China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*

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ABSTRACT While China has been portrayed as a reluctant supporter of UN peacekeeping in the past, it has voted in favour of every newly established UN peacekeeping operation since the beginning of the new millennium. Previous studies of China's behaviour in UN peacekeeping explained this phenomenon primarily with recent shifts in its foreign and security policy rather than with changes in UN peacekeeping itself. This article analyses China's voting behaviour in the UN Security Council on peacekeeping resolutions in the context of the evolving concepts of UN peacekeeping. It argues that China's recent enthusiasm for these missions is the result of two developments. On the one hand, Beijing was able to reinterpret its understanding of UN peacekeeping after its experience in the 1990s, especially with regard to the use of force; while on the other hand, the way UN peacekeeping missions are conducted was reformed after the Brahimi Report in 2000, which made UN peacekeeping more agreeable to the China.

As China is rising, political analysts are increasingly worried about its future role in the international system. They often portray the country as a growing economic and military power that could upset the world. Yet they seem to overlook that China's growing strength might actually help to keep the peace. If the Chinese leadership managed to embrace the principles of UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) fully, China could become one of the most resourceful contributors to international peacekeeping. But Beijing is widely regarded as one of the strongest defenders of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.[1] Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese representatives in the UN Security Council (UNSC) frequently expressed their uneasiness about UN peacekeeping mandates that authorized the use of force or interfered in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. This behaviour led critics to complain that China would try to defend an outdated concept of state sovereignty against the changing realities on the ground. In the new millennium, however, Beijing began

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1 See Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 26; Samuel S. Kim, "China's international organizational behaviour," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 413–14; Wang Jianwei, "Managing conflict: Chinese perspectives on multilateral diplomacy and collective security," in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 92.

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to support every newly established UNPKO and to deploy more Chinese peacekeepers abroad than ever before. This article would like to suggest a possible explanation for this new trend in Chinese peacekeeping.

China's attitude towards UNPKO has been analysed in both the Chinese and English literature, but in varying depth. The vast majority of scholars publishing in Chinese are content with describing the changes in UN peacekeeping since the 1990s instead of analysing China's role within it.[2] Referring primarily to the peacekeeping literature of the early 1990s, most of them ignore new developments in UN peacekeeping and therefore still promote an outdated concept of UNPKO.[3] Just a few Chinese practitioners have recently shed light on China's new interest in UN peacekeeping.[4] In the English literature, Kim's early research on Chinese behaviour in the United Nations laid important groundwork for understanding its attitude towards UNPKO.[5] Other contributions traced China's changing attitude over the decades, defined major turning points and identified Beijing's normative concerns as key obstacles to its full participation.[6] In this context, Yuan and Carlson provided an overview about the Chinese debate on military interventions and state sovereignty.[7] New

2 See for example Li Yizhong, "Weihe xingdong zhong de zhiduhua queshi wenti jiantan" ("A cursory inquiry of the problem of lacking systematization of UN peacekeeping operations"), *Forum of World Economy and Politics*, No. 2 (2001), pp. 55–58; Xu Weidi, "Yaobai yu panghuang zhong de tansuo: lianheguo weihe xingdong mianlin de kunnan yu tiaozhan" ("Exploration in vacillation and hesitation: the difficulties and challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations"), *World Economics and Politics*, No. 5 (2005), pp. 7–13; Zhang Jing, "Lianheguo weihe xingdong de lishi yu xianzhuang" ("The history and present state of UN peacekeeping operations"), *International Studies*, No. 4 (1994), pp. 7–15. For China's role in UN peacekeeping see Jiang Zhenxi, "United Nations peace-keeping operation at the turn of century," *International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2000), pp. 33–38; Jiang Zhenxi, "China's active involvement in UN peacekeeping operations and her propositions," *International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2003), pp. 63–69; Liu Enzhao, *Lianheguo weichi heping xingdong* (*UN Peacekeeping Operations*) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1999), pp. 251–56.

3 See for example Nie Jun, "Lun lianheguo weihe jizhi de quexian" ("On the flaws of the UN peacekeeping regime"), *Journal of Xiangfan University*, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2004), pp. 28–32; Zhang Lu, "Lun dangdai lianheguo weihe xingdong de yihua: dui di er dai lianheguo weihe xingdong mianlin wenti de sikao" ("On the differentiation of contemporary UN peacekeeping operations: pondering about problems facing the second generation of UN peacekeeping operations"), *Pacific Journal*, No. 2 (2004), pp. 74–75.

4 See Qu Zhiwen and Li Chunzeng, "Lun Zhongguo weihe jingcha peixun yu guoji jiegui de tujing" ("Ways of adapting the training of China's peacekeeping police to international standards"), *Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2003), p. 64; Zhang Huiyu, "Zhongguo dui lianheguo weihe xingdong de gongxian" ("China's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations"), *Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy*, Vol. 20, No. 5 (2004), p. 32; Zhao Yu, "Lun Zhongguo minshi jingcha canyu lianheguo weihe xingdong de yiyi" ("On the importance of participating in UN peacekeeping operations for China's civilian police"), *Journal of Chinese People's Public Security University*, Vol. 109, No. 3 (2004), pp. 149–50.

5 Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 194–241.

6 Byron N. Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (1998), pp. 102–22; Yongjin Zhang, "China and UN peacekeeping: from condemnation to participation," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996), pp. 1–15.

7 Allen Carlson, "Helping to keep the peace (albeit reluctantly): China's recent stance on sovereignty and multilateral intervention," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1–27; Yuan Jing-dong, "Multilateral intervention and state sovereignty: Chinese views on UN peacekeeping operations," *Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (1998), pp. 275–95.

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motivations behind China's increasing participation in the UN peacekeeping regime were suggested by Tang and Pang.[8] In the growing body of literature, two articles stand out: recognising the changing nature of UN peacekeeping, Fravel was the first to describe systematically Beijing's changing attitude towards different types of UNPKO[9]; and Gill and Reilly were able to clarify Beijing's decision-making process on UN peacekeeping issues and to discover first signs of a new Chinese flexibility at the end of 1999.[10]

However, since Gill and Reilly's analysis was published in 2000, there have been significant developments in the way UNPKO are conducted, which have not yet been covered by recent articles.[11] More importantly, the framework of analysis introduced by Fravel was not thorough enough to notice relevant subtleties in China's attitude towards UNPKO in the 1990s, particularly with regard to the use of force, which might explain its different behaviour later on. This article aims at filling this gap by analysing recent changes in UN peacekeeping, documenting carefully even subtle shifts in Beijing's attitude towards UNPKO, and suggesting a possible explanation. To this end, it examines China's changing voting behaviour in the UNSC regarding peacekeeping. Chinese diplomats may show their approval by voting in favour of a resolution or their disapproval by abstaining. A public explanation of their vote can further qualify the support or abstention with a dissociating or sympathetic comment. The option of vetoing a UNPKO resolution has so far not been used unless the resolution touched upon the Taiwan issue.

This article first provides a typology of UNPKO in order to understand better the evolution that the concept of UN peacekeeping has undergone, which is shown in the second section. It goes on to analyse China's voting behaviour in the UNSC with regard to these different types of UNPKO. It then presents the changes in China's attitude towards UN peacekeeping, but also the limits of its flexibility.

8 Pang Zhongying, "China's changing attitude to UN peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), pp. 87–104; Tang Yongsheng, "China's participation in UN peacekeeping regime," in Wang Yizhou (ed.), *Construction within Contradiction: Multiple Perspective on the Relationship between China and International Organizations* (Beijing: China Development Publishing House, 2003), pp. 73–99.

