Understanding the European Foreign Policy System

KAREN E. SMITH

Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson, *Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 176 pp., £40.00, (hb), ISBN 0-7190-5854-6.

Fraser Cameron, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), $16.95, ISBN 1841270016.

Roy Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 256 pp., £57.00 (hb), ISBN 0-742500225.

Dimitrios Kavakas, *Greece and Spain in European Foreign Policy: The Influence of Southern Member States in Common Foreign and Security Policy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 404 pp., £45.00 (hb), ISBN 0-7546-1821-8.

Simon Nuttall, *European Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), $55.00, ISBN 0-19-829336-4.

Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy: What It Is and What It Does* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 299 pp. (pb), ISBN 0-7453-1869-X.

Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 314 pp., £47.50 (hb), ISBN 0-7546-1261-9.

Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001) 196 pp., (pb), ISBN 0-333-94989-7.

As can be seen from the range of books reviewed here, there is considerable interest in studying European foreign policy. Numerous questions about European foreign policy merit attention: how and why has the European foreign policy system evolved? how does it operate? what does it produce? and what effects does it have on the outside world and on European Union (EU) member states? All of these books grapple with at least some of these questions.

First, however, students of European foreign policy must define the very object of their study. Hazel Smith offers a useful definition of foreign policy, and the authors reviewed here would probably all be quite comfortable with it. Foreign policy is 'the capacity to make and implement policies abroad which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor in question' (p. 7). The 'actor in question' does not have to be a state, so we must not dismiss the possibility that a collectivity of states could have a foreign policy.

Contemporary European History, **12**, 2 (2003), pp. 239–254 © 2003 Cambridge University Press
DOI:10.1017/S0960777303001176 Printed in the United Kingdom

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The collectivity known as the European Union, however, is nowhere near a unified system (with, say, a single European foreign ministry), which is where the fun of defining and analysing European policy begins. The member states still retain a great deal of autonomy in terms of acting internationally, and the EU itself is composed of different frameworks ('pillars'), with different decision-making rules and procedures for dealing with 'the international'. According to Brian White, we must therefore view European foreign policy as a *system* which encompasses three different strands: Community foreign policy (the foreign policy of the European Community, the 'first pillar' of the EU, covering primarily trade and development policy); Union foreign policy (encompassing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, the 'second pillar'); and the separate foreign policies of the member states (pp. 39–41). The books reviewed here differ in their emphasis on these strands: Fraser Cameron, Simon Nuttall and, to a great extent, White, concentrate on the CFSP; Roy Ginsberg and Smith analyse the output of both first and second pillars; and Dimitrios Kavakas, Ben Tonra, and Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson look at the national level.

White's definition unintentionally highlights a large gap in the literature on European foreign policy (including the books reviewed here), as it leaves out the external dimension of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), or 'third', pillar. Of course, until about 2000, the external dimension of JHA was quite limited, with only a few actions undertaken to try to fight international organised crime, terrorism or drug trafficking. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the link between JHA and foreign policy has become much more evident. But in retrospect, it is striking how little attention was paid to the overlap between the international crime-fighting agenda and foreign policy in the literature on European foreign policy. So while both Ginsberg and Smith are concerned to ensure that we consider the foreign policy output of the EU – first *and* second pillars – neither gives the third pillar more than a passing mention (see Smith, pp. 18–20; Ginsberg, p. 23). Hopefully, academic interest in the JHA – foreign policy overlap will produce more rounded and wide-ranging studies of European foreign policy in the near future.

Theorising European foreign policy

Brian White's book is explicitly theoretical: he wants to rescue Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) from oblivion and show how useful it could be for analysing European foreign policy. FPA, in other words, does not have to be restricted to analysing the foreign policies of sovereign states. It can be applied to the three subsystems of governance identified above: Community foreign policy, Union foreign policy and national foreign policy.

White distinguishes his FPA approach from two 'popular' ways of analysing Europe's global role: the 'EU-as-actor' approach, which he argues assumes that the EU can be analysed as though it were it a single international actor; and 'institutionalist' approaches, which concentrate on the development of EC/EU institutions and the extent to which decision-making in foreign policy has been institutionalised

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

(pp. 27–32). White's approach is instead policy-oriented, in that he is concerned with understanding 'how policy emerges, from whom and why' (p. 29). He argues that analysis of European foreign policy should begin with six standard FPA questions (p. 40):

1. Who makes European foreign policy?
2. What is the nature of the European foreign policy process?
3. What issues constitute the European foreign policy agenda?
4. What instruments are deployed by European foreign policy?
5. What is the context within which policy is made?
6. What are the outputs generated by the policy process?

The emphasis on policy making augments the EU-as-actor and institutionalist perspectives, and importantly, does not impose any particular methodology on the analyst. FPA 'can contain positivist *and* ''post-positivist'' approaches' (p. 176).

