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Nationalism and after

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Until recently, International Relations (IR) paid remarkably little attention to identities, including its own. IR called up the nation-state, while displaying very little interest in either nation or state, or the meaning(s) of the hyphen in between. Assuming state-nations removed from view the contested politics of identity and boundary making within the state. This article seeks to make these politics visible. It considers, first, why IR might have missed nationalism, and then reviews different conceptions of nation. It analyses the gendered and global politics of nationalism, and concludes with the prospect and possibility of the nation in new transnational times.

It is surprising that nationalism has been so peripheral a concern to International Relations (IR). The discipline was founded in 1919 with an intellectual brief to seek understanding of the causes of war, in the shadow of World War 1 and in a time of validation and saliency of the principle of national self-determination, especially for Woodrow Wilson and to the League of Nations. The rise of virulent nationalisms through the 1930s, most dramatically nazism and fascism, reconfigured international relations and ushered in another extraordinarily violent world war. In the postwar decades, anticolonial movements came to power and the numbers of states multiplied. Modernization theories that analysed their attempts at nation-building were largely written out of IR, into comparative government or development studies.[1]

IR's lack of curiosity about different political identities, including nationalism, stems in part from the way the discipline constituted itself in relation to the in-between of states. The predominant identity story became that of sovereignty, assuming a coincidence of authority, territory, population and identity, and ascribing primary loyalty through citizenship to the state. It also grounded identity within bounded territorial limits, tying people to place. The territorializing logic and disciplinary power of the state[2] have also bounded IR as a discipline.

The construction of unitary and separate states was taken further by the tendency to represent states as actors, as purposive individuals, investing the state with an identity.[3] This enabled an apparently clear distinction between the inside and the outside of states, between 'domestic' and international politics, and between order

[1] There is a puzzle here about why IR so relentlessly evacuated dimensions and relations that seem essential to understanding world politics. Indeed, a number of recent papers and articles begin, as this one does, with 'until recently, IR ignored (race, culture, identity, ethnicity, migration, colonization, gender . . .).

[2] Chris Farrands 'Society, Modernity and Social Change: Approaches to Nationalism and Identity', in Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (eds.), *Identities in International Relations* (Basington: Macmillan, 1996).

[3] Jill Krause, 'Gendered Identities in International Relations', in Krause and Renwick, *Identities.*

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within and anarchy beyond. Nationalism, on the other hand, can constitute a powerful force for disorder both within states and in inter-state relations.

IR's dominant practice of conflating nation and state homogenizes identities within states and sharply marks differences along state boundaries. In the process it obscures the politics of identity, including those which constitute 'the people' and endow the state with authority as their representative. So ways of interrogating nationalisms, for example by asking whose nation? whose state? and how do nation and state articulate in any particular case? are simply unavailable. As a result, nationalism studies remained largely the preserve of historians, sociologists and regional specialists.

Some IR scholars, including some called 'realist', have queried nationalism. Liberal IR, in its English manifestations,[4] paid some attention to civil society, and civic nationalism. E.H. Carr's review of nationalism written towards the end of World War 2 demarcated the history of international relations into phases, with reference to very different constructions of nation. The first identified the monarch and the nation. The second was ushered in by the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna, in the form of liberal democracy, laissez-faire and free immigration. The third was shaping from 1870, through further democratization and the socialization of the nation, as 'the masses' expected their national governments to assume responsibility for their welfare. It 'climaxed' through 1914 to World War 2, and proved both the danger and the moral bankruptcy of nationalism. Carr speculated on postwar developments necessary to allow 'Europe and the world' to 'recover their balance in the *aftermath* of the age of nationalism'[5] (my emphasis). His focus on the US–European world failed to take account of anticolonial movements which would soon multiply the numbers and diversify the nature of states. But in the postwar years, the primary focus for International Relations became the titian confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, and the nation-state attracted little attention in itself. IR could still be chided for its 'scant attention' to nationalism well into the 1990s.[6]

Griffiths and Sullivan observe that '[w]ith few exceptions, International Relations is the study of what happens *outside* states after they form'.[7] This might in part be explained by disciplinary ambivalence towards nationalism. It is a crucial concept in IR, authorizing state sovereignty and assisting the resolution of potential conflicts of obligation and affiliation by asserting the primacy of loyalty to the particular state rather than to human kind—especially important when the issue becomes that of violence against others. But there remains a fundamental contradiction between the Westphalian normalization of state sovereignty and the potentially explosive claims of national self-determination.[8]

Losing its national component by default, IR's state-centrism assumed that 'state=nation'.[9] In the process, the discipline disengaged from 'probably the most

[4] James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Martin Griffiths and Michael Sullivan, 'Nationalism and International Relations Theory', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 43 (1997), pp. 53–66.
[5] E.H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 73.
[6] James Mayall, 'Nationalism in the Study of International Relations', in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Relations: a Guide to Theory* (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 182.
[7] 'Nationalism', p. 54.
[8] Griffiths and Sullivan, 'Nationalism'.
[9] Roger Tooze, 'Prologue' in Krause and Renwick, p. xvii.

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explosive force shaping domestic and global constitutional orders at the end of the twentieth century'.[10] It is this disengagement, and more broadly IR's lack of attention to political identifications, collective identities and 'culture', that contributed to the discipline's failure to predict, or comprehend, the end of the Cold War. Initially met with triumphantism, as the victory of the West, capitalism and democracy, the subsequent 'turbulence' and perceived upsurge of nationalism and other exclusivist identity movements and conflicts have unsettled this confidence.[11] In the process, they have forced questions of nation and identity into disciplinary view.