9 M. Taylor Fravel, "China's attitude toward UN peacekeeping operations since 1989," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 11 (1996), pp. 1102–22.

10 Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping: the view from Beijing," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000), pp. 41–59. Choedon summarizes the findings of Fravel and Gill/Reilly. See Yeshi Choedon, "China's stand on UN peacekeeping operations: changing priorities of foreign policy," *China Report*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2005), pp. 39–57.

11 See for example Yin He, "China's changing policy on UN peacekeeping operations," *Asian Paper* (2007), http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/2007/YinHe0409073.pdf, accessed September 2007; Gary D. Rawnsley, "May you live in interesting times: China, Japan and peacekeeping," in Rachel E. Utley (ed.), *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 81–98; Drew Thompson, "Beijing's participation in UN peacekeeping operations," *Jamestown Foundation China Brief*, Vol. 5, No. 11 (2005), pp. 7–10, http://www.jamestown.org/images/ pdf/cb_005_011.pdf, accessed September 2007.

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Concepts of UN Peacekeeping

Military interventions challenge the very core of national sovereignty. For this reason, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld and his advisors defined three principles for UNPKO when organizing the UN's first military force in the Suez Crisis of 1956[12]: the consent of all conflicting parties to the activities of the mission; the impartiality of the peacekeepers in their relationship with the conflicting parties; and the minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-defence.[13] This "holy trinity"[14] was to ensure that national sovereignty was respected in compliance with international law, which allows the use of military force only either in self-defence or under the authorization of the UNSC invoking chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Yet the interpretation of these principles and the character of UNPKO have changed in the decades that followed. In looking at the roles of international peacekeeping in world politics, many analysts distinguish chronologically between different generations of peacekeeping missions.[15] However, this categorization reveals little about the different functions of peacekeeping within a generation and their continuation or change across generations.[16] Other scholars therefore classify UNPKO along more differentiated and complex typologies.[17] For the purpose of this study, the following combination of five categories introduced by Bellamy, Williams, Griffin and Findlay serve best to analyse China's shifting attitude towards different roles of UNPKO because they are distinguished by the scope of their tasks and their interpretation of the three UNPKO principles, especially with regard to the use of force (see Figure 1).

12 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 105; Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 31.

13 Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 4.

14 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 95.


15 See Trevor Findlay, "The new peacekeeping and the new peacekeepers," in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Challenges for the New Peacekeepers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 12–13; John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, 2nd ed. (Washington: Brassey's, 2000), pp. 22–29; Winrich Kühne, "Peace operations and governance: lessons learned and perspectives," in Thierry Tardy (ed.), *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 102–07; John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second generation multinational operations," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1992), pp. 113–31; Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 1–2; Oliver P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 11–12; Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, "Cascading generations of peacekeeping: across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor," in Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 9–14.

16 See Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 13; Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall, "International peacekeeping and conflict resolution: a taxonomic analysis with implications," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1998), p. 38.

17 See Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 5–6; Diehl, Druckman and Wall, "International peacekeeping and conflict resolution," pp. 39–40; Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 5–7; Marrack Goulding, "The evolution of United Nations peacekeeping," *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1993), pp. 456–60; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 1–8, 14–15.

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Figure 1: **Typology of Five Roles in UN Peacekeeping**



First is traditional peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeepers try to build confidence and facilitate political dialogue for others to resolve a conflict rather than attempting to do so themselves. They adhere strictly to the three UNPKO principles.[18]

Second is transition management. These multidimensional missions take on a wide range of responsibilities in order to transform states and societies: they supervise elections, build democratic institutions, conduct military and police training, promote post-conflict rehabilitation, and protect human rights. Peacekeepers managing transitions also adhere strictly to the UNPKO principles.[19]

The third category is wider peacekeeping operations, which were originally intended as traditional peacekeeping missions but their mandate was gradually expanded. In the context of fragile interim ceasefires and ongoing violence, these missions have taken on additional tasks such as securing the delivery of

18 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 95–97, 101.
19 *Ibid.* pp. 111–12.

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humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians from imminent physical threats.[20] While these peacekeepers claim to uphold the UNPKO principles, it is often unclear how to adhere to them in a hostile environment.[21]

Fourth is peace enforcement which, as an element of UNPKO, intends to coerce the conflicting parties to comply with a previously consented agreement by using military force under the authorization of the UNSC. Deployed within a hostile environment, peace enforcers interpret the UNPKO principles in such a way that they act impartially if they militarily penalize those groups who try to undermine the peace accord by violence.[22] Peace enforcement should not be confused with pure *enforcement actions*, which are military operations mandated by the UNSC to impose the will of the international community on an enemy state by defeating it militarily – and which are clearly not peacekeeping.[23]

The final category is peace support operations. This type of multifunctional peacekeeping operation combines robust military force with a strong civilian component that carries out civil administration, civilian policing and humanitarian tasks. Peace support operations combine aspects of transition management, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but attempt to overcome the problems of each of them. Prepared to act in an environment of ongoing conflict, peace support operations interpret the UNPKO principles in the same way as peace enforcement does.[24]

These five roles of peacekeeping are not mutually exclusive, but they are nevertheless distinctive. While traditional peacekeeping and transitional management differ in the scope of their tasks, they both adhere strictly to the three UNPKO principles and use only a minimum of force. Wider peacekeeping operations have extended their tasks and reinterpreted the three principles while operating in an increasingly hostile environment. Also deployed in such an environment, peace enforcement missions use force to protect their mandate, sometimes as an element of larger peace support operations.

Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Although UN peacekeeping has not evolved in a linear manner with a clear division between these five features, some of them were more prevalent in certain periods than in others. Accordingly, the interpretation of the three UNPKO principles has undergone slight changes over the past 60 years of UN peacekeeping history. Since UNPKO in the Cold War era were primarily intended to prevent direct confrontation between the superpowers rather than violent conflict per se, their principles remained vague and often impractical,

20 *Ibid.* pp. 128–30; Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, pp. 147–48.
21 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 356–58.
22 Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 21–24.
23 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 6–7; Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, pp. 29–30.
24 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 165–66, 169.

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particularly with regard to the use of force.[25] They were dramatically challenged when the UN operation in Congo moved from traditional to wider peacekeeping and used peace enforcement and even enforcement actions in the secessionist province of Katanga.[26] After sharp criticism by France and the Soviet Union, the subsequent UNPKO of the Cold War era remained strictly within the limits of traditional peacekeeping missions.[27]

Post-Cold War era (1988–1999)

When the Cold War began to thaw, UNPKO underwent a substantial transformation. While the number of UNPKO increased drastically between 1988 and 1993, the UNSC also embarked on authorizing a new form of mission that operated in intrastate conflicts, carried out more complex tasks and became more intrusive in nature – wider peacekeeping operations.[28] But the vulnerability of American soldiers killed in Somalia and the failure of the UN peacekeepers to protect civilians against ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and Bosnia prompted the international community to re-evaluate the role of UNPKO. As a result, the UNSC became more reluctant to authorize new missions, while the United States preferred to enforce peace outside the United Nations in coalitions of willing or capable regional organizations.[29]

