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SALAFI THOUGHT IN TURKISH PUBLIC DISCOURSE SINCE 1980

Abstract
Turkey has been absent from the growing literature on the phenomenon of transnational Salafism. A tendency among Middle East specialists to focus on Arab regions and in Turkey on the Islamist movement and its long struggle with the Kemalist establishment has perpetuated the notion of Turkey as a category apart. This article argues that, on the contrary, Salafism is a fringe strand of Turkish Islam that began to evolve in the context of the state's effort in the 1980s to recalibrate religion as a complement to nationalism. Salafism became a topic of discussion in media and scholarly writing in Turkish religious studies faculties, while self-styled Salafi preachers trained in Saudi Arabia found a niche through publishing houses. These publishers facilitated the translation into Turkish of Arabic texts by important Saudi religious scholars in an effort to change the discursive landscape of Islam in Turkey. I show that contra assumptions of a rich Sufi tradition acting as a block against modern Salafi ideas, Salafism managed to gain a foothold in Turkey, facilitated in part by the republic's experience of secular materialism.

Keywords: global Salafism; Middle East studies; political Islam; republican Turkey; Saudi Arabia

At the closing session of a conference held in 2013 at the Foundation for Research in Islamic Sciences in Istanbul to discuss Salafism, Ali Bardakoğlu, former head of Turkey's Religious Affairs Directorate known as Diyanet, made a rather startling comment. After three days of papers and discussion, he took the podium to admonish delegates as follows: "There should have been a paper at this meeting that discussed Turkish Salafism [*Türkiye Selefiliği*]. Scholarly gatherings must take place in which religious movements in Turkey, including even Salafism, can be discussed extensively from different angles."[1] Indeed, in over 700 pages of the subsequently published volume *Tarihte ve Günümüzdeki* (Salafism Today and in History, 2014) not one article dealt with the ideology in any Turkish manifestation. This was particularly odd given that with Syria's descent into civil war since 2011 the ideological-theological formulation "Salafism" had entered Turkish public discourse with some force. Some Turks had left to take part in a conflict they conceptualized as a war against an infidel ruler who did not apply God's law over the community of Muslims, while Salafi communities in Turkey began to attract the attention of Turkish and international media[2] and thousands of volunteers arrived in Turkey as a transit point for joining the fight. Yet so novel did Salafism appear that

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between *Selefiye* and *Selefilik* (and others) there was no consensus in media over what name to give it in Turkish.[3]

This article aims to take up Bardakoğlu's challenge by examining the reception of Salafi ideas in Turkey since the 1980s. It has three broad aims: to consider the degree to which Salafi thought has become influential in mainstream religious discourse; to examine the shift in discussion of Salafism in media and scholarly circles from an ideology of marginal interest to one with more extensive impact than thought previously; and to reflect on culture-specific conditions that may color Salafism in the Turkish context. The article is broadly divided into two halves: one that gives a brief historical sketch of Salafi thought as a category, including problems in its shifting definition and the early republic's approach to religion, and another that looks at how Salafism was received in Turkish-language discourse (encompassing media, theological writing, public intellectuals, and historical-critical scholarship) in the era of transnational Salafism, when what is often termed quietist or apolitical Salafism began to emerge as a trend within what we could call Turkish Islam.

The scholarly literature on Islam in Turkey has focused predominantly on the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement of Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011), its intellectual origins in the Sufi-influenced thought of theologian Said Nursi (1876–1960), and its progeny, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP), which has formed governments since 2002.[4] At the same time, literature on Salafism, a burgeoning field in recent years, has been heavily tilted toward Arab countries, with some consideration of south and southeast Asia whose wider links in modern history to the Arab region have been manifest in labor migration and political and economic ties.[5] The isolation from the Arab and Islamic sphere that the early Kemalist regime sought to impose on the Turkish republic appears to have cast a long shadow over historical and political writing on the Middle East region, such that for long scholars have approached Turkey as if ontologically different.[6] Facing challenges from the left, revolutionary Iran, and the Turkish Islamist movement, the state took a new approach in the 1980s in adopting what was known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (Türk İslam Sentezi). The scientific positivism which had been the guiding principle of the republic since 1923 was thus modified to make room for religion as a central element of Turkish national culture, a reconciliation that created space for the emergence of new Islamic currents such as Salafism. I argue that this development long remained unanalyzed because it ran counter to understandings of the nature of Turkish Islamic culture.

SALAFISM: AN OVERVIEW

The genealogy of Salafism is both unclear and contested. The terms Salafi and Salafism derive from the Arabic term *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (the pious predecessors),[7] a phrase understood by today's Salafis to indicate the first three generations of Muslims who are imagined to have lived in an exemplary manner since they had first-hand experience of the life of the Prophet or lived by the standards of those who did. But it is not clear at what point Salafi comes to refer to those who claim adherence to a complex of jurisprudential and theological positions deploying the Salaf as an ordering principle.[8] In brief, it could be said that three streams of thinking interacted under the label of Salafism in the early 20th century: firstly, the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) as filtered

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through the understandings of the Wahhabi movement regarding *shirk* (polytheism) and *kufr* (unbelief) and their Hanbali-Athari (antirationalist) critique of Ashʿari theology; secondly, a strand concerning the religious scholars influenced by figures such as Shah Waliullah (1703–62) and Muhammad al-Shawkani (d. 1834) who rejected the practice of taqlid (following precedent) of the four Sunni legal schools for unmediated interpretation (*ijtihād*) of the scriptural sources of Qurʾan and prophetic hadith;[9] and thirdly, Salafism as the Islamic modernism of intellectuals such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905). Largely through the vehicle of his writings in *al-Manar*, Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a disciple of ʿAbduh, attempted a synthesis of all three as an Arab-oriented fundamentalist revivalism that would enable Islamic culture to meet the challenge of the West, with ʿAbduh configured as its godfather though he had never described himself as a "Salafi" in such terms.[10]

Salafism as modernist revivalism did not survive the semantic evolution of subsequent decades, such that today's Salafis consider this earlier usage a usurpation of their ideological lexicon. While at the Muslim Brotherhood's fifth general conference in 1938 Hasan al-Banna was able to define the organization as "a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth,"[11] by the 1980s the term had become the province of Wahhabiyya. Today the Brotherhood and groups such as Palestinian Hamas or Tunisian Ennahda (al-Nahda) can be classified as movements of "political Islam" or Islamism, distinct from the Salafis, while Husam Tamam was able to write an authoritative study describing a "Salafization" of the Brotherhood that began in the 1970s.[12] In the second stage of Salafism's evolution, in the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia became the site for formulations of Salafism shorn of the modernist legacy, uniting the Wahhabis and antitaqlid faction through the figure of Ibn Taymiyya.[13] Salafism's third stage comes in the 1990s in the context of globalization, which transformed these two trends into what Olivier Roy calls a deterritorialized transnational ideology that imagines an Islamic nation "beyond ethnicity, race, language and culture."[14] Roy argues that this ideology is not interested in fostering "Muslim culture," local Islams, or community *esprit de corps,* and it easily adapts to ideas of individualization, the consumer, and the free market. Its heavily text-based methodology allows its adherents to claim better understanding of the divine law, privileging knowledge of the Arabic language while deploying other markers such as clothing, facial hair, form of prayer, and constant referencing of their canon of revealed texts to set them apart.[15]

Surveying the map of Salafism today, Roel Meijer's volume *Global Salafism* (which does not consider Turkey) identifies three elements: jihadi Salafism, political Salafism, and quietist Salafism.[16] The first, jihadi Salafism, channels Wahhabi thinking on how to manage Muslims and Muslim-run entities that fail to meet the doctrinal test of faith and action, but is influenced by Muslim Brotherhood thinker Sayyid Qutb's ideas on the apostasy of postcolonial Muslim rulers. The second, sometimes termed *al-salafiyya al-tanẓīmiyya* (organized/activist Salafism), supports some level of involvement in national political processes (as seen in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Egypt). The third, sometimes called *al-salafiyya al-ʿilmiyya* (scholastic Salafism), is "quietist"[17] in that it rejects participation in processes of political contestation and advocates obedience to rulers as long as they ensure the writ of shariʿa through empowerment of its guardians, the ʿulamaʾ.[18] This final grouping does not capture differences over the more radical opposition to taqlid which prominent quietists in the Saudi orbit such as hadith scholar Nasir al-Din al-Albani

