Authors' Response

Why minds create gods: Devotion, deception, death, and arational decision making

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Abstract: The evolutionary landscape that canalizes human thought and behavior into religious beliefs and practices includes naturally selected emotions, cognitive modules, and constraints on social interactions. Evolutionary by-products, including metacognitive awareness of death and possibilities for deception, further channel people into religious paths. Religion represents a community's costly commitment to a counterintuitive world of supernatural agents who manage people's existential anxieties. Religious devotion, though not an adaptation, informs all cultures and most people.

R1. Disentangling notions of counterintuitive, contradiction, counterfactual, and category mistake

R1.1.

Barrett and **Kelemen** contend that we have mistakenly overextended the notion of "counterintuitive" that Boyer (1994; 2001) uses for religious concepts. A counterintuitive idea in this sense is one that violates innately based, intuitive assumptions about the ontological properties of the everyday world, such as the categorical and relational properties that people in all cultures appear to spontaneously ascribe to intentional agents (folkpsychology), biological kinds (folkbiology), and inert bodies (folkphysics). **Barrett** and **Rottschaefer** argue that we confuse this notion of counterintuitive with counterfactual, category mistake, and contradiction.

Response. The general sense of *counterintuitive* in cognitive psychology (since at least the 1960s) was stated by George Miller as "contrary to what common sense would suggest."[1] One apparently universal aspect of "common sense" found across cultures was the structurally peculiar taxonomic ordering of plants and animals in Linnaean-like hierarchies (Berlin et al. 1973). Sperber's (1975a) description of how "symbolism" is triggered through "contradiction" of such "universal, necessary truths" was the first step in what has come to be known as the "cognitivist" program in the study of religion.

> [Universal properties of folkbiological taxonomy] are not contingent but necessary truths. . . . Any statement which contradicts [them] is forever paradoxical and can only be assimilated through symbolic processing. The only zoological classifications that are clearly of this type are descriptions of fantastical animals: the minotaur.

Our use of *contradiction* is clearly consistent with this tradition in the cognitive study of religion. **Barrett** and **Rottschaefer** ignore that in common English (and philosophy) the term "contradiction" has the broad sense of "an assertion to the contrary of what has been said or what is." They suggest the term applies only to its narrow sense in logic, as a statement that is necessarily false. But symbolic thoughts, including religious beliefs, often involve broad and narrow contradictions.

Elaborating on Sperber's insight, Atran (1986) proposed a series of cognitive principles to distinguish between how the science of biology and biological symbolism emerged as more or less distinct branches of thought from a common universal structure (folkbiology). Here, the more specialized concept of *counterintuitive* as applied to "mythico-religious beliefs" was first formulated:

> The formative analogies of science are superficially like [the symbolic analogies] of myth and religion. . . . To compare, for example, the essential traits of plants with those of animals, or living kinds with mechanical devices, appears to violate categorical constraints on common sense. . . . Violating these fundamental ontological divisions of the everyday world creates phenomenally impossible situations. But the invocation of such phenomenal impossibilities in science is not an open invitation to phenomenal reconstrual of an imaginary world that is forever empirically impossible. Rather, it is a directive to make hitherto independent and only partially understood properties of these categorically distinct subjects mutually, and precisely, intelligible . . . [despite the fact] that both science and symbolism initially speculate about the possible relations between *counterintuitive* phenomena. (Atran 1986, pp. 161–63; cf. Atran 1990, pp. 218–22)

Pascal Boyer, who pioneered the first full-fledged theoretical account of religious cognition (Boyer 1994), acknowledges how his own original notion of *minimal counterintuition* builds from these notions:

> A metamorphosis between two different categories requires suspending the causal expectations that accompany both ontological domains. As a result, the range of inferences that can be entertained about the object concerned is not restricted enough to make the imaginary entity the object of precise scenarios. This illustrates a more general point made by Atran, on the basis of the connection between folk biology and animal "symbolism": "Only to the degree . . . that impossible worlds remain bridged to the everyday world can information about them be stored and evoked in plausible grades" (Atran 1990, p. 220). (Boyer 1994, pp. 122–23)

Boyer (2003) also uses the term *counterfactual* with regard to religious beliefs much as we do:

> A good deal of spontaneous reflection in humans focuses on past or future interaction and on counterfactual scenarios. This capacity to run "off-line" social interaction is already present in young children. Thinking about supernatural agents certainly activates such off-line capacities.

Barrett and **Rottschaefer** restrict "counterfactual" to its narrow sense in the philosophy of science as being contrary to actual facts in this world but not in another (nomologically) possible world. They ignore that in common English (and philosophy) *counterfactual* has the broad sense of "contrary to actual or possible fact." Religious notions, say, of afterlife, typically involve broad and narrow counterfactuals.[2]

The critique of our use of *category mistake* as "lacking truth conditions" follows in the same vein. From Aristotle and Kant to Gilbert Ryle and A. J. Ayer, a category mistake has been taken to occur when someone applies a concept that violates the necessary conditions of its application. Statements containing category mistakes lack truth conditions in that they can say nothing true or false. They are literally meaningless. Violations of necessary conditions may

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involve rupturing the logical, or *analytic,* structure of conceptual definitions (e.g., "the bachelor is married"), or sundering the synthetic a priori structure that the mind imposes on understanding the world (e.g., "the dead are resurrected"). Religious belief may involve both violations (e.g., "the dead are alive"),[3] but we are most concerned with misapplication of concepts outside the commonsense ontological domain, or *category,* to which they meaningfully apply.

R1.2.

Kelemen believes we may be rashly generalizing the idea of counterintuitiveness, from areas where there is much agreement in cognitive and developmental psychology about *mental modules* responsible for innate ontology (folkpsychology and folkphysics), to where there is little agreement (folkbiology).

Response. There is much debate about the precise scope and limits of the basic conceptual domains that comprise intuitive ontology; however, a cursory glance over the field reveals hundreds of articles and books that credit the plausibility of a core domain of folkbiology (for review, see Medin & Atran 2004). There is no doubt that application of counterintuitiveness to religious ideas was originally inspired in large part by considering categorical violations of universal folkbiology.

R1.3.

Wright argues we take too narrow and "rationalist" a view of religion as counterintuitive, which restricts "definition of faith to virtually one of superstition." Religious cognitions cannot be "counterintuitive" because religion is a communicative act of commitment that involves risk and sacrifice which is obviously real and, therefore, intuitive.

Response. We agree that religion critically involves communicative acts involving real risk and sacrifice. The efficacy of such acts depends crucially upon the counterintuitive framework in which they are embedded. This peculiar metarepresentational framing, which cannot logically or empirically fix content and interpretation, makes possible an "openly imagined goal of faith" (as **Wright** puts it). It allows people to communicate trust through promissory commitments that require real sacrifices (i.e., without regard to the risks inherent in an uncertain future). We take on "The Mickey Mouse Problem" (see note 1) precisely because we *do not* think that religion boils down to counterintuitive "superstitition."