Moreover, the original understanding of the UNPKO principles did not any longer meet the realities of intrastate conflicts. In civil wars, consistent consent was often difficult to maintain since the loyalty of militias towards their warlords frequently shifted.[30] Impartiality was understood as being neutral to the conflict instead of ensuring that all parties adhere to the consented agreement.[31] Most importantly, the authorization of the use of force had been unspecific from the outset. While the peacekeepers' right of self-defence was expanded to include the protection of UN personnel, it remained largely unclear to what extent peacekeepers could secure their freedom of movement and defend their mission.[32] As UNSC resolutions authorized the UN peacekeepers to use "all necessary means" under chapter VII without specifying the level of force to be used, it was not clarified whether this phrase was meant to authorize peace enforcement or simply to reassert the use of force for self-defence.[33]

25 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 47–49.
26 *Ibid*. pp. 71–81; Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 103–05.
27 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 71–73.
28 Findlay, "The new peacekeeping and the new peacekeepers," pp. 2–3, 12–13; Thakur and Schnabel, "Cascading generations of peacekeeping," pp. 11–12.
29 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 316–17.
30 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 109–10; Daniel and Hayes, *Coercive* Inducement, pp. 24–25.
31 Daniel and Hayes, *Coercive Inducement*, p. 25; Dominick Donald, "Neutrality, impartiality and UN peacekeeping at the beginning of the 21st century," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2002), pp. 22–23.
32 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 13, 17–19.
33 Since the use of force in self-defence was already implicitly authorized under chapter VI, permitting "all necessary means" under chapter VII seemed superfluous. See Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 8–9.

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Post-Brahimi era (since 2000)

In 1999, the number of UN peacekeepers surged again when the UNSC authorized four new missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Congo. At the same time, a new pattern of UNPKO deployment was emerging, in which command and control of peace enforcement actions were subcontracted to pivotal states or military alliances.[34] This practice had already appeared in the 1990s when the peace in Bosnia was enforced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in co-operation with the UN protection force (UNPROFOR). NATO later installed its implementation force (IFOR) and stabilization force (SFOR) while the United Nations were only responsible for the police force of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). But since the operation of the Australian-led international force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999, pivotal states have regularly been mandated to establish a secure environment, in which the subsequent UNPKO could then be fully deployed.[35]

These developments coincided with the results of a larger debate about the lessons learnt from wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia.[36] In 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited a high-level panel, chaired by the former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi, to review all aspects of UNPKO. The so-called Brahimi Report made four key recommendations: First, peacekeepers should be specifically mandated to use force to defend themselves, their freedom of movement, their mission and civilians under imminent threat of attack.[37] Second, the United Nations should not mandate a mission before it had the resources available to fulfil it, which meant in fact that pivotal states could be deployed first, to be followed by a UN force.[38] Third, the report suggested a better consultation between the UNSC and the troop-contributing countries.[39] Finally, the panel encouraged the United Nations to pursue a multidimensional approach in peacebuilding as an integral part of UNPKO, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, training of police forces, supervision of elections, and strengthening of the rule of law and the protection of human rights.[40]

As a result of these recommendations and the fresh experience in Kosovo and East Timor, peace support operations emerged as a new form of UNPKO, replacing the roles of transition management and wider peacekeeping. In fact, all newly established missions after 1999 were designed as peace support operations,

34 *Ibid.* pp. 39–44, 211.
35 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, pp. 85–87.
36 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 326–32; Kühne, "Peace operations and governance," pp. 103–04.
37 A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras. 49, 62.
38 A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 60. See also Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, pp. 334–35.
39 A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 61.
40 *Ibid.* paras. 37–43.

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with the sole exception of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea which is a traditional peacekeeping mission.[41] The UNPKO principles were reinterpreted so that military force could now be used to coerce conflicting parties to adhere to the originally consented agreement.[42] Pivotal states continued to play a crucial role in providing security for these missions and in enforcing the peace if a ceasefire should break down.[43]

Evolution of China's Attitude towards UN Peacekeeping

Just as the concept of UN peacekeeping has undergone a transformation from traditional peacekeeping to peace support operations, so has Beijing's attitude towards these different types of UNPKO. At first, China completely rejected the idea of UN peacekeeping. Beijing regarded all UN interventions as being manipulated by the superpowers, not least because China had been the target of the first US-led enforcement action authorized by the United Nations in 1951 during the Korean War.[44] After joining the United Nations in 1971, Beijing demonstrated its dissociation from peacekeeping activities by not taking part in the voting on UNPKO.[45] Since 1981, however, when China began to open up to the world, Chinese diplomats have voted in favour of all those missions which carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks or managed transitions.[46] But they resisted the attempts of Western powers to integrate peace enforcement into the transition management missions of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.[47] Beijing was able to accept peacekeeping missions that strictly adhere to the three UNPKO principles and use military force only for self-defence.

China's struggle with wider peacekeeping

When the UNSC began to extend the mandates of certain missions in the 1990s, China had difficulty in adapting to this new development. It felt particularly uncomfortable with the use of force in wider peacekeeping missions and with peace enforcement carried out by pivotal states. Its changing voting behaviour in the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia is particularly instructive as it shows how Beijing struggled to find the right balance between growing international pressure arising out of humanitarian concern and its reservations against the use of force (see Table 1).

41 Kühne, "Peace operations and governance," pp. 104–05.
42 *Ibid*. pp. 108–10.
43 Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, p. 211.
44 Yuan Jing-dong, "Multilateral intervention and state sovereignty," p. 276.
45 Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, p. 233; Sally Morphet, "China as a permanent member of the Security Council: October 1971–December 1999," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2000), p. 158; Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," pp. 108–10.
46 See Morphet, "China as a permanent member of the Security Council," pp. 160–61; Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," pp. 112–15.
47 Wang Jianwei, "Managing conflict," p. 78. See also Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, p. 129.

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Table 1: **China's Votes on Relevant Resolutions Authorizing the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of resolution	Type	Provisions* VII	NM	DF	PS	Vote*	China's explanation of vote
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/770 13/08/1992	Protection of humanitarian assistance	Wider peacekeeping	■	■			A	Against the use of force
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/776 14/09/1992	Incorporation of S/RES/770 into UNPROFOR's mandate	Wider peacekeeping					A	Against the reference to S/RES/770
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/781 09/10/1992	Ban on military flights acting pursuant to S/RES/770	Wider peacekeeping					A	Against the reference to S/RES/770
UNITAF** Somalia	S/RES/794 03/12/1992	Protection of humanitarian assistance	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	Y	Against the role of pivotal states, but exceptional situation
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/836 04/06/1993	Protection of safe areas	Wider peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but humanitarian situation
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/871 04/10/1993	Split of commands within UNPROFOR	Wider peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but consent obtained
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/908 31/03/1994	Extension of close air support to Croatia	Wider peacekeeping	■		■		Y	Against the use of force, but limited to self-defence
UNAMIR Rwanda	S/RES/929 22/06/1994	Protection of refugees	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	A	Against the use of force and lack of consent
MNF** Haiti	S/RES/940 31/07/1994	Establishment of stable environment	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	A	Against the role of pivotal states and the use of force
UNCRO Croatia	S/RES/981 31/03/1995	Establishment of UNCRO	Wider peacekeeping	■		■	■	Y	Against the use of force, but consent obtained
UNPROFOR Bosnia	S/RES/998 16/06/1995	Incorporation of Rapid Reaction Force	Peace enforcement	■			■	A	Against changing peacekeeping mandate to enforcement action
IFOR** Bosnia	S/RES/1031 15/12/1995	Replacement of UNPROFOR	Peace support operation	■	■		■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request and exceptional situation
UNTAES Croatia	S/RES/1037 15/01/1996	Establishment of UNTAES	Transition management	■		■	■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request