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(1914–99) embraced but which was problematic for Wahhabi scholars in the quietist mold such as Rabiʿ al-Madkhali (b. 1931) or ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz (1910–99).[19]

This categorization offers a model for understanding transnational Salafism as a contemporary practice rather than as a historically shifting set of beliefs, which perhaps reflects the priorities of policy-oriented security studies that tend to dominate writing on the subject.[20] Meijer offers a model for predicting the spread of Salafism that considers its chances weak where the population is strongly embedded in local practices and engaged in an ethnic-nationalist struggle. "It can only succeed in making inroads when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed and the national struggle can be linked with a larger global struggle, or it fits into the politics of identity in Western Europe," he writes.[21] Thus it has not been successful among Palestinians, despite a stream of Wahhabi influence among Palestinian students who attended Saudi universities from the 1970s,[22] but has had varying fortunes in Yemen where there is a historical base,[23] Indonesia where it is something of a Saudi import,[24] and France where it has spoken to immigrant disaffection with the state.[25]

SALAFISM AND THE LATE OTTOMANS

While the terms Salafi/Salafism and the complex of trends they first referred to—modernist reform, rejection of taqlid and Wahhabi Hanbalism—were elaborated in the early 20th century as an Arabic discursive category, the genealogy of their reception in the Ottoman/Turkish sphere is obscure. Wahhabism had not been popular in Istanbul on political or theological grounds throughout the 19th century. In his history, compiled between 1854 and 1884, Ottoman statesman Cevdet Paşa denounced the Wahhabi practice of destroying shrines and extensive condemnation of Muslims as infidels (*takfīr*) as hitherto unseen excess (*guluv ve ifrat*),[26] while many if not most Wahhabi scholars viewed the Ottoman state as illegitimate because of its tolerance of Sufi and Shiʿi practices and Hanafi-Maturidi legal-theological system.[27] The Ottoman Grand Mufti Arif Hikmet (d. 1859) engaged in debate over Ibn Taymiyya's thought with the Baghdadi scholar Mahmud al-Alusi, denouncing Ibn Taymiyya as an anthropomorphist for his literalist views on God's attributes.[28]

The modernism of ʿAbduh was received positively by like-minded reformers in Istanbul grouped around the journal *Sebilürreşad* (Path of Guidance, 1908–25), originally titled *Sırat-ı Müstakim* (The Straight Path), in which poet and Muslim intellectual Mehmet Akif translated ʿAbduh's work. The modernists were one of three groups among the Ottoman Turkish ʿulamaʾ and intellectuals struggling to manage the problematization of Islam by European Orientalists, with whom many had close relations, and religion generally by scientific materialism. They were challenged by a conservative group of religious scholars writing in the journal *Beyânu'l-Hak* (Statement of Truth, 1908–12), whose editor Mustafa Sabri (1869–1954) was the most prominent among them. Through publications such as *İslam Mecmuası* (Islam Journal, 1914–18), the third group led by radicals such as Ziya Gökalp sought to find a place for Islam in a model that combined Turkish nationalism and scientific positivism. Like ʿAbduh, the modernist intellectuals were little interested in the radical critique of the shariʿa methodological tradition of the theorists against taqlid but in finding reasoning within the four jurisprudential schools for practices that would, effectively, bring Muslims closer to European norms.[29] Thus

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they were prepared for changes on a range of key questions including the *medrese* system, interpretation of scripture, the methodology of jurisprudence, and doctrinal matters of theology.

One of the first Late Ottoman thinkers to address the movement against taqlid and its critique of Ashʿari theology was İsmail Hakkı in his work *Yeni İlm-i Kelam* (New Theology, 1920). As M. Sait Özervarlı has shown, Hakkı tried to effect a reconciliation between Islamic thought and European science without succumbing to its radical materialist currents, but he gives space to the new discourse of Salafism. While avoiding Ibn Taymiyya's extreme views on Sufism, Shiʿism, and *takfīr*, he outlines a theological tradition by the name of Selefiyye (the spelling used in the first Latin script versions of his book). Distinguishing it from the Ashʿari and Maturidi traditions, he describes the Selefiyye as a group who rely on Prophetic hadith, though he does not go further into the implications of this regarding taqlid.[30] In other words, as a scholar steeped in the Ottoman Hanafi-Maturidi tradition Hakkı skirts around the antitaqlid claims of Salafism. In the figure of jurist and hadith scholar Mehmed Zahid Kevseri (1879–1952) it is explicitly rejected in an essay he wrote in his years of exile in Cairo as the "bridge to unbelief" (*qanṭarat al-lādīniyya*);[31] it was also rejected by theologian Said Nursi (1877–1960) and intellectual Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904–83).[32] So resistance to this strand of Salafism in Turkish Islam has been strong, which suggests possibilities in Salafism today for a dissident position on the religious establishment's Hanafi-Maturidism.[33]

Salafism's rationalist critique of the legal schools and the Sufi orders—seen as unnecessary mediations between believer and divine sources (Qurʾan and Prophetic sunna)—were influential, nevertheless, in Nursi's response to the aggressive secularism of the republic. Şerif Mardin and Carter Findley have pointed to the significance of Nursi opting to establish a text-based movement that believers could follow by reading for themselves, rather than found a Sufi order of his own. In this he embodied a shift in teaching from orality to textualism, which anticipates what Bernard Haykel calls the "hyper-textuality" of today's transnational Salafism and the direct access to knowledge that it offers the Muslim.[34] Nursi accepted the critique of Sufism that was common to the various strands of reform and revival that Rida sought to unite under the Salafi rubric.[35]

POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

The ideological rigidity of the Kemalist period eased up with the end of the one-party system to allow space for political trends using faith as a reference. These trends had adapted to the secular order in terms of the absence of shariʿa courts and the process of party politics through elections to a government-forming legislative chamber. Kemalist orthodoxy viewed Islamic institutions at state and popular level—through the shariʿa court and education system, or the network of Sufi orders (Tr. *tarikat*)—as a bar to Turkey's arrival at a state of modernity, which Kemalists and some Islamic intellectuals understood as a universal condition Europeans had reached before other civilizational blocs. Many elements of manifest faith that intermingled with popular custom such as Islamic dress codes were deemed by republican ideologues as incompatible with this effective Westernization. But Islamic thinkers and institutions were strong enough

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to reconfigure religion as a social and political reference point when possibilities for activism eventually opened up. Gavin Brockett argues that intellectuals succeeded in defining the nation in religious terms through the liberalized print culture of the late 1940s and the 1950s.[36] Nursi and other religious scholars were also innovative in encouraging followers to take advantage of the opportunity to move into politics in the 1950s, which at some points helped the series of parties Erbakan established from 1969 but also others such as Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi).[37] Nakshibendi Sufi orders, which had never gone away despite the republican ban on their activities, encouraged followers to infiltrate the state bureaucracy, in which a branch of Nursi supporters established by preacher Fethullah Gülen was particularly effective from the 1980s.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis deployed by the military junta which seized power in 1980 and which had been developed in nationalist circles a decade before was attractive as a state-controlled discourse that could assuage the violent political and social radicalization of the late 1970s and reduce the attraction of hostile Islamist and leftist trends. Constitutional changes further deployed the Diyanet administration as a vehicle of ideological policing.[38] This shift had consequences in foreign policy, in particular with regards to how the Turkish state dealt with Saudi Arabia at a critical moment of Saudi propagation of Wahhabism under the increasingly popular Salafi rubric. Driven by twin challenges from its Wahhabi core (the 1979 siege of the Mecca Grand Mosque) and revolutionary Iran, the Saudi leadership resolved to use Islamic institutions under its tutelage to disseminate Wahhabi scholarship worldwide through funding of mosques and publication of literature staking Wahhabi Salafism's hegemonic claims over Sunni belief and practice.[39] Turkey now happily engaged these institutions, in some cases for the first time. Thus General Kenan Evren transformed Turkey into one of the most active members of the Jeddah-based Organisation of the Islamic Conference.[40] In 1984, a year after the Organisation of the Islamic Conference endorsed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and granted Turkey the observer status it had long sought for Turkish Cypriots, Evren was elected one of its three vice chairmen and took charge of its committee on commercial and economic cooperation.

