Seneca *Ep.* 90, he has to play down earlier Jewish evidence that the Jews had influenced Greeks—this, B.-S. contends, is not a claim about greater antiquity, but it is surely a claim about priority and that is what is important. Secondly, the evidence that B.-S. does use to illuminate the dispute stems from the first century A.D. (though strangely he often talks of first century B.C., e.g. pp. 59, 68, 76) and may reflect debate over Rome, in particular the Jewish handling of the imperial cult. Significantly, both the anti-Jewish writers cited, Apion and Chaeremon, are believed to have travelled as Alexandrian representatives on anti-Jewish embassies to Rome. Arguments that the Jews were not an ancient people but one which was a deviation from the Egyptians would undermine any claim to special treatment that the Jews may have had with regard to the cult of the emperor. Since Rome placed an especial emphasis on *mos maiorum*, those hostile to the Jews may have wished to draw to its attention Jewish disregard for their 'Egyptian' traditions and the Jews in turn would have stressed their antiquity. A political context may, therefore, have had as much influence on these arguments as a philosophical one.

In the second half of the book B.-S. argues that the theory of the recovery of ancient wisdom which originated in the Stoa came to have a fundamental impact on the development of Platonism in the early centuries A.D. For B.-S., Platonism is essentially 'the belief that Plato's philosophy was Dogmatic and authoritative' (p. 102). The authority of Plato derived, he suggests, from the belief that Plato had already done exactly what the Stoics proposed. Plato's writings were the result of his reconstruction of ancient wisdom; what the Platonist had to do was interpret those writings. This, argues B.-S., allows the Platonist to counter the arguments of the Sceptics (though here B.-S. may be over-estimating the importance of the Sceptics in this period). This strength gave the Platonists secure ground in their attacks on Christianity, but the attacks in turn shaped the character of Christian thought. Both Platonism and Christianity interestingly are schools of thought that look to texts for their authority.

This challenging book deserves to be read and pondered, not only by philosophers, Platonist or otherwise, but also by historians of religion. B.-S. may not have recovered the wisdom of the ancients, but he has surely provoked new ways of thinking about what we know.

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EROTIC ETHICS

G. V. NUSSBAUM, J. SIHVOLA (edd.): *The Sleep of Reason. Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Pp. viii + 457. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. Paper, US$26/£18.50. ISBN: 0-226-60915-4 (0-226-60914-6 hbk).

The contributors to this volume are as follows: David M. Halperin, Martha C. Nussbaum, Maarit Kaimio, Stephen Halliwell, David Leitao, A. W. Price, Juha Sihvola, Kenneth Dover, Eva Cantarella, J. Samuel Houser, David Konstan, Simon Goldhill, and Christopher A. Faraone.

This volume of fifteen essays grows out of a conference held at the Finnish Institute

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at Rome in 1997, bringing together an international group of philosophers, philologists, and historians with a common commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship and a focused interest in the ethical aspects of ancient thinking upon erotic experience. Nussbaum and Sihvola in their introduction remind us of a weakness that has characterized much scholarship on sexual ethics in ancient Greece and Rome—namely the lack of informed interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and classics. The potential for meaningful scholarly dialogue has been hindered by a tendency to isolate ancient philosophical arguments from the literary and cultural contexts that produced them, or to dislocate philosophical insights into erotic experience from their settings within broader philosophical traditions and systems—often articulating complex theories of mind, emotion, and ethics. For, while it may be 'next to impossible to understand what the philosophers are saying without extensive study of cultural paradigms, of a sort that requires familiarity with history, literature, and visual art' (p. 4), misunderstanding is also likely to arise from the analysis of select philosophical insights into ancient sexuality and erotic experience in isolation from their philosophical frames. The contributors to this collection go some way towards the redress of this situation.

