PARMENIDES

S. SCOLNICOV: *Plato's* Parmenides. Translated with an Introduction and Commentary. Pp. xii + 193, figs. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2003. Cased, US$49.95, £32.95. ISBN: 0-520-22403-5.

If a successful philosophical work requires its reader to think hard about difficult problems, then Plato's *Parmenides* is immensely successful. If a satisfying philosophical work also demonstrates the significance of these problems and provides their solutions, then it is not clear that the *Parmenides* is satisfying. In the first part of the dialogue, following a short introduction, Plato puts in the mouth of a young Socrates his own theory of separated forms and participation in them by separate sensible particulars, and then, through the character Parmenides, presents arguments against the details of that theory. Having apparently shown that Socrates' proposed theory is untenable, Parmenides claims that thought and discourse require the reality of Forms, and then provides an exercise that, supposedly, prepares the way for a revised account that avoids the problems of Part I. The structure and details of the arguments are complicated and, as is usually the case with Plato, the hard work of interpretation is left to the reader, who becomes a participant in the philosophical drama of the dialogue. In his new translation with introduction, commentary, and notes, Samuel Scolnicov aims to provide help to that reader. The introduction provides preliminary accounts with short discussions of basic notions, plus a set of outlines that provide a map to the arguments. In the notes and commentary, S. offers a clear and plausible interpretation of the dialogue as a whole.

S.'s view is that in the *Parmenides* Plato confronts us with aporia in Part I, while Part II explores hypotheses that could lead to euporia. S. takes Plato's use of hypotheses seriously and claims for his translation the virtue that it makes Plato's arguments 'more hypothetical and more subtly qualified' than other translations suggest (p. 40). Plato uses a method of hypothesis to show the conditions necessary for certain assumptions (for instance, that truth differs from falsity, p. 11). The arguments in the second part are to the principles, not from them: thus the importance of finding the 'unhypothetical beginning'. In the *Parmenides*, this method comes into play the second part. Part I poses an Eleatic dilemma. Only a single mode of being is possible (being *καθ' αὑτό*, 'in itself'). So, Socrates' response to Zeno can succeed only if either Forms and particulars are the same in type of being or completely separate types of entity. In either case, no participation (the crossing of boundaries from one type or kind of entity to another) is possible; thus the aporia (pp. 22–5 with pp. 55–73). If there is no participation, there can be no access to Forms, and so thought and discourse are impossible for mortals. Yet, even formulating this conclusion shows the pragmatic possibility of both. The arguments of Part II explore two hypotheses (the one is, the one is not) that show a way out. The conclusions are genuinely hypothetical and are not detachable from their premises without an unhypothesized principle. The eight arguments of the two hypotheses propose two modes of being, being *καθ' αὑτό* and being *πρὸς ἄλλο*. This distinction is now not that between senses of 'is', types of being, or degrees of reality; rather it is a differentiation between independent and dependent beings. The problem Plato faces is to show that a one can be a many through participation (which gives being *πρὸς ἄλλο*) while at the same time maintaining its independent

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being καθ' αὑτό.[1] The problem is inherited from the Eleatic claim that plurality is not possible. Plato's solution is to show the necessity of both unity and plurality: for the one that is, a one that participates in being (and in other forms) while being a whole of parts or aspects, is 'not put together from' those parts. Rather, its being is complex but 'holistic', unlike an utterly simple Parmenidean unity (p. 97). The Platonic account is given in the four positive arguments or movements (II, III, V, VII) of the second part, and contrasted with the Parmenidean account that appears in the negative arguments (I, IV, VI, VIII). S.'s analysis of the argument structure here seems right.

How does Plato argue for the claim that the one that is maintains two modes of being, being both καθ' αὑτό and πρὸς ἄλλο (through participation)? According to S. (pp. 26–27), he does not do so: 'this will not be derived, and no mechanism will be given for it'. Rather, the claim is fundamental to the anti-Eleatic hypotheses, and supported pragmatically by engagement in thought and discourse. According to S., the final paragraph of Part II (166c2–5) concludes that both modes of being are necessary for the possibility of meaningful thought and discourse (i.e. for forms), and that the being καθ' αὑτό of the One is the fundamental condition of anything else, thus providing a starting place in a manner similar to the positing of the *Good* of the *Republic*.