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Table 1: **Continued**

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of resolution	Type	Provisions* VII	NM	DF	PS	Vote*	China's explanation of vote
SFOR** Bosnia	S/RES/1088 12/12/1996	Replacement of IFOR	Peace support operation	■	■		■	Y	Against the use of force, but at request
UNMIK Kosovo	S/RES/1244 10/06/1999	Establishment of UNMIK and KFOR	Peace support operation	■	■		■	A	Principle concerns, but consent obtained
INTERFET** East Timor	S/RES/1264 15/09/1999	Establishment of stable environment	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	Y	——
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone	S/RES/1270 22/10/1999	Establishment of UNAMSIL	Peace support operation	■		■	■	Y	——
UNTAET East Timor	S/RES/1272 25/10/1999	Establishment of UNTAET	Peace support operation	■	■			Y	——
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone	S/RES/1289 07/01/2000	Enhancement of security	Peace support operation	■		■	■	Y	——
MONUC Congo	S/RES/1291 24/02/2000	Extension of MONUC	Peace support operation			■		Y	——
ISAF** Afghanistan	S/RES/1386 20/12/2001	Authorization of ISAF	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	Y	——
UNMISET East Timor	S/RES/1410 27/05/2002	Replacement of UNTAET	Peace support operation	■	■			Y	——
ECOFORCE** Cote d'Ivoire	S/RES/1464 04/02/2003	Authorization of ECOFORCE	Peace enforcement			■	■	Y	——
ECOMIL** Liberia	S/RES/1497 01/08/2003	Establishment of stable environment	Peace enforcement	■	■		■	Y	——
UNMIL Liberia	S/RES/1509 19/09/2003	Establishment of UNMIL	Peace support operation	■		■		Y	——
UNOCI Cote d'Ivoire	S/RES/1528 27/01/2004	Establishment of UNOCI	Peace support operation	■	■	■	■	Y	——
MIF** Haiti	S/RES/1529 29/02/2004	Establishment of stable environment	Peace enforcement	■	■			Y	——

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Table 1: **Continued**

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of resolution	Type	Provisions*				Vote*	China's explanation of vote
				VII	NM	DF	PS		
MINUSTAH Haiti	S/RES/1542 30/04/2004	Establishment of MINUSTAH	Peace support operation	■		■	■	Y	——
ONUB Burundi	S/RES/1545 21/03/2004	Establishment of ONUB	Peace support operation	■		■		Y	——
UNMIS Sudan	S/RES/1590 24/03/2005	Establishment of UNMIS	Peace support operation	■		■		Y	——
EUFOR** Congo	S/RES/1671 25/04/2006	Authorization of EUFOR R.D. Congo	Peace enforcement	■	■	■	■	Y	——
UNMIT East Timor	S/RES/1704 25/08/2006	Establishment of UNMIT and preparation of elections	Peace support operation			■		Y	——
UNAMID Sudan	S/RES/1769 31/07/2007	Establishment of UNAMID	Peace support operation	■	■	■	■	Y	Commending tripartite dialogue mechanism on hybrid operation

Notes:

* VII: ''Acting under chapter VII''; NM: ''all necessary means,'' ''all necessary measures'' or ''all necessary steps''; DF: use of force is limited to the defence of UN personnel, of their freedom of movement and of civilians under imminent threat; PS: role of pivotal states or alliances; A: abstention; Y: yes.

** Non-UN peacekeeping operation.

The failure of the UN operation in Somalia had an important impact on China's scepticism against peace enforcement. In April 1992, peacekeepers had been deployed in an environment of ongoing violence to monitor a cease-fire between warlords. China voted in favour of the resolutions that mandated the US-led united task force (UNITAF) under chapter VII to use "all necessary means" to secure a stable environment.[48] But the Chinese representative in the UNSC always insisted that these "exceptional measures" could only be justified with the "long-term chaotic situation resulting from the present lack of a government in Somalia."[49] He also expressed China's reservation against the role of pivotal states that were not under close UNSC control. When American forces became involved in combat with Somali militias, the Chinese began to regret their initial support and concluded that a deviation from traditional peacekeeping should be avoided in the future.[50]

As a consequence, China abstained in the vote that authorized a French-led multinational operation to end the unfolding Rwandan genocide in June 1994. The resolution of this peace enforcement mission permitted the use of force while stressing the "strictly humanitarian character" and "impartial and neutral fashion" of the operation as well as the "unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community."[51] But the Chinese representative explained that the operation lacked the consent of all Rwandan factions and added that, given "the experience and lessons of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia," resorting to force would only exacerbate the situation on the ground.[52]

China's lessons from Somalia also reinforced its opposition to the use of force by pivotal states in the case of Haiti. Back in September 1993, China had supported the UN mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was to create a new police force and to modernize the military. But in July 1994, when the UNSC mandated a US-led multinational force to provide a secure environment for UNMIH,[53] China abstained in the vote, cautioning that the use of force by a "certain group of states" would create a "dangerous precedent" for UNPKO.[54] Beijing's persistent demand for reducing the military personnel of the mission in the following years suggests that the Chinese were concerned about American influence in Haiti.[55]

48 S/RES/794, 3 December 1992, para. 10; S/RES/814, 26 March 1993, section B, preamble, para. 5.
49 S/PV.3145, 3 December 1992. See also S/PV.3188, 26 March 1993.
50 Fravel, "China's attitude," p. 1113.
51 S/RES/929, 22 June 1994, preamble, paras. 1, 3.
52 S/PV.3392, 22 June 1994. See also Fravel, "China's attitude," p. 1114; Yongjin Zhang, "China and UN peacekeeping," p. 11.
53 S/RES/940, 31 July 1994, preamble, paras. 1, 4–5, 8–9.
54 S/PV.3413, 31 July 1994.
55 See S/PV.3496, 30 January 1995; S/PV.3676, 28 June 1996; S/PV.3721, 5 December 1996; S/PV.3806, 30 July 1997; S/PV.3837, 28 November 1997. While China had voted in favour of all successor missions to the UN Mission in Haiti, its representative always pointed out that this was only because of the "urgent request" of the Haitian government and the "exceptional case" of Haiti. Wary of the US role in the mission, China did also abstain in the vote when UNMIH took over from the US-led forces in January 1995. See S/RES/975, 30 January 1995, preamble, paras. 2, 5.

