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The Voluntary Sector's War on Poverty

ENABLE was our War on Poverty
—Ellen Manser, director, Project ENABLE[1]

In 1970, Elizabeth Wickenden, a longtime activist on behalf of public social provision and a broker between voluntary social welfare agencies and the federal government, despaired of a quiet revolution occurring in social service provision. "Virtually unchallenged and undebated," she observed, "the principle established with the first large-scale federal welfare program, the Federal Emergency Welfare Administration [*sic*], that public funds should only be expended by public agencies, was quietly repudiated."[2] Through a series of domestic initiatives, including the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965 and amendments to the Social Security Act in 1967, the federal government had begun to channel a significant amount of money through nongovernmental organizations. To older activists like Wickenden, who had fought hard to build the *public* infrastructure of the welfare state, such a trend was troubling, as it seemed to indicate a dwindling commitment to public social provision that had informed New Deal social policy.

This policy shift that Wickenden observed produced the contemporary nonprofit sector. While the nonprofit sector as a whole has drawn increasing attention from social scientists in the past two decades, most, with a few exceptions, deal with it after it had absorbed the public dollars made available in the 1960s and 1970s. The primary conclusions of these scholars have been twofold: first, to emphasize the interpenetration of the nonprofit and public sector, primarily through contracting arrangements; and second, to raise questions about the seeming loss of independence and identity by

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nonprofit agencies that deliver substantial amounts of public services.[3] There is relatively little examination of how voluntary agencies that predated this period surveyed the prospects of such funding, estimated its impact, or experienced this renewed, intimate contact with public policy. Nearly all of these issues presented themselves in the 1960s; what is remarkable is how little concern they appeared to have been both to the voluntary sector and public policymakers.

Historians of the welfare state in turn have devoted most of their attention to voluntarism prior to the New Deal and the expansion of public welfare functions thereafter—neglecting what one historian has characterized as the "symbiotic" relationship between the public sector and the nonprofit sector post–New Deal.[4] The experience of a voluntary sector that endured the Depression, made peace with (and even encouraged) the growth of public welfare during the New Deal and beyond, and then faced another shift in public policy that bore directly on their services in the 1960s has been obscured. For those interested in current questions bearing on the prospect of further expansion of public subsidy of private institutions, notably "faith-based" social service providers, this earlier history is noteworthy.

This article will argue that the creation of the nonprofit social service sector by the federal government was the culmination of a series of loosely related phenomena in both the public and voluntary sector that coalesced during the 1960s. One was the War on Poverty, which this article will focus on. There, new nonprofit organizations were seen as a way to circumvent established political system and social service networks that had not addressed the needs of the poor. Ironically, in spreading out money for the War on Poverty, poverty planners (much to the dismay of some) also found it necessary to fund older, voluntary agencies that were seen as part of the problem. In the wake of the War on Poverty, then, was left a new landscape of social service provision, with thousands of new nonprofits created by government action mixed in with an older voluntary sector whose relationship to the government had also been altered.

Exploring this episode will not only shed light on a key turning point in the relationship of the voluntary sector to the public sector, but it will also add a new dimension to our understanding of the long-range impact of the War on Poverty. The more mundane, but no less significant, legacy of the War on Poverty—its role in the transformation of social service delivery—had been obscured, in part because it is seen as the residue, and not the central goal, of anti-

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poverty policy in the 1960s. The initial focus of the literature on Community Action was on the influence of social scientists in designing the program, its radicalization in some cities, and the limits of the program as it ran into resistance from local political establishments. Recent scholarship on Community Action has directed our attention away from the question of whether the program solved poverty and to examine its success in the political inclusion of the impoverished.[5] Less well explored has been the reception and impact of Community Action, and the War on Poverty, on this particular set of institutions—the old-line voluntary sector—that, in the eyes of poverty warriors, needed to be made more attentive to the poor.[6]

On the voluntary side, the impetus to participate in the War on Poverty was driven by a mix of idealism, a desire to preserve a leadership role in social welfare issues, and a need to expand revenue streams. One high-profile effort was Project ENABLE, a project promoted to local Community Action agencies through the national Office of Economic Opportunity. This program, conceived by the Family Service Association of America, the Urban League, and the Child Study Association of America, aimed to forge the social work manpower of the first, the connections to minority communities of the second, and the parent-education expertise of the third into a tool to help parents in poor communities address problems in their families and their communities—a tool that would be funded by public money flowing from the OEO.

Seen from the perspective of nonprofit agencies, the War on Poverty was an important milestone in a gradual process of drawing the voluntary sector back toward public social service provision—a common policy during much of American history, but which had been displaced by the New Deal's focus on building public institutions. Here, as this article will show, the experience of Project ENABLE, while by no means uniformly positive, proved to the leadership of older voluntary agencies that mixing public money and private institutions did not necessarily threaten the voluntary character of their mission. Liberals within the voluntary sector embraced the opportunity to participate in the War on Poverty; administrators embraced the opportunity to add a revenue stream to an eroding philanthropic base. Nonetheless, the example of ENABLE foreshadowed problems that would characterize this "partnership in public service"—not simply the routine problems of meeting the bureaucratic requirements of government, but the broader problems of build-

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ing nonprofit programs around potentially unstable government programs, and the impact of public financing on the autonomy of voluntary institutions. In the late 1960s, with new sources of government subsidy opening every year, these issues did not prove to be strong deterrents to voluntary agencies, and led few to worry about the erosion of the public-private line the New Deal had emphasized.