R2. Modular memory and other constraints on the cultural propagation of religious beliefs

R2.1.

Barrett and **Kelemen** raise concerns about the ecological validity (naturalness) of our measures for assessing the cultural selection of supernatural beliefs.

Response. In our experiments, we operationalized minimal counterintuitiveness as the transfer of a property associated with the core conceptual domains of folkphysics, folkbiology, folkpsychology, from an appropriate ontological category of person, animal, plant, substance, to an inappropriate one (see Table 1 in the target article). For example, a "wise mountain" transfers a folkpsychological property (wisdom) from its proper category (person) to an improper category (substance). **Barrett** finds this problematic, without saying how counterintuitiveness can be measured independent of category-level violations.




Figure R1. Relationship between frequency of counterintuitive elements in a tale and the cultural success of the tale.

Two independent lines of evidence bolster the case that our operationalization of counterintuitive beliefs captures the core definition of supernaturals in cultural narratives and religions. First, in a recent study, we had 44 Canadian students (of various religious backgrounds) rate the degree to which intuitive and minimally counterintuitive beliefs are supernatural (on a 6-point scale). Counterintuitive items were considered more supernatural than intuitive ones, $t(43) = 14.71$, $p < .001$ ($M = 1.83$ vs. $M = 4.39$). Bizarre but intuitive items were deemed intermediate on supernaturalness ($M = 3.53$). Independent judges, who were blind to the purpose of the experiments reviewed in the target article, agreed with our operationalization of counterintuitiveness as a central aspect of supernaturalness.

Second, in a study conducted with Jay Faulkner and Mark Schaller (Norenzayan et al. 2005), we analyzed folktales possessing many of the counterintuitive aspects of religious stories. We examined (1) the cognitive structure of Grimm Brothers' folktales and (2) the relative cultural success of each tale. Two trained raters, unaware of our hypotheses, read each tale and counted the number of coun-

Table R1. *Mean ratings on psychological variables, as a function of whether a folktale is minimally counterintuitive*

	Minimally Counterintuitive			
	Yes	No	*t*	*p*
Memorability	4.89	4.37	2.42	.02
Understandability	6.24	5.74	3.19	.003
Ease of Transmission	5.46	5.02	2.02	.05
Interest-Value	5.03	4.83	0.97	.34
Transmission to Peers	2.80	2.68	0.80	.43
Transmission to Children	4.05	3.81	0.95	.35
Communicability (Rank)	3.27	3.71	1.58	.12
Moral Lesson	4.59	4.43	0.50	.62

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terintuitive elements in each based on the specific criteria discussed in this article. We measured cultural success in two ways. The number of hits for each of 42 folktales was calculated using the search engine Google, as well as cultural familiarity ratings by university students. In addition, 65 university students read these folktales and rated them on a number of characteristics, including memorability and ease of transmission.

The hypothesized nonlinear relation between the frequency of counterintuitive elements and cultural success was confirmed (Fig. R1). Variability within the successful sample ($sd = 1.65$) was lower than within the unsuccessful sample ($sd = 2.19$), $F(1, 20) = 3.92$, $p = .05$. Among culturally unsuccessful tales, the distribution is relatively flat, and there is no single modal number of counterintuitive elements. In contrast, among culturally successful tales, there is a clear mode: The majority of these tales had a counterintuitive score between 2 and 3, inclusive. Using this range (2–3) to define a set of minimally counterintuitive folktales, it is revealed that 76.5% of minimally counterintuitive tales are in the culturally successful sample. Among stories with fewer counterintuitive elements (scores < 2), only 30% are in the culturally successful sample. Among stories with excessive numbers of counterintuitive elements (scores > 3), only 33% are in the culturally successful sample.

Table R1 summarizes mean ratings of memorability and other psychological variables. Minimally counterintuitive folktales were considered more memorable than folktales containing either too few or too many counterintuitive elements ($p = .02$). Minimally counterintuitive folktales were also rated easier to understand ($p = .003$) and transmit ($p = .05$). Although the two sample distributions clearly differed in terms of counterintuitive elements, investigation of bizarre elements revealed no apparent differences.

Thus, while results indicate that cultural success is a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped function of the number of counterintuitive elements, success is not predicted by unusual narrative elements more broadly. These findings support our idea that the cognitive analysis of counterintuitiveness captures fundamental features of supernatural beliefs found in naturally occurring cultural narratives and is directly tied to memorability and cultural survival.

R2.2.

Schaller emphasizes the dual role of communication and cognition in the emergence of culture.

Response. **Schaller** rightly points out that constraints on communication have unintended but far-reaching consequences for the propagation of religious beliefs. Understanding the ways by which some ideas but not others achieve a cultural-level distribution involves investigating several sorts of partially interrelated psychological constraints, including memory requirements, modular processing demands, and conformity to social interaction schema, such as dispositions to build social stereotypes (Hirschfeld 1996; Schaller et al. 2002) and preferred mating strategies (Kenrick et al. 2003).

R2.3.

Kirkpatrick argues that our account is "only the first step toward the much larger theory required to explain religion." He suggests that "the main" factor in explaining religion – "and individual and cultural differences therein" – concerns the realm of social interactions, including "attachment, social exchange, coalitional psychology, status and dominance, and kinship."

Response. In our evolutionary landscape of naturally selected "mountain ridges" that canalize human thoughts and experiences into religious beliefs and practices, we included the ridge of *emotions* and the ridge of *social interactions* in addition to the ridge of "conceptual modules" that is responsible for intuitive ontology. In our target article we could only touch upon the details involved with each ridge, and the candidate concerns that **Kirkpatrick** evokes appear reasonable (for details, see Atran 2002a, Ch. 5). Our perspective clearly overlaps with Kirkpatrick's; however, our framework diverges from his in de-emphasizing the central role that he gives to "attachment theory," in explaining religion (note 9 in the target article; Atran 2002a, sect. 3.7).

R3. Memes and religion

Nicastro argues that our experimental findings on memory and counterintuitiveness are compatible with a memetic account of religion. Moreover, a memetic account is as "mindful" as our "black box" explanation involving dubious notions of cognitive modularity and domain specificity.

Response. Few, if any researchers, restrict the term "modularity" to perceptual input as described by Fodor (1983) (for reviews, see Barkow et al. 1992; Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994; Medin & Atran 2004; Pinker 1997; Sperber et al. 1995). **Nicastro**'s characterization of folkbiology, folkphysics, and folkpsychology as "impenetrable" Fodorian modules that "occupy a similar status in cognitive science as 'instinct' used to in ethology" is therefore beside the point. Scores of experimental studies now invoke and test claims about conceptual modularity in developmental and cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology.