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The frequently changing mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and later Croatia is a prime example of wider peacekeeping – and of Beijing's struggle with revising its lessons learnt in Somalia and Rwanda. From the outset, China could agree on extending UNPROFOR's mandate to address humanitarian concerns, such as the protection of Sarajevo airport, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the establishment of "pink zones" to shelter ethnic Croats in Bosnia.[56] But Beijing opposed all those resolutions that authorized the use of force or altered UNPROFOR's mandate in this regard – though this position became more sophisticated as time went by.[57] In 1992, Beijing abstained from those resolutions that either authorized the use of "all necessary measures" under chapter VII or referred to other resolutions doing so: to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance by UN convoys, to enlarge UNPROFOR's mandate in this regard, to ban flights over Bosnia and to enforce these no-fly zones in co-operation with NATO.[58] The Chinese representative explained that "to take all necessary means is tantamount to issuing a blank cheque. It may lead to the loss of control of the situation …. Once military activities are in operation, the nature of the United Nations involvement will change, making it difficult for UNPROFOR to carry out its original mandate."[59] China's concern that the use of force could become uncontrollable made it impossible for Chinese diplomats to vote in favour of any resolution referring to the use of force, even if they shared its humanitarian motivation.[60]

In mid-1993, however, when the fighting between the ethnic groups in Bosnia intensified, Beijing was able to overcome this concern – even though with unease – and voted in favour of resolutions that limited the use of force to specific cases: to shield civilians from attacks in so-called safe areas, to protect the freedom of movement of the peacekeepers and to defend themselves.[61] While stating its reservation against the use of force, China pointed out that it would support these resolutions out of humanitarian considerations and because of the consent of the host countries.[62] Military means would only be authorized "for self-defence, rather than for punitive purposes with the use of excessive force."[63] In May 1995, however, Beijing saw this line crossed when Western powers formed a robustly armed Rapid Reaction Force that was to be integrated into

56 See Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," p. 117.
57 This important pattern has been overlooked by Fravel. See Fravel, "China's attitude," p. 1111.
58 S/RES/770, 13 August 1992, preamble, para. 2; S/RES/776, 14 September 1992, para. 2; S/RES/781, 9 October 1992, preamble, para. 1; S/RES/816, 31 March 1993, preamble, para. 4. However, China had supported an earlier resolution that did not directly invoke chapter VII but referred to resolution 781, which again referred to resolution 770. See S/RES/786, 10 November 1992, preamble, para. 2. But the Chinese delegate emphasized that "the Chinese delegation is not in favour of any use of force on the question of establishing a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina." See S/PV.3133, 11 November 1992.
59 S/PV.3106, 13 August 1992.
60 See S/PV.3114, 14 September 1992; S/PV.3122, 9 October 1992; S/PV.3191, 31 March 1993.
61 S/RES/836, 4 June 1993, preamble, paras. 5–6; S/RES/871, 4 October 1993, preamble, para. 9; S/RES/908, 31 March 1994, preamble, para. 8. Resolution 863 refers to resolutions 770 and 776.
62 S/PV.3228, 4 June 1993; S/PV.3286, 4 October 1993; S/PV.3356, 31 March 1994.
63 S/PV.3356, 31 March 1994.

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UNPROFOR under chapter VII.[64] China decided to abstain in the vote and explained:

> A United Nations peacekeeping operation, as the name indicates, is for the purpose of keeping peace rather than fighting. … The establishment of this force is for the purpose of enforcement action and brings about a de facto change to the peacekeeping status of UNPROFOR. Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peace-keeping force.[65]

In November 1995, the Dayton Agreement concluded the war in Bosnia after a heavy air campaign by NATO forces had coerced the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiation table. The UNSC decided that UNPROFOR should be replaced by the NATO-led multinational IFOR, which was authorized to use force in order to implement the Dayton Agreement, to control the airspace over Bosnia, to defend itself against attacks and to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.[66] China voted in favour of this resolution, yet its representative in the UNSC emphasized that this was mainly due to the "urgent wishes of the parties concerned" and the need for "extraordinary action in extraordinary circumstances."[67] He added:

> This does not mean however that China's position has undergone any change: that is, China has all along disapproved of operations authorized by the Security Council when at every turn it invokes chapter VII of the Charter and adopts mandatory measures. Still less can it approve the Security Council's authorization of the unlimited use of force.[68]

In the following year, Beijing also supported the replacement of IFOR by SFOR, again a NATO-led multinational mission authorized to conduct peace enforcement in order to ensure compliance with the Dayton Agreement.[69] China once again expressed its reservation against the use of force in UNPKO but voted in favour of the resolution because SFOR would accept the leadership of the UNSC and act at the "requests of the parties concerned."[70]

As its voting behaviour regarding UN peacekeeping in Bosnia illustrates, Beijing had grudgingly drawn three conclusions from wider peacekeeping by the end of the 1990s. First, the use of force in UNPKO was acceptable as long as it was restricted to the defence of the peacekeepers, their freedom of movement and civilians under imminent threat. Second, a division of labour seemed practical between multinational forces, which were mandated to conduct peace enforcement, and the actual UN mission, which would be limited to non-coercive peacekeeping. Third, China was obviously willing to condone UNPKO as long as two conditions could be met: authorization by the UNSC and consent of the parties concerned. In its official statement, China still propagated the

64 S/RES/998, 16 June 1995, preamble, paras. 1, 9–10.
65 S/PV.3543, 16 June 1995.
66 S/RES/1031, 15 December 1995, preamble, paras. 14–17, 36.
67 S/PV.3607, 15 December 1995.
68 *Ibid.*
69 S/RES/1088, 12 December 1996, preamble, paras. 8, 18–21, 27.
70 S/PV.3723, 12 December 1996.

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concept of traditional peacekeeping and the strict adherence to the three UNPKO principles in official statements.[71] In reality, however, it had already embraced the necessity of limited peace enforcement conducted by pivotal states.

China's familiarization with peace support operations

At the turn of the millennium, China familiarized itself fairly quickly with an emerging type of UNPKO: peace support operations. This process was accelerated by the events of the Kosovo crisis of 1999, which came as a real shock to Chinese diplomats. Not only had Western powers intervened militarily in the Kosovo conflict without seeking prior authorization of the UNSC, more dramatically, NATO had also mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. As a result, Beijing abstained in the vote on establishing the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the first UN peace support operation and on authorizing the NATO-led Kosovo force (KFOR) to enforce the peace in June 1999.[72]

Yet this unpleasant experience of being sidelined in the UNSC prompted Beijing to play a more active role in the establishment of a new UNPKO in East Timor, which should end large-scale killing and looting after a call for independence in August 1999. The Chinese representative insisted on the consent of the target country and a mandate of the UNSC as preconditions for this mission:

> According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international and regional peace. The issue of East Timor must be solved through the United Nations. The deployment of any peacekeeping force should be at the request of the Indonesian government and endorsed by the Security Council.[73]

When Indonesia was willing to assent to this intervention, the Australian-led INTERFET was mandated to restore peace and security in East Timor.[74] By October 1999, stability had been largely established, and the UNSC authorized the UN transitional administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to fulfil its broad mandate.[75] China voted in favour of both the peace enforcement mission and the subsequent peace support operation. Obviously, Beijing regarded its support as a good opportunity to project its image as a responsible power in the region and to strengthen the role of the United Nations after the Kosovo crisis.[76]

71 In March 1995, the concept of traditional peacekeeping was for the last time propagated by a Chinese diplomat in the UN Security Council. See S/PV.3512, 31 March 1995.
72 S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999, preamble, paras. 7, 10.
73 S/PV.4043, 11 September 1999.
74 S/RES/1264, 15 September 1999, preamble, para. 3. See also Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, p. 288.
75 S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999, preamble, paras. 1, 4.
76 Gill and Reilly, "Sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping," p. 48. See also Michael C. Davis, "The reluctant intervener: the UN Security Council, China's worldview, and humanitarian intervention," in Michael C. Davis *et al.* (eds.), *International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 247.