These developments have led to much disciplinary soul-searching, and prompted searches for more persuasive ways of engaging with the post-Cold War world. Calls for 'better accounts of the world' were propelled, too, by new critical challenges from within the discipline, and among those close by, including poststructuralists, postcolonialists and feminists (sometimes the same), whose approaches offered more productive ways of thinking about collective identifications and contemporary identity conflicts.[12] Nationalism has become more visible in IR, bringing with it, at times, other ways of writing the nation. *Millennium*'s 1991 special issue 'Reimagining the Nation' marked the first of a number of special issues on nationalism.[13] New scholarly interest in nationalism beyond IR included special issues in feminist journals,[14] and a spate of new journals, including *Nations and Nationalism* (1995), *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* (1995), and on rather different intellectual terrain *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* (1994) and *Social Identities* (1995).

Making the nation

Nationalism drives forms of political mobilization around the idea of and identification with 'the nation'. The nation is figured, often, as ancient, or at least as an unproblematic birth identity. Foundation myths tell of common origins or common sufferings, including resistance to colonization or other forms of domination.[15] Some conspicuously recent nationalisms, for example settler state nationalisms, drew initially on kin and histories from other places, but lately stress common

[10] Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Revisiting the "National": Towards an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?', in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 105.

[11] James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Note the frequency with which IR and other writings characterize contemporary nationalism in terms of 'upsurge'. Other popular descriptors include resurgent, elusive, paradox, surprising, pervasive . . . .

[12] Lapid and Kratochwil, *The Return*; Krause and Renwick, *Identities*; Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Phillip Darby (ed.), *On the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender & Dependency* (London: Pinter, 1997); and numerous articles within *Millennium* and *Alternatives* especially.

[13] *Millennium*, 20/3 (1991); see also *Millennium*, 22, 3 (1993), special issue on Culture and International Relations.

[14] For example, 'Nationalisms and National Identities', *Feminist Review*, 44 (1993); 'Gender, Nationalisms and National Identities', *Gender and History*, 5, 2 (1993).

[15] Recalling Renan's observation that 'Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort', in Ely and Suny, *Becoming National*, p. 53.)

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destiny and shared citizenship,[16] though not without challenge from those committed to more exclusivist notions of belonging.

Older forms of political identity are not necessarily eclipsed by nationalism, and some of these are incorporated into national stories or as national markers. But most scholars of nationalism agree that it is a modern political identity. In perhaps nationalism's most famous text,[17] Benedict Anderson traces its emergence first among creole (white) Americans resisting their unequal treatment by metropoles. It spread in Europe from the French Revolution, in popular and in reactive state 'official' nationalisms. More recently, it has globalized through the independence of states along the old colonial boundary lines. This stark outline is enough to suggest that colonization, anti-colonialism and post-colonialism are crucial ingredients in the study of nationalism, and indeed of international relations more generally.[18] So too are the massive transformations associated with the rise of industrial capitalism and new communications technologies; and the complex politics of state formation and consolidation that tapped into or sought to contain nationalist passions. (It may be no accident, then, that the current 'upsurge' of nationalist movements and violence coincides with another series of dramatic transformations, including those referred to in the short-hand globalization.)

One of the paradoxes of nationalism is that an identity frequently celebrated and authenticated through reference to the past is judged in scholarship to be modern; an identity naturalized and spoken of as inherited is judged invented, constructed, imagined;[19] though nationalism does use cultural and memory resources to boost its claims and normalize its affiliations. Materialists who point to uneven development or to class articulations with nationalism focus, as well, on the materialization of nationalism in representations and associations, in, for example, 'fictive ethnicity'.[20] Some, while conceding that nationalism is a modern political identity, argue for continuity or connections with pre-national forms. So Anthony Smith argues for a much longer historical trajectory, and recalls 'ethnies' that inform nationalisms[21] (though ethnies, too, were, presumably constructed, often in state or other authority interventions and consolidations).

Prasenjit Duara argues that nationalism is not a new type of identity or mode of consciousness. He usefully interrogates the relationship between nationalism and the nation-state, and argues that '[w]hat was new was the global *institutional* revolution . . . which produced its own extremely powerful representations of the nation-state'.[22] What was new, and powerful, was the vocabulary and the world system of nation-states, which legitimized state nationalisms, recognizing the state as primary

[16] Nira Yuval-Davis and Daiva Stasilius (eds.), *Unsettling Settler Societies* (London: Sage, 1995).
[17] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).
[18] Darby, *On the Edge*; the often-noted dominance of Anglo-North American centres and looking positions in IR may be an explanation here. See Robert Crawford and Daryll Jarvis (eds.), *International Relations: Still an American Social Science?* (New York: St Martin's Press, forthcoming).
[19] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
[20] Etienne Balibar, 'The Nation Form: History and Ideology', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991); see also Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain* (London: Verso, 1977).
[21] Anthony Smith, 'Gastronomy or Geology? The role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1 (1995), pp. 3–24.
[22] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 9.