The Turkish government also initiated cooperation, some of it not publicly declared, between Diyanet and the Mecca-based World Muslim League. The latter paid for the administration to send officials to Europe to develop outreach activities in Turkish migrant communities.[41] This coordination extended to a wider network of commercial and cultural ties to Saudi Arabia, involving banking and financial services, publishing houses, newspapers, magazines, and children's books.[42] During this time the military authorities oversaw an increase of more than 50 percent in the Diyanet budget, making it one of the biggest state service agencies, and it expanded from around 50,000 employees in 1979 to around 85,000 in 1989.[43] Twenty-three faculties of Islamic theology were created in Turkish universities, and by 1987 it was said there were more mosques in the country than schools.[44] The junta fostered an economically neoliberal and socially conservative environment in the hope of limiting the political trends challenging the nexus of military, judicial, and bureaucratic institutions that saw the state as their ward. Within this framework there was wide scope for Islamic activism, from the Gülen movement, whose educational and charity works eased the government's budgetary burden, to groups bearing revolutionary ideologies such as İbda-C whose anti-Iranian religious nationalism was useful in checking Khomeinist infiltration.[45]

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SALAFI PREACHERS IN TURKEY

In this changed political environment preachers openly adopting the Salafi designation began to find a niche in Turkish society.[46] Shaykhs who began their *daʿwa* works in the 1990s after studying in Saudi Arabia were able to establish charity organisations (*dernek*) and publishing enterprises. While they were subject to periodic harassment and arrest by security forces, particularly in the early years of AKP rule, they adopted markedly more public profiles with the AKP's ascendancy over the military following its 2007 election victory.[47] Many had studied at the Islamic University of Medina. Established in 1961 after lobbying from Pakistani Islamist ideologue Abu al-Aʿla Mawdudi (1903–79) for a Saudi-based institution with a global focus, the university became a center in which diverse schools of Islamic thought could evolve within the Salafi framework.[48] Turkish Salafis became active on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, and established websites for their publishing enterprises. In their writings, Wahhabi Salafi scholars such as Bin Baz, al-Albani, Salih al-Fawzan (b. 1933), and Muhammad ibn al-ʿUthaymin (1925–2001) form the core of their references, while they avoid contemporary ʿulamaʾ from outside the Salafi tradition such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), the Egyptian scholar based in Qatar who is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. While Turkish is the prime language of communication, Arabic is prominent in dedicated sections of websites and Saudi Salafi works sold in their bookshops, and Islamic terminology appears in published Turkish texts. They focus on Salafi theological themes regarding faith and action and engage in polemics against Shiʿi and Sufi practices. Names among these preachers include Ubeydullah Arslan,[49] Ebu Said Yarpuzi (also known as Mehmet Balcıoğlu), Huseyin Abu Emre,[50] Murat Gezenler,[51] Murat Ekinci (also known as Ebu Hafs),[52] Ebu Hanzala Hoca (also known as Halis Bayıncık), and Feyzullah Birışık.[53]

The most well-established of these preachers is Abdullah Yolcu (b. 1958) whose work will be discussed in detail here. A Turkmen from Kirkuk in Iraq, Yolcu speaks fluent Arabic and publishes in Arabic and Turkish. Before issuing his books in Turkish he published extensively in Saudi Arabia using his full Arabic name ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Athari, sometimes adding al-ʿIraqi, indicating Iraqi origin, while his Turkish works are published under the name Abdullah Yolcu or Abdullah b. Abdulhamid el-Eseri.[54] After settling in Turkey in 1986, Yolcu established the Guraba publishing house in Istanbul in 1992 with what Guraba says is the aim of helping to counter a century of Westernization, extreme Sufism (*aşırı tasavvuf*), and prevalence of Shiʿi and Christian practices.[55] Set up as an arm of an Izmir-based charity called İlim Der, Guraba publishes Turkish translations of Bin Baz, al-ʿUthaymin, al-Albani, and al-Fawzan, and from 2005 began to draw on a pool of Yolcu's work in Arabic for presentation to a Turkish audience in Turkish.[56] Yolcu is also a founding member of a group called the League of Muslims Scholars, established in Kuwait in 2010 as a rival to the International Union of Muslim Scholars founded by al-Qaradawi in 2004.

With his bookstore in the Sultanahmet district of Istanbul, the heart of government in the Ottoman period and location of many of its most important mosques, Yolcu has positioned himself as the face of quietist Salafism in Turkey. Guraba's publication choices indicate an intent to promote a corrective, conservative Sunni Islam taking Wahhabism as its model, something Yolcu reinforces in his writings, lectures, and even attire, often appearing in the gold-rimmed black cloak and white headdress of Saudi

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ʿulamaʾ.[57] His books avoid political issues such as the invasion of Iraq, the war in Syria, or direct intervention in Turkey's domestic politics, and are careful when engaging Salafi positions on questions such as *takfīr* and jihad: he suggests, for example, that although removal of the sharīʿa system is a form of apostasy, the laws of the secular state should be disobeyed (rather than rejected).[58] This studied moderation helps further the Salafi cause in Turkey by engaging with the wider public and avoiding conflict with the state, while presenting Salafism in a consensual manner as the summation of the four schools of Sunni *fiqh*. At the same time his project to introduce a sharīʿa sensitivity to Islamic practice in Turkey today is radical in that it implies a rejection of the entire tradition of Ottoman-Turkish Islam with its extensive Sufi networks and Hanafi-Maturidi ʿulamaʾ institutions. Indeed, he dismisses the majority of religious scholars and Islamist intellectuals and politicians for compromises to "nationalism" (Ar. *qawmiyya*) and "rationalism" (Ar. *ʿaqlāniyya*) and acceptance of the post-sharīʿa state.[59]

Guraba lists nine of Yolcu's Turkish-language books for sale but he has many other titles from Saudi publishers in Arabic.[60] They reflect the archetypal themes of the Wahhabi tradition: the danger to the Muslim's faith of engaging, even unwittingly, in overly friendly relations with non-Muslims, partaking in non-Muslim festivities and customs, indulging in the temptations of modern music, slipping into the laxity that is the condition of many if not most Muslims in post-sharīʿa states. His concern is largely individualist, a vocation to save Muslim souls one by one, and Yolcu often states that his audience is the mass of lax Muslims who are neither loyal adherents of sharīʿa nor apostates. Muslims, he says, should be ever wary to protect and maintain the integrity of their faith from the traps of materialist culture. Declaring the *shahāda*, the Muslim profession of faith, is not enough: to insist in the face of argumentation on forsaking the Ramadan fast, or prayer, or any other of the main commands of the sharīʿa tradition is apostasy.[61] Other actions that put one's Islam (*müslümanlığı*) in jeopardy include use of saint figures as intermediaries (a polytheistic dilution of the focused worship of God alone), compromising the absolute authority of sharīʿa, dabbling in sorcery (addressing entities other than God), denigrating any elements of Islam, or suggesting it is an incomplete system.[62] Underpinning these arguments is the theological position, a corrective to Ashʿari theology derived by the Wahhabi and antitaqlid trends from Ibn Taymiyya, which holds that faith is a continuous work in progress, liable to increase and decrease according to the believer's attention to the minutiae of word and action.

Yolcu and Guraba have made choices regarding which of Yolcu's works to translate into Turkish and which to republish in Arabic from Saudi originals, what additions to make and what to omit. Nonchalance towards rituals and disregard for doctrinal questions, on the one hand, and cultural-historical reach of Sufi practices, on the other, makes Turkey a prime target for Salafi proselytization. For example, his two keynote works *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi* (Belief of the Pious Ancestors) and *Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'e Göre İman* (Faith According to the Sunni Tradition), both previously published in Arabic in Saudi Arabia, seek to define Sunnism in Wahhabi Salafi terms and press that claim to a Turkish audience. *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi* was published by the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2002 with an endorsement from the minister.[63] It was issued in Turkish in 2013 with the addition of separate forewords by twenty scholars from a number of countries; eleven of them were based in Saudi Arabia and one is from Turkey.[64] Defining *Selefilik*, he says it expresses the idea that Muslims who follow

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the Qurʾan, the Prophet's sunna, and the example of the early Muslims are the most correct. Such Muslims are the guardians of Islam from unbelief and innovation; the Salafi way is pure tawhid (Tr. *tevhid*, commitment to God alone) and the furthest from *shirk* (polytheistic practice).[65] In the second title, first published in Saudi Arabia in 2003,[66] Yolcu acknowledges there has been an Islamic awakening (*İslami uyanış*) but says youth must be aware of shariʿa rules to protect their faith, in particular observing prayer.[67] If those who refuse to pray do not repent, he writes, "they should be put to death because they are apostates," and this would have a series of consequences in terms of funeral rites, inheritance, and child custody.[68]