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China also endorsed the establishment of the next peace support operation in October 1999 when the ongoing UN observer mission in Sierra Leone was replaced by the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to implement a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, to monitor the ceasefire, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to support the elections. UNAMSIL was mandated to "take the necessary action" under chapter VII, but this time the use of force was explicitly restricted to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect "civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the government of Sierra Leone."[77] The Chinese representative in the UNSC expressed Beijing's full support for the mission and his satisfaction with the "comprehensive and balanced" draft resolution.[78] Later, China also voted in favour of extending UNAMSIL's mandate when military force was permitted for the protection of key locations and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.[79]

Beijing supported all subsequent peace support operations in Congo, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and Sudan – often without any explanation of its vote. For each of these missions, the authorization of the use of force was explicitly limited to the protection of UN personnel, their freedom of movement and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[80] In Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, pivotal states or alliances had taken the responsibility to carry out peace enforcement tasks.[81] In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, French forces were even explicitly authorized to use "all necessary means" for providing general security, protecting civilians and intervening on request of the UN mission against belligerent actions.[82] Since China voted in favour of all of these resolutions and did not issue any dissociating comment, it had obviously fully endorsed the concept of peace support operations with limited peace enforcement tasks and pivotal states that carried them out. What prevented China from supporting UNPKO at the beginning of the 1990s – robust peacekeeping and role of pivotal states – had become acceptable by the beginning of the new millennium.

China's Flexibility with the UN Peacekeeping Principles

China's fear of an uncontrollable use of force by peacekeeping troops is crucial for understanding its voting behaviour on UNPKO. Whenever resolutions authorizing the use of "all necessary means" under chapter VII did not specify

77 S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999, paras. 8, 14.
78 S/PV.4054, 22 October 1999.
79 S/RES/1289, 7 February 2000, para. 10; S/RES/1299, 19 May 2000, para. 1.
80 S/RES/1291, 24 February 2000, preamble, para. 8; S/RES/1509, 19 September 2003, preamble, para. 3 j; S/RES/1528, 27 February 2004, preamble, paras. 6 i, 8; S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, preamble, para. 7 e, f; S/RES/1545, 21 May 2004, preamble, para. 5; S/RES/1590, 24 March 2005, para. 16 i.
81 S/RES/1464, 4 February 2003, para. 9; S/RES/1497, 1 August 2003, preamble, paras. 1, 5; S/RES/1529, 29 February 2004, preamble, paras. 2, 6.
82 S/RES/1528, 27 February 2004, preamble, paras. 1, 6, 8, 16.

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the level of force to be used, China abstained in the vote. But as early as 1993, Chinese diplomats began to support robust peacekeeping missions – though not without a dissociating explanation – if the use of force was clearly restricted to the protection of the peacekeepers, their freedom of movement and civilians under imminent threat. More challenging to Beijing were resolutions that delegated the use of force to pivotal states or alliances since this construction compromised the control of the UNSC and the impartiality of the mission. After the negative experience in Somalia, China abstained from resolutions that subcontracted peace enforcement tasks to pivotal states in the cases of Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia, and complained: "Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in cases in which the Security Council, invoking chapter VII of the Charter on flimsy grounds, resorts to, or authorizes a few countries to take, enforcement actions. … Indiscriminate use of mandatory means will not help resolve problems."[83]

But when IFOR and SFOR were established as the first complex peace support operations, Beijing could no longer afford to abstain from a larger peacebuilding process in Bosnia without damaging its reputation, even though these missions were largely run by NATO. By the end of the 1990s, China had gradually managed to reinterpret two of the three UNPKO principles: the minimum use of force and the impartiality of the peacekeepers.

The turning point of China's voting behaviour regarding UNPKO was marked by its support for INTERFET in September 1999.[84] For the first time, Beijing did not dissociate itself from a resolution authorizing pivotal states to enforce the peace. Since then, China has voted in favour of every newly established UNPKO and provided Chinese peacekeepers to each one of them, even if these missions involved peace enforcement tasks carried out by pivotal states.[85] That Chinese concerns – the restriction of the use of force – were incorporated in the draft resolutions explains Beijing's growing contentment with these missions. In October 1999, the Chinese representative in the UNSC expressed his satisfaction about the draft resolution authorizing UNAMSIL after "intensive consultations." He almost enthusiastically stated: "It accommodates the requests of the government of Sierra Leone and the African members and reflects the concerns of other Council members. It is comprehensive and balanced and, to a certain degree, reflects the Council's attention to and input on African issues. China appreciates this."[86] A few days later, he expressed pleasure that all Chinese amendments had been incorporated in the resolution that authorized UNTAET.[87] In 2002, China praised the

83 S/PV.3492, 18 January 1995.
84 See also Gill and Reilly, "Sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping," p. 50.
85 The only exception to this regularity was China's abstention in the votes on UNMIK and KFOR, which could not be supported due to Beijing's previous opposition to the intervention in the Kosovo conflict.
86 S/PV.4054, 22 October 1999.
87 S/PV.4057, 25 October 1999.

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missions in Sierra Leone, Congo, Burundi, Angola, East Timor and Afghanistan as successes.[88]

China's acceptance of robust peacekeeping is also evident in its recent official statements at the United Nations. In 2003, Beijing indicated that its experience with UNPKO has caused a remarkable departure from its adherence to the concept of traditional peacekeeping: "Given the growing complexity of operations, traditional operations were no longer suited for certain types of conflict; the situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Liberia, for example, had highlighted the need for rapid, early and robust intervention."[89] Beijing explicitly supported the revision of peacekeeping mandates, "including the use of enforcement measures where necessary."[90] In 2004, China publicly recognized the importance of the military component in peace support operations: "In conflict management, the roles of military action and that of the civilian elements are closely interrelated and predicated on one another. … Military success guarantees the presence of a civilian role, which is an essential and indispensable element in any post-conflict reconstruction."[91] Whereas Beijing maintained in the past that the use of force was not permitted "except for self-defence,"[92] military force could now be applied "where necessary."[93]

However, China's enthusiasm for UNPKO in the new millennium was probably not just the result of a Chinese adaptation process during the 1990s. It seems as if the Brahimi Report on the reform of UN peacekeeping had contributed significantly to China's growing acceptance of peace support operations since it addressed many of Beijing's longstanding concerns.[94] When the Brahimi Report proposed to restrict the use of force to the protection of the mission, it was reiterating a Chinese demand of the early 1990s. In fact, the emerging practice of limiting the authorized level of force in UNPKO-related resolutions was the product of a Chinese initiative – and reportedly called the "Chinese model."[95] Likewise, Beijing had been an early supporter of the rapid deployment capacity of the United Nations, of an enhanced co-operation between the UNSC and troop contributing countries, and of a stronger involvement of neighbouring countries and regional organizations in UNPKO, especially in African conflicts.[96] So China has adapted its position to the

88 A/C.4/57/SR.13, 27 November 2002, para. 18.
89 A/C.4/58/SR.11, 14 November 2003, para. 31.
90 *Ibid*. para. 33.
91 S/PV.5041, 22 September 2004.
92 A/C.4/51/SR.15, 18 November 1996, para. 36; A/C.4/52/SR.14, 16 February 1998, para. 60; A/C.4/53/SR.14, 6 January 1999, para. 31; A/C.4/54/SR.11, 30 November 1999, para. 24; A/C.4/55/SR.20, 5 April 2001, para. 29.
93 A/C.4/58/SR.11, 14 November 2003, para. 33. See also A/C.4/59/SR.17, 31 December 2004, para. 24.
94 See A/55/PV.35, 17 October 2000; A/C.4/55/SR.20, 5 April 2001, para. 31. See also Pang Zhongying, "China's changing attitude," p. 82.
95 See Wang Jianwei, "China's multilateral diplomacy in the new millennium," in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 166, 192 (n. 44).
96 S/PV.3449, 4 November 1994; S/PV.3492, 18 January 1995; S/PV.3611, 20 December 1995; A/C.4/52/SR.14, 16 February 1998, para. 64, 66; A/C.4/53/SR.14, 6 January 1999, para. 35.