The Critique of Voluntarism

While the War on Poverty, and particularly the Community Action Program, has been remembered as an attack on the bureaucracies and political structures that underserved the poor, it is less widely recalled that traditional, voluntary agencies were also a direct target of that critique. Richard Cloward's stance typified this outlook. Cloward, a professor at the Columbia University School of Social Work, had become increasingly convinced in the late 1950s that social welfare institutions, and the people who staffed them, were barriers, rather than aids, to the progress of poor people. In 1963, he singled out voluntary-sector "family service" agencies as examples of how the poor had been abandoned by the institutions intended to serve them. By the early 1960s, the functions of these agencies were centered primarily on counseling and other therapeutic services, and were staffed largely by professional social workers. This trend, Cloward argued, had produced "a general disengagement from the poor" by these agencies whose origins had been in serving the impoverished. By the 1960s, Cloward pointed out, most of those served by family agencies were lower middle class and were served with "service" rather than material assistance. The desire of professional social workers to work with less deprived people, the increased role of the state in social provision, and the cultural gap between middle-class social workers and the often minority poor all conspired to distance these voluntary agencies from those most in need.[7]

The Family Service Association of America agencies that Cloward attacked were important symbols of the social work establishment. The member agencies of the FSAA offered a range of services to their clients, usually organized around a core service of social casework, often taking the form of marital or parent-child counseling. There were roughly 300 FSAA-affiliated agencies in the early 1960s, employing only about 2,200 professional social workers, a drop in the bucket of the estimated 116,000 people classified as "social

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workers" in the United States. But FSAA agencies, despite their small numbers, were highly professionalized and were visible and prominent within social welfare circles—hence Cloward's specific critique of them. While only a quarter of all social workers in the country had a two-year MSW degree, 82 percent of family agency workers did. FSAA social workers comprised roughly 10 percent of the membership of the National Association of Social Workers. Moreover, the FSAA published the *Journal of Social Casework,* the leading professional journal for family caseworkers, and its model of social work professionalism remained ingrained in many schools of social work. In short, family service agencies were one of the pinnacles of professional practice in social work in the United States.[8]

The FSAA's history was as important as its contemporary functions were, for it also symbolized the shifting relationship between the state and the voluntary sector. Many local family service agencies had their roots in the Charity Organization Society movement of the late nineteenth century—an effort to rationalize charity and welfare in order to discourage "dependency" and contain the political use of public assistance in burgeoning industrial cities. These agencies disdained the public provision of monetary assistance to the poor, and often found themselves as prominent sources of "relief" in the early twentieth century. In many cities up through the 1920s, local governments subsidized them to provide monetary relief in times of financial stress in lieu of direct public welfare provision. The efforts of such voluntary agencies to stand in for public welfare reached their height in the early years of the Depression and had largely failed by 1931.[9]

In the Roosevelt administration, advocates of federal relief in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration explicitly repudiated the subsidy of private institutions, seeing them as a conservative effort to forestall the development of a public welfare system. Harry Hopkins's first order as director of FERA was to mandate that federal relief money be distributed by public institutions. Said Josephine Brown, a former FERA employee, "This policy was epoch-making in that it established once and for all a clean-cut principle and broad philosophy of governmental responsibility for relief."[10] In the wake of this policy (continued by the Bureau of Public Assistance), most voluntary agencies, glad to be relieved of the crushing burden of providing monetary aid, sought out different modes of service that capitalized on the skills of their increasingly professional staffs.[11]

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This division was never entirely fulfilled, particularly in child welfare. Public welfare proponents fought running battles with Catholic leaders from the enactment of the child welfare provisions of the Social Security Act onward over the role that private organizations would play in child care. Catholic political clout kept federal money out of urban children's services through the 1950s, and received copious public subsidies in several cities, notably New York, through the 1960s.[12] But for former Charity Organization Societies, Associated Charities, Family Welfare Associations (which, after the 1930s, moved toward the "Family Service" moniker in an effort to distinguish themselves from monetary relief and particularly public welfare), the division between a public sector that provided basic material assistance and a voluntary sector that focused on problems of emotional "adjustment" largely held for the two decades after the end of the Depression.

By the early 1960s, though, this alignment between public and private became destabilized by broader attacks on the social work "establishment," both private and public. President Kennedy had come to believe by 1963 that a broader effort was needed to address poverty than the modest welfare bills he had passed early in his administration. As numerous studies of the origins of the War on Poverty have shown, Kennedy's economic advisers began showing interest in the question of poverty in 1963, and saw it as a much larger and distinct problem from the issue of welfare. Moreover, as planning for a poverty program gained steam, key policymakers grew more and more exasperated with the social work and welfare establishment. On a national level, antipoverty proposals from federal departments seemed to play more to institutional habits of narrow, categorical programs rather than the broad-based, innovative attack the poverty task force sought. On a local level, they saw welfare bureaucracies as working against, rather than with, the poor. As Frank Mankewicz, a member of Kennedy's anti-poverty task force, recalled, "The institutions responsible for solving the problem were in large part responsible for the problem."[13]

The planners of the War on Poverty, and particularly the Community Action program, saw their efforts as a way to extend services into areas that had been neglected by both voluntary and public institutions. In this, they were influenced by the example of Mobilization for Youth, the antidelinquency project that Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin of Columbia University had headed since the late 1950s. Ohlin and Cloward's theory held that children in slum areas shared the