In chapters 3 to 8, White applies his framework to each type of European foreign policy governance, seeking to answer the standard FPA questions. Four of these chapters cover Union foreign policy (on European Political Co-operation, the framework for foreign policy co-operation that preceded the CFSP; post-Maastricht Treaty CFSP; post-Amsterdam Treaty CFSP; and the Common European Security and Defence Policy), and one covers Community foreign policy. There is only one chapter on the national subsystem, the case of British foreign policy (chapter 7). In it, White argues that although both Europeanist and Atlanticist orientations coexist uneasily in British foreign policy, there has still been an extensive process of Europeanisation, by which he means that the relations between the United Kingdom and the EU have become ever closer and more friendly. His conclusions are more pessimistic about the fit between the national and EU subsystems: 'the persistence of national discourses on Europe may well delay if not prevent the construction of a European political identity which . . . is necessary to underpin an effective European foreign policy'(p. 177).

White's framework provides us with a very useful way to analyse European foreign policy, by breaking down and analysing the separate subsystems. But he does not spend much time bringing them back together again to consider the system as a whole, other than to argue that European foreign policy is 'subsystem dominant' (p. 166). There is too little consideration of the linkages between the subsystems, particularly the Community and Union subsystems, in comparison with the attention given to the separate subsystems, although he does argue that such linkages are growing. Yet the case studies used to illustrate the operation of each subsystem either do not involve cross-pillar co-ordination (EC action in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT) or do so to a limited degree (economic sanctions on South Africa decided on in European Political Co-operation – EPC). White does not address the increasing extent to which 'comprehensive approaches' towards regions or third countries have been designed and implemented (for example, the stabilisation process in south-eastern Europe, or the Euro-Mediterranean process). Hopefully White's future work will provide a better sense of the extent to which the subsystems fit together in practice.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Development of the second pillar

Fraser Cameron's book is a short and very succinct survey of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is a good introduction for students new to the subject, and it contains illustrative tables, a useful glossary, and appendices citing important declarations and treaty provisions. Cameron takes the reader through the CFSP's precursor, EPC, the Maastricht Treaty provisions creating the CFSP pillar, the reforms to CFSP contained in the Amsterdam Treaty, and the launch of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) in 1999. However, the careful reader would note that figure 3.1 (p. 33), on CFSP institutions, reflects the Amsterdam provisions, but rather confusingly appears almost thirty pages before the Amsterdam Treaty reforms are introduced. Cameron also provides a few, brief case-studies of the post-Maastricht CFSP in action: the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe; the administration of the divided city of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and support for the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Cameron's emphasis lies squarely on the CFSP pillar: only chapter 7 contains a cursory overview of the EU's most important relations with third countries, which includes the Community pillar's contribution to those relations in the form of international agreements and aid. Thus we do not get much of a feel for how the pillars work together, or do not, as the case may be. There is only a brief discussion of the problems of 'coherence' and 'consistency' between the pillars (p. 101) in the context of the challenges facing the CFSP. The chapter on the challenges does, however, flag up several important issues including the role of the rotating Council presidency in CFSP, and democratic input from the European Parliament.

Cameron maintains that there is a convergence of views on foreign policy among the EU member states, and that the trend is for more and more co-operation in this area. He maintains that the EU should, however, select a small number of priorities to address, such as conflict prevention. This would reflect well on the EU's origins as a means to prevent war within western Europe, and the wealth of resources it could wield in support of such a preventive strategy (p. 114). It is already the main provider of 'soft security', helping to stabilise Europe, but, Cameron argues, it must now add 'hard security' to its arsenal of instruments 'if it is to act credibly on the world stage' (p. 115). And he warns that 'History will judge Europe's leaders harshly if they fail to deliver' (p. 115).

The CFSP is also the focus of Simon Nuttall's *European Foreign Policy*, which follows on from his excellent *European Political Co-operation*.[1] As a history of the development of the Maastricht Treaty provisions on CFSP, 'the forces which brought that policy into being, and indeed prevented it from being other than what it was' (p. 1), this book has no equal. It is by far the best book published on the CFSP of the early 1990s, and takes us through the negotiations that led to the CFSP, the external forces that affected it, and the attempts to implement the CFSP during 1994 (one year after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force).