The argument for conceptual modules – as in the case of folkbiology – involves converging evidence from a number of venues: functional design, ethology (homology), universality, precocity of acquisition, independence from perceptual experience, selective cerebral impairment, resistance to inhibition (hyperactivity), and facilitation of cultural transmission. None of these criteria may be necessary, but presence of all or some is compelling, if not conclusive (for a fuller discussion of criteria for modularity, see Atran 2001a; Hirschfeld & Gelman 1994; for a review of converging empirical evidence in the case of folkbiology, see Medin & Atran 2004).

In contrast, there is little theoretical analysis or experimental study of memes. This is not surprising because there is no consensual – or even coherent – notion of what a meme is or could be (Atran 2001b). Derived from the Greek root *mimeme,* with allusions to memory and mime (and the French word *même,* "same"), a meme supposedly replicates from mind to mind in ways analogous to how genes replicate from body to body. Candidate memes include a word, sentence, thought, belief, melody, scientific theory, equation, philosophical puzzle, religious ritual, political ideology, agricultural practice, fashion, dance, poem, and recipe for a meal; or a set of instructions for origami, table manners, court etiquette, a car, building, computers, or cellphones (Blackmore 1999; Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1995).

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For genes, there is an operational definition: DNA-encoded units of information that dependably survive reproductive division, that is, meiosis (although crossover can occur anywhere along a strand of DNA, whether at the divisions of functionally defined genes or within them). In genetic propagation, information is transmitted with an extremely high degree of fidelity. In cultural propagation, imitation is the exception, not the rule; the typical pattern is of recurrent, guided transformation. Modular mental structures thus play a central role in stabilizing and directing the transmission of beliefs towards points of convergence, or cultural attractors (Sperber 1996).

Minds structure certain communicable aspects of the ideas produced, and these communicable aspects generally trigger or elicit ideas in other minds through inference (to relatively rich structures generated from often low-fidelity input) and not by high-fidelity replication or imitation. Communication of religious beliefs bears this out. For example, in one set of classroom experiments, we asked students to write down the meanings of three of the Ten Commandments: (1) Thou Shall Not Bow Down Before False Idols; (2) Remember the Sabbath; (3) Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother. Despite the students' own expectations of consensus, interpretations of the commandments showed wide ranges of variation, with little evidence of consensus. A student project by Amol Amladi aimed to show that members of the same church have some normative notion of the Ten Commandments, that is, some minimal stability of content that could serve for memetic selection. Twenty-three members of a Bible class at a local Pentecostal Church, including the church pastor, were asked to define the three Commandments above, as well as "Thou shalt not kill," "The Golden Rule," "Lamb of God," and "Why did Jesus die?" Only the last two elicited some degree of consensus. It is an open question whether cultural consensus would be obtained for other congregations, despite claims by **Hogan** and others that "all moralities have approximately the same content (e.g., the Ten Commandments)" (cf. Schlesinger 1999).

In another student project, Sara Konrath compared interpretations of cultural sayings (e.g., "Let a thousand flowers bloom") among 26 control subjects and 32 autistic subjects from Michigan. The autistic subjects were significantly more likely to closely paraphrase and repeat content from the original statement (e.g., "Don't cut flowers before they bloom"). Controls were more likely to infer a wider range of cultural meanings with little replicated content (e.g., "Go with the flow," "Everyone should have equal opportunity") – a finding consistent with previous results from East Asians (who were familiar with "Let a thousand flowers bloom" as Mao's credo; Atran 2001b). Only the autistic subjects, who lack inferential capacity normally associated with Theory of Mind (ToM), came close to being "meme machines." They may be excellent replicators of literal meaning, but they are poor transmitters of cultural meaning (see the discussion of autistics failing to understand the Eucharist, sect. 6, para. 2 in the target article).

With some exceptions, ideas do not reproduce or replicate in minds in the same way that genes replicate in DNA. They do not generally spread from mind to mind by imitation. It is biologically prepared, culturally enhanced, richly structured minds that generate and transform recurrent convergent ideas from often fragmentary and highly variable input (Norenzayan & Atran 2004).

R4. Why religion is not likely to be an adaptation

R4.1.

Landau, **Greenberg**, **& Solomon** (**Landau et al**.) wish to argue that belief in supernatural agents is an adaptation for terror management. They dispute the implication of our experiments that supernatural beliefs are a buffer against existential concerns, functionally distinct from worldview defense.

Response. **Landau et al**. are not clear whether they mean religious belief is literally an adaptation – a genetically transmitted trait that has conferred a reproductive advantage to ancestral humans, such as the visual system, sexual desire, and possibly mind reading (biological adaptation) – or the distinct claim that religion serves psychological functions (not biological adaptation). We agree with **Kirkpatrick**'s notion of why adaptationist arguments for religion falter. Such arguments need to: (1) rule out that the phenomenon is a cultural by-product of other adaptations; (2) show that it has the telltale features of a naturally selected mechanism, such as a compelling adaptive function *in ancestral environments,* unitary and complex design, efficiency, precision, specificity, economy, and reliability (cf. Williams 1966).

Experiments reported in the target article showed that among predominantly Christian participants, mortality awareness, relative to control, led to (1) stronger belief in Buddha (a culturally alien deity of a world religion), (2) stronger belief in shamanic spirits (culturally alien deities of an obscure religion), and (3) contrary to **Landau et al**.'s assertion, these effects were moderated by participants' religious identification in a direction *contrary* to that predicted by narrowly sectarian worldview-defense: those who identified more with their religion (none were Buddhists or shamanists) were *more* likely to believe in a culturally alien Buddha or shamanic spirits under mortality salience conditions (see Norenzayan & Hansen 2005). In the control conditions, the correlations between religious identification and belief in culturally alien supernatural agents were no different from zero. Perhaps participants were favoring a nondenominational, all encompassing "religious worldview" endorsing equally the religious beliefs of outgroups as much as those of the ingroup. This is a viable possibility that remains to be explored in more detail.

These effects did not emerge for self-avowed atheists. Although atheists under mortality salience did not show stronger supernatural belief, neither did they derogate supernatural beliefs (in defending an atheistic worldview). Atheists may have access to alternative, nonsupernatural terror management mechanisms, an idea requiring further investigation. In brief, the evidence suggests that, at least among believers, religious belief and cultural identification with the ingroup converge, but are possibly distinct mechanisms (see, for example Solomon et al. 1991).

R4.2.

Sosis & Alcorta also claim religion is an adaptation that regulates social interaction and promulgates social cohesion. They think we underplay the functional and adaptive value of religion by overlooking "conditionally associated neuroendocrine responses" in ritual display.

Response. **Sosis & Alcorta** observe that critical nuclei and cortices in the brain, such as the amygdala and hypothala-

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mus, interact "to generate the affect, cognition, and somatic states of religious belief and practice." But these same nuclei and cortices also routinely interact to generate the affect, cognition, and somatic states of mundane beliefs and practices. They are also involved in singular experiences such as posttraumatic stress disorder. No readily identifiable sequence of neuron firings marks religion.