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same, normal aspirations as middle-class children, but as they became teenagers they found the normal pathways to upward mobility "blocked" by lack of opportunity. Delinquency was then an alternate path to fulfill those legitimate aspirations. The solution, embodied in MFY, was then to try to reorient the structures in which poor urban children lived in order to create more opportunity and reduce crime. Kennedy's Presidential Committee on Juvenile Delinquency embraced the theory. One of the implications of opportunity theory, wrote Sanford Kravitz, a committee member, would be to induce "change and adaptation in prevailing social services, and educational institutions, employment services, even political structures."[14] This outlook became the centerpiece of Community Action. In the hothouse atmosphere of the White House in late 1963 and early 1964, as Lyndon Johnson groped to make the antipoverty program a centerpiece of his administration, the juvenile delinquency planners were folded into the poverty program, and brought their desire to reorient local institutions, both public and voluntary, with them. Adam Yarmolinsky, chief of staff for the Kennedy poverty task force, anticipated that the key conflicts in the emerging community action program would be between "traditional charitable organizations" and newly created community action agencies.[15] Some key poverty warriors took an even dimmer view of the voluntary sector and its casework philosophy, "a big fraud," according to Richard Boone, one of the more radical members of the staff of the Office of Economic Opportunity.[16]

Faith in the voluntary sector was eroded in other quarters as well. A well-publicized study done by Robert Hamlin of Harvard's School of Public Health in 1961 specifically took voluntary agencies to task. Hamlin studied the financial practices of fifty-six national voluntary agencies such as the National Tuberculosis League, the National Foundation (formerly the anti-polio National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis), and other groups. In a stinging rebuke, Hamlin argued that these were not "self-contained little organizations" that voluntarism connoted. Rather, they were huge "public trusts" that consumed over half of the $292 million they raised on fund-raising, administration, and "educational purposes" often masquerading as fund-raising. Even local chapters, better monitored by their United Funds, were often utterly inefficient, expensive, and self-interested. Excoriating the agencies for investing more in self-perpetuation than in serving public interests, Hamlin called for a national commission to certify the accounting practices of volun-

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tary agencies. The major health charities, led by Basil O'Connor of the National Foundation, protested the Hamlin report, but it nonetheless bruised their image.[17] Casting voluntary agencies as lumbering, selfish bureaucracies rather than small-scale efforts of altruism, the Hamlin report helped undermine the credibility of those agencies.

Family Agencies, the State, and the Poor

The critique of voluntary agencies added fuel to a gradual reassessment of the relationship between voluntary social welfare organizations and the state, particularly in public welfare. Following the breakdown of many voluntary institutions during the early years of the Depression, most nonprofit agencies had come to terms with what Linton Swift, the director of the Family Welfare Association of America (the FSAA's predecessor), termed "New Alignments" between public and private agencies. That alignment presumed basic public responsibility for financial assistance while the voluntary sector focused on standard-setting, professional service, and experimentation with new programs. The embrace of this policy varied across types of agencies and within the family service movement itself. Catholic charities, for instance, with heavy brick-and-mortar investment in child-care institutions, tended to resist the expansion of public institutions but encouraged public subsidies of voluntary institutions. Jewish welfare organizations and "nonsectarian" groups such as the FSAA usually took stances in favor of higher standards of public assistance, for instance, and better training and staffing of public institutions, in order to wean clients away from seeking supplemental financial assistance from their agencies.[18]

In the 1960s, however, many within family agencies and other voluntary-sector institutions began to question their arm's-length relationship with public policy and public money. Two factors were most important in this reassessment: a desire by liberals in the voluntary sector to involve themselves more deeply and effectively with poorer people, particularly African Americans; and stagnating financial resources within the voluntary sector.

Critics within family service agencies had raised the question of the voluntary sector's commitment to the very poor even before Cloward had. Activists such as Sidney Hollander, a liberal philanthropist from Baltimore, had fought an often-lonely fight for private welfare organizations to take a more active advocacy role for im-

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proving public welfare in local communities and pushing for more expansive social legislation in Congress. But in the early 1960s, with a Democratic administration that promised new attention to social welfare, the leadership of top voluntary associations had "advocacy" on the tips of their tongues. Hollander wrote to Elizabeth Wickenden in 1961 after a convention of voluntary groups, "Everybody but everybody was urging social action; action by agencies, by boards, by staffs. It's now welfare's fair haired boy."[19]

Similarly, debates were mounting within family agencies about their commitment to hands-on work with the poor. One social worker deplored the inwardness of casework agencies and the "tremendously smug sense of satisfaction about things as they are in casework and a closed mind that refuses to inquire whether there are new ways to confront the problems we are attempting to slough off."[20] Agencies were genuinely divided over their responsibility to "the disorganized bottom layer of the central city," as one study described it. Some agencies saw it as central to their mission, while others thought public institutions, with vaster financial resources, were the logical place to deal comprehensively with the range of needs that such families presented. Social workers in all these agencies agreed that dealing with the poorest of the poor took an immense amount of time and resources. Some believed that the family agency's specialty was preventive work, and that such families were beyond their reach; others, who emphasized the ability of social casework to rehabilitate people, nonetheless felt that agencies needed to mix such difficult cases with more promising ones. As Dawson Bradshaw, the executive director of Family Service of St. Paul, Minnesota, observed, there was "uncertainty in our thinking whether we should invest our effort in the more hopeful cases with fewer problems, or in the messy cases."[21]