Yolcu discusses taqlid at length, condemning the dogmatic adherence of an *ʿālim* to a school or an unschooled believer to a particular scholar, while warning the believer against shopping around for views that suit one's desires.[69] It is following the views of the scholars that has led Muslims towards practices that put their faith at risk, such as visiting shrines and indulging in music and singing. Music is productive of "destructive atheistic ideas" (*yıkıcı ateist fikirler*) such as mixing of the sexes and bodily adornment, and thus destructive to the moral fabric of the Muslim community.[70] He lists fatwas on the topic from Saudi scholars, including al-Fawzan's refutation of al-Qaradawi's view that music is forbidden only in the context of alcohol and other sins;[71] he also reproduces a fatwa from 2000 issued by the permanent fatwa committee of the Council of Senior ʿUlamaʾ in Saudi Arabia declaring music and song to be impermissible.[72] Only the voice without instrumental musical accompaniment is legitimate, while the voice heard by the believer should not be that of an unrelated adult woman (his one concession is that tambourines may be used among women at weddings).[73] It is in the context of this discussion on music and singing that Yolcu engages in his strongest criticism of Sufism by name. He faults Sufi dhikr rituals for clapping, shouting and "acrobatic movements like people who drink alcohol," mixing of genders, singing that "alights love and desire and excites the senses," and forms of song that have "invented new forms of invoking God [*zikir*]," an innovation he says is rejected by the four Sunni legal traditions and Ibn Taymiyya.[74] "Know, Muslim brother, that involving yourself in listening to these things creates an emotional reaction in that it moves the feelings and lights emotions without foresight and understanding," Yolcu writes.[75] It was through Sufism that the Byzantine and Persian musical custom infiltrated Islamic culture, he says, but the wisdom of the shariʿa was to establish a taxonomy of the licit and the illicit to prevent the believer from going astray.[76]

In these discussions on Sufism, shrines, and music the subtle crafting of Arabic texts into a Turkish language discourse for Turkish audiences reveals itself most clearly. Yolcu's critique is easily understood to refer to Alevi practices in his reference to Sufi *sema* in Turkish, while his Arabic discussion of *samāʿ* does not convey Alevism at all.[77] Similarly, in discussing shrines he writes that "the Shiʿa and some Sunnis regard traveling to graves or mosques built upon them, known as *türbe*, as a form of pilgrimage," but the Turkish text carries a footnote, not present in the Arabic version, which gives the example of visitors to Mevlana's tomb in Konya and the mosque of Eyüp Sultan in Istanbul.[78] While the frequent use of *rawāfiḍ/rāfiḍa* (a derogatory term for Shiʿa) would be understood by Arabic readers as references to Arab or Iranian Shiʿa, *rafiziler* can intimate Alevis to readers of the Turkish text. This becomes relevant again in his discussion of *takfīr*. The rules of *takfīr* should be followed scrupulously in

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order not to wrong a believer, he says; but while those who were never Muslim such as Christians, Jews, polytheists, Zoroastrians, and philosophers will go to hell, among Muslims *batıniler* and *aşırı rafızıler* (extreme Shiʿa) may suffer the same fate, according to the specific innovations they engage in.[79] Again the term *batıniler*, from the Arabic *bāṭiniyya* denoting Ismaʿili Shiʿa and others who believe in esoteric knowledge, carries the semantic hint in Turkish of Sufi/Alevi practice in Turkey. The overall message, however nuanced, is that Turkey is a nominally Muslim society on the edge of *kufr* because Muslims in their ignorance fail to live by the standards of the Prophet's sunna, for which the absence of the shariʿa juridical structure is no excuse.[80]

Another striking aspect of Yolcu's discourse is its conformity with transnational Salafism's simplicity of message and Arabist leanings. His arguments can speak directly to Turkish experience without any call for spelling out its specificities or even citing Turkey by name. They assume what Meijer calls an "intellectual superiority of religious knowledge" that privileges the Arabic language (for which the Guraba website offers learning materials) in elaborating "correct" and "true" Islam,[81] which is consonant with Salafism's claims to greater certainty of God's law through constant referencing of revealed texts, the Qurʾan, and hadith as textual forms of authority in Arabic.[82] This offers a counterpoint to the early Kemalist effort to Turkicize Islamic ritual through the introduction in 1932 of the call to prayer (*ezan*) in Turkish. An interesting comparison can be made too between the quietist Salafi discourse of Yolcu and that of *Konstantiniyye*, the Islamic State's Turkish-language publication which began publishing in 2015. *Konstantiniyye* states directly what Yolcu leaves implied regarding the non-Islamic nature of the Turkish state.[83] The quietism of Turkish neo-Salafism contrasts with the Islamic State's call on believers, in propaganda materials in Turkish and other languages, to quit infidel lands (*dār al-ḥarb*) for the shariʿa zone of its caliphate. Like the AKP itself, the quietist Salafis risk being outflanked from the right as the jihadists introduce competition over religiosity.[84] At the same time, the Salafis exhibit a subversive élan. In their rejection of the entire Hanafi-Maturidi system it could be said that Salafis like Yolcu demonstrate what Haim Malka in a discussion of Tunisian Salafism calls "rebellion against local Islamic traditions and practices and their relationship to political systems."[85]

SALAFISM AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE

In media and academic discussion Salafism was received initially as a new phenomenon in the Muslim world extraneous to Turkey.[86] Islamist intellectuals played a critical role in the gradual process of re-Islamization that Turkey witnessed in the decades following the end of one-party rule. Ali Bulaç was one of the most important, and an analysis of his writings shows an increasing effort to deal with the repackaged ideology of Salafism and to integrate it into his thinking. In his first works published in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Bulaç did not discuss Salafism at all and rarely referred to the notion of exemplary early Muslims. In his 1987 study *İslam Dünyasında Toplumsal Değişme* (Social Change in the Islamic World) he talked of *selefi akımlar* (Salafi trends) in history that were opposed to the philosophers and speculative theology, but by 1994 a clear shift in his concerns had occurred.[87] His book *İslam Düşüncesinde Din-Felsefe, Vahiy-Akıl İlişkisi* (The Relationship between Religion-Philosophy, Revelation-Intellect in Islamic Thought), published that year, cites *selefi* (Salafi) nine times, *selefiler* (Salafis) six times,

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selefiye (Salafism) six times, *selef* (the ancestors) five times, *selef-i salihin* (the pious ancestors) twice, and *selefi akımlar* (Salafi trends), *selefi düşünce* (Salafi thought), and *selef mezhebi* (the Salafi school) once.[88]

Bulaç takes this further in more recent works, advocating reconciliation between Salafism and the modernist political movements (in *Kutsala, Tarihe ve Hayata Dönüş* [Return to the Sacred, History and Life], 2006) and between Salafism and Sufism (in *Postmodern Kaosta Kıble Arayışı* [The Search for the Qibla in the Chaos of Postmodernism], 2012). What is interesting is that with Bulaç this accommodationist approach seems to derive from a desire to rebuild Turkish Islam's connections with the Arab-Islamic milieu and create a new Muslim subject through holding to scriptural sources (without stepping into antitaqlid territory). In newspaper columns published in 2013 and 2014 he warned readers against rejecting Salafism and argued that their use of *takfīr* was less radical than that of the early Kharijites.[89] Like the Salafists, Bulaç also promotes the use of Arabic. Although this reflects changes of the past two to three decades in Turkey's social linguistic environment (efforts to re-establish some of the Ottoman lexicon),[90] Bulaç goes further in that he not only teaches readers Arabic alternatives to the religious terminology of Kemalist High Turkish but also introduces Arabic terms with no especial Islamic function at all. Thus in one work, while he informs that the Turkish word *din* (religion) could be rendered *ed-Din*, he also gives the Arabic origin *hubut* as a synonym for *düşmüş* (collapse),[91] *el-hayatü'd-dünya* for *dünya hayatı* (the life of this world),[92] *kemal* for *mükemmellik* (wholeness),[93] *hudut* for *sınırlar* (limits),[94] and *ed-Dinu'l-Kayyim* for *dosdoğru din* (the most correct religion).[95]

