anglo-European culture" as Robinson describes them) have a moral value. It isn't just that they express and evoke emotions, but that they also "actively encourage us to reflect about (sic) our emotional responses and to leam from them". Understanding people in real life requires a special kind of emotional or bodily understanding, and great works of art can help us to develop and refine such understanding. Such works provide us with a "sentimental education".

Michael Proudfoot

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