Part of the challenge for family agencies in urban areas was that these "hard to reach" clients were often minorities. In 1963, Whitney Young, the new head of the Urban League, addressed the Family Service Association of America's national convention and took it to task for not serving black families adequately. Young, an MSW himself, had done a community assessment of the social service needs of Roxbury, Boston, where 70 percent of Boston's African American population lived in 1960, and had criticized the decision of the local family service agency to close its branch office there.[22] Family agencies on the West Coast found themselves struggling to connect with African American clients through their traditional program of casework. An experimental program in San Diego tried to promote group

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discussion sessions around family issues in a poor black neighborhood but had great difficulty getting people to participate. The question of the division of caseloads between the "easily accessible" and the "difficult to engage but in need of treatment," the agency concluded, was "a question for resolution in the 1960s."[23]

A heightened sense of the urgency of racial issues in the 1960s and a genuine desire by some in the voluntary sector to involve themselves in dealing with poverty combined with a looming problem of financing for family agencies to increase their interest in public antipoverty policy. Private family service agencies depended almost exclusively on money raised by "federated financing," that is, what were known by the early 1960s as United Funds, the predecessor to the United Way. The median FSAA member agency received 85 percent of its income from a federated financing organization.[24] In the early 1960s, despite steady growth in the amount raised by federated financing, family agencies were feeling shortchanged and constrained by those funds. Competition within local funds from health-related fund-raising, such as the American Heart Association, had eroded the leading position family agencies had once enjoyed in local fund-raising. And while fund-raising had grown, its growth was relatively slow, and many agencies felt themselves "in a financial squeeze" as they tried to maintain salary levels in order to attract and keep professional workers. Nonprofit agencies that participated in federated funds were prohibited from conducting independent fund drives. In order to grow, or to create new programs, private agencies could look primarily to three outside sources: fee income from clients, foundation grants, or public funds. By the early 1960s, many agencies were looking with more interest at the public purse. Anthony DeMarinis, director of Family and Children's Service of St. Louis, told fellow agency executives in 1958 that "I think the position we have taken in regard to public monies is going to have to change." Smaller agencies in particular were reported to be "desperately struggling for funds" and more likely to embrace public financing.[25]

Moreover, one of the principal concerns about public funding of voluntary agencies—that it would undermine public programs, not vice versa—seemed to have softened by the early 1960s. Public assistance programs were well established, if not well funded or particularly popular, and dwarfed family agencies. While making clear that "public money should not be sought at the expense of public agency," the FSAA board decided that using government funds to

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set up new projects in its member agencies seemed acceptable. In a letter of support to the House of Representatives for the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, FSAA Executive Director Clark Blackburn endorsed the idea of limited purchase of service from private institutions, with safeguards to ensure that private agencies were not simply substituted in for public institutions.[26] By the early 1960s, both the national FSAA and numerous local organizations were experimenting with obtaining public funds from all levels of government, from selling "visiting homemaker" services to local public welfare agencies to applying to the National Institute for Mental Health for research grants.[27] In 1963 the FSAA created an Ad Hoc Committee on the Use of Public Funds to try to lay out policy guidelines for local agencies. Symbolically, at least, by 1963, because of the rediscovery of poverty and constraints on voluntary funding, family agencies were willing to reconsider the "New Alignments" between public and private wrought by the New Deal.

Voluntary Agencies and the Office of Economic Opportunity

Although liberals and leaders of the voluntary sector had begun to rethink their relationship to the public sector in the early 1960s, the War on Poverty itself caught them by surprise. Leaders of voluntary agencies realized that they had been sidelined by the War on Poverty as it began to unfold in early 1964. Elizabeth Wickenden wrote in February that "I am still uneasy about the poverty picture for a variety of reasons. . . . I suppose this whole thing will shake down in time and in the meantime I think it is just as well to let Sargent Shriver struggle with it." Grace Coy, a board member of the FSAA, reported to the board that according to her sources in Washington, the drafters of the Economic Opportunity Act wanted a "new broom to go in and do a new sweeping job." Private agencies such as FSAA members "were not held in high esteem." She urged getting in on planning as soon as possible so that the poverty program did not "go over our heads." Clark Blackburn went to Washington in April to meet with Shriver's deputies "in an attempt to get a clear picture of their thinking," and expressed particular concern about the community action program. Such distance was an abrupt shift from the FSAA leadership's relationship with Washington of just a few years earlier—both Wickenden and Blackburn had served on the Ad Hoc Committee on Public Welfare convened by Abraham

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Ribicoff, President Kennedy's Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, which had put the imprimatur of the voluntary sector and professional social work on the 1962 Public Welfare Amendments.[28] To have gone from acknowledged leaders in the field to the periphery, and possibly to be seen as the enemy, was bewildering.