Sosis & Alcorta's studies of costly signaling in ritual – including neurophysiological aspects – make noteworthy contributions to commitment theories of religion. Nevertheless, their invoking of "adaptation" produces no new finding or surprising insight, and the underlying reasoning seems questionable (i.e., religion enables social cohesion; social cohesion is adaptive; therefore religion is adaptive).

We do not reject "adaptationism" as a research strategy that may potentially prod important scientific discoveries about thought and behavior. Elsewhere, we argue that it can be an insightful research heuristic for designing tests to decide between competing theories (Atran, in press). But we also find that invoking adaptation in ancestral environments (or EEA; see also **Fabrega**) is often unjustified, unnecessary, and rarely predicts panhuman aspects of cognition and culture. Given the "family resemblance" character of religion across individuals and cultures (see **Sperber**), and lack of a well-circumscribed and replicable structure or structural core, the prima facie case for religion as an adaptation seems implausible.

R4.3.

Bering & Shackelford propose that the tendency to infer agentic intent in natural events might have served an ancestrally adaptive function.

Response. We argued that supernatural agent beliefs that anchor religions are promiscuous overextensions to novel domains of the naturally selected proclivity for an oversensitive agency-detection mechanism. (**Ketelaar**'s speculations about the relation between predator images in horror movies and religion are plausible extensions of this line of reasoning.) Although the adaptationist argument for agency detection is grounded in sound theoretical and empirical literature, there is no independent case for any *exapted* adaptive function for supernatural beliefs. Experiments that **Bering & Shackelford** describe tell us something important: that preschoolers refrain from cheating in the perceived presence of a supernatural agent illustrates the important causal role that supernatural agent beliefs play in maintaining the moral order from a very young age. These findings, though, are consistent with explanations that do not invoke adaptationist reasoning at the level of religious beliefs.

R4.4.

According to **Knight**, behavioral ecology can "account for the cognitive peculiarities of religious belief." The functional efficacy of God concepts depends upon contractual relationships that uphold the institutional authority of God – something that imaginary and fantastical beliefs could not do alone. He argues that our framework neglects religion in small-scale hunter-gather societies, and that our "mentalist perspective" discourages empirical research on the evolutionary origins of the utilitarian functions and signaling displays that underlie religion.

Response. **Knight** rightly insists that the perspective of behavioral ecology is crucial to understanding religion. But he provides no more evidence (or argument) that behavioral ecology can account for the cognitive "design features" of religion that we discuss (e.g., the peculiar counterintuitive properties of supernatural agents), than that behavioral ecology can account (as many of its proponents believe it can) for the design features of human language (e.g., syntactic features). At best, it may help to show that a given feature has behavioral correlates that convey some selective advantage to that feature over competing features. Nothing in our account precludes "empirical research on fossils, artefacts, genes, and climates" as these relate to religious beliefs and practices. A previous review of available evidence (Atran 2002a) suggests that expanding hominid camp size may have been an important factor motivating the commitment to non-kin that characterizes all religions (cf. Alexander 1979), and that spatial distance and ecological range may be crucial to understanding differences in ritual forms among religions (cf. Whitehouse 2000). Nevertheless, these and other factors noted by **Knight**, as important as they are to any general account of religion, may have only limited value for understanding the peculiar cognitive, social, and emotional processes responsible for religious emergence and recurrence across human cultures.

Knight's points are well taken about the importance of contractual relationships in upholding deity concepts, and about hunter-gatherer societies often reversing the dominance relations that prevail in larger-scale societies (chieftainships, states, and other "kleptocratic" societies; see Diamond 1997). These points we also make elsewhere (Atran 2002a, sect. 5.5). We do not favor consideration of large-scale over small-scale societies. Neither do we say, or imply, that belief in supernatural agency alone forestalls moral defection – that's the whole point of "The Mickey Mouse Problem" (see note 1). Elsewhere (Atran 2002a, sects. 5.6–5.8), we discuss the evolutionary rationality of extravagant displays of self-sacrifice, love, and vengeance as they relate to religion (in ancient Judea, colonial India, the Solomon Islands, contemporary Middle East, Central Asia, United States), including how kinship structures differentially constrain such displays for men and women (e.g., in Arab societies).

Arational aspects of devotional values. Commitment theorists, including political scientists, acknowledge the role of religious values in coordinating groups for economic, social, and political activities, and in providing people with immunity that goes with action in large numbers (Schelling 1963). Religious commitment, by establishing trust, can reduce "transaction costs" in group mobilization (Fukuyama 1995; Hardin 1995). But this does not explain why *religious* motivation, as opposed to other forms of social mobilization, is historically the most enduring, and cross-culturally the most recurrent, facilitator of trust.

All commitment theories of religion rely (implicitly or explicitly) on standard models of utility and rational choice. Roughly, rational decision making employs cost-benefit calculations regarding goals, and entails abandoning or adjusting goals if the costs of realizing them are too high. But religiously driven behavior is often motivated independently of its prospect of success. High-cost personal sacrifices to (non-kin) others in society are typically motivated by, and framed in terms of, religious values.

Post hoc explanations of religious sentiments (as in ji-

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hadist martyrs dying to kill for non-kin) can no doubt be rendered in terms of utility-maximization (under psychologically and culturally appropriate contextualization of preferences and utilities). But such maneuvers do little real explanatory work. They also fail to capture cognitive peculiarities in decisions involving religious values, which may not be very sensitive to certain "framing effects," free-riding, or to calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity or to tradeoffs. For example, in nonreligious contexts people tend to be worried more about warding off loss than about seeking gain (e.g. loss aversion; Tversky & Kahneman 1981). But in religious martyrdom, death is life bursting into eternal bloom (Atran 2003; as it was also for the Japanese Kamikaze, see Ohnuki-Tierney 2002). For the martyr, often it matters not that others will reap the rewards of his sacrifice. Neither may it matter for the jihadist martyr if he kills thousands of foes or no one but himself (Atran 2004a; 2004b). For example, Atran asked would-be martyrs questions of the sort, "Is a person more deserving if he kills one rather than ten of the enemy, or ten rather than a hundred?" All responded that it wouldn't matter if the martyr killed no one but himself, or all the enemy. He also asked: "What if your father was dying and your mother found out your plans and asked you to delay until the family could get back on its feet?" All answered that there is duty to family and duty to God but duty to God cannot be postponed, even for a minute (reported in Begley 2004).

These aspects of religious or "devotional" values raise a host of theoretical and empirical issues that require a research program in their own right. Devotional values encompass aspects of what political scientists (Varshney 2003; Weber 1978), anthropologists (Durkheim 1912/1995; Rappaport 1999) and psychologists (Baron & Spranca 1997; Fiske & Tetlock 1997) call noninstrumental, sacred or protected values. But the different interests and methods of these disciplines produce accounts of devotional values that do not always overlap, especially as they relate to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents who master existential anxieties. We believe that our framework can provide such a focus.