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Nuttall starts with the provisions on EPC in the Single European Act, and argues that in 1987, when the Act entered into force, 'there was no reason to expect any changes in the EPC system in the immediate future' (p. 30). But the ending of the Cold War fundamentally altered the purpose and basis of foreign policy co-operation among the Community member states. He argues that 'There would not have been a CFSP had it not been for the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe' (p. 270). Yet, Nuttall notes, the response to the collapse of communism was not led by EPC; the Community was at the forefront of efforts to support the transition to democracy and the market economy in central and eastern Europe, with its PHARE aid programme, trade and co-operation agreements, association ('Europe') agreements and the prospect of accession. Although the need to respond to the collapse of communism was cited as a justification for a common foreign policy, the primary reason why EPC was replaced by the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty was the Franco-German decision to make CFSP a part of the wider objective of political union. And both France and Germany were pursuing political union for domestic reasons: France wanted above all an economic and monetary union to tie down a united Germany, while Germany used political union as a trade-off for its agreement to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

The inclusion of a military dimension in the CFSP provisions was the result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War of early 1991. Prior to the invasion, 'it had been possible to take the view that the European Community's foreign policy vocation lay on peaceful lines' (p. 147), particularly because the end of the Cold War initially promised the dawn of an era of peace. After the invasion, the 'Europeans were quick to draw the conclusion that a recognized international policy role depended on the ability to project power, and that collectively they did not have that ability' (p. 147). Thus the Western European Union (WEU), a nominal alliance among several EU member states, was 'co-opted': it could be used as the EU's defence arm and act as the European pillar of NATO. This careful wording in the Maastricht Treaty satisfied both Europeanist and Atlanticist member states, but the compromise was far too fragile to allow it to be tested in the real world, namely the Yugoslav wars.

Nuttall maintains that the shape of the CFSP was not affected by the Community's intervention to try to stop the conflicts in Yugoslavia. Those efforts began in June 1991 (with the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia), in the middle of the intergovernmental conference that produced the Maastricht Treaty. But by that point in time, the major decisions regarding CFSP had already been taken. Instead, 'the Community's policy towards Yugoslavia . . . was affected, some would say adversely, by the positions of principle adopted by some Member States, especially the United Kingdom and France, in the discussions in the IGC' (p. 194). Above all, national positions in the debate on whether to intervene with an armed force, through the Western European Union, were affected by national positions with respect to the development of a security and defence dimension in the CFSP (p. 213). There was thus little enthusiasm to use the WEU to implement CFSP decisions. The Community's failure to bring an end to bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, however,

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did have an impact on the general mood within the Community, leading to substantial public disillusionment and making ratification of the Maastricht Treaty that much more difficult.

Although some observers maintain that the CFSP added little to the EPC procedures that preceded it, Nuttall argues that there are substantial differences between them. CFSP is much more bureaucratic and 'legalised' than EPC was. Meetings are increasingly held in Brussels, rather than in the country of the Council presidency. There is therefore less opportunity for informal socialising in 'agreeable and prestigious surroundings' (p. 273), which facilitate personal contacts and permit increased solidarity among the member states. The CFSP produces a much larger volume of paper, but not necessarily more common policies, than EPC. As Nuttall argues (p. 13), the jury is still out on whether this will end up transforming EU foreign-policy making.

Analysing the European Union's international impact

One of the questions attracting attention in many of these books is the extent to which the EU can actually produce a foreign policy that is effective. How influential is the EU in international relations? Sceptics abound. Throughout his book, Ben Tonra argues that the EU foreign policy system simply does not work well in a crisis – time is needed to reach collective agreement, and time is the one luxury absent in crises. But White argues that the CFSP can be effective, if:

> intervention occurs at an early rather than later stage of a potential conflict;
> EU action does not mobilise strongly divergent national interests;
> there is effective planning and efficient implementation across the pillars;
> implementation does not pose major financial or budgetary problems; and
> action requires the deployment of non-military rather than military power (p. 103).

He does not fully develop this argument, however, leaving it to others to assess the EU's international influence. Smith and Ginsberg do so. Both argue that the EU can exercise influence, and criticise the facile assertion that the EU is an economic superpower but a political dwarf.

Hazel Smith, like White, takes issue with the institutional or procedural approach, which ends up equating EU foreign policy with the CFSP and concentrating on how decisions are made in the second pillar (pp. 8–9). She argues persuasively that the Union's foreign policy is much more than the CFSP, and dismisses critics who argue that the EU cannot make foreign policy, or is too weak to implement it, because it lacks the proper instruments. She maintains that the Union is an entity with a more or less coherent set of values, interests and policies (pp. 7–8), which it tries to promote through foreign policy. Smith thus aims to fill a major gap in the literature by looking at what the Union – meaning the first and second pillars – actually does abroad.

Given this wonderful breath of fresh air, her background chapters (2–4) are disappointing in their emphasis on the development of EPC and then CFSP. Chapter 3 ('Institutionalising European Foreign Policy') is in fact exclusively a history of the

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CFSP. And the explanations of the history of and mechanisms for using economic instruments (including development co-operation and trade) in chapters 2 and 4 are quite limited in comparison. This rather surprising institutionalist beginning is corrected, however, in the rest of the book.