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loyalty-claimant and identity-enforcer. This internationally sanctioned presumption of a coincidence of consent, authority and affiliation brings us back to sovereignty in its contemporary, nation-state form. Thus the system of states which IR has long taken as its field privileges and participates in the production of identity along territorially based and bounded state lines. In the process, the state comes to speak for, represent, and replace 'the people'. So the nation-state returns, but within a dynamic international context, and in such a way as to unsettle the hyphen between the nation and the state. This in turn draws our attention to the disciplinary power of the state and its implication, singly and within international concert, in the construction of its subject(s).

National stories

Nationalism, then, depends on history, but not in any innocent or predetermined way. Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture 'What is a Nation?' observed that 'It is good for everyone to know how to forget'.[23] This theme is taken up in more recent writings on nationalism, tracing a politics of forgetting and remembering that help constitutes the national political subject. Duaru argues (with particular reference to China) that 'national history secures for the contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time'.[24] Nationalism 'marks the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other'.[25] History (capital H) produces the nation. Nationalism seeks to occupy a privileged position as the 'master identity', even as it competes with and interacts with both other identities, and other histories which suggest other readings of the nation. Sanjay Seth, writing of India, concurs: 'for most nationalisms "history" has been that space where national identity is formed and/or found'.[26]

States never succeed in completely eliminating or even silencing other nationalisms or more localized identities (though of course states are not singular either). Where they cannot defeat other imaginings, state and dominant nationalist elites seek to contain or deflect them. These moves might include more benign or inclusive constructions of the nation, like multiculturalism, recognizing difference even as it is depoliticized and culturalized. Struggles over history, about how and what to remember, are evident in contemporary 'culture wars', over history textbook writing, and so-called political correctness. They connect in fascinating ways with debates about collective identity and collective guilt, or responsibility.[27]

These contests over history and memory provide us with rich material for analysing the discursive construction of the nation, and its narration.[28] Making the nation entails 'hard ideological labour, careful propaganda, and a creative imagination'.[29]

[23] Quoted in Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, p. 49.
[24] *Becoming National*, p. 4.
[25] *Becoming National*, p. 8.
[26] Sanjay Seth, 'Nationalism, National Identity and "History": Nehru's Search for India', *Thesis Eleven*, No. 32 (1992), p. 37.
[27] Note the current outbreak of apologies or demands for same.
[28] Homi Bhabha, 'DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation', in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).
[29] Eley and Suny, *Becoming National*, p. 7.

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The complex politics of recognition and representation can be traced through the diverse cultural politics of disaffected or subordinated intellectuals, and the productive power of state identity practices. Cultural studies writers have traced the formation of national publics through literature, popular culture, mass education and communications, including through various state techniques of citizen manufacture, making the people.

Looking within the state, however, reveals not *the* people, but many people, many different political identities, none of which are ever finally or securely made. Nations, like states, are never complete—rather they are radically incomplete, plural, filled with tensions and conflicts. The nation is always in process, and in contest. Its articulation is not only 'imagined', but through imagining is materialized in contingent and contradictory ways.

Anderson gave impetus to understandings of the nation as imagined, asserting that nations 'are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined'.[30] Gathering cultural studies, postcolonial and feminist writings within their collection 'On Becoming National', Eley and Suny direct attention towards 'how the nation is *represented*, how its aspirations are *authorized*, and how its origins and claims are *narrated*'.[31] Such de/constructions open up space to interrogate nationalisms over time and place. Exploring nationalism in various historical and particular contexts, we discover the diversity of nationalisms, of political projects which claim 'the nation'. It becomes clear that there is, indeed, 'no nationalism in general'.[32] We obverve that

> nationalism is not a monolithic phenomenon to be deemed entirely good or entirely bad; nationalism is a contradictory discourse and its internal contradictions need to be unpacked in their historical specificity. The historical agency of nationalism has been sometimes hegemonic though often merely dominant, sometimes emancipatory though often repressive, sometimes progressive though often traditional and reactionary.[33]

The nation and its others

There is nothing fixed or inevitable in any one construction of the nation, in the boundaries drawn between those who belong and those outside, or in the consequences of inclusion or exclusion, in terms of privilege or penalty, safety or danger. There are, however, characteristics intrinsic to becoming national, some of which attach to the politics of identification more generally. Nationalism, like all political identities, is relational. It is about identity *and* difference; inclusion *and* exclusion. Its boundary making produces us *and* them; making 'the people' and simultaneously making the others, outsiders, strangers, immigrants . . . .[34] The nation-people are defined by their difference from those who do not belong, who are not part of the collective 'we'.

[30] *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.
[31] *Becoming National*, p. 24.
[32] Andrew Parker *et al*. (eds.), *Nationalism and Sexualities* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 3.
[33] R. Radhakrishnan 'Nationalism, Gender and Narrative', in Parker (ed.), *Nationalism and Sexualities*, p. 82.
[34] Adam Lerner, 'Transcendence of the ImagiNation', International Studies Association conference paper, Vancouver, 1991.