R5. Are we functionalist and reductionist? Costly commitment to the supernatural

R5.1.

Rottschaefer criticizes our "speculative cost/benefit estimate" for religion as unsupported.

Response. We did not provide experimental evidence that religion carries sacrifice, that is, hard-to-fake costly commitment. Nevertheless, anthropological evidence for costly sacrifice is overwhelming, even if many reports are anecdotal. Summing up the anthropological literature, Raymond Firth (1963, pp. 13–16) concludes "sacrifice is giving something up at a cost. . . . 'Afford it or not,' the attitude seems to be."

There can't be individual fitness advantages of the sort that part-for-whole sacrifice among animals may convey (Burkert 1996), given that the probability of certifiably obtaining the desired outcome, such as a rewarding afterlife or freedom from catastrophe, ranges between zero and chance. For a bear to sacrifice its paw in a bear trap by gnawing it off, a lizard to leave behind its tail for a predator, or a bee to die by stinging an intruder to save the hive, seem reasonable tradeoffs for survival. Yet, what could be the calculated gain from:

Years of toil to build gigantic structures that house only dead bones (Egyptian, Mesoamerican, and Cambodian pyramids)?

Giving up one's sheep (Hebrews) or camels (Bedouin) or cows (Nuer of Sudan) or chickens (Highland Maya) or pigs (Melanesian tribes, Ancient Greeks), or buffaloes (South Indian tribes)?

Dispatching wives when husbands die (Hindus, Inca, Solomon Islanders)?

Slaying one's own healthy and desired offspring (the first born of Phoenicia and Carthage, Pawnee and Iroquois maidens, Inca and Postclassic Maya boys and girls, children of South India's tribal Lambadi, adolescents in contemporary satanic cults)?

Chopping off a finger for dead warriors or relatives (Dani of New Guinea, Crow and other American Plains Indians)?

Burning your house and all other possessions for a family member drowned, crushed by a tree, or killed by a tiger (Nāga tribes of Assam)?

Knocking out one's own teeth (Australian aboriginals)?

Making elaborate but evanescent sand designs (Navajo, northern tribes of Central Australia)?

Giving up one's life to keep Fridays (Muslims) or Saturdays (Jews) or Sundays (Christians) holy?

Or from just stopping whatever one is doing to murmur often incomprehensible words while gesticulating several times a day?

As Bill Gates aptly surmised: "Just in terms of allocation of time resources, religion is not very efficient. There's a lot more I could be doing on a Sunday morning" (cited in Keillor 1999).

R5.2.

Qirko argues, as does **Martin**, that costly commitment to religion is overstated. Believers often are not sacrificing, "but simply (and rationally) exchanging goods or labor for desired services" (Qirko). Religious specialists typically make greater sacrifices than non-specialists, but even specialists (e.g., celibate priests) may gain more than they sacrifice (by advancing the fortunes and inclusive fitness of their genetic kin). Other forms of apparent sacrifice (e.g., martyrdom) may simply involve cultural manipulation and perversion of adaptive behaviors (e.g., creating fictive kinship among "brothers" of non-kin). Cooperation often benefits average individual interests in the long run and does not require costly commitments.

Response. As indicated in response to **Rottschaefer**, on balance the anthropological evidence seems to favor a net cost over benefit in sacrificial displays (see Evans-Pritchard 1940, on the limits to which the Nuer of Sudan allow rational calculations of exchange and redistribution to enter into sacrificial displays). Many examples of celibacy may fit inclusive fitness models, but not all (only children also become Hindu Sadhus, Lamist monks and even Catholic priests and nuns). Fictive kinship, like ethnic mobilization, may indeed involve manipulations of the sort that **Qirko** suggests. We do not believe that religious sacrifice endures only if it benefits those who make the sacrifice. The actual sacrifices of some individuals may be co-opted as sacrificial

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displays that enhance the prestige and power of others. For example, Atran (2003a; 2004a) describes how, like good advertisers, the charismatic leaders of martyr-sponsoring organizations turn a recruit's ordinary desires for family and religion into cravings for what they're pitching, to the benefit of the manipulating organization rather than the individual being manipulated (much as the pornography industry turns universal and innate desires for sexual mates into lust for paper or electronic images to ends that reduce personal fitness but benefit the manipulators). Finally, much of the cooperation that benefits individuals does not involve costly sacrifice in the long term; however, trust in promissory commitments to an uncertain future (of the kind that religions typically sanctify) usually do.

R5.3.

Martin also chides us for reverting to functionalist arguments that we seem to criticize. The resolution of existentialist anxieties, such afterlife as a solution to death anxiety, seems to be largely absent from Hellenic religion (and Judaism, see **Cohen**, **Rozin**, **& Keltner** [**Cohen et al**.]). Morality also does not appear to have been a preoccupation of ancient Greek religion.

Response. "Rationalist" schools of the Greece and Roman played down concern with death and afterlife. Epicurus and Lucretius argued that people shouldn't fear death – nor, therefore, invoke gods for help – because death is simply nonexistence: If people aren't worried by the fact that they didn't exist for some indeterminate time in the past, there is no reason to be worried about not existing for some indeterminate time in the future. Such views had no popular appeal. There's a lot more anxiety about losing what one has, especially one's own life or that of someone dear, than of never having something (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). The manner (Paradise and Hell, reincarnation, transmigration of souls, etc.), importance, and richness of an afterlife may vary greatly across religious traditions. But most people hope, and in all societies there is institutionalized belief, that death doesn't end existence.

In a similar vein, it would be misleading to suggest that religion in the secular United States and France was not concerned with a personal God who dealt with human existential anxieties just because Thomas Jefferson and the Jacobins championed a "lazy" divinity who, having set the world in motion, refrains from interfering in human affairs. Most people want personal solutions to personal problems, which Jefferson's Unitarian God and the French Revolution's deity could not provide.

Greco-Roman law and governance, unlike Hebrew or Islamic law and governance, were not dominated by religion and belief in supernatural authority (until Constantine); however, **Martin**'s claim about the divorce between Greek religion and morality is puzzling. Greek (and Roman) religious mythology and theater offer a running commentary on the moral shortcomings of mortals and gods, and of the transcendent necessity for upholding a rigid moral order by self-punishment of transgressions (i.e., costly sacrifice), even if violations of that order are unintentional and beyond individual control (e.g., Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia in the *Iliad*, the self-blinding of *Oedipus Rex*).

Our critique of "functionalism" does not entail that religion lacks social purpose. It is rather that religion may serve many different and even contrary purposes (e.g., as Karl Marx's opiate of the masses or as Benjamin Franklin's incitement to rebellion against tyranny). *Morality* and *existential anxiety* represent broad clusters of ever-pressing human concerns that logical and factual reasoning alone cannot adequately cope with. There appears to be significant convergence and recurrence in the choice and interrelation of functional elements within and between these broad clusters across religious traditions. But there seems to be no determinate relation of cause and effect between functional categories, much less one that is evolutionary, prescribed by natural selection as an adaptation.