Smith adopts a 'geo-issue-area approach', which combines a geographical and issue-area approach. She covers four geographical areas in four separate chapters: the EU's relations with the North (encompassing the rich, non-European members of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development), the neighbouring South (the Mediterranean and Arab world), the distant South (the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Asia and Latin America), and the 'new Europe' (the non-EU Scandinavian states, Russia and the other former Soviet republics, the central and east European states, south-east European states, and the three Mediterranean applicant states, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey). In each of those chapters, she adopts an issue-area approach. She considers the EU's policies in the areas of security and defence; external trade; development aid; interregional co-operation; and enlargement. She then looks at the actors, instruments, legal bases and decision-making procedures in each issue-area. These chapters give us a sweeping overview of what the EU is actually doing around the world. Her book thus usefully updates Christopher Piening's *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs*.[2]

Smith's main argument is that when we broaden our perspective beyond the CFSP, we will see that the EU does have a 'comprehensive, extensive and sometimes remarkably effective foreign policy'. It is not always successful or efficient, and does not always achieve its objectives, but this can be said of states as well (p. 267). The EU is a 'serious foreign policy actor that has pursued its objectives abroad using a wide variety of instruments. It has a clear philosophy in its promotion of liberal capitalist democracy, the role of law, human rights and democratisation' (p. 270). Economic and security interests have admittedly, however, impeded that promotion. But although EU foreign policy does support elite business interests, Smith notes that it can also support the interests of wider coalitions as well. In fact, the EU is being pushed in the direction of an ethical foreign policy because it is so open and visible (watched by the member states, their parliaments, the European Parliament and public opinion). It simply cannot engage in the 'worst types of foreign policy *realpolitik*' (p. 271). Smith argues that as long as the EU's military dimension is devoted to supporting humanitarian work and peace-keeping, then it may be able to maintain its reputation as a more ethical international actor. But she warns that should the EU engage in warlike activity (such as bombing Iraq), then it will be judged as other states who engage in such activity are judged (pp. 271–2).

Smith's argument that the EU is at least partly justified in claiming to be an ethical foreign policy actor is, at times, overstated. For example, she states that since the Maastricht Treaty, 'the Union is only able to develop institutional links with states that accept the principles of the market economy, political pluralism, rule of law and respect for human rights' (p. 158). Yet we have plenty of examples of the

[2] Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997.

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EU engaging with states that do not accept those principles (China, Pakistan, many African countries, and so on). Thus while the EU may be trying to implement an ethical foreign policy, in practice it can often end up not doing so. We should thus question further the extent to which parliaments and public opinion can keep the EU 'in line' with its ethical commitments.

Roy Ginsberg focuses squarely on the effects that EU foreign policy has on outsiders. He sets out to undertake a rigorous, methodical analysis of the EU's 'political impact', or 'the ability to affect what others do' (p. 2). Like Smith, his definition of European foreign policy activity goes well beyond CFSP (but does not encompass national foreign policies): it 'refers to the universe of concrete civilian actions, policies, positions, relations, commitments, and choices of the EC (and EU) in international politics' (p. 3).

Ginsberg's view of the EU's foreign-policy making system derives from David Easton's model of governmental decision making. At the centre are the three pillars of the EU and national foreign policies (a somewhat extended version of White's concept of European foreign policy). This central system is affected by the international and European contexts (including international systemic change and any feelings of a common European identity). Inputs into the system include the demands and pressures exerted by external actors, member states, nongovernmental actors, and 'European' actors. The system produces 'outputs' (any European foreign policy decision, p. 10), which feed back into the system, positively when the outputs have political impact, or negatively, when they do not (Figure 2.1, p. 23).

Ginsberg's model includes virtually all of the concepts that have been used in the literature on European foreign policy, such as externalisation (the process by which outsiders' demands spark movement towards deeper integration), presence and actorness (the EU has considerable presence in international affairs but has difficulty translating it into actorness, or the capacity to act effectively and deliberately in international relations), and the politics of scale (a concept originally developed by Ginsberg, indicating that the member states can exercise more influence internationally by acting collectively rather than individually). Grouping so many concepts together, however, does not consitute explanation: we still need to explain which factors are more important, and why, in producing particular outputs, and how and why decisions on those outputs are taken. Thus at the end of Ginsberg's book, we may be convinced that the EU has external political impact, but we do not know *why* it does.