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Adam Lerner invites us to interrogate nationalism by asking who does the nation exclude?[35] Often in IR, it is assumed that the nation is defined against other nations. However, through earlier national times in Europe that definition was just as often one of the national people against those who were seen to be without nation, constituted as races, or natives for example.[36] Being English, or British, was constituted within an Empire frame. Contemporary European reactive nationalisms or reethnicizations now close against unwanted 'strangers within'. 'The immigrant' becomes code for black or Asian in the UK, for North African or Muslim in France, for Turk in Germany, for Asian in Australia; and so the nation is racialized as white. Even those born in the state and/or accorded formal citizenship occupy a kind of ambiguous nationality or suspect citizenship.[37] Similar processes of ethnic closure, often mobilising cultural–religious markers, are visible elsewhere, for example in BJP reconstructions of India as Hindu.[38]

Nationalist politics of belonging and boundary defence deploy complex politics of representation and difference. There is no automatic association of difference with danger, or inferiority, although there are examples aplenty of these associations currently, some with deadly effect. Ambivalence may abound, mixing pleasure and danger, fear and desire. Or difference may be a more constructive space, in which it is possible to begin to take account and to converse.[39]

But these days nationalism has a reputation as being dangerous. What makes nationalist politics and passions so powerful and potentially destructive is the way in which the boundaries of belonging can become the limits of the moral community, beyond which the use of organized violence can become thinkable, indeed do-able.[40] There is a fatal but by no means inevitable process here in the slide from multiple identities, including awareness of or identification with the nation, to a primary identification with the nation, to a readiness to use or condone violence in the name of the nation.

Nationalism enables the politics of identity making and boundary maintenance; the limits of the national community both needing and often fearing its others. This is an unstable mix, necessitating the hard ideological and imaginative work referred to earlier. It also associates nationalism with violence, and with the peculiar power of the nation as a 'community of life and death'.[41]

[35] Lerner, 'Transcendence'.

[36] Richard Handler and Daniel A. Segal, 'Nations, Colonies and Metropoles', *Social Analysis*, No. 33 (1993), p. 3. For articulations between nation and race, see Roxanne Lynne Doty, 'The Bounds of "Race" in International Relations', *Millennium*, 22 (1993), pp. 443–62; Avtar Brah, 'Re-framing Europe Engendering Racisms, Ethnicities and Nationalisms in Contemporary Western Europe', *Feminist Review*, No. 45 (1993), pp. 9–29; Kathryn Manzo, *Creative Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1996).

[37] Balibar, 'The Nation Form'; Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Immigration and National Identity: Constructing the Nation', *Review of International Studies*, 22 (1996), pp. 235–55; Jan Jindy Pettman, 'Second Class Citizens? Nationalism, Identity and Difference in Australia', in Barbara Sullivan and Gillian Whitehouse (eds.), *Governing Gender: Sex, Politics and Citizenship in the 1990s* (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 1996).

[38] Shcheta Mazumdar, 'Women on the March: Right-wing Mobilization in Contemporary India', *Feminist Review*, No. 49 (1995), pp. 75–92; Javeed Alam, 'What Kind of Nation are We?', *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 22, 1996, pp. 1612–20.

[39] Hence the possibility of Australia as a 'multicultural nation'.

[40] I note 'organized' violence because the most common form of violence, within communities, is often 'domestic' violence, usually men against women with whom they are or have been living. This is ironic in view of men's construction as protectors of 'their' women, and of IR's representation of the inside as safe.

[41] Gopal Balakrishnan, 'The National Imagination', *New Left Review*, No. 211 (1995), p. 67.

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De/constructivist explanations of nationalism leave us wondering why people might kill or die for a nation that is invented, or in Anderson's question 'why should so many be prepared to kill or die for a nation their grandparents had never heard of?'[42] IR's repertoire of political subjects seems an inadequate explanation. Sovereign man, political man and economic man is individual, abstract, competitive, calculating; free of the links and burdens of collectivity or care. Yet nationalism calls forth a different kind of man, and affective forms of political affiliation.

The close associations between nationalism and war makes IR's neglect of nationalism strange, for war is in a sense where the discipline began. Images of nationalism often cohere around a motif of sacrifice, and unquestioning obedience. 'My country right or wrong' removes the possibility of questioning the politics or ethics of foreign policy, and disguises the political investments of the state. The nation appears above politics, in the same way that it appears beyond history. The ultimate sacrifice is being prepared to lay down one's life for one's country, or its womenandchildren,[43] or one's mates. Images of blood, bond, love, and pain preside. Ross Poole finds in the language of nationalism and war, of care and self-sacrifice, 'not so much the construction of a new and virulent form of masculinity, as the recovery for masculine identity, of that relational form of identity constituted within the family. It is, in this sense, the return of the feminine'.[44] These emotional and affective relations are, however, contained within disciplining heterosexist militarism and backed by the coercive power of the prerogative state.

Such violence is powerfully endorsed through conceptions of sovereignty which grant to states the monopoly of the legitimate uses of violence, and the right to decide when such use is indeed justified. Bhikhu Parekh notes the 'strange process of mutation in which authority is *derived* from individuals . . . and *exercised* not just over them but over the territory'.[45] The state/community produces identity, constituting its members as citizens and as subjects 'in both of Foucault's senses of "subjection"—subject of and subjected to the nation'.[46] In this sense, foreign policy, too, constitutes the nation, its identity and its interest.[47] The binary identity: difference produces particular kinds of power relations, international relations, foreign policy, defence, and security.