R5.4.

Pyysiäinen also argues that we espouse an overly functionalist account of religion. Religion persists not because it is costly, but because, once it is around, it may be too costly to eliminate. He sees little clinical support for the "tentative suggestion" in Atran (2002a, p. 169) that "the more traditionally and continuously religious the person, the less likely to suffer anxiety and depression in the long run."

Response. **Pyysiäinen**'s speculation runs counter to anthropological evidence, including the substantial body of data produced by commitment theorists of religion. Secularist intellectual and political movements tried to do away with religion, often at enormous costs in lives (e.g., French Revolution, Spanish Civil War, Stalinist and Maoist communism), but they failed in the long run. Evangelical Christianity is the fastest growing major religious movement in the world, followed by militant Islam. Adherence to evangelical movements typically requires a considerable material outlay (up to 30% of family holdings among Latin America's poor), whereas adherence to militant Islam often requires willingness to fight outnumbered and die in jihad. We grant that rejecting religion (like opting out of a marriage) can be sometimes more costly than upholding it because of the ensuing disturbance to one's societal relationships; however, this cannot explain how costly commitments to religion (or marriage) ever arose to begin with – or why people will die to defend Mary's virginity but not Minnie Mouse's.

According to **Pyysiäinen**, "many extensive literature reviews have shown that results from studies on religion and mental health are mixed and even contradictory." Yet, the citation from Atran (2002a, p. 169) concludes a literature review showing mixed and even contradictory results for conversion studies. The passage cited refers only to anxiety and depression studies among regular churchgoers and to elderly populations, and not to health and well-being generally or among converts. In the target article, we simply point out that our account does not preclude religious contributions to health and well-being.

R5.5.

Glassman argues that our "severely reductionist" account of religion unjustifiably excludes the possibility that theistic beliefs – to the extent that they do not conform to mundane ontological intuitions – can have ontological significance in their own right.

Response. **Glassman** offers no way of testing his specula-

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tion about the role of working memory, only unconstrained analogies with "neural synchrony" and how humans "are always grasping for meanings." Our empirically testable notion of counterintuitiveness does not foreclose the possibility that "religious beliefs comprise a set of *heuristics* for summarizing cultural accumulations of experience." In a decade-long study of the Lowland Maya that focused, in part, on the role of spiritual values in predicting short and long-term effects of agro-forestry practices and the relative distributions of tree species over informant parcels (Atran et al. 2002), we concluded that: "spirit preferences may represent a statistical summary of sustained human-species interactions over many generations" (Atran et al. 2004, p. 414).

R6. Is the supernatural necessary to religion?

R6.1.

Whitehouse objects to our claim that invoking supernatural agents create arational conditions for commitment. He does so on the grounds that ritual can lead to commitment without invoking the supernatural, while invoking the supernatural does not explain how consensus is achieved about the "truth" that the supernatural is supposed to represent.

Response. We did not contend that invocation of the supernatural *causes* commitment, as **Whitehouse** implies, or that commitment cannot occur without invoking the supernatural. Rather, we argued that, all things being equal, sincere and costly commitment to a factually contradictory supernatural world tends to foster, in others, the most enduring form of trust that the believer's interests extend to the community and are not primarily self-centered. Max Weber (1946) put it this way:

> On a long railroad journey through what was then Indian territory, the author, sitting next to a traveling salesman of "undertaker's hardware" . . . casually mentioned the still impressively strong church-mindedness. Thereupon the salesman remarked, "Sir . . . if I saw a farmer or a businessman not belonging to any church at all, I wouldn't trust him with fifty cents. Why pay me, if he doesn't believe in anything?"

Unlike validation of ideologically driven commitments, which can involve logical and factual reasoning and possibly ritualization as well, supernatural beliefs can *only* be ritually validated. Of course, there can be ritualized commitment without the supernatural, but commitment to a supernatural world appears to be historically more robust and enduring than ideological commitment whether ritualized or not (for reasons given in the target article). Arational ideologies that invoke transcendent laws of history and human nature – such as communism, fascism, or market capitalism – also have quasi-agentive characteristics.

Whitehouse criticizes us for assuming but not explaining the ideological standardization of religious concepts. We do not assume standardization of content, and repeatedly point out that, in many instances, there is little consensus about conceptual content, whether in the "doctrinal" religions of large-scale societies or the "iconic" religions of small-scale societies. It is because stable consensus about religious content is rarely possible (given the intrinsic lack of logical and factual consistency in representations of the supernatural) that ritual coordination is required to produce a visceral, communal consensus. **Ainslie**'s proposal that social ritual also provides a common "model" for individuals to establish empathetic relations with supernatural agents seems right, if we consider the model to consist of variable, loosely-textured content bound by rigid, formulaic structures.

R6.2.

Stingl & Collier argue against "error theory" in moral philosophy, which holds that there are no objective moral properties. For them, moral beliefs are likely grounded in ancestral primate categories like "unjustifiable inequality" – categories as biologically real as "predator" or "prey." Religious beliefs, then, may reinforce phylogenetically based moral sentiments that have been destabilized but not destroyed by reflective (i.e., metarepresentational) capacities for doubt and deception.

Response. Unlike perceptually based beliefs (e.g., "the grass is green"), moral beliefs (e.g., "adultery is bad") lack clear physically grounded truth conditions. Humans respond to moral values *as if* they were objectively true in order to overcome doubt and deception regarding the imperative of moral goodness in cooperating. Unlike error theorists, we do not claim that this is a naturally selected response governed by some special psychological mechanism (moral faculty). Instead, we argue that by *parasitizing* an evolved capacity for metarepresentation – the very capacity that created moral doubt and deception – humans build counterintuitive worlds governed by supernaturally sanctioned moral values. Believing in these worlds resolves moral dilemmas that undermine social cooperation. **Stingl & Collier** accept the plausibility of this religious resolution to moral dilemmas without accepting that moral beliefs are completely arbitrary (shifting sand on the phylogenetic landscape). We are inclined to agree with Stingl & Collier that there may be some phylogenetic basis to moral judgment (see ongoing work by Marc Hauser), and that religion may sometimes reinforce more primitive and unreflective moral sentiments that could not otherwise withstand the threat of reflection and deception.

R6.3.

Rottschaefer argues that we fail to address differences between major religious traditions that involve supernatural agency (e.g., personal conceptions of the supernatural in the Abrahamic faiths) from those that do not (e.g., Buddhism, Taoism), between folk and disciplined (theological) epistemic assessments of religion, and between religious and scientific use of counterintuitions.