Ginsberg instead sets out a way to *measure* the EU's political impact. He first specifies that external political impact refers to the effects of European foreign policy activity such that:

> nonmembers modify or change the direction or substance of a domestic or foreign policy that would not likely have occurred in the absence of the EU stimulus or EU stimulus accompanied by stimuli from other international actors;
> nonmembers' interests are beneficially or adversely affected by an EFP [European foreign policy] action;

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nonmembers' interests are beneficially or adversely affected by EFP inaction; and there is a modification or change in processes and outcomes of international negotiations (p. 49).

Ginsberg claims to measure the effects of EU foreign policy activity by both subjective and objective means, though he is more interested in doing so 'objectively', with 'quantifiable data' and elite interviews (pp. 51–2). But his elites are mostly located in Brussels (see pp. 285–6), so that we do not really get an outside view of the EU's impact.

Ginsberg argues that there are different levels of political impact – nil, marginal, considerable and significant – and differentiates these in a classification scheme (Table 3.2, p. 53). The biggest difference is found in the 'quality of influence on nonmember interests': nil impact means that EU foreign policy activity has no influence; marginal impact means it has beneficial or adverse effects; considerable impact means it has 'major' beneficial or adverse effects; and significant impact indicates 'major' beneficial or adverse impact on 'vital interests'.

This may appear quite objective, but deciding whether an effect is beneficial or adverse, and to what extent, and whether the interests are vital or not, is an inherently subjective task. And the subjectivity is quite clear in his three case-studies: the EU response to the war in Yugoslavia (1991–5); the EU's relations with the Palestinian Authority, Israel and the Middle East peace process in the 1990s; and its relations with the United States in the 1990s. In each, Ginsberg identifies specific, separate 'instances' of impact, classifies them, and then adds up the number of instances in each category of impact (for a total of 219 outputs). But his decisions to categorise a particular output are clearly subjective, and are not justified in the text. Sometimes, even, the outputs considered are not strictly speaking EU foreign policy outputs (such as French President Mitterrand's trip to Sarajevo in June 1992 (p. 61)) or are huge catch-all cases (such as EU and US international humanitarian aid co-ordination in the 1990s (p. 212)). Nonetheless, Ginsberg concludes that the EU had considerable political impact in 46 per cent of his cases, and significant impact in 29 per cent (p. 278). Its impact was greater in the cases of the 1991–5 wars in the former Yugoslavia and relations with the United States, and much less in the case of the Israel–Palestinian conflict. Therefore, the EU is not a political dwarf.

Questions about the categories are not the only problem with this approach. We get no sense of how all of the outputs fit together (did the EU come up with a coherent, well-thought-out *policy* towards the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?), nor what the intended impact was (how did this compare to what it actually was?), nor why there were different types of impact (why does the offer and conclusion of association agreements have different impacts on different partners at different times?), nor the extent to which the impact of previous decisions played a role in given cases of decision making (was there feedback, as envisaged in Ginsberg's model of foreign-policy making?). And as Ginsberg even admits, external political impact is not a guarantee of external political effectiveness, meaning the capacity to defend European principles, values and interests (p. 279). Thus Ginsberg's task was

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ambitious, but in the end, not nearly ambitious enough, and we are left with only a partial understanding of the EU's international role.

The national level

The remaining books consider the effects of the EU on the member states, and vice versa. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William E. Paterson consider how a large state, Germany, has used the EU to try to shape its regional milieu. Between them, Dimitrios Kavakas and Ben Tonra cover the role of five, mostly small, states in the EPC/CFSP pillar.

Tonra's book is an engaging and interesting study of whether the development of foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU has constrained or empowered Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. He begins with the argument that CFSP has 'created a form of symbiosis in which states are increasingly reliant upon the efficiency of the collective policy process and the collective policy process depends upon the political will of the states' (p. 3).

All states participating in the European integration process compromise their autonomy to some degree. The paradox is that for some (smaller, or what Tonra calls 'minor') states, this should present considerable difficulties: 'States which are less able to shape events, to have their views taken into account or even to be heard internationally, are apparently willing to participate in a process which is progressively weakening their residual ability to speak or act independently' (p. 4). Tonra wants to know if foreign-policy makers in minor states believe that the benefits of participating in this process outweigh the costs. His approach is explicitly constructivist. The CFSP is not a forum within which states bargain on the basis of previously formed interests, but an environment within which the interests and identity of the actors develop and change (p. 11). Tonra argues that to understand the devotion of policy makers to the CFSP, we must consider their motivation: they are not just trying to solve particular problems, much less pursue particular national interests, but believe they *must* contribute to the collective process, to the effective expression of a common identity (pp. 18–19).