In scholarly discussion, led by professors in Turkish religious studies departments, Salafism was at first rarely treated as a question relevant to Turkey. In 2009 the journal *Marife* (Knowledge), published by Necmettin Erbakan University in Konya's theology faculty, devoted an issue to Salafism (*selefilik*) with articles on refutations of Wahhabism, jihadi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, Nursi's view of the *salaf*, the thought of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya, and the Salafism of the modernists.[96] Other publications took as their focus an attempt to challenge Salafism's claims to represent normative Sunni Islam,[97] or offered discussions of Salafism as a contemporary Arab phenomenon, associated with the mujahidin fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the emergence of al-Qa'ida.[98] Mehmet Zeki İşcan does not discuss Turkish Salafism in his study *Selefilik: İslami Köktenciliğin Tarihi Temelleri* (Salafism: The Historical Roots of Islamic Radicalism, 2006), yet in his 2012 article "Türk Basınında Matüridi ve Matürıdilik" (Maturidi and Maturidism in Turkish Media) he touches indirectly on a tendency among secular writers to denigrate any Islamist challenge to republican secularism by using the Salafi epithet.[99] İşcan cites writings by economics and philosophy professor Bünyamin Duran,[100] historian Sait Başir,[101] former diplomat and National People's Party parliamentarian Gündüz Aktan,[102] and newspaper columnists Avni Özgürel (writing in *Radikal*)[103] and Atılgan Bayar (*Haber Türk* and *Yeni Asır*)[104] that fetishize the Hanafi-Maturidi nature of the Ottoman Islamic system as the essence of republican Islam while depicting it as under threat. Aktan, for example, writes: "Our pain will end the day that the religious understand that the republic is the model best suited to Islam and that religion lies in Hanafi-Maturidism not Salafism."[105]

More substantively, Hilmi Demir, a professor at Hitit University, argues that "Salafization" is taking place at the level of theological creed (*akide*). Reviewing writings since

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1990 of scholars in the Nakshibendi Sufi tradition, the most extensive in Turkey historically, he describes a shift in positions regarding questions of faith and action in accordance with the Salafi critique of Ashʿarism (action as proof of faith, faith as something that rises and falls, the invalidity of reason alone for judging good and bad, prayer led by an imam of questionable faith, etc.).[106] Accordingly, the Diyanet administration and Nakshibendi publications have begun to cite *selefiyye* as a theological position in Sunni Islam (as İsmail Hakkı had done in 1920). In an official *ilmihal* (summary of doctrine) first published in 1999, and on its twenty-second print run in 2015, *selefiyye* is listed alongside Ashʿarism and Maturidism as the first of three Sunni theological schools (*itikadi fırkaları*), despite the fact that the theological position referred to only began to acquire the name Salafi, in some circles, in the late 19th and early 20th century.[107] Demir also notes that since the 1990s Turkish-language refutations of Salafism have almost all gone out of print. He points to *Ehl-i Sünnet İtikadı* (Sunni Belief), a translation into modern Turkish of an Arabic work by Halidi Nakshibendi shaykh Ahmed Ziyauddin Gümüşhanevi (d. 1893). Published in 1994 and 1996, it was last issued by the same publisher (Bedir) in 2002. He also cites a Turkish translation published in 1994 of Abu Hamid ibn Marzuq's *Baraʾat al-Ashaʿira min ʿAqaʾid al-Mukhalifin* (Defending Ashʿaris from the Beliefs of the Dissenters, 1968); it has not been reprinted. It should be noted, however, that in 2009 Syrian religious scholar Saʿid Ramadan al-Buti's refutation *al-Salafiyya: Marhala Zamaniyya Mubaraka La Madhhab Islami* (Salafism: A Blessed Historical Phase, Not a School, 1988) was finally published in Turkish.[108]

A recent study by Feriha Perekli makes similar arguments concerning a Salafization of religious discourse that accompanied the rise of the Islamist movement and which was effected through use of the term *tevhid* (Ar. tawhid, oneness of God). Perekli points to what she calls tawhidi discourse in the Milli Görüş newspaper *Milli Gazete* and recent works by Islamist writers such as Hamza Türkmen that attempt to align the Turkish Islamist movement with the Salafi genealogy of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab.[109] Political Islam in Turkey is thus reconfigured as a *tevhidi uyanış* (tawhid awakening), which Türkmen even attempts to connect to the Kadizadelis, the movement of 17th-century preachers from outside the prestigious *medrese*-trained corps of ʿulamaʾ who criticized the Sufi orders.[110] Kadizadeli's links to Ibn Taymiyya are far from established,[111] and it is notable that Yolcu makes no attempt to claim the movement as an Ottoman Salafi forebear.[112] "Although Turkish tawhidi Islamists have not called themselves 'Salafis,' they are representative of Salafi thought in that they refer only to the Qurʾan and Sunnah, they refuse heterodox Islam/Sufism, and call for a return to the pure faith of the Prophet and his companions," Perekli writes.[113]

Multiple meanings of Salafism can thus be found in Turkish public discourse, evidencing a degree of semantic confusion not found in its Arabic usage. In the hands of defenders of the secular republic Salafism is a catch-all term for demonizing the entire Islamist movement; for some public intellectuals it is part of the modern landscape of Islamic politics that should be embraced; for some Islamist politicians it more accurately describes the nature of the revivalism they are engaged in. The lack of orthographic stability is revealing of the range of meanings deployed: when discussed in positive or neutral terms *selefilik*, *selefiye*, or *selefiyye* are usually preferred, but *selefiyyecilik*, *selefçilik,*[114] and others often indicate disapproval. While Diyanet chose *selefiyye* for its catechism of 1999, a report it issued in 2015 in refutation of Islamic

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State ideology shifted to *selefilik* to denote quietist engagement in the theological and methodological preoccupations of the Salafi movement and *selefizm* for "violence and terror-based political Salafism."[115] The Islamic State, it says, has veered from a "trend known in history as scholastic Salafism [*ilmi selefilik*] and which could be described as the most elementary and authentic effort to understand and live Islam."

CONCLUSION

While Arabic religious discourse elaborated the notion of Salafiyya in the early 20th century, the secular nationalist ideology of the early republic truncated such discussion in the Turkish sphere. Reengagement with Salafi ideology in its Saudi-inflected modern iteration in the enabling environment of post-1980 Turkey had several consequences: production of a wide range of understandings of what the term denoted, the internalization of some Salafi ideas, and the evolution of a quietist Turkish Salafism bearing a rejectionist approach to the wider Islamic culture supporting it. The direction of local and regional politics, with the AKP's successes against the military "deep state" and Turkey's involvement in Syria's civil war, created an opening for an enterprise such as Guraba to turn its attention to publishing Salafi material in Turkish and raising its profile in social media. If Salafism were to be understood as a new religious movement, it would be, according to J. Gordon Melton's classification, as a sect. While movements lacking legitimacy in the eyes of an existing religious establishment tend to be defined as cults or even new religions, sects are perceived as operating within the recognized tradition, with perhaps stricter positions on belief and practice.[116] Reminiscent of other geographical contexts, as a marginal sect the Turkish Salafis not only address the center with claims to represent normative Sunnism but are met with some degree of indulgence of those claims from the mainstream itself.

Meijer's observation that Salafism may succeed "when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed" seems then to speak surprisingly well to the Turkish case.[117] In figures such as Yolcu this current found a place from which to attempt the production of a Turkish Salafism from Arabic texts. Translation, as theorists Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere argue, is never innocent. "There is always a context in which the translation takes place, always a history from which a text emerges and into which a text is transposed,"[118] they write; it is a form of rewriting that involves "the shaping power of one culture upon another in which the source language can wield a force of authority in the translated context."[119] Yolcu does this in taking Arabic-language texts from Saudi Arabia and feeding them into the Turkish ecumene where their impact is to speak through articulation in Turkish to the historical experience of secular materialism and its production of a post-sharīʿa society. Although Yolcu says he believes it would take many years for Salafism to make significant inroads in Turkey, that question is now brooked in public debate in the context of the Syrian war and its repercussions.[120] It is perhaps worth noting the conclusions of one recent study of Salafi groups in Lebanon: what started as a small movement of quietist Salafis during the mid-1970s evolved in time into an extensive network of quietist, political, and jihadi elements in which actors manage to shift between categories.[121]

No less than other Muslim societies, Turkey evidences the kind of minimalist, individuated Muslim subjectivity that Roy and Meijer identify as an important element in

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the diffusion and reception of transnational Salafism. This speaks to the success of Said Nursi's project to sublimate the charisma of the Sufi shaykh into the text, as Şerif Mardin put it, reducing a rich tradition to a Spartan textuality.[122] He was prompted to follow this course by the republic, with its banning of the orders and championing of what he saw as dark materialist currents that had seized Europe. If the Hanafi-Maturidi system is under threat, as some scholars and media commentators have suggested, it could be argued that decades of state-sponsored positivism helped create an environment in which transnational neo-Salafism could develop. Scholars of political Islam seem to have accepted too readily the assumption that Turkey's Sufi traditions form a protective wall against Salafi ideas.[123] Hakan Yavuz, for example, talks of Nakshibendism as the "incubator" of a Turkish Islam that is "more liberal, open, and ready to reconcile differences within a democratic environment."[124] While this notion of a detached Turkish Islam has not gone unchallenged,[125] it would appear that continued emphasis on Sufism and the Milli Görüş line of political Islam, as well as a lingering sense of Turkish exceptionalism, have acted to hamper scholarly consideration of Salafism as a new form of religiosity in Turkey, allowing essentialist notions of the impenetrable cultural fortress to obscure important mutations in religious discourse.