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changing realities on the ground as the Brahimi Report accommodated relevant Chinese concerns.

Limits to China's Flexibility in UN Peacekeeping

While showing remarkable flexibility in reinterpreting the force level and impartiality practical to UNPKO, Beijing had difficulty in agreeing to mandates that interfered in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. During the 1990s, China frequently cautioned against integrating human rights monitors, judicial reform, police training and military restructuring into the remit of wider peacekeeping missions and abstained in some of these votes (see Table 2).[97] China criticized that UN peacekeeping activities "tend to be increasingly mixed up with those in the economic, social, development, humanitarian assistance and other areas"[98] and demanded that the "relevant United Nations bodies should not confuse peacekeeping operations with peace-building activities; still less should they force extraneous elements into peacekeeping operations."[99] In the new millennium, however, China seems to have come to realize that these peacebuilding activities were necessary elements of effective UNPKO. Moreover, the nature of peace support operations, often including a complex mixture of military, police, economic and humanitarian assistance, made it increasingly difficult for Beijing to withdraw its support. The Chinese were willing to accept even undesired elements in this comprehensive package rather than damage their reputation among the developing countries by standing on the sidelines. At the end of 2001, Beijing recognized that "peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and peace-building activities had become increasingly intertwined,"[100] but the host country should play a "dominant role"[101] in solving the conflict. In 2005, President Hu Jintao embraced a "comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction."[102] China endorsed the concept of peace-building as part of complex peace support operations, though pointing out that the United Nations should refrain from "imposing a predetermined model of governance": "In areas emerging from conflict, ensuring the rule of law and justice should become an integral part of the overall effort to achieve peace and stability, protecting the fundamental interests of local populations and serving the overall interests of social stability."[103]

The critical prerequisite for China's acceptance of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states has always been the consent of the target country. As

97 See S/PV.3473, 30 November 1994; S/PV.3707, 22 October 1996; S/PV.3795, 30 June 1997; S/PV.3842, 18 December 1997; S/PV.3984, 26 February 1999.
98 S/PV.3492, 18 January 1995.
99 A/C.4/51/SR.15, 18 November 1996, para. 37.
100 A/C.4/56/SR.20, 4 December 2001, para. 45.
101 A/C.4/55/SR.20, 5 April 2001, paras. 28–29.
102 S/PV.5261, 14 September 2005.
103 S/PV.5225, 12 July 2005.

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Table 2: **China's Votes on Relevant Resolutions Addressing Domestic Issues within UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Mission Country	Resolution Date	Purpose of resolution	Type	Vote*	China's explanation of vote
UNMIH Haiti	S/RES/975 30/01/1995	Establishment of UNMIH	Wider peacekeeping	A	Against the mandate and size of UNMIH
UNMIH Haiti	S/RES/1048 29/03/1995	Final extension at reduced size of military component	Wider peacekeeping	Y	Incorporations of amendments and at request
UNSMIH Haiti	S/RES/1063 28/06/1996	Maintenance of law and order and training of police	Wider peacekeeping	Y	Against the presence of UN military personnel, but at request
UNOMIG Georgia	S/RES/1077 22/10/1996	Integration of Human Rights Office	Wider peacekeeping	A	Against the Human Rights Office
MONUA Angola	S/RES/1118 30/06/1997	Replacement of UNAVEM III	Wider peacekeeping	Y	Against matters that fall within the terms of other UN bodies
MIPONUH Haiti	S/RES/1123 30/07/1997	Training of police	Wider peacekeeping	Y	Against the extension of the peacekeeping mandate, but at request
UNMIBH Bosnia	S/RES/1144 19/12/1997	Establishment of UNMIBH	Peace support operation	Y	Cautious about issues such as judicial reform and economic matters
OSCE** Kosovo	S/RES/1199 23/09/1998	Monitoring of humanitarian situation	NA	A	Against the interference in internal affairs and the invocation of chapter VII
OSCE** Kosovo	S/RES/1203 24/10/1998	Call for compliance with OSCE observers	NA	A	Against the interference in internal affairs and NATO's decision to use force
MINURCA Angola	S/RES/1230 26/02/1999	Extension of MINURCA	Wider peacekeeping	Y	Against the interference in military restructuring
MONUC Congo	S/RES/1493 28/07/2003	Protection of civilians in Ituri and Kivu	Peace support operation	Y	——
AMIS** Sudan	S/RES/1556 30/07/2004	Authorization of international monitors in Darfur	NA	A	Against the invocation of chapter VII
AMIS** Sudan	S/RES/1564 18/09/2004	Investigation of human rights violation in Darfur	NA	A	Against pressure, but support for African Union
AMIS** Sudan	S/RES/1679 16/05/2006	Transition of AMIS to a UN mission	NA	Y	Against the invocation of chapter VII, but support for African Union
UNMIS Sudan	S/RES/1706 31/08/2006	Expansion of UNMIS to Darfur	Peace support operation	A	Against the lacking consent of Khartoum, but support for replacement of AMIS

Notes:

* A: abstention; Y: yes.

** Non-UN peacekeeping operation.

announced in the debate on INTERFET's intervention in East Timor, China demands two essential preconditions for UNPKO: endorsement by the UNSC and consent by the government of the host country, the latter of which can only be omitted in a failed state situation as in Somalia.[104] It makes a crucial difference to China's voting behaviour whether this consent has been obtained or not. See, for example, the difference in China's voting behaviour on UN intervention against human rights violations in Congo and Sudan.

In the case of Congo, the UNSC authorized the UN organization mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to use force in order to improve the security conditions in the Ituri district and in North and South Kivu, where the UNSC registered "grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law."[105] China voted in favour of this resolution without any dissociating explanation, obviously because this intervention had the consent of the Congolese regime. In the case of Sudan, however, where Arab militias have been committing large-scale atrocities against civilians in the western region of Darfur, China's stance was more complicated. Beijing voted in favour of the establishment of the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in southern Sudan in March 2005, but abstained when the mandate of UNMIS was extended to Darfur, including the use of "all necessary means" under chapter VII to "protect civilians under threat of physical violence."[106] Beijing explained its abstention by the fact that the consent of the Sudanese leadership had not been obtained.[107] When the UNSC recognized the deployment of human rights monitors in Darfur by the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS), China had abstained on the grounds that pressure on Khartoum would only make the situation worse.[108] After the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, however, the Chinese representative voted in favour of transferring AMIS into a UN mission, but criticized the invocation of chapter VII.[109] In July 2007, Khartoum finally agreed to the deployment of UN light and heavy support packages to AMIS and the hybrid UN African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which was authorized to enforce the implementation of the Darfur Agreement.[110] Now China voted in favour of this resolution and lauded the Sudanese regime for its "flexibility" and "vigorous measures in resolving the issue."[111] Regardless of its business interests in Sudan, China's voting behaviour regarding the Darfur issue clearly demonstrates that Beijing is likely to resist the enforced protection of human rights until the target country agrees to the mission.