State power and international norms around sovereignty authorize violence. This authority is all the more powerful when co-joined with the moral authority and appeal of the nation. Jean Elshtain suggests that 'Societies are, in some sense, the "sum total" of their war stories'.[48] These stories forge connections and evoke a language of blood, kin, home. They facilitate personal identification with the collective body and will. Some surmise in this men's search for meaning, intimacy and creativity; others, envy of women's birth-giving capacity.[49] Others return to Waltz's

[42] *Imagined Communities.*
[43] Cynthia Enloe, 'The Gulf Crisis: Making Feminist Sense of It', *Pacific Research*, November 1990, p. 3
[44] 'Gender and National Identity', *Intervention*, No. 19, 1985, p. 78; Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women: a Feminist International Politics* (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 50.
[45] Bhikhu Parekh, 'Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1 (1995), p. 27.
[46] Stuart Hall, 'Culture, Community, Nation', *Cultural Studies*, 7, 3 (1993), p. 355.
[47] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States' Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester University Press, 1992).
[48] *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 166.
[49] Marilyn Lake, 'Mission Impossible: How Men Gave Birth to the Australian Nation', *Gender and History*, 4, 3 (1993), pp. 377–86.

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first image, finding malignancy, irrational impulses, and blood lusts, in human nature or men's aggressive instincts. Still others seek more psychocultural understandings, for example deploying Lacanian psychoanalysis to processes underlying collective identifications and especially those fantasy structures that reward violence against others.[50]

The intensity of nationalism is forged in the struggle itself. Nationalism is the product as much as the cause of conflict, mobilization and terror. So the wars in the former Yugoslavia 'produced' new nationalist players and compulsory nationality. They also produced a logic of their own, whereby despite small and in recent decades largely tolerable differences between Serbs and Croats, these differences became worth dying for '*because* someone will kill you for them'.[51]

The nation can evoke commitment and emotion, love and hate, violence and sacrifice in 'ordinary' people, including those who would never consider using violence in their personal relations or home place. Naturalizing the call to violence in the name of the nation, then, requires an identification that transcends the everyday. For some, a possible explanation lies in Anderson's observation that nationalism is less an ideology, than something akin to religion.[52] But beyond such 'collective reenchantment' lies the family, and through family, ideas of overcoming death through continuity.[53] In family, too, are located the demands of kin and blood.

The language of nation assumes connectedness to the body politic, and to a collectivity which preceded and will survive any individual life. It is infused with domestic and family imagery, of emotion, intimacy, love and generosity. It both reproduces and reflects understandings of gender difference and gendered obligations and roles. Interrogating nationalism requires attention to the articulation between the gendered discourse of the nation, and gender relations.[54]

Gender and nation

The nation is usually imagined as female, the state as male, delivering particular, and gendered, expectations and demands upon the citizen-kin.

The nation as woman generates representations of the nation as under threat and sexual danger, and construes invasion or colonization as male heterosexual rape. In the national gender script, 'the rape of Kuwait' is typical—figuring a male perpetrator, a female or feminized victim, and a male hero. It also constitutes national

[50] Renata Salecl, *The Spirit of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism after the Fall of Socialism* (London: Routlegde, 1994); Alan Finlayson, 'Psychology, Psychoanalysis and theories of Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 4, 2 (1998), pp. 145–62.

[51] Michael Ignatieff, 'Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences', *Queen's Quarterly*, No. 102, 1996, p. 19; see also Slavenka Drakulic, *Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War* (London: Hutchinson, 1993).

[52] Adam Lerner, 'Transcendence of the Nation: National Identity and the Terrain of the Divine', *Millennium*, 20 (1991), pp. 407–27.

[53] 'National Imagination'.

[54] Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997), p. 39; see also 'Introduction', Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (eds.), *Recasting Women in India: Essays in Colonial History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Pettman, *Worlding Women*; Jill Steans, *Gender and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

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agency as masculine, so that 'women are the *symbol* of the nation, men its *agents*, regardless of the role women [and men] actually play in the nation'.[55]

There are now numerous studies on the gendered discourse of nationalism, and of the particular constructions of desirable masculinity and femininity required for the nation. Glenda Sluga, for example, remarks that in different historical contexts 'gendered forms of national identification and masculinist definitions of the body politic and the national citizen were mutually reinforcing'.[56] She traces the emergence of both the nation and the bourgeois public sphere through nineteenth century France, and explains the processes whereby citizenship is consolidated as masculine (including through women's legal exclusion until 1944). Analogies between nations and bodies made definitions of gender and sexual identity 'crucial to the imagining of national communities and national selves'.[57]

Gender relations constitute identities and are constituted through constructions of nation. The close association between masculinity, nationalism and militarism cohere around notions of honour, patriotism, and cowardice. The citizen soldier is (still usually seen to be) male.[58] The nation/military is a passionate brotherhood, a 'virile fraternity'.[59] Proving manhood and proving/defending nation are closely entwined. The birth of the nation is through the blooding of young men.

Men have particular national obligations, including as protectors of women, children, land and home. The nation's women have obligations too. There are complex moves which take us from the nation as woman, to the nation's women, to the familiar construction of women as mothers of the nation.[60] This last recognizes that the physical reproduction of the collectivity is women's business, but also requires determining which children can be recognised as belonging within the collectivity. National attention to women as reproducers might be an attempt to seek strength in numbers, or to utilize eugenic aspirations to 'improve the stock'. Especially in times of mobilized nationalism, there is pressure on women to have the right children, by the right men. Women's national obligations in reproducing the nation rest on their presumed, and often actual, responsibilities for children's upbringing and cultural transmission, as well as their care of the nation's men and households more generally.