Tonra sets about his task by welding two stories together: the development of the capabilities of European foreign and security policy (its ability to agree, its ability to act, and the dedication of resources to pursue agreed goals (p. 45)), and the participation of Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland in that development. He first sets out the background of their foreign policies before EPC was set up in 1970, in chapters 3 to 5. A brief chapter comparing the three states follows. All three have limited means to pursue foreign policy, and must rely primarily on diplomatic and political tools. Their security environments differ (Ireland, for example, dealing almost exclusively with the dominance of the UK), as do the internal policy-making contexts in all three states (the Danish parliament's role in foreign policy is unmatched in the other two states). In Ireland and Denmark there has been ambivalence towards the use of military instruments (and Ireland is neutral of course), although all three states were and still are very committed to UN peace-keeping.

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Another background chapter covers the participation of the three states in foreign policy co-operation since 1970. Initially, the three states did not differ so much: in the first decade of co-operation, none were much interested in moving EPC beyond declaratory diplomacy, and opposed the development of any military capability in EPC (p. 146). But then differences appeared, most notably with respect to the military dimension. The increasing links between EC and EPC (as in the use of sanctions), and the extension of EPC's remit to the political and economic aspects of security, worried both Denmark and Ireland (domestic opposition was crucial in both cases). The Netherlands, however, began to drop its opposition to a European security identity, although it remained Atlanticist in outlook (pp. 152–4). Negotiations on the Maastricht CFSP provisions brought more differences to light: the Netherlands pushed, with a spectacular lack of success, for the communitarisation of foreign policy (and has since supported the introduction of more qualified majority voting in this field), much to the opposition of Denmark and Ireland (both of whom insist on retaining the right to veto proposals). The Netherlands was more pleased with the provisions on defence policy. Ireland could just about live with the abstract reference to its neutrality in the text of the Treaty, but the defence dimension caused considerable difficulty in Denmark (and after the negative result in the June 1992 referendum on the Treaty, Denmark had to opt out of the defence provisions). The development of the EU's defence dimension in the decade after Maastricht pushed both Denmark and Ireland to the margins of policy development, while the Netherlands has been frustrated by the slow pace of developments (pp. 166–7). That slow pace has, in part, been caused by the reticence of states such as Denmark and Ireland to agree to an EU military dimension (p. 168). What is quite clear from this discussion is that there is 'no single constituency of minor states' within CFSP (p. 255).

Chapters 8–10 contain three case-studies: EU foreign and security policy in the Middle East, 1970–95; towards South Africa, 1976–95; and in Yugoslavia, 1990–6. While much of this covers ground familiar to students of EU foreign policy, Tonra adds the contribution of Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands to the EU role in the three cases. On the Middle East, there were no real dissimilarities between the three states – all three were concerned to prevent the larger member states from dominating the policy process. Neither Denmark nor the Netherlands wanted the Europeans to challenge the primacy of the United States in the Middle East. The Middle East was not a large issue in the domestic debates in all three states.

In terms of domestic resonance, South Africa was a completely different matter. Because of strong domestic opposition to apartheid, all three states pushed for a collective European policy towards South Africa. They were early and vigorous supporters of sanctions, and were frustrated by the opposition of the larger states (including France, Germany and the United Kingdom) to strong negative measures. But all saw that even weak collective sanctions would have more of an effect than strong unilateral ones. Denmark, however, was caught between its support for sanctions and its opposition to the use of Community measures for political purposes:

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it tried to resolve this by advocating the national implementation of sanctions agreed upon in EPC (p. 206).

The Yugoslav wars posed considerable problems for all three states, especially during the first year of the conflicts. The Netherlands held the Council presidency during the second half of 1991, the most crucial period for European involvement in the wars. Its attempts to co-ordinate a collective policy came to naught, and its experience has often been used to argue that small states face insurmountable problems in holding the presidency, particularly during major international crises. Denmark and Ireland were forced to consider whether the Europeans should use military force to try to resolve the crisis. Although both contributed troops to the UN's efforts, they opposed the use of force by the EU/WEU. The Netherlands, on the other hand, strongly, and unsuccessfully, supported using the WEU in the crisis.

Chapter 11 is the most fascinating chapter of the book; it contains excerpts from Tonra's many interviews with foreign policy practitioners from the three member states. It should be required reading for those who advocate abolishing the rotating presidency (regardless of the Dutch experience in 1991). Officials and ministers from all three states 'insist that the equal right of all states to host the presidency is an important principle and is of immediate practical value' (p. 258). Minor states view the CFSP as an opportunity to increase their own influence and impact in the international arena (p. 255). They can influence the debate within CFSP, but to do so must present solid, well-formulated arguments (p. 256). This is similar to Kavakas' argument that a co-operative attitude enables minor states to influence CFSP (see below). Policy makers from all three states see the CFSP process as providing significant added value (p. 280), and that the constraints of the process apply to minor *and* large states. For some states (particularly the Netherlands), a common European foreign and security policy has increasingly even become a national foreign policy objective in its own right.