Response. Distinct religious traditions do indeed involve different conceptions of supernatural agency (e.g., along dimensions of predatory vs. protective, exaggeration or lack of human foibles, kinds and degrees of powers that transcend ordinary human abilities, etc.). No major religious traditions seem to lack personal conceptions of the divine (see experiments with Buddhists; Pyysiäinen 2003). Theological doctrine often differs from folk statements of religious belief, but the cognitive content appears to be much the same for theologians and non-theologians alike, regardless of religious tradition (as experiments among Christians and Hindus suggest; see Barrett 1998; Barrett & Keil 1996).

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Scientific theories and religious beliefs differ in their use of, and development from, counterintuitions (often initially involving the very same metaphors). We did not claim that scientific analogies must be "understood in literal (commonsense) terms" (**Rottschaefer**). Rather, science's "formative analogies . . . are used to show that familiar things belong to more extensive classes of objects and processes, which depend for their occurrence on more pervasive relational or structural properties that are not immediately obvious" (Atran 1990, p. 12). Religious beliefs do not constitute empirical "theories" in any substantive sense because of lack of: logical constraints, rules of correspondence between mental concepts and real-world referents, conditions for consistent empirical testing, stable criteria for developing and then deciding between competitive theories, requirements for reducing knowledge in pieces into integrated structures, consensus in expunging agency and moral motivation from explanation, and so on.

R7. A scientific account of religion need not be strictly positivist or severely reductionist

Hogan suggests we agree with his positivist view of religion (and magic) as a spontaneous and rash form of causal reasoning that more reflective reasoning (favored by science) strives to overcome and replace.

Response. Ever since Edward Gibbon, in the *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,* attributed the fall of Rome to the Christian infusion of religious obscurantism into rational forms of Roman law and governance (Gibbon 1789/1994), many, if not most, scientifically minded philosophers, historians, and scientists have adopted a positivist view of religion similar to **Hogan**'s (cf. Dawkins 1998; Diamond 1997; Horton 1967; Nielsen 1996; Popper 1950; Russell 1948). We don't.

A crucial difference between science and religion is that factual knowledge as such is *not* a principal aim of religious devotion, but plays only a supporting role. Only in the last decade has the Catholic Church reluctantly acknowledged the factual plausibility of Copernicus, Galileo, and Darwin (Geitner 1999). Earlier religious rejection of their theories stemmed from challenges posed to a cosmic order unifying the moral and material worlds. Separating out the core of the material world would be like draining the pond where a water lily grows. A long lag time was necessary to refurbish and remake the moral and material connections in such a way that would permit faith in a unified cosmology to survive.

Religion survives science as it does secular ideology not because it is older than, or more primitive than, science or secular reasoning, but because of what it affectively and collectively secures for people. Religion underpins the "organic solidarity" (Durkheim 1912/1995) that makes social life more than simply a contract among calculating individuals. It creates the arational conditions for devotion and sacrifice that enable people and societies to endure against even terrible odds.

In breaking one vicious cycle, however, religions almost invariably set in motion another. The more strongly individuals uphold group interests, the more they risk fighting the interests of other groups, as **Hogan** implies. The absolute moral value that religions attach to in-group interests practically guarantees that the ensuing conflict and competition between groups will be costly and interminable, and they will only be resolved in specific cases by banishment, annihilation, or assimilation of out-groups and their ideas. Nevertheless, proselytizing religions may also contain "humanist" elements – especially in early stages of expansion – that foster tolerance and openness (e.g., early Christianity and Buddhism). The dominance of "secular" ideologies stemming from the European Enlightenment have arguably lessened the compulsion for religious exclusion – not so much by dampening religious passion, as by transforming religious belonging from a mainly *ascriptive* to more *voluntary* forms of association and action.

R8. Has the essence of religion been overlooked? Dreaming, embodiment, and language

R8.1.

Bulkeley suggests more work on "extraordinary dimensions of religious experience," on cultural variation in religious experience, and on dreaming as "a primal wellspring of religion."

Response. We agree with each point. Elsewhere (Atran 2002a, sect. 3.1, part 3), we explore implications of dreaming in different religious traditions, and examples of extraordinary manifestations of religious experience (spirit possession, sudden conversion, revelation, trance, etc.), including comparisons with pathological expressions of the religious and mundane (epilepsy, schizophrenia, autism). In our society, relatively few individuals have emotionally arousing mystical experiences, although the overwhelming majority of individuals consider themselves religious believers. The neurophysiological bases that commit the bulk of humanity to the supernatural remain a complete mystery.

One aspect of dreaming that we do not discuss concerns the extraordinary playing out of intellectual and emotional conflicts that re-emerge in religious mythologies, part of what Joseph Campbell (1975) dubbed "the mythic image." One experiment worth pursuing might be a diary study to see if subjects report being more religious on days when they have vivid dreams.

R8.2.

Cornwell, **Barbey**, **& Simmons** (**Cornwell et al**.) maintain that the manner in which concepts are physically embodied helps to explain ordinary and extraordinary (e.g., supernatural) concepts.

Response. The claim that ideas are "highly constrained by the physical structure of the body and environment" (**Cornwell et al**.) is intriguing, but difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, sensorimotor interactions with the surrounding environment undoubtedly channel conceptual understanding: for example, Rosch's "basic-level" concepts for natural objects, like "chair" or "chicken," are not only concepts that children first learn and adults most readily use; people's sensorimotor interactions with the referents of such concepts also show high covariation (Rosch et al. 1976). On the other hand, the psychological factors involved in the fact that people tend to look up when they think of birds or gods, but down when they think of worms and devils, are insufficient to distinguish, say, birds from gods or worms from devils. These "embodiments" may facilitate, but are not necessary for, conceptual understanding (e.g., people can also look

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down and easily think of gods). An intriguing possibility is that embodiment principles may have special relevance to the way supernatural ideas elicit emotions and associated body states. Rituals often involve "performing embodiments that help drive people's cognitive systems into appropriate religious states" (Barsalou et al., in press): kneeling in prayer helps instill submissiveness to a religious idea, consuming the host in Mass helps convey incorporation of the Holy Spirit within. Associated motor performances may enhance memory for religious ideas, as may the highly circumscribed physical settings that "situate" cognitions within a vivid field of memorable loci. Finally, the multi-modal states that rituals elicit may be later evoked and recombined in simulations interpreted as religious visions.

R8.3.

Fabrega claims we ignore the evolution of language, culture, and "especially self-awareness," and fail to clearly articulate the connection between modules and metarepresentation, particularly in relation to emotional factors.

Response. We don't think language has any special role in generating religious ideas beyond its role in facilitating conceptual combination in mundane thinking. There is a strong, but not yet well-understood, relationship between language and Theory of Mind (ToM; e.g., in the recursion of sentences and propositional attitudes, that enables metarepresentation). From the perspective of conceptual modularity, the cognitive faculty for metarepresentation may have coevolved, or emerged as a by-product, of language or ToM (or both) to take, as input, the outputs of all other conceptual modules (Sperber 1994). We discuss the relationship of metarepresentation to self-awareness and emotion elsewhere (Atran 2002a, sect. 4.8).