Women also function as symbols of difference and markers of the boundaries of national and other political communities—hence the significance attached to women's clothing, and associations, especially their relations with 'other' men. Their symbolic significance and construction as national dependents or possessions can make them especially vulnerable to policing by in-group men, and to violence directed towards them as a means of 'getting at' their men. The systematic nature of

[55] *Feminist Review*, Editorial, No. 44, 1993, p. 1.
[56] Glenda Sluga, 'Identity, Gender, and the History of European Nations and Nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism*, 4 (1998), p. 87; see also Joane Nagel, 'Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the Making of Nations', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21 (1998), pp. 242–69.
[57] Sluga, 'Identity, Gender', p. 101.
[58] Note the man it takes to be a good military man—not gay, and not a woman; Pettman, *Worlding Women*, ch. 5.
[59] Parker, *Nationalism and Sexualities*, p. 6.
[60] 'Nationalist wombs', Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: Pandora, 1990), p. 54; see also V. Spike Peterson, 'The Politics of Identity and Gendered Nationalism', in Laura Neack, Patrick J. Haney and Leanne AK Hey (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second-Generation* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995); Pettman, *Worlding Women*; Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*.

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mass war rape includes the objective of demonstrating enemy men's failure as protectors, as well as the violation of national women to disrupt the reproduction of the collectivity—hence the extraordinary identity of 'enemy babies'.[61]

Women are forever caught between the symbolic uses different national projects make of them, and the ways in which actual women experience, engage with or resist nationalism.[62] Women are implicated in their collectivity's use of violence, so often perpetrated in their name, or the collective womenandchildren that underlines their dependence and object status in the national project. But many women over place and time have supported nationalist movements and participated in wars and other forms of national violence. While some feminists and peace women may organize on the basis of a transnational identification with and as 'women', the national claim usually trumps gender (and class). It also makes organizing as feminists across national boundaries in times of more exclusivist and aggressive nationalisms extremely difficult.[63]

While feminists and nationalists may have difficult relations, they are not necessarily entirely opposed. Asian and Middle East anticolonial nationalisms grew through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, appropriating western political discourse around democracy and self-determination and reworking these through local traditions of political thought and to local political contingencies.[64] Their definition of nationalism against the West was located in difference, itself associated with the cultural or domestic sphere imagined beyond western control. In the process, women and gender relations became symbols of difference, and objects of nationalist concerns. Modernizing nationalist elites often supported women's education and improved status as part of national emancipation, though seeking a modern but not a western woman. More conservative nationalists deployed culture and tradition to defend women's difference, and their own national–cultural projects. 'Tradition' became the site on which both the nation and the rights of women were contested.[65]

Recently, many nationalist movements, both state seeking and state sanctioned, have taken more exclusivist turns, and enforced restrictive notions of woman in the name of nation.[66] Other mobilized identity movements deploying markers of religion, ethnicity or race also display a central concern with the rights and relations

[61] So the Pope appealed to raped women in the former Yugoslavia not to abort but to bear and love their 'enemy babies'.

[62] Deniz Kandiyoti, 'Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation', *Millennium*, 20 (1991), pp. 429–43.

[63] Nationalism troubles feminism; but there are also inter-national feminist politics, and differences between women have become a primary issue amongst feminists. Pettman, *Worlding Women*; Pettman, 'Transcending National Identity: the Global Political Economy of Gender and Class', in Crawford and Jarvis, *Still an American Social Science*? See also Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds.), *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Mary John, *Discrepant Dislocations: Feminism, Theory and Postcolonial Histories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[64] Partha Chatterjee, 'The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question', in Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*; Parekh, *Ethnocentricity*, p. 47.

[65] Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Lata Mani, 'Contentious Traditions: the Debate on Sati in Colonial India', in Sangari and Vaid, *Recasting Women*.

[66] Valentine Moghadam (ed.), *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*; Janet Agray, 'The War against Feminism in the Name of the Almighty', *New Left Review*, 224 (1997), pp. 89–110.

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of women, imposing surveillance and control of in-group women's movements and sexual relations. These similarities in terms of gender dynamics and the uses of women to signify difference are indicative of the difficulties in making clear distinctions between nationalism and other kinds of collective political identities. These difficulties remind us of the necessity to locate processes of political identification within wider social relations, as power relations. They suggest, too, why thinking about nationalism *and after* becomes especially challenging.

After nationalism

Nationalism seems at present to be facing heavy competition from other forms of political identity, though this is especially so for official state nationalisms. Anti-state mobilizations move through different manifestations in identity cross-overs. A political collectivity might seek equality and participation within a state: failing this, its leaders might appeal for special status, or seek autonomy or separation, and so the language used changes along with the project. However, commentators also label any particular identity conflict in different ways. The wars in the former Yugoslavia are an example, where the boundaries were simultaneously described as ethnic, national, and religious divides. The multiple forms of identity mobilized in such political conflicts are often signalled by the label 'ethno-nationalist'. This suggests that nationalism shares key features with other collective political identities, though it can be distinguished in terms of the markers used to determine belonging or exclusion, or in terms of its particular political project, which might or might not include claiming a separate state.

Considering what might come after nationalism, then, seems premature, for the political configurations and passions associated with nationalism are far from over. However, we do face a difficult challenge regarding how we characterize the post-Cold War world, and what we now make of the nation-state and of nationalism.