This feeling of being marginalized, combined with a genuine desire to be part of the assault on poverty, and a cognizance of the coming wave of federal spending on poverty, motivated the FSAA leadership to try to insert themselves into the War on Poverty. The FSAA had recently completed a project (funded by the National Institute for Mental Health) with the Child Study Association of America to train FSAA caseworkers in group-discussion techniques for parent education. The program aimed to bolster family agencies' competency in "Family Life Education," an amorphous educational concept that had coalesced in the immediate post–World War II era. Most concretely, Family Life Education described any effort to convene groups of parents to discuss issues surrounding parent-child relationships. For the roughly one-third of FSAA agencies that used it as a program, Family Life Education was envisioned as a preventive technique to forestall family breakdown, and often advertised to Parent-Teacher Associations and similar groups. It was not universally popular among FSAA agencies; on the one hand, as Family Service of St. Paul argued to its United Fund in the late 1940s, it could be used as a "case finding" device to attract new groups to the agency. On the other hand, many caseworkers felt that the group-oriented discussion did not really draw on any of the counseling techniques they had been trained in, and was a distraction to their core mission of individual counseling.[29]

As the initial stages of local planning for the War on Poverty got under way in the fall of 1964, following the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act, Blackburn told his member agencies that it was time for them to try to think about new ways of reaching out to "sub-culture" groups they had avoided before, people whose "grinding poverty has reduced them to creatures able only to struggle for existence." When, by late 1964, few local agencies had taken Blackburn up on his charge, the national FSAA decided to take matters into its own hands and propose a national program based on its parent education project that could be delivered as a package to local agencies to propose to their community action agency. Such a top-down approach was not unusual in the OEO; most of the programs eventually run by local community action agencies were "na-

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tional emphasis programs" designed by or filtered through the OEO. But both the FSAA and the CSAA were perceived as white, middle-class organizations—two strikes against them at an OEO searching to empower the poor. The FSAA and the Child Study Association thus contacted the Urban League in early 1965 and proposed a joint-venture demonstration project to bring parent education groups to minority families with OEO funds. The Urban League, sharing a similar belief in upward mobility and the power of social work, agreed to the prospect, but on the condition that it would involve intensive work with actual families and not merely training for social workers.[30]

Initially, this new sort of public-private partnership seemed to strike a chord at the OEO. An exploratory meeting with Sanford Kravitz, who had moved from Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency to the OEO's research and demonstration office, presented this vision for the project: it would create a significant corps of people with specialized training who could help train other workers, particularly "indigenous" personnel, in these techniques; it would help clients take advantage of other opportunities opened up by the War on Poverty; and it would educate social work professionals about the problems of the poor from the mouths of the poor themselves. Kravitz encouraged the group and urged them to submit an application under the Economic Opportunity Act's section 207, which provided his office's funding. He told the group that the OEO was in need of sound community action projects, as most communities had not submitted plans and the fiscal year was drawing to a close.[31]

The give-and-take between the voluntary agencies and poverty planners gradually modified the proposed project. Over the next few months, the staffs of the three national agencies worked furiously to draft a proposal, traveling back and forth to Washington to consult with OEO officials, primarily Kravitz. The OEO staff urged them to increase the emphasis on "social action," that is, encouraging the clients of the program to take action to improve not only their interfamilial relationships but also community conditions. The official proposal, submitted in early May, framed the project as an effort to "motivate and encourage economically and socially disadvantaged families to participate more actively and more hopefully in productive demonstrations around their own individual, familial, and community goals." Group education, in short, would help disadvantaged families gain strength through discussion and encourage them to take action in their community. If chronic deprivation interfered with

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self-esteem, Project ENABLE (Education and Neighborhood Action for Better Living Environment) would help rebuild it.

Clients were not the only subjects of rehabilitation in Project ENABLE. The program was explicitly envisioned as an effort to demonstrate the relevance of the voluntary sector to the War on Poverty. Kravitz later recalled that the FSAA's attempt to reach out to poor black families was perceived at the OEO as a significant attempt by the voluntary organization to reorient itself.[32] The executives of the three national agencies saw it clearly as a means to show Washington that voluntary agencies have a "meaningful, essential contribution and stand ready to move in new directions." Acknowledging "certain apprehensions as to what the future of the voluntary organization was," the president of the FSAA's board urged his colleagues to endorse the ENABLE proposal to reach out to people "who are not now related in any way to our agencies."[33]

The proposal faced rough sailing at the Office of Economic Opportunity. Though Kravitz had been encouraging, Whitney Young, Clark Blackburn, and Carl Scott of the Child Study Association of America got a different reaction from two OEO representatives during a meeting at the National Conference of Social Work in Atlantic City in May 1965. The federal officials were blunt and hostile. They questioned the commitment of these "notoriously middle class organizations" to work with the poor, and suggested that ENABLE was "inappropriate, immaterial, incompetent, and impotent in the face of apathy, disorganization, or the fundamental problems of living in poverty." Basically, they told the stunned executives, the organizations had to show that their member agencies were sincere, and that the proposal was not simply the recycled programs of past years. Outraged, Young, Blackburn, and Scott nonetheless agreed to revise and resubmit.[34]

Their hopes built after a grueling series of meetings with OEO staff through the summer, but in early August the OEO said no. The three executives, angry at the rebuff, sent a telegram to Shriver to ask him to take immediate action on the issue, and the telegram resulted in a meeting at the OEO the next week with Richard Boone, Jules Sugarman, and Kravitz. As Kravitz recalled, Whitney Young's name and the Urban League's clout spurred Shriver to order his subordinates to work something out with the voluntary agencies.[35] With the assurances of the voluntary agencies that they would conduct a "bold experiment rather than a bland demonstration," the OEO agreed to fund the project for slightly less than $1 million for na-