R9. Is a pancultural theory of religion possible? How to better understand cultural variation

R9.1.

Cohen et al. argue that the specific cognitive contents, emotions, and social arrangements vary greatly across religious traditions. They advocate context-bound theories of religion that are grounded in specific cultural and historical circumstances.

Response. **Cohen et al**. are right. For example, the monotheistic religions may be unique in teaching that the commonalities between human behavior and society, on the one hand, and nature (the biological and physical environment), on the other hand, are not the principle guides to the world's moral order. Religious sentiments of "awe," fear, disgust, contempt, guilt, and the sublime – and their associations with natural forms, life stages and death – may be very different in monotheistic societies (where animals, for example, are simply to be used rather than negotiated with, or observed as objects of curiosity rather than deep insight into human character and the structure of the world). There are also profound differences between the Abrahamic religions – and even between different currents within these religions – as a result of historical and environmental contingencies. But we have elaborated our general framework precisely as a means to systematically understand human religious *variation.*

Both **Cohen et al**. and **Kirkpatrick** highlight cultural variability in the psychological processes motivating religious belief. We agree regarding the importance of individual and cultural variation in religion. It is important to understand, for example, why religion motivates some to become lifetime peace advocates and others to advocate terrorism or war (Atran 2003a; 2004a). One such investigation is being conducted regarding religiosity and cultural variation in levels of intolerance for religious others (Hansen & Norenzayan 2005). In two different cultural contexts (Canada and Malaysia) it is found that, controlling for ethnic background and other demographic variables, Chinese Buddhists express more social tolerance of religious outsiders than Chinese Christians. Importantly, this difference in tolerance is consistently mediated by measures of religious exclusivity (the belief that the in-group religion is the only true way of knowing the divine, anchoring the social cohesiveness of religion). These measures of exclusivity are distinct from measures of religious devotion (the strength of religious faith in a supernatural deity). The latter measures failed to explain cultural differences in tolerance. Other experimental work is investigating the ways some Protestant religions suppress processing of emotional cues in work contexts (Sanchez-Burks 2002). But **Cohen et al**. may be unduly pessimistic about the project of outlining a unifying framework of religion. Such a project also guides empirical investigation of ways in which historical contexts shape and sustain religious particulars.

R9.2.

Sperber argues that, from a cross-cultural perspective, "religion" shows only a family resemblance character. He implies that we take overattribution of agency as a defining condition of religion because that has been the prevailing historical bias in the anthropological study of religion since Tyler.

Response. We accept the cautionary note that religion is not a well-circumscribed thing but a fuzzily bounded network of interrelated phenomena. We do not think that there are intelligible "laws," "grammars," "codes," or fully integrated "systems" of religion.

We clearly don't take overattribution of agency as a sufficient condition of religion ("the Mickey Mouse Problem"), but we do consider it necessary to the extent that it involves attributions of counterintuitive ontologies. We do not think that the historical standpoint is simply a conventional bias. In all societies ever described, it appears that people do believe in agents unseen who have intentionally generated the world we see. In every society, people believe that ritual – conventional, formulaic sequences of behavior – can provoke spirits to renew or alter the world for the better and make clearer its meaning, like stage directors called upon to rerun, change, or improve a play. Our chosen conduit metaphor is of an evolutionary landscape that constrains (initially randomly) interacting humans, as they "walk" through life, onto converging life paths that involve cognitions of supernatural agents who deal with emotionally eruptive existential anxieties and regulate long-term social commitments. Within this framework, an explanatory account, or theory, of religion would build from the "bottom-up" in terms of the cognitive, emotional and social microprocesses that assemble interacting individuals into religious traditions.

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Our use of a working notion of "religion" that is to some extent consonant with traditional anthropology is not circular reasoning. As with Darwin's use of the commonsense notion of species, which first focused his attention, subsequent discoveries revealed only rough correspondence between the commonsense construct (species) and historically contingent patterns of evolution (more or less geographically isolated and interbreeding populations). Darwin continued to use a traditional circumscription of *species* (Wallace 1889, p. 1), while denying it any special ontological status or reality, using it only as a heuristic notion that could ground attention as diverse and often inconclusive scientific analyses advanced (Atran 1998). Likewise, our working characterization and account of "religion" may continue to help orient research, but should not be mistaken for a final point of reference and explanation. Nevertheless, we hope that this approach can eventually lead to a scientific account of systematic cognitive and behavioral processes across religions, much as there is now a scientific account of systematic organizational and behavioral processes across species.

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NOTES

1. The initial linking of cognitive and commitment theories of religion occurred subsequent to a *BBS* exchange between Atran (1998) and Boyer (1998a). Atran, following up on an earlier discussion with Norenzayan, argued that previous cognitivist accounts of religion by Boyer, Sperber, Atran, and others failed to explain why people make costly commitments to some counterintuitive beliefs (e.g., biblical stories of Moses and the talking bush, the resurrection of Jesus Christ) but not to others (e.g., cartoons of a talking mouse, science fiction "beamings"). The issue soon became known in cognitivist e-mail circles as "The Mickey Mouse Problem." It is this problem that motivated Atran to write *In Gods We Trust.*

2. According to Islamic tradition, Abu Hurayah and Abu Sa'eed reported that Muhammed said: "He who gets into Paradise . . . neither . . . will his clothes wear out [narrow counterfactual] nor will his youthfulness decline . . . there is everlasting life for you and no death [broad counterfactual]" ("Everlasting Life in Paradise," http://www.geocities.com/islaminme001/bi_elip.htm).

3. Religious debates often involve competing claims about the other side making a "category mistake":

> A category mistake arises from fallacious reasoning about different logical categories. For example, the question "What does blue smell like?" is a category mistake. . . . Blue belongs to the category of colors while odors belongs to the category of smells. . . . Again, the question, "To whom is the bachelor married?" is a nonsensical question, because it is a category mistake because a bachelor by definition does not belong to the category of married persons. Furthermore, it is logically fallacious to argue that: 1 side + 1 side + 1 side = 3 triangles. It is fallacious reasoning because a "side" and a "triangle" belong to different categories. The [question], "Who invented the Trinity?" . . . makes a fallacious category mistake. Basically, it asks (1 Father + 1 Son + 1 Holy Spirit = 1 person, God the What?). . . . So, the question is a nonsensical one. ("Trinity: Category Mistake," http://muhammadanism.org/Trinity/Trinity_Fallacy01.htm).

Accordingly, "Christians and Muslims cannot be both correct, because their positions are mutually contradictory . . . in this pursuit of truth" ("Muhammadanism," http://www.muhammadanism.org/; for a competing Christian view see, "Let us Learn Ministries," 2002, http://www.letusreason.org/Islam13.htm).

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Letters "a" and "r" appearing before authors' initials refer to target article and response respectively.

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