NOTES

Author's note: I thank Pembroke College, Oxford, for funding to undertake research in Turkey.

[1]Ali Bardakoğlu, "Selefiliğin Geleceğine İlişkin Perspektifler," in *Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik*, ed. Ahmet Kavas (Istanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2014), 662.

[2]For example, see Jamie Dettmer, "Growing Unease Over Turkish Jihadists in Syria," Voice of America, 8 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/growing-unease-over-turkish-jihadists-in-syria/1765615.html.

[3]In 2001 neither was there a spelling convention in Western media; see J. Hooper and B. Whitaker, "Salafee Views Unite Terror Suspects: The Binding Tie," *The Guardian*, 26 October 2001.

[4]Notable works which give an excellent account of political Islam in Turkey while ignoring Salafism include Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009); Ümit Cizre, ed., *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* (London: Routledge, 2008); William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010); and Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred C. Stepan, eds., *Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). General histories of modern Turkey tend to give only brief consideration to other forms of Islamist thought and activism.

[5]Roel Meijer, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) and Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) are important in defining transnational Salafism today but say little about Turkey.

[6]Area studies programs tend to associate Islam with the Arab Middle East. See Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," *American Historical Review* 96 (1991): 1363.

[7]Arabic transliteration is used for Islamic terms but Turkish with some Turkish texts, indicated with Ar. and Tr. if not clear.

[8]Recent works on Salafism as a neologism include Khaled El-Rouayheb, "From Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d. 1566) to Khayr al-Din al-Alusi (d. 1899): Changing Views of Ibn Taymiyya among Non-Hanbali Sunni Scholars," in *Ibn Taymiyya and His Times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 269–318; Frank Griffel, "What Do We Mean By 'Salafi'? Connecting Muḥammad ʿAbduh with Egypt's Nūr Party in Islam's Contemporary Intellectual History," *Die Welt des Islams* 55 (2015): 186–220; and Henri Lauzière, "The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42 (2010): 369–89. Lauzière thinks the radical antitaqlid groups have more rights to the term Salafiyya than the modernists, a position Griffel rejects. On the

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idea of "Salafism" having some kind of deeper historical resonance, see Bernard Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," *Global Salafism*, 33–57, esp. 38.

[9]They would include Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1856–1924), Khayr al-Din al-Alusi (1836–99), Mahmud al-Alusi (1802–54), author of *Ghara'ib al-Ightirab* (Baghdad: Maktabat al-Shahbandar, 1909), and Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi (1866–1914), author of *Dala'il al-Tawhid* (Damascus: al-Fayha' Press, 1908). Al-Qasimi avoided Ibn Taymiyya's extreme views on *takfīr*; see Mun'im Sirry, "Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī and the Salafi Approach to Sufism," *Die Welt des Islams* 51 (2011): 75–108.

[10]ʿAbduh also opposed taqlid but for modernist purposes. On Salafiyya and Arabism, see David Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Itzchak Weismann, *Taste of Modernity: Sufism Salafiya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[11]*Risalat al-Mu'tamar al-Khamis* (Cairo, 1939), 14–16; cited in Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 14.

[12]Husam Tamam, *Tasalluf al-Ikhwan: Ta'akul al-Utruha al-Ikhwaniyya wa-Suʿud al-Salafiyya fi Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Alexandria, Egypt: Bibliotheca Alexandrina/Future Studies Unit, 2010).

[13]In her study *Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008), Malika Zeghal shows that Salafism retained currency in Morocco into the 1950s as a religious nationalism informed by both Wahhabism and the modernists.

[14]Roy, *Globalized Islam*, 272.

[15]Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," 36.

[16]See Meijer, "Introduction," *Global Salafism*, 1–32; and Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," 33–57. The typology was earlier developed in Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 207–39.

[17]The English term, despite its popularity, emerges from no direct equivalent in Arabic.

[18]This school is often referred to as the Madkhali school after Saudi scholar Rabiʿ al-Madkhali on account of his propagandistic progovernment positions in the 1990s, but in its quietist approach regarding political activity and obedience to the legitimate ruler it would include his teachers al-Albani and Bin Baz.

[19]On al-Albani's relationship with Bin Baz, see Stephane Lacroix, "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and His Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism," *Global Salafism*, 58–80.

[20]See Andrew Hammond, "Rereading Jihadi Texts: Between Subalternity and Policy Discourse," in *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity*, ed. Noha Mellor and Khalil Rinnawi (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 67–85.

[21]Meijer, "Introduction," 29.

[22]Khaled Hroub, "Salafi Formations in Palestine," *Global Salafism*, 222–44.

[23]Laurent Bonnefoy, "Salafism in Yemen: A 'Saudisation'?," *Global Salafism*, 323–40.

[24]Nourhaidi Hasan, "Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement," *Global Salafism*, 187.

[25]Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, "Salafism in France: Ideology, Practices and Contradictions," *Global Salafism*, 369.

[26]Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet,* 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1892), 7:186. He also cites a number of refutations of Wahhabism in the section "Mezheb-i Vehabinin Keyfiyet-i Zuhur ve İntişarı," 182–207.

[27]Abdulaziz Al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism," *New York University Law Review* 79 (2004): 500–501.

[28]Al-Alusi, *Ghara'ib al-Ightirab*, 388; cited in El-Rouayheb, "From Ibn Hajar al-Haytami," 307–8.

[29]Rida removed some passages regarding emulation of Europeans in his edition of ʿAbduh's *Risalat al-Tawhid* and added praise of Ibn Taymiyya to suggest he had been a central figure in ʿAbduh's thought. See El-Rouayheb, "From Ibn Hajar al-Haytami," 311. On ʿAbduh's use of *ijtihād*, see Mark Sedgwick, *Muhammad Abduh* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009), 122–28.

[30]Religious scholar Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen, who served as the head of Diyanet in 1960, repeats this citation of Selefiyye in his *Muvazzah İlmi Kelam* (Istanbul: Fethi Demir Matbaası, 1955).

[31]Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari, "al-Lamadhhabiyya Qantarat al-Ladiniyya," in *Maqalat al-Kawthari*, by al-Kawthari (Cairo: Al Tawfikia, Bookshop, 1953), 129–36. Kevseri became a bête noire for the Salafis.

[32]See Michelangelo Guida, "The New Islamists' Understanding of Democracy in Turkey: The Examples of Ali Bulaç and Hayreddin Karaman," *Turkish Studies* 11 (2010): 359–60. Islamic law professor Hayreddin

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Karaman was accused of advancing antitaqlid Salafism in his journal *Nesil* and *İslam Hukukunda İçtihad* (1975). See also Sedgwick, *Muhammad Abduh*, 95–102.

[33]On republican angst over the fate of Hanafi-Maturidism, see Mehmet Zaki İşcan, "Türk Basınında Matüridi Ve Matürıdilik," in *Büyük Türk Bilgini Imam Matüridi ve Matürıdilik,* Marmara University Divinity Faculty conference papers no. 261 (Istanbul: Ilahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 478–92.

[34]See Carter Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010), 20. See also Şerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), 230. For Haykel's comment, see Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," 36.

[35]Mardin, *Religion and Social Change,* 176, 208. Mysticism deflected Muslims from the task of facing the challenge of secular materialism through direct reference to scripture.