We live in a time of conspicuous and often dangerous nationalisms;[67] though some question how new the 'new world disorder' is, and ask whether removing the spectacle of the Cold War has simply drawn our attention to other kinds of identity and difference. Following E.H. Carr's periodization of nationalism we may now be in its fifth phase, beginning in 1989. Its origins predate the end of the Cold War, and are located within the failures of nation and state building in many postcolonial and Soviet states, and especially within intensifying globalization processes which undermine state sovereignty and legitimacy more generally. But nationalist energies have also been released by the demise of the tacit global order patrols of the US and the former Soviet Union. They are fuelled by the dislocations and pain of economic restructuring, notably by structural adjustment programs enforced on third world states by international financial institutions and western governments, and by the economic liberalization accompanying the collapse of state socialism in Europe.[68]

[67] There are more benign forms of nationalism, for example contemporary forms of Welsh or Scottish nationalism.

[68] Isabella Bakker (ed.), *The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy* (London: Zed Books, 1994); Rae Blumberg, *et al*. (eds.), *EnGENDERing Wealth & Wellbeing* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

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Interestingly, some of these features resemble those which Carr was most anxious to evacuate from the national and international scene, in order to move beyond catastrophic nationalism. He advocated an internationalizing of concern for and institutions towards social justice, defined in terms of equal opportunity, freedom from want, and full employment. He specifically argued that there could be no return to the 'free' market economy of the nineteenth century, if nationalism were to be defused. Moving beyond nationalism would necessitate that the international 'become social'.[69] It is clear that contemporary globalization overrides both the social state and the possibility of a social international system.

A major preoccupation in IR currently is globalization and the consequent transformations of states, which in turn affect notions of place, space and identity. Nationalism, as usually understood, is a territorially located identity, in some relation with a state, its own or that which it mobilizes against. Now states seem under attack from above and below, and sovereignty is eroded by the dominance of the global market, and by communications and other technologies that bypass state borders.

Globalization reconfigures relations between states and markets, capital and labour, women and men, *and* states and nations. It is a multifaceted and contradictory process.[70] Its contemporary phase has dismantled the 'three ways' of state economic management that dominated the post-war world—welfare capitalism, state socialism and third world developmentalism.[71] It is marked by liberalization in trade and finance, transnational production and symbolic capital, and new communications technologies. These largely overflow or ignore state boundaries. They contribute to states' abandonment of many of the social and economic responsibilities forced upon them through previous political struggles. This shift impacts in particular ways on women, who as primary family managers and care providers must compensate for the withdrawal or reduction of 'unproductive' public expenditure. So, too, labour is disorganized, as the state which came to function as a site for class struggle and validation of labour or welfare victories vacates in favour of global and capital determinations.[72]

These transformations have contributed to state legitimacy crises, especially in postcolonial and post-Soviet states. Whilst nowhere is untouched by globalization, it is simplistic to represent these changes as equally affecting 'the world'. Their effects include growing disparities, within and between states. States are not innocent victims, but often complicit or enthusiastic agents of globalization.[73] They par-

[69] Carr, *Nationalism*, p. 70.

[70] V. Spike Peterson, 'Reframing the Politics of Identity: Democracy, Globalization and Gender', *Political Expressions*, 1 (1995), pp. 1–16. Jan Aart Scholte, 'The Geography of Collective Identities in a Globalizing World', *Review of International Political Economy*, 3 (1996), pp. 565–608; Roger Tooze, 'International Political Economy in the Age of Globalization', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); James Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Opportunities and Challenges* (Bouldner: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Eleanor Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.), *Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London, Pinter, 1996); *Review of International Political Economy*, 2, 1 (1995), special issue on The Power of Representation in International Political Economy.

[71] Samir Amin, 'The Challenge of Globalization', *Review of International Political Economy*, 3 (1996), pp. 216–59.

[72] 'The National Imagination'.

[73] Philip Cerny, 'What Next for the State?', in Kofman and Youngs, *Globalization*; Paul Hirst, 'The Global Economy—Myths and Realities', *International Affairs*, 73, 3 (1997), pp. 409–25; see also Held in this issue.

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ticipate in a deepening contradiction between the official inter-state organization of sovereignty and the actual domination of 'the market'. That contradiction in turn undermines the nation-state, for the state has abrogated key components of its contract with its citizens, handing them over to transnational forces. So large segments of state populations withdraw their consent from, and their identification with, the state, and may attach to more localized or anti-state loyalties.

Globalization and economic nationalism are usually seen as oppositional. This might be too simple. George Crane pursues a different relation by viewing the intersection of state, nation and economy as a facet of national identity.[74] He develops the notion of 'imagined economy', and illustrates ways in which images of economic life, hard times and good, can be mobilized in relation to national identity. So, historically, Japanese industrialization and, more recently the 'East Asian miracle' were explained in terms of national character; though given the current crisis, 'Asian exceptionalism' has taken a beating. He goes further: 'The Asian currency fiasco is more than a financial problem, it is an identity crisis'.[75]

Crane notes E.H. Carr's designation of the period leading to the world wars as the 'socialization of the nation'. He asks how globalization affects the imagined national economy. Using China as his example, he demonstrates how 'globalization works from within the discourse of national identity as well as from outside the sovereign territory'.[76] Globalization challenges state managers, who must reimagine the nation, in part to attract global capital. The global redefines the national. Crane suggests that we are witnessing the 'globalization of the nation'.[77]

Another crucial component of globalization is migration.[78] Larger numbers than ever before are on the move, or resident in states other than that of their birth. Many of them are labour migrants, legally or illegally living beyond their state borders, with little likelihood of achieving full citizenship rights there. Increasing numbers of migrants are women, indicating the changing global division of labour in these globalizing times.[79] Migration stories tell of displacements, dislocations, and longing; though some also tell of escape, adventure and pleasure. Being away from home contributes to identity reconstitution. 'Routes' join 'roots' in 'the stories people tell themselves about who they are, where they live and how they got there'.[80]

[74] 'Imagining the Economic Nation: Chinese Responses to Globalization', ISA conference paper, Minneapolis, 1998, p. 1.