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tional organization and training, and to recommend that local community action agencies fund the programs at a local level. Nonetheless, the OEO was slow getting notice about the program out to its regional offices, and many local agencies had not heard of ENABLE by the end of 1965. Finally, the presidents of the boards of the Urban League, the FSAA, and the CSAA asked for a meeting with Shriver in late December. The OEO director, already chastened by a year of controversial community action, apologized for internal problems at the agency, expressed his personal belief in ENABLE and voluntary agencies, and promised that his staff would turn up the heat on the regional organizations and some locals. Applications vetted by local community action agencies began filtering up to regional OEO offices in early 1966, and the program was firmly under way. Ultimately, fifty-nine projects were funded, thirty-two of them joint operations between local FSAA members and Urban League locals, twenty-one run only by family agencies, and six by Urban Leagues. Nonetheless, the experience of gaining funding, recalled Ellen Manser, the project director, "vividly demonstrated the hostile climate for established social agencies."[36]

Project ENABLE

In the brief survey that follows of this experiment in public subsidy of voluntary-sector antipoverty work, it is evident that Project ENABLE faced an uphill battle in establishing legitimacy and addressing the family issues of its poor clients. Many of ENABLE's failures were not attributable specifically to the project's use of established voluntary agencies; rather, of a piece with the War on Poverty as a whole, they resulted from unrealistic expectations of the unwieldy mix of social service and social action, as well as the supercharged racial atmosphere of 1966. But the experience of these local ENABLE programs reveals too that this new engagement in public antipoverty work was a strenuous challenge for these voluntary agencies, one that they met with limited success. Most notably, it required participating in a new style of institutional politicking with public authorities (in the form of community action agencies), reaching out to clients far more deprived than their traditional clientele, and using the training of their professional social workers not only to help clients understand their own problems, but to push them to take public action to address problems in their communities. It was,

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quite simply, a stretch—one seen as healthy by liberals within the voluntary sector, but as overreaching by others.

Obtaining funding for local ENABLE programs forced voluntary agencies to negotiate with a new set of funders. Family agencies were used to dealing with local planning and funding organizations such as Welfare Councils, Community Chests, and United Funds. In some localities, it was personnel from these preexisting social service infrastructures who played an important role in planning the local War on Poverty. In Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and Beaumont, Texas, the community action agency was housed in the same building as the local family service agency that sponsored ENABLE—hardly the reconfiguring of local power the planners had hoped for.[37]

In general, though, getting ENABLE approved locally meant dealing with the local community action agency, an entirely new, hybrid public-private organization—some of which had vocal representation from poor minority groups as a result of the "maximum feasible participation" clause of the Economic Opportunity Act. Most typically, the primary community action office in a given community was receptive to the ENABLE proposal, and helped the private agency shepherd the application through the steps to the regional office. In Baltimore, for example, the ENABLE team reported that the local community action agency worked very hard with the voluntary agencies to get funding approved.[38] Many community action agencies were still searching for programs that would bring quick, positive publicity and swell the rolls of people that they could claim to have reached. In cities such as Providence, Little Rock, and Omaha, where the program gained good press, ENABLE leaders complained that the community action agency tried to take credit for their accomplishments. Not all community action agencies cooperated with ENABLE. In St. Paul, the local community action office had its arm twisted by the regional OEO office in Chicago to fund ENABLE, and the community action agency thereafter subjected the voluntary organizations to low-level administrative harassment throughout the project. Stockton, California, reported "active community opposition" to the funding of ENABLE, primarily from several prominent community activists. In cities where the primary community action agency may have been friendly, relationships with branch offices in poor communities and local personnel often were not—battling not only over the intrusion of "middle class" organizations but also over control of the "indigenous" neighborhood workers trained by ENABLE. In Philadelphia, the tension went to the

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heart of the ENABLE program itself. Victoria Simms, a group discussion leader from the Urban League, who was also closely associated with the local community action agency, displayed "real cynicism" about the potential of the program and was finally let go by both ENABLE and the Urban League.[39]

The principal difficulty anticipated by most poverty planners was that these voluntary organizations would have problems reaching out to poor racial minorities. But the first racial challenges came from within the project itself. Each project had an executive, usually the Family Service executive, two half-time group leaders, and a full-time "community organizer," each working with an aide drawn from the local community. Usually the community organizer, who helped recruit members and who also coordinated social action, was an employee of the Urban League who was African American, though some Latino organizers were also employed. The group leaders, who ran the discussion groups, were often white caseworkers from the family agency, though a number of African American social workers from the League also ran groups. Among the professional staff, racial relationships ran the gamut. The African American and Mexican American staff worked closely and smoothly in Houston. In East Orange, New Jersey, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, the mixed black-white team worked well together and, administrators believed, was an important symbol to their communities. In the Bronx, however, a young Jewish woman (assigned from Jewish Family Service to be the group leader) was working with an African American man who was the community organizer. As the regional report delicately reported, "Teaming up white females with Negro males in predominantly Negro areas presented some concern in team relationships," and the woman soon resigned and was replaced by a married man from JFS who worked much better with the community organizer. In Baltimore, all possible schisms of race, class, and gender came to the fore in the team; the two group leaders, a "pushy" African American woman from the Urban League "with strong middle-class values which she seeks to impose on all Negroes" and a young white woman with very clear ideas on how the project should be run, butted heads with the young black man who was hired as the community organizer. Tensions mounted to the point where a fistfight broke out in the program's office.[40]