104 See also Davis *et al.*, *International Intervention*, p. 244; Gill and Reilly, "Sovereignty, intervention and peacekeeping," pp. 44, 46; Samuel S. Kim, "China's path to great power status in the globalization era," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003), p. 70.
105 S/RES/1493, 28 July 2003, preamble, paras. 25–26.
106 S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006, paras. 1, 5–6, 8–9, 12 a.
107 S/PV.5519, 31 August 2006.
108 S/RES/1556, 30 July 2004, preamble, paras. 1–2, 7–8; S/RES/1564, 18 September 2004, preamble, para. 12. See S/PV.5040, 18 September 2004.
109 S/RES/1679, 16 May 2006, paras. 3, 5. See S/PV.5439, 16 May 2006.
110 S/RES/1769, 31 July 2007, preamble, paras. 1, 15.
111 S/PV.5727, 31 July 2007.

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Another limit to the China's flexibility in UN peacekeeping is its competition with Taiwan for international recognition.[112] In the 1990s, Beijing frequently attempted to use its influence in UNPKO in order to isolate Taipei diplomatically in the world. In January 1997, Beijing vetoed the extension of a UNPKO in Guatemala, criticizing that the government "unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations."[113] Guatemala had sponsored Taiwan's bid for UN membership and just invited Taiwan's foreign minister to attend an official ceremony. In February 1999, China also cast its veto against extending the mandate of a mission in Macedonia, obviously in reaction to Macedonia's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan the previous month.[114] Regarding peacekeeping missions in Haiti, China threatened to veto several extensions of these mandates, especially when Taiwan's vice-president was invited to Haiti in January 1996.[115] Though sending a large contingent of Chinese peacekeepers to Haiti, China resisted extending the mandate of the UN stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for the required period in May 2005, obviously because of a scheduled visit by Haiti's president to Taiwan.[116] It seems that China regards its engagement for UNPKO as an effective instrument to increase the pressure on former or current allies of Taiwan.

Conclusion

As China is rising, its role in UN peacekeeping has grown remarkably. While China was a reluctant sponsor of UNPKO throughout the 1990s, it has become a staunch supporter of peace support operations in the new millennium. There are some sound explanations for this phenomenon, most of which point to recent shifts in China's foreign and security policy: Beijing's interest in shaping its image of a responsible power in order to tame international fears about its dramatic rise; its uneasiness about American hegemony and its desire to

112 Pang Zhongying, "China's changing attitude," p. 84; Rawnsley, "May you live in interesting times," p. 87; Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," p. 122; Wang Jianwei, "Managing conflict," pp. 80, 81. See also Chris Alden, "China in Africa," *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2005), pp. 151, 153; Ian Taylor, "China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1998), pp. 456–59; Ian Taylor, "Taiwan's foreign policy and Africa: the limitations of dollar diplomacy," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 11, No. 30 (2002), pp. 125–26; Drew Thompson, "China's emerging interests in Africa: opportunities and challenges for Africa and the United States," *African Renaissance Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2005), pp. 23–24; Thompson, "Beijing's participation in UN peacekeeping operations," p. 8.

113 S/PV.3730, 10 January 1997. See also Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," p. 120; Wang Jianwei, "Managing conflict," p. 81.

114 See S/PV.3982, 25 February 1999.

115 In January 1996, China had threatened to use its veto against a further extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Haiti, but eventually agreed to a final extension while reducing the number of UN peacekeepers from 1,900 to 1,200. See Barbara Crossette, "UN mission to Haiti is reprieved," *New York Times*, 1 March 1996, p. A8; Barbara Crossette, "China takes a slap at Haiti," *New York Times*, 3 March 1996, p. 4/2; Tzou, "The PRC's policy toward UN peacekeeping operations," p. 119; Wang Jianwei, "Managing conflict," p. 81.

116 "Haiti gets caught up in China–Taiwan standoff," *Agence France Presse*, 29 May 2005.

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strengthen the United Nations, especially after the unilateral intervention in the Kosovo conflict; its shared security interests with the rest of the world in fighting international terrorism arising from failed states; and the opportunity to train its military and police forces abroad.[117]


While these are important motives, this article suggests that changes in UN peacekeeping itself have contributed significantly to China's shifting attitude. In fact, a mutual adaptation process had worked in two ways. On the one hand, the experience with wider peacekeeping in the 1990s convinced the Chinese leadership that robust peacekeeping was indeed necessary in certain cases and that large-scale atrocities required an international response. On the other hand, China's acceptance of UNPKO rose when Beijing became more involved in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates and when the Brahimi Report addressed some of its key concerns. The changes in China's voting behaviour since 1999 and the growing contribution of Chinese peacekeepers in absolute and relative terms since 2002 (see Figure 2) coincide with the reform of UNPKO in 2000. This strongly suggests that the disappearance of wider peacekeeping and the emergence of complex peace support operations helped China to accept the concept of UNPKO fully in the new millennium.

The review of China's voting behaviour in the UNSC regarding different roles of UNPKO reveals a remarkable ability to adapt its position to changing realities on the ground and to reinterpret two of the three UNPKO principles. Though grudgingly, Beijing agreed in 1993 to the use of force in UNPKO as long as this was restricted to the defence of the peacekeepers, their freedom of movement and civilians under imminent threat, and accepted in 1995 to subcontract peace enforcement tasks to regional alliances. The reform debate about UN peacekeeping led to the creation of peace support operations, which sought to overcome the problems of wider peacekeeping. These missions carried out multifunctional peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks and did not refrain from applying military force to protect their mandate, which was regularly performed by pivotal states operating outside the UN framework. But as recommended in the Brahimi Report in 2000, peace support operations also accommodated some of China's key concerns: they regularly restricted the use of force to the protection of the mission, limited the role of pivotal states by a clear mandate and tried to address the root causes of conflict in a complex peacebuilding endeavour. As a result, China voted in favour of, rather than abstained from, resolutions which comprised state-building activities and was

117 See for example "China in firm support of UN peacekeeping missions," Beijing *Xinhua* in English, 13 December 2005, FBIS, 13 December 2005; Kenneth Allen, "China's foreign military relations: 2003–2004," *Chinese Military Update*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (2005), pp. 4, 6; Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, "US–China cooperation on the problem of failing states and transnational threats," *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, No. 126 (2004), http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr126. pdf, accessed September 2007, p. 1; Yin He, "China's changing policy on UN peacekeeping operations," pp. 43–55; Tang Yongsheng, "China's participation in UN peacekeeping regime," p. 85; Thompson, "Beijing's participation in UN peacekeeping operations," p. 8; Zhang Huiyu, "China's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations," p. 32.

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Figure 2: **China's Absolute and Relative Contribution to UN Peacekeeping (1996–2006)**



Sources:
China's average contribution between 1996 and 2006 in "China's national defense in 2006," December 2006, Appendix V, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/194350.htm; international average contribution between 1996 and 2006 in UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Monthly summary of military and police contribution to United Nations operations," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/Yearly_ Summary.pdf, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/Yearly06.pdf (all accessed in September 2007).

able to support interventions to protect human rights if the consent of the target country could be obtained.

So China has recently become more involved in UN peacekeeping because the nature of UNPKO had changed in such a way that full participation became more acceptable to Beijing. But its voting behaviour also shows that the consent of the target state is the bottom line of its ability to reinterpret the three UNPKO principles. Despite all its flexibility, Beijing has maintained its conception of sovereignty based on consent. Another concern to China is UNPKO which involve the Taiwan issue. Yet apart from these limitations, this study suggests that Beijing is indeed able to modify its normative position based on lessons learnt. In order to promote China's acceptance of international practices, it is apparently effective to take its normative concerns seriously when engaging it in international regimes. Given China's comfort level with the way peace support operations are carried out, the world is likely to see a sustainable Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping in the years to come.

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