[75] Crane, 'The Economic Nation', p. 11; see also Jongwoo Han and Lily Ling, 'Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy and Capitalism in Korea', *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 42 (1998), 53–78, concerning recasting masculinities and femininities in the process of reconstituting national identity and political economy.

[76] Crane, 'The Economic Nation', p. 25.

[77] Crane, 'The Economic Nation', p. 30.

[78] Interestingly, Carr identified migration as a crucial dimension of nationalism, viewing freedom of migration as a vital feature of the comparatively benign second phase of nationalism, *Nationalism*, p. 12; and the closing of [European and United States] national frontiers to largescale immigration after 1919 as a 'fateful step' towards renewed nationalist conflagrations. He remarked, 'No single measure did more to render a renewal of the clash between nations inevitable', pp. 22–3.

[79] Jan Jindy Pettman, 'Women on the Move: Globalization and Labour Migration from South and Southeast Asian States', *Global Society*, 1998; see also Helene Pellerin, 'Global Restructuring and International Migration: Consequences for the Globalization of Politics', in Kofman and Youngs, *Globalization*.

[80] David Trend, 'Nationalities, Pedagogies and Media', *Cultural Studies*, 7 (1993), p. 89; see also Stuart Hall, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990). There are questions here about what we now make of home? Can we have only one home? Can we presume, any more, that home means where we came from, or the state which officially identifies itself as 'ours'.

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The presence of visible migrants appears to disrupt the sovereignty story, which usually links population, place, identity and citizenship. Significant numbers of the national people experience the migrant presence as a threat. Reactive nationalisms in migrant-receiving states reflect and produce resentment of the intrusion of difference. This can be articulated within classic state discourses, as threats to national identity and security—the enemy within. These can have the effect of reterritorializing identity, and ensure that many within the state are viewed as outside the nation. Borders are also enforced by state practices.[81] While liberalizing trade and finance, states tenaciously resist the freedom of movement of people, or labour. They claim as an aspect of their sovereignty the right to determine who will enter, stay, and have access to resources including citizenship in their state. In turn, experiences of discrimination or closure can activate new identities as, for example, a Turk, or Kurd, becomes 'ethnic' in Germany and a nationalist in her own view. She may become part of a diasporic national movement.

Migrants and racialized others negotiate their ways through multiple identities offered or denied to them. These negotiations bear the stamp of home, of the current place, and of global identity politics. Links and flows between them are facilitated by new communications technologies, including faxes, email and websites, which enable the emergence and growth of virtual national communities of affiliation and grievance. Through them, dispersed members become directly involved in nationalist causes at home.[82]

So, too, do diasporas reconfigure and replenish. Notions of home, and place, are often a part of a sense of identity.[83] But feelings of belonging need not depend on being there, or ever intending to return there permanently. At the same time, migration is no longer mainly from one state to another. Changes in state politics encourage returnees; family members maintain intimate connections and domestic economies across several or more states; women and men engage in multiple migrations or repeated border crossings, and routinely deal with agents and agencies of more than one state. Transnationalism becomes a part of millions of people's everyday lives and associations.[84]

These transformations not only affect people and nations. They recast states, too. Arjun Appadurai remarks on the difference between regarding the US as 'a land of immigrants', compared with its 'being one node in a postnational network of diasporas'. He argues that 'the nationalist genie, never perfectly contained in the bottle of the territorial state, is now itself diasporic', and adds 'no idiom has yet emerged to capture the collective interests of many groups in translocal solidarities, cross-border mobilizations, and postnational identities'.[85]

Nationalism is experiencing new times. To some extent, they do not seem so new—especially where exclusivist and violent nationalist politics exact horrific costs

[81] Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Immigration and National Identity: Constructing the Nation', *Review of International Studies*, 22 (1996), 235–55; Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *Constructions of State Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[82] Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation*.

[83] So is location, especially whether one lives within 'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil'; and in terms of nationality, for access to work and other rights, preferably in rich states.

[84] *Identities*, 4, 2 (1997), special issue 'Transnational Processes/Situated Identities'; Jose David Saldwar, *Border Matters: Remapping American Studies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Masao Miyoshi, 'A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State', *Critical Inquiry*, 19, 4 (1993), pp. 273–96; Appadurai, *Patriotism*.

[85] Appadurai, *Patriotism*, 423, 413, 418.

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from those who are seen to be outside the nation, as they have done before. But emerging deterritorialized forms of power, identity and global flows are recasting nations, states and the international.

We may be living in post-nation-state times, though there was never a neat fit between nation and state. The nation often exceeds or displaces the state in many people's affection. But are we also witnessing post-national times? Or can the nation be reconfigured beyond its familiar territoriality and reference to the state, and within more multinational and multilocational reception? And can IR reconfigure itself in ways that enable productive engagement with contemporary international identity politics?

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