[36]Gavin Brockett, *How Happy to Call Oneself a Turk: Provincial Newspapers and the Negotiation of a Muslim National Identity* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 2011), esp. chap. 4.

[37]See Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity*, 287; David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Huntingdon: Eothen, 1999), 46, 63; and Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order in Republican Turkey," *Islamic World Report* 1 (1996): 51–67. On the Motherland Party, see Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 53.

[38]For more on the history of Diyanet, see İstar Gözaydın, "Diyanet and Politics," *The Muslim World* 98 (2008): 216–27. On Muslim League collaboration, see Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975* (London: Hurst, 1977), 381.

[39]On this period of Saudi ideological expansion, see Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islam and the Theology of Power," *Middle East Report* 221 (2001): 28–33; and Abou El Fadl, *Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women* (Oxford: One World Books, 2008). On the second round of Saudi expansion in the early 2000s, see Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed., *Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia's Political, Religious and Media Frontiers* (London: Hurst, 2008).

[40]Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, 304.

[41]Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 10 (1988): 762.

[42]Uğur Mumcu, *Rabıta* (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1987), 193.

[43]Eric Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century,* ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 65.

[44]Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," 765.

[45]Little has been written on İbda. The group is discussed in Gareth Jenkins, *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 201–2; Jenkins, "Turkey's Islamic Raiders of the Greater East Seeking Ties with al-Qaeda?," *Jamestown Terrorism Focus* 4 (2007): 6–7; and Jonathan Fighel, "Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)—A Profile," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1 December 2003, accessed 3 May 2015, http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=892. In Turkish, see Mehmet Büyükkara, "Türkiye'deki Radikal Dini-Siyasi Akımlar," *Demokrasi Platformu* 2 (2006): 205–34; and Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye'deki İslami Oluşumlar* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1991), 166–76. Çakır's book is one of the few resources for non-Milli Görüş Islamic movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

[46]An Islamic discussion group called the Malatya Fikir Kulübü was established by religious scholar Mehmet Said Çekmegil (1921–2004) in the 1960s; its members included students who studied in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is not clear if they applied the Salafi label or were among the small number of Turks who fought in Afghanistan. See Mustafa Peköz, "Selefiler-AKP kolkola: El Kaide'leşen AKP," *Açık Gazete*, 21 August 2012; and "Özgür-Der Eğitim Seminerlerinde Bu Hafta," Ozgurder.org, 25 October 2016, accessed 25 October 2016, http://www.ozgurder.org/news_print.php?id=768.

[47]See Peköz, "Selefiler-AKP kolkola"; and Ismail Yaşa, "Türkiyeli Selefiler Tekfirci mi?," *Tevhid Haber*, 24 July 2009, accessed 30 October 2016, http://www.tevhidhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=60097. Yaşa is one of a number of AKP supporters/members who describe themselves using the Salafi label.

[48]See Michael Farquhar, "Saudi Petrodollars, Spiritual Capital, and the Islamic University of Medina: A Wahhabi Missionary Project in Transnational Perspective," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47 (2015): 701–21.

[49]On his website, one section is titled, "Why Am I Salafi?," 22 April 2014, accessed 30 October 2016, http://www.ubeydullaharslan.com/index2.php?sayfa_id=121&id=96&l=1.

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[50]A former colleague of Ebu Said, Abu Emre manages the Ankara bookstore Kitap ve Sünneti İhya Yayınevi.

[51]He runs a Konya bookstore called Neda Kitap.

[52]He established the İlim-Der association in Izmir. See http://www.ilim-der.com, accessed 30 October 2016.

[53]For his Twitter account, see https://twitter.com/feyzullahpolen, accessed 27 October 2016.

[54]For example, see Abdullah al-Athari, *Islamic Beliefs: A Brief Introduction to the ʿAqidah of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamaʿah* (Riyadh: International Islamic Publishing House, 2004).

[55]See http://www.guraba.com.tr/vitrin/hakkimizda.html, accessed 30 October 2016.

[56]This site lists twenty-one titles; http://islamhouse.com/ar/author/6996/books/showall/1, accessed 30 October 2016.

[57]See the photograph on his Twitter page; https://twitter.com/AbdullaYolcu, accessed 30 October 2016.

[58]Abdullah b. Abdulhamid el-Eseri, *Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'e Göre İman: Hakikati, Onu Zedeleyen ve Bozan Şeyler,* trans. Ahmed İyibildiren (Istanbul: Guraba, 2014), 735. When Yolcu writes that "the *Selef-i Salihin* had not seen a ruler who did not rule by God's shariʿa," his implication is that Muslim rulers are guilty of this in the contemporary world. See also Abdullah Yolcu, *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi: Ehl-I Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat* (Istanbul: Guraba, 2014), 235–42.

[59]"They are trying to reconcile Islam and the West; they rely on Sufism rather than the Qur'an and the sunna"; interview with the author (in Arabic), Istanbul, 26 March 2015.

[60]The Turkish-language works I review, published either under the name Yolcu or el-Eseri, include the pocket handbooks *İslami Açıdan Yılbaşı Kutlaması* (New Year Celebrations from an Islamic Perspective, 2014) and *İslami Açıdan Dostluk ve Düşmanlık* (Friendship and Enmity from an Islamic Perspective, 2005), in addition to *Kur'an ve Sünnet'in Işığında İslam'ın Şartları* (The Pillars of Islam in the Qur'an and Sunna, 2010), *Meşru ve Gayrımeşru Tevessül: Çeşitleri ve Hükümleri* (Legitimate and Illegitimate Supplication: Forms and Judgements, 2013), *İslami Açıdan Müzik ve Teganni* (Music and Singing from an Islamic Perspective, 2013), and *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi: Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat* (Belief of the Pious Ancestors: The Sunni Tradition, 2014) and *Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'e Göre İman: Hakikati, Onu Zedeleyen ve Bozan Şeyler* (Faith According to the Sunni Tradition: Its Truth, What Harms It and What Spoils It, 2014), both of which act as Yolcu's flagship statements of position.

[61]Abdullah Yolcu, *Kur'an ve Sünnet'in Işığında İslam'ın Şartları* (Istanbul: Guraba, 2010), 29–30, 62.

[62]Ibid., 81–95.

[63]ʿAbd Allah bin ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Athari, *al-Wajiz fi ʿAqidat al-Salaf al-Salih* (Riyadh: Wizarat al-Shu'un al-Islamiyya, 2002). Guraba published it in Istanbul in Arabic in 1997.

[64]Muhammed Raşid b. Halid Karaköylü, former imam of the Van Şerefiye mosque in eastern Turkey.

[65]Yolcu, *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi*, 59, 66, 69.

[66]ʿAbd Allah bin ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Athari, *al-Iman: Haqiqatuhu, Khawarimuhu, Nawaqiduhu ʿInd Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaʿa* (Riyadh: Madar al-Watan, 2003).

[67]El-Eseri, *Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'e Göre İman*, 44.

[68]Ibid., 741.

[69]El-Eseri, *Meşru ve Gayrımeşru Tevessül*, trans. İyibildiren, 153–73, esp. 155–56. He gives no comment on juristic *talfīq*, which ʿAbduh applied. The book was published in Arabic as ʿAbd Allah bin ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Athari, *al-Tawassul al-Mashruʿ wa-l-Mamnuʿ: Anwaʿ wa-Ahkam* (Istanbul: Guraba, 2013).

[70]Abdullah b. Abdulhamid El-Eseri, *İslami Açıdan Müzik ve Teganni,* trans. Mustafa Öztürk (Istanbul: Guraba, 2013), 17–18. Published in Arabic as ʿAbd Allah bin ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Athari, *al-Ghina' wa-l-Musiqa bayn al-Lahw wa-l-Waʿid* (Istanbul: Guraba, 2001).

[71]Ibid., 115.

[72]Ibid., 118–24.

[73]Ibid., 242–43.

[74]Ibid., 141–42.

[75]Ibid., 169.

[76]Ibid., 240.

[77]Ibid., 140–70 (the section titled "Sufi Sema'nin Hükmü"). For the Arabic, see al-Athari, *al-Ghina' wa-l-Musiqa*, 171–208.

[78]El-Eseri, *Meşru ve Gayrımeşru Tevessül*, 244. For *türbe* the Arabic version uses the term *mashhad*; al-Athari*, al-Tawassul al-Mashruʿ wa-l-Mamnuʿ*, 283.

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[79]Yolcu, *Selef-i Salihin Akidesi*, 1689.