When the program did get under way, the parents who did eventually participate in ENABLE were, overall, a substantially poorer group than the average FSAA agency's clientele. These were groups

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largely alien to most family agencies, and sometimes even a stretch for the Urban League, and it was a struggle for program organizers to recruit participants. One of the more positive elements of the program was its use of community aides, generally middle-aged African American women without social work training, to aid in recruiting and organizing the groups. For those programs that enjoyed reasonable attendance, it was clearly because the aides gave them entrée and legitimacy into these communities where family agencies in particular had little established rapport. But, as Alan Matusow observed of "indigenous" personnel in the Community Action program in general, the people employed as ENABLE aides were not the most downtrodden and often were already upwardly mobile. In Tulsa, sniffed the consultant, the aides had "middle class stretch," as they identified more with workers than with clients. Many of the ENABLE aides aspired to do hands-on social work themselves rather than serve as adjuncts to the group leaders. In Salt Lake City, the aides were given a few articles on social casework and it raised their expectations "to be junior therapists," noted the regional consultant.[41]

Predictably, when faced with the task of recruiting, most of the community organizers turned to groups that were already organized. In communities where Head Start had begun, those parents were often the first recruited, and indeed, the program was promoted as a complement to Head Start. Church groups and neighborhood centers also were popular points of recruitment. As the Minneapolis program admitted, "these are not the unreached." A few programs did plow new ground. The isolated Mexican-American settlement of Montopolis on the outskirts of Austin, Texas, was one of the programs' success stories, where ENABLE helped residents lobby for water service and social services in their community. In places such as Austin, the ENABLE program was out ahead of the community action agency, which turned to ENABLE for recruits for its other programs. Some genuine grass-roots, door-to-door recruiting did take place in other cities, usually by the aides, whose role in recruitment was almost universally praised in those programs. This was sometimes less than it seemed, though. In Dallas, the regional consultant determined that the aides had simply recruited their small group of friends for the discussions. In other areas, such as Baltimore, door-to-door recruiting "has not had any magic effect in motivating people to attend the groups."[42]

It was a long hot summer for the ENABLE group leaders. Several, already attuned to read client resistance in terms of apathy,

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attributed low turnout to the weather. Where project leaders had hoped for groups of twenty, in Philadelphia the "summer heat" and lack of tangible benefits worked against participation and produced an irregular group of six to eight each session. In Chicago, in the midst of its 1966 riot, the program met outright hostility. The evaluator decided that "one has to question the effectiveness of this kind of program" in the two black housing projects where turnout averaged four per group. One group run by Jewish Family and Children's Services (an FSAA agency) in Pittsburgh garnered a dismal turnout of two people. Across the program, attendance fell below goals, but these large cities were at the low end. St. Paul, where the agency had run family life education classes in the neighborhood prior to ENABLE, attendance was quite good. In Newark, one of the Spanish-speaking aides did a remarkable job in recruiting and maintaining the Hispanic group. Omaha's aides targeted mothers receiving Aid to Dependent Children and did not hesitate to follow up repeatedly, building above-average attendance.[43]

As for the substance of the program, "improving family relations," the first goal of ENABLE and the heart of the voluntary agencies' expertise was virtually impossible to measure. Nonetheless, ENABLE's evaluators concluded that the program had "often very dramatic" effects on parents, though "they cannot be described quantitatively." Survey results suggested that parents felt more ability to control aspects of their children's behavior and were able to see the child as an individual, though there was less change in attitude toward spouses. The program also claimed some success in more "realistic" expectations of children by educating about stages of child development. Moreover, simply providing a forum to discuss common problems seemed to have been appreciated. In New Orleans, a glowing report described the initial "prevailing mood of hopelessness in these parents. They felt if they had no money to give their families, they had nothing to give. As the group meetings progressed and they identified concerns common to all parents, rich or poor, such as setting limits, teaching self-responsibility, assigning chores, their mood changed to one of hope." However, in places like San Diego (once again), group leaders steeped in casework with better-off clients were overwhelmed by the problems of their group and uncomfortable with the group method as a technique.[44]

The projects' second goal, "social action," is more amenable to evaluation. A handful of ENABLE groups (almost always identified as "mothers") mobilized to demand improvements in their treatment

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by welfare and housing agencies. Cloward might have been pleased to learn that the leader of the Bedford-Stuyvesant chapter of ENABLE led a discussion of Cloward's articles on welfare rights organizing, and integrated her group into the welfare rights protests that spread across the city in the summer of 1966. The Omaha group formed "Mothers for Adequate Welfare," which started a letter-writing campaign for higher welfare allowances, and met with state legislators and the governor. The Newark group went to the state legislature in Trenton as part of a delegation to ask for higher benefits. In Boston, the Roxbury group organized a consumer-education group that led to an organized boycott of an exploitative local grocer.[45]

But in most areas, social action was interpreted narrowly and apolitically, often with the urging of the sponsoring agencies, as effecting some small, concrete change in the immediate range of neighborhood services. Half of the groups focused on improving recreational opportunities, often building or restoring a local playground. Others sought improvements in lighting or safety in their housing projects. The executive of the Lancaster agency discouraged the staff from activity in areas "where there was little hope for any accomplishment" and urged them to focus on recreation. In Beaumont, the executive did not want to "rock the boat" and the African American group leader was conscious of his position as a "Negro in a small southern community" and was reluctant to be seen as an agitator. Moreover, ENABLE efforts at social action often conflicted with local community action agencies, which were also searching out ways to implement community change. In New Orleans, the local community action agency specifically prohibited ENABLE from conducting such efforts and pushed the program into "consumer education."[46] While the drawing together of impoverished parents by these voluntary agencies may have indeed had some intangible benefits, it did little to chip away at the basic conditions of poverty.

The End of ENABLE

Public funding through Project ENABLE had thus presented a host of problems to voluntary agencies: conflict with community action agencies, racial tensions among staffers, recalcitrant clients, lack of tangible results, and techniques that went against the professional training of many on agency staffs. But despite the fact that ENABLE was rarely implemented as smoothly and successfully as the planners

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would have liked, the national staff broadcast a message of optimism to agencies in the fall. OEO officials were much friendlier and receptive to the program than they had been a year before, the second round of groups in many cities had increased in attendance (in part, it appears, by recycling many members of the first groups), some of the worst personnel issues had been solved, and another sixty family agencies had expressed some interest in starting a program for 1967. However, project director Manser noted also the "lively debate about the total poverty program" in Congress during the summer of 1966. The Community Action Program had been rife with controversy nearly from the moment it was implemented. Protests from big-city mayors over deliberate circumvention of their authority helped rein in some of the more radical members of the national Community Action staff. The research and demonstration programs of the national office, through which the training program and national staff of ENABLE were funded, came under particular fire, and its appropriation was in question. As a result, OEO had no answer for ENABLE and other programs seeking reauthorization for 1967. National staff members began leaving to return to their parent organizations. In early December, Congress announced that it had drastically cut the budget for research and demonstration for the OEO and had earmarked many of the funds going to local organizations. On both fronts, ENABLE found itself frozen out, save for a grant of $97,486 to finish up the research aspects of the project "in a professional manner."[47]

As the consulting company contracted to analyze ENABLE observed, the OEO considered the FSAA, the Child Study Association of America, and the Urban League to be "middle-class people" and the poverty agency hoped the program would result in permanent changes in the policies of such agencies—to orient them more to the poor—and asked the consulting company to specifically evaluate this question.[48] On that front, ENABLE was ultimately disappointing. In Minneapolis, the gap between caseworker and clients remained. "The conditions under which these parents grew up and in which they now live make it exceedingly difficult for the leader to give the kind of help she is accustomed to give," the program reported. More traditional and conservative agencies, even within those willing to experiment with new techniques in ENABLE, found little to recommend it. The head of Sunbeam Family Service in Oklahoma City, Udell LaVictoire (who was described by a regional consultant as having "a great deal of faith in the power structure at

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the top"), was not impressed by the experiment. He wrote Manser that he "wasn't exactly heartbroken" by the dim prospect of reauthorization, though he felt that with more stress on individual rather than group service the program could be more effective. In general, though, he deplored the fact that the OEO wanted to avoid "anything smacking of social work and social service," and concluded that "our poverty war has too much of the wrong kind of armament." LaVictoire's position was harsher than most, as the follow-up study done on attitudes of agency executives noted a generally favorable opinion of their ENABLE experiment. However, little concrete change in the day-to-day operations of the agencies seemed evident once federal funds had dried up—perhaps not surprising due to the program's brief run and experimental status.[49]

On the other hand, there was, as with many demonstration projects, an *esprit de corps* among the national staff and often among local staffs as well, particularly in "successful" communities such as Little Rock and Austin. The dedication of social workers and the aides they recruited in some cities is clearly evident, and whatever modest gains came from ENABLE were, inevitably, rooted in the ability of its workers to make the program flexible and adaptable to local situations and the clients they dealt with. Repeatedly, the professionals found themselves surprised by the potential they encountered in the people with whom they worked, both aides and discussion group members. A discussion among Midwestern ENABLE programs agreed, "There are more 'healthy' people in any community than the agencies realized." Manser, in her final report on the project, remarked on the "unexpected strength, talent, and enthusiasm" of the parents.[50] By using public funds to reach out to clients they had avoided before, ENABLE, briefly, did seem to expand the horizons of some of the personnel in the agencies that participated.

On its face, ENABLE could hardly be seen as a model of voluntary delivery of public social services. Blackburn of the FSAA was still furious over the treatment of ENABLE by the OEO, writing to Shriver in 1967 of his "strong feeling that agencies eager to support the War on Poverty are being rebuffed." But most of the problems with ENABLE, from the point of view of the FSAA, were ascribed to the particular circumstances of the OEO, and not public contracting in general. Indeed, the ENABLE experiment did little to discourage FSAA agencies from pursuing public funds. The FSAA board of directors concluded in 1967 that public funds were not a threat to their autonomy, with the appropriate safeguards, and started

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to plan other programs out of the national office to avail themselves of public monies to reach out to new clients.[51]

The FSAA board's sanguine attitude toward public funding was undoubtedly influenced by the prospect of its increase. Despite ENABLE's death amid the politics of community action, other federal initiatives indicated that the experimentation with public purchase of voluntary services was rapidly becoming policy, even within community action. Some community action agencies turned to family agencies for their traditional casework services (undoubtedly much to Richard