The CFSP has affected the foreign policy process in all three states: it has increased their access to information and to a much wider range of international actors; affected the ways in which they organise their foreign ministries; created a basic commitment to joint policy making; seriously affected their positions on security and defence; and broadened their foreign policy agendas (pp. 257–65). A rather colossal omission in the book is that Tonra never directly gets to grips with the concept of 'Europeanisation' – there is no discussion of the meaning of this term (although it appears in the title), so his book can only make a disappointingly indirect contribution to the burgeoning literature on it.

Kavakas's focus is also the role of member states – one minor (Greece), one not so minor (Spain). His main argument is that the foreign policy behaviour of a member state affects its influence within CFSP. Member states that participate constructively in CFSP, playing by the rules and through EU institutions, increase their influence on the output of CFSP (p. 126). Greece and Spain are both relatively new member states from southern Europe, but they differ in the extent to which they are seen as successful within CFSP. Spain has been perceived as a co-operative state, and therefore can influence CFSP; Greece has not and its influence has suffered. Kavakas argues,

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

though, that this may be changing: Greece has been more co-operative for several years, and is recovering from its negative reputation, while Spain has been obstructive on several occasions and could be damaging its image.

Unlike Tonra, Kavakas does define Europeanisation, as the 'adaptation of national policy making' (p. 89), which is measured by examining the changes in the administration, formation and 'differentiation' (or convergence with other states' positions) of national foreign-policy making that occur after a state joins the EU. Kavakas analyses these changes, and illustrates the difficulties that states face in adapting to the EU. Within the Greek Foreign Ministry, separate departments deal with so-called 'national issues': relations with Cyprus, Turkey and the Balkans. The Greek position on these 'vital' issues tends to be highly nationalistic, although on other issues – where there is also considerably better co-ordination within the ministry – it tends to be more co-operative. Greece has tried to incorporate national priorities into the EU agenda, rather than vice versa. This reflects the greater influence of domestic politics on Greek foreign policy, which contributes to the often strident positions Greece adopts on its vital national issues (for example, threatening to veto any EU co-operation or association agreement with third countries that recognise the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (p. 96)). It also, as Kavakas argues in a later chapter, reflects the 'securitisation' of Greece's regional relations, in which threats to Greek security are emphasised. This fuels the perception that Greece must win on issues involving its vital interests (pp. 187–9). In contrast, Spain has 'incorporated the CFSP process in all its foreign policy structures in order to add a European dimension to its own policy and to apply common European policies in all departments' (p. 96). Spain has also avoided attaching exaggerated importance to foreign policy issues, and tried to de-securitise relations with the Mediterranean, by developing friendly relations with southern states and diminishing the relevance of disputes with them (p. 189).

Kavakas looks at Greek and Spanish participation in five areas related to CFSP, and evaluates the implications of their behaviour on the role and degree of influence in each: participation in intergovernmental conferences; the running of their presidencies of the Council of Ministers; foreign policy initiatives taken within CFSP; participation in all areas of CFSP; and success in gaining key positions for Greek or Spanish nationals within CFSP (such as special representatives). Again, the conclusion is that 'one of the recipes for success for a state like Greece or Spain to obtain a significant level of influence in the Common Foreign and Security Policy is to pursue a strategy of participation' (p. 157).

Kavakas's book is unfortunately not very well written, and contains many typographical errors (such as references to non-existent tables). It is also not very clear why he includes Gibraltar as a case here, as it is purely a bilateral dispute between two EU member states. Spain has sought to exclude Gibraltar from CFSP (p. 118), but one could argue that this is how it should be: bilateral disputes are not an issue for the EU's foreign relations. It seems to be included just to show that on some issues Spain can be a difficult partner. Yet a more detailed examination of Spanish policy towards northern Africa might have illustrated that even Spain's pursuit of its

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

interests can sit uneasily with the interests of its EU partners (contrary to what is asserted on p. 115).

The largest EU member state is the subject of the final book reviewed here. Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson consider whether the pro-integration consensus evident in German diplomacy in the past has been giving way to policies that are more focused on protecting or promoting Germany's national interests. Unlike Kavakas or Tonra, they do not look at this member state's role in the CFSP, but at its role in the EU more generally. Like Kavakas and Tonra, however, they also emphasise the role of domestic norms and institutions as shapers of national diplomacy.

Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has traditionally followed a policy of 'exaggerated multilateralism' (p. 7). There is a wide consensus within the country in favour of the very goal of European integration. The one exception to the pursuit of milieu goals through multilateral frameworks was the unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, but this remains an unusual event. But does this mean that Germany relinquishes the pursuit of national interests – and even power – within the EU? No, say the authors, but we must reconsider the nature of those interests and power, and the ways in which Germany has sought to pursue them (p. 5). As they state in their conclusion, there has 'been no regression to national interest politics' (p. 127), and 'the commitment to multilateralism in NATO and the EC/EU has embedded itself firmly as a *value* guiding German external policy' (p. 126).