In the course of his commentary, S., as anyone who tackles the whole of the dialogue must, deals with the odd collection of characteristics that Plato discusses. He offers coherent and consistent accounts which are occasionally too brief. (The discussions of older/younger/the same age are sketchy, but imperfect treatment of these notorious arguments need not be held against S.). A more serious difficulty is the problem of participation in being. S. skirts the question of *what* a form (or anything, F) is καθ' αὑτό: it is what it is to be F, but he does not connect this with the one's relation to being. The one, for instance, is one in virtue of itself, but it also participates in being. These assertions are not fully explicated, other than S.'s claim that οὐσία is 'shorthand for whatever the one can . . . participate in' (p. 92 *et passim*). This is less than satisfying, especially given Plato's arguments about being and not-being at 162a4ff. S. adopts the traditional translation of 142c3, taking εἰ ἓν ἔν as 'if the one is one' rather than the intentionally odd 'if one one;' adding the 'is' under-stresses the contrast of that phrase with the εἰ ἓν ἔστιν of the end of that line (a foreshadowing of the Late Learners of the *Sophist*). I think that here Plato is marking participation in being as a necessary requirement for a one to be at all. We need not treat being as existence to make sense of Plato's claims here, but treating it merely as a placeholder is not the only alternative.[2]

S.'s analysis is subtle, weaving together Platonic explorations of the problems of one and many, being and not-being, and the logical conditions of ontology. All of this packed into 166 pages of text, including the translation, makes for complicated and compressed argument in some places. The prose is clear, if sometimes rather terse, and the translation literal yet readable. There have been several new translations with commentaries and interpretations of the *Parmenides* in the last decade and a half, and S.'s book is a welcome addition for those trying to understand a difficult dialogue. For

[1]For S., the subject in Part II is any 'one'; Plato is arguing at a high level of generality that encompasses both forms and particulars.

[2]For a different view of the rôle of participation in being in Plato's later works, published at the same time as S.'s, see A. Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics* (Princeton, 2003). Now that both Scolnicov's and Silverman's books are available, it would be good to have the comments of each on the other.

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the philosophical reader, S.'s interesting and rewarding book is quite successful even if, like the Platonic dialogue it treats, it is not completely satisfying.

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CLITOPHON

M. KREMER (ed.): *Plato's* Cleitophon. *On Socrates and the Modern Mind.* Pp. xii + 87. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Oxford: Lexington, 2004. Paper, £16.95. ISBN: 0-7391-0818-2.

Clitophon is gaining acceptance as an authentic dialogue of Plato's. The most authoritative voice on the dialogue, Simon Slings, states his hesitant faith in the dialogue's authenticity in *Plato: Clitophon* (Cambridge, 1999). This is a turnaround on the issue of authenticity from his 1981 doctoral thesis. J. A. Bailly's commentary, *Plato's Euthyphro and Clitophon* (Newburyport, MA, 2003), suggests by the title a belief in its authenticity that is at times belied by some comments he makes. Those who appear to have wavered regarding the status of the dialogue are Shorey, Taylor, and even Ficino. No one in the ancient tradition, with the possible exception of Xenophon, appears to have questioned the dialogue.

Mark Kremer's *Plato's Cleitophon. On Socrates and the Modern Mind* includes, along with his introduction, translation, and interpretive essay, three important articles from the 1980s that broke a relative silence concerning the dubious piece, and speak to its authenticity. Reproduced are Roochnik's 'The Riddle of the Cleitophon' (*Anc. Phil*. 4 [1984], 132–45), Orwin's revised version of 'The Case against Socrates' (*CJPS* 15/4 [1982], 741–53 and Blits' 'Socratic Teaching and Justice' (*Interpretation* 13 [1985], 321–33).

K.'s translation is literal and does not convey Clitophon's mastery of elenchus or rhetoric. The A, D, and F MSS of the dialogue all give *poreuomai* at 410c and only a later hand on the A MS (A^2) gives *poreusomai*, but Kremer translates 'I will go to Thrasymachus' without comment. Slings has pointed out that *poreusomai* is inept, suggesting that the reading should follow ADF. Gonzales' translation notes this and follows ADF, as does Orwin's. However, 'I will go to Thrasymachus' (A^2 = *poreusomai*) as opposed to 'I go to Thrasymachus' (ADF = *poreuomai*) lends itself to the idea that Clitophon is *threatening* to defect to Thrasymachus, where no such threat, but rather an explanation of a present state of affairs, occurs.

K.'s suggestion that we see the movement from Clitophon's abandonment of *techne* to support of logical positivism (Roochnik had called this radical relativism) is less convincing without the implications of A^2, namely that *Clitophon* precedes *Rep.* I and that Clitophon has defected to Thrasymachus by the time of *Rep.* I. K. dismisses Bruell's claim that we don't know the relative order of the dialogues, on the basis that K.'s ordering must be correct for K.'s argument to go through. There is an absence of a real attempt to address Slings's authoritative work on the dialogue; he is barely mentioned by K. (the other articles occurred long before Slings's latest position). Slings appears as an afterthought, dismissed by K. on the grounds that an appreciation of the meaning of the dialogue speaks more to its authenticity than philological assessment.

Roochnik's treatment of Clitophon as politically fickle (a thought that is also suggested by Nails in her recent *The People of Plato* [Indianapolis, 2002]) is forced

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