[80]El-Eseri, *Ehl-i Sünnet ve'l-Cemaat'e Göre İman*, 762.

[81]Meijer, "Introduction," 13.

[82]Haykel, "On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action," 36.

[83]The cover of issue 5 shows an image of army soldiers with a caption declaring that "those who commit *kufr* are fighting in the path of the tyrant." The issue's foreword condemns "democracy, *laïcité*, communism, Christianity and Judaism," and an article offering shariʿa justifications for taking non-Muslims as wives and slaves in war addresses Muslim intellectuals and Western liberals, declaring: "Islam has a concubinage and slavery system, even if the infidels don't like it . . . The Islamic State will never distort religion or conceal principles that don't appeal to infidels in order to look nice." See "Slave and Concubinage Rights in Islam," *Konstantiniyye* 5 (2016): 14–22, quote at 22.

[84]See Hilmi Demir and Selim Koru, "The Islamic State's Plans for Turkey," War on the Rocks, 18 January 2016, accessed 19 September 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-states-plans-for-turkey/.

[85]Haim Malka, "The Struggle for Religious Identity in Tunisia and the Maghreb," Centre for Strategic & International Studies, May 2014, accessed 27 October 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggle-religious-identity-tunisia-and-maghreb. See also Noureddine Miladi, "Social Media as a New Identity Battleground," in *Political Islam and Global Media*, 34–47.

[86]A search of the official Council of Higher Education's database shows that thirty-six masters theses and seven doctorates with titles citing the word Salafi have been conducted since 1999. See http://tez.yok.gov.tr/, accessed 20 September 2015.

[87]Bulaç is discussed in Guida, "The New Islamists," 347–70; Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State,* ed. Richard Tapper (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), 189–219; Feriha Perekli, "The Ideological Framing of the National Outlook Parties in Turkey," *New Middle Eastern Studies* 2 (2012): 1–21; and Osman Taştan, "Religion and (Religious) Minorities," in *Turkey since 1970: Politics, Economy, Society*, ed. Debbie Lovatt (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 137–59.

[88]Ali Bulaç, *İslam Düşüncesinde Din-Felsefe/Vahiy-Akıl İlişkisi* (Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1994). See index.

[89]Ali Bulaç, "Modern Selefilik," *Zaman*, 30 October 2014 and "Selefilik ve Haricilik," *Zaman*, 6 October 2014.

[90]See Efe Murat Balıkçıoğlu, "Osmanlıcanın ideolojisi," T24, 5 March 2015, accessed 18 September 2016, http://t24.com.tr/k24/yazi/osmanlica, 88. The classic study on republican language politics is Geoffrey Lewis, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[91]Bulaç, *Kutsala, Tarihe ve Hayata Dönüş* (Istanbul: Yeni Akademi Yayınları, 2006), 159.

[92]Ibid., 269.

[93]Ibid., 270.

[94]Ibid., 272.

[95]Ibid., 275.

[96]A list of titles and abstracts can be accessed at http://www.marife.org/sayilar.php?dil=tr&did=27, accessed 30 October 2016.

[97]For example, see Mehmet Kubat, "Selefi Perspektifin Tarihselliği," *İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 17:3 (2004): 235–51; and Vecihi Sönmez, "Selef Düşüncesinin Tarihi Arkaplanı ve Selefilik," *Araşan Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Ilmi Dergisi* 9–10 (2010): 169–85 Bishkek.

[98]For example, see Birol Akgün and Gökhan Bozbaş, "Arap Dünyasında Siyasi Selefizm ve Mısır Örneği," *Akademik Ortadoğu* 14 (2013): 1–38. See also Ramazan Yıldırım, "Cemaatten Partiye Dönüşen Selefîlik," SETA, Istanbul, December 2013, and Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, "11 Eylül'le Derinleşen Ayrılık: Suudi Selefiyye ve Cihadi Selefiyye," *Dini Araştırmaları* 7 (2004): 205–34.

[99]İşcan, "Türk Basınında Matüridi ve Matürıdilik," 487. Salafism is mentioned by name once, in a citation from Gündüz Aktan.

[100]See Bünyamin Duran, "Meşru Demokrasi," *Köprü* 68 (Autumn 1999): 112–18.

[101]See Sait Başer, *Yahya Kemal'de Türk Müslümanlığı* (Istanbul: Seyran, 1998).

[102]Gündüz Aktan, "Derdimiz Ne? (2)," *Radikal*, 31 August 2006; "Geleceğe Doğru (3)," *Radikal*, 7 January 2006.

[103]See Avni Özgürel, "Osmanlı'da Dindar-Laik Çekişmesi," *Radikal*, 14 May 2006.

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[104]See Atılgan Bayar, "Evet, Atatürk Matüridi Meşrebti: Teoloji Bilmeyen Niçin Devlet Yönetemez?," *Habertürk*, 11 July 2007.

[105]Aktan, "Derdimiz Ne? (2)."

[106]Hilmi Demir, "Nakşibendilik Selefileşiyor mu?," 21. Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü, 17 September 2014.

[107]Hayreddin Karaman, Ali Bardakoğlu, and Yunus Apaydın, *İlmihal 1: İman ve İbadetler* (Istanbul, Diyanet Religious Affairs Directorate, 1998), 23.

[108]Said Ramazan el-Bûtî, *Selefiye: İslami Bir Ekol/Mezheb Değil, Zamansız Bir Aşamadır*, trans. Vecihi Sönmez (Istanbul: Ehl-i Sünnet ve Cemaat Yayınları, 2009).

[109]See Hamza Türkmen, *Türkiye'deki İslamcılığın Kökleri* (Istanbul: Ekin, 2014), 168.

[110]Madeline C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Post-Classical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 40.

[111]Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 15, 19, 191.

[112]A key work of their mentor Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573), his *al-Tariqa al-Muhammadiyya*, was an Ottoman educational text throughout the 19th century in Egypt; see Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *The Turks in Egypt and their Cultural Legacy* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 130. But as a Maturidi theologian who advocated study of *kalām* and logic, Birgivi Mehmed does not fit the profile of today's Salafis.

[113]Perekli, "The Ideological Framing of the National Outlook Parties in Turkey," 7n34.

[114]A usage given by Hayreddin Karaman, *Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak* 1 (Istanbul: İz Ayıncılık, 2002); see Section 1, "Selefiyye'den Kur'an Müslümanlığına," accessed 20 September 2015, http://www.hayrettinkaraman.net/yazi/laikduzen/1/0043.htm.

[115]Diyanet Religious Affairs Directorate, *Daiş'in Temel Felsefesi ve Dini Referansları Raporu* (Ankara: Diyanet, 2015), 8.

[116]J. Gordon Melton, "Perspective: Toward a Definition of 'New Religion,'" *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 8 (2004): 73–87. On Wahhabism as a marginal movement that moved into the mainstream, see Hamadi Redissi, "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932," in *Kingdom Without Borders*, 157–81.

[117]Meijer, "Introduction," 29.

[118]André Lefevere and Susan Bassnett, eds., *Translation, History and Culture* (London: Pinter, 1990), 11.

[119]André Lefevere, "Translation: Its Genealogy in the West," in *Translation, History and Culture*, 24.

[120]In 2014 a number of writers began to discuss jihadi Salafism in Turkey in print media. See Rüşen Çakır, "Selefileri Beklerken," *Vatan*, 11 March 2014; İlhami Güler, "Yükselen Selefilik ve Tarihsel Kritiğe Olan İhtiyaç," *İslami Analiz*, 11 September 2014; Yusuf Kaplan, "Islam Dünyasının 'Püsküllü Bela'sı: Neo-Selefiler," *Yeni Şafak*, 9 October 2014; and Tayfun Atay, "Selefilik, Sekülerlik, Laiklik ve İslam—1," *Radikal*, 16 January 2015.

[121]Robert Rabil, *Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014). On Salafism in Lebanon, see Zoltan Pall, *Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).

[122]Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey*, 230.

[123]The prevalence of Sufism has not been a barrier to Salafism, in fact it attracts it. The Wahhabis responded to widespread Sufi practices in the Najd and the Hijaz. Sufi educational systems came under threat in rural Pakistan in the early 20th century; see Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 115.

[124]Hakan Yavuz, "The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order," in *Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1999), 136.

[125]For example, Elisabeth Özdalga, "The Hidden Arab: A Critical Reading of the Notion of 'Turkish Islam,'" *Middle Eastern Studies* 42 (2006): 551–70.

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