Germany has made a fundamental contribution to steering the direction of integration, and shaping the EU's rules and agenda priorities, as part of its attempt to shape its regional milieu. It has 'exported' its domestic system – a constitutional dispersal of power – to the EU (chapter 2). Germany is one of the most deconcentrated states in the EU, both at federal and *Länder* levels. Co-ordination across sectors is in fact a major weak point, and the Foreign Ministry is too weak within this system to take on a co-ordinating role. This allows a multiplicity of actors to influence EU developments. The *Länder*, for example, were instrumental in pushing for the incorporation into the Maastricht Treaty of the subsidiarity principle, easier access to Council documents, and the creation of a Committee of the Regions.

Another way in which Germany has sought to shape its milieu is through the construction of strategic, long-term partnerships with particular partners (chapter 3). This has been spectacularly successful in the case of Franco-German relations, though they have recently come under strain. The institutionalised partnership with France 'provides a major explanation of the success of German European policy at a strategic level' (p. 97), and namely progress towards deepening European integration. Germany accepted EMU to try to ameliorate French fears of united Germany. Germany's attempts to build partnerships with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom initially met with little success, but are now bearing more fruit.

The central chapters of the book (chapters 4–6) then analyse three key areas of European integration that have been priorities for German diplomacy: the reform of the Union during the 1996–7 intergovernmental conference, the completion of EMU, and preparation for enlargement to include central and east European

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

countries. In the 1996–7 IGC, Germany wanted to strengthen the supranational elements of the EU, including extending Community pillar decision-making procedures into the two intergovernmental pillars (CFSP and JHA). It also supported flexibility (the concept that some member states could forge ahead with deeper integration) as a way to handle the problems posed by 'difficult' member states (read the United Kingdom under Prime Minister John Major). With respect to EMU, Germany sought to ensure that other member states agreed to a Stability Pact, which would reduce the risks of inflation in the single currency area. It was more successful in shaping EMU than it was in influencing the IGC, which resulted in the minimalist Amsterdam Treaty.

As for eastern enlargement, Germany was torn. On the one hand, it supported enlargement for solid security, political and economic interests, even though widening could pose a challenge for the strategic imperative of deepening. On the other hand, narrow domestic concerns led Germany to stress the need to reduce its contribution to the EU budget, and at the same time to block the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which could reduce the size of the EU budget (p. 109). The prospect of enlargement, combined with Germany's domestic concerns to reduce EU spending, have seriously strained the Franco-German partnership, although Germany backed off from its insistence on CAP reform at the Berlin European Council in March 1999.

With this book, Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson have contributed a succinct and insightful analysis of post-Cold War Germany, illuminating the extent to which – and why – Germany has been successful in shaping its regional milieu. As they conclude,

> the continuing commitment of Germany's European policy-makers to seek multilateral European solutions to contemporary political problems will continue to entrench at the European level a style of cooperative, consensus-orientated decision-making comparable to that which exists in Germany, and with which German actors are familiar and comfortable. (p. 135)

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, what do the authors reviewed here have to say about the possible effects of enlargement on the European foreign policy system? An EU of twenty-five member states is just around the corner, and a burning issue is how an enlarged EU will function, both internally and externally. As just noted, for Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, there is little to fear from an enlarged EU – in that the new member states have already been socialised into the consensus-oriented process so dear to Germany. Smith notes that the EU's foreign policy agenda 'has been surprisingly unaffected by changes to its membership', and that 'the consequences of previous enlargements have not had an appreciable impact on the direction of EU foreign policy – instead serving to consolidate the EU's liberal vocation in world affairs' (p. 28). On the basis of past experience, then, we do not have serious cause for concern. But not all of the authors are optimistic. Tonra notes that there is a general

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press

recognition that with a larger number of member states, the European foreign policy system will not be able to sustain effective decision-making. Yet no member state – even the relatively pro-integrationist Netherlands – is enthusiastic about relinquishing the national veto in the area of foreign policy, and certainly not in security and defence policy (p. 252). Cameron argues that the enlarged EU will have increased weight and influence in international affairs (p. 102), but that there will be challenges, namely in 'defining the common interests in a much more heterogeneous Union' (p. 103). Ginsberg similarly worries that this will be a problem (p. 228). No doubt the next outpouring of literature on European foreign policy will raise all of the questions posed by the authors reviewed here, but with respect to a much enlarged Union.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777303001176 Published online by Cambridge University Press