As the title of this volume (taken from Foucault's 'Fantasia of the Library') suggests, Foucault's *History of Sexuality* provides a key intertext for several essays, and although conservative classicists may not necessarily agree that 'getting clear about what Foucault's claims were and what we should make of them is a major part of any recovery of ancient Greek and Roman debates about sexual ethics' (p. 13), this proves a productive starting point. The collection opens with two of its best essays, both concerned with issues of methodology as well as Foucault, and both previously published: Halperin's 'Forgetting Foucault', and Nussbaum's revised essay on 'Eros and Ethical Norms'. Halperin offers an elegant reassessment of Foucault's philosophical contribution to contemporary debates on erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Greece, challenging the widely held misreading of Foucault that the Greeks distinguished sexual acts rather than sexual actors. Nussbaum, also reassessing Foucault's legacy, traces a debate about the ethical status of passionate *eros* through Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus to the Stoics and Plutarch, arguing convincingly for the necessity of viewing these philosophers (and their thinking about sex) as engaged in a broader cultural debate concerning the ethical norms of kindness, egoism, and reciprocity.

The following chapters are organized (more or less) chronologically, moving forward from Nussbaum's study of visual culture in the early fifth century B.C.E. to trace a history of sexual ethics through to the second century C.E. First, Kaimio's essay offers some original insights into Greek views of sexuality and marriage, challenging the view that Greek philosophers were uninterested in the sexuality of women and privileged pederastic relationships in their analyses. She argues that the lexicon of terms associated with the marriage bed articulated in fifth-century tragedy elaborates a complex understanding of marital eroticism that informs the thinking of later Hellenistic and Roman philosophers. Similarly highlighting the significance of genre in a focused study of Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, Halliwell reminds us that analysis of sexual ethics in Old Comedy—a rich source of evidence for Greek sexual customs, norms, and language—must be alert to the properties and proprieties of the genre if it is to avoid generalization and misapprehension. Leitao also urges the philosophical scholar towards greater philological and historical vigilance, seeking to disprove the historical reality of the famous Sacred Band, an élite Theban corps of lovers

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mentioned in Plato's *Symposium*, through an outline of the emblematic and normative purposes to which the Band has been employed historically.

Next, addressing some of the claims raised in Nussbaum's earlier chapter, Price's essay offers a lucid analysis of the ethical connection between pederasty and pedagogy, considering the object of love in Plato (*Phaedrus* and *Symposium*) and the Stoics. In turn, building upon Price's earlier work, Sihvola bases his chapter upon a nicely nuanced reading and reconstruction of Aristotle's views on *eros*, arguing that Aristotle's *eros* is more passionate, intense, vulnerable, and exclusive than many commentators (including Price) allow.

One of the best (and briefest) self-contained pieces in the collection, Dover's chapter scrutinizes each word of the notorious fragment of Asclepiades that apparently attacks two women for homosexual activity and questions why female–female sexual relations should be vilified in Greek culture while male same-sex relations were valorized. Halperin's second contribution develops this debate, engaging Brooten's *Love Between Women* to argue that direct parallels between ancient and contemporary sexual categories—particularly the notion of 'ancient lesbianism'—are inappropriate and misleading.

Turning from ancient Greece to Republican Rome, Cantarella's essay re-considers an apparent case of Republican 'surrogate motherhood' (in which Cato 'lends' his wife Marcia to his friend Hortensius), and offers some fresh insights into the legal and ethical norms of the period. Nussbaum's second contribution offers a welcome and original re-evaluation and systemic philosophical analysis of two of Musonius Rufus' (Platonist, Stoic, Roman, and 'incomplete feminist') neglected works, detailing Musonius' place in a complex Platonic–Stoic philosophical tradition and his influential engagement in debates about female education and virtue in his contemporary Rome.

The remaining essays set out to consider erotic experience and sexual ethics in ancient Rome through more broadly focused philosophical and philological lenses. Houser's essay on Dio Chrysostom offers an ambitious study of Dio's ethical concerns on same-sex relationships, corroborating Foucault's general theories of ancient sexuality. Konstan's intelligent and wide-ranging discussion (taking in Homer and Euripides, Catullus and Lucian) focuses on ancient ideas of *philia*, considering friendship, reciprocity, and symmetry in erotic relations, both heterosexual and pederastic. Goldhill (in a shortened and refocused version of an earlier essay) deftly examines a range of philosophical and literary views of the erotic gaze as evidenced in the diverse works of novelists Achilles Tatius and Heliodorus, Christian thinkers Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian, and Jewish Platonist Philo, tracing a moral debate about the 'erotic eye' in the context of Stoic theories of knowledge and perception.

Finally, returning its focus to ancient Greece, the collection concludes with Faraone's detailed interrogation of papyrological, epigraphical, and archaeological evidence on ancient Greek love magic, arguing that this material may be seen to support a controversial view that the Greeks believed women to be capable of self-control and the pursuit of *philia*.

The collection closes with an appendix of 'major historical figures discussed', an index of modern names and subjects, and *index locorum*. Notes and bibliographical references follow individual chapters.

Greek philosophers, writers, and texts unavoidably dominate the collection as a whole, but the emphasis in some chapters upon a continuity of experience and thought between ancient Greece and Rome oversimplifies the complexity of Greek and Roman

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sexuality no less than Greek and Roman thinking about sex. Overall, however, the 'zealous erudition' demonstrated by contributors and the diverse internal dialogues and debates between essays reinforce the authority of this collection and its reasoning about erotic experience and sexual ethics in antiquity.

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MORAL CONFLICTS

N. WHITE: *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics*. Pp. xv + 369. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £35. ISBN: 0-19-825059-2.

The title is for once a meaningful indicator of content. White argues here, contrary to deeply entrenched interpretive canons, that pre-Hellenistic Greek moral thinkers neither assumed nor argued that happiness is the sole rational aim (eudaimonism) and that all genuine goods can be smoothly folded into a single happy life (harmonizing eudaimonism). In particular, they are argued to have been firmly conscious of the potential conflict, usually assumed to be endemic to modern, as opposed to ancient, moral thought, between individual happiness and morality, the agent's happiness and that of others.

The argument is thorough and painstaking, indeed sometimes painfully so; the pages are many, the print small, the necessary cross-references legion. In what follows I inevitably fail to trace every, or perhaps any, subtlety, and attempt only to raise some general questions about the shape of the whole.

We get, initially, several presumption-clearing chapters. First, true to the claim that the study of the history of philosophy ought to include the study of the historiography of philosophy, W. reviews the historical influences on current scholarly thinking about Greek ethics. This in and of itself makes the book valuable to serious students of the topic. It is here presumably meant to raise red flags about the extent to which, for example, the current leaning toward eudaimonistic interpretations is due to the continuing and insidious influence of Hegel. A chapter on imperatives is then intended to raise suspicions about the familiar claim that modern ethics is imperative in tone while ancient ethics is attractive. White wants to block an inference from the absence of imperatives to the absence of conflict by finding imperative formulations in Plato and Aristotle. This done, the fact remains, nevertheless, that, for the Greeks, the virtuous life is the life that is the fullest and most perfect expression of one's nature, rather than a repression or overcoming of one's nature or some part of it. Virtue is never opposed to happiness except perhaps in the attenuated sense in which political virtue can be seen as contributing less to happiness than intellectual virtue.

Finally, still in the presumption-clearing mode, there is a chapter questioning the claim that the ancient understanding of the *polis* makes the notion of any conflict between the agent and others nonsensical. White suggests here that because there is ample evidence of the capacity to recognize extra-*polis* norms and appeals, it cannot be assumed that there is any straightforward and unqualified identification of the self or one's good with the city or its good. That the classical conception of the *polis* involved essentially a notion of a common good in light of which individual good is to be defined no doubt got into the traditional story most directly (whether via Hegel or not) from Aristotle's remarks about the political nature of humans and his correlative claim that the happiness of the city is the most final of human goods. This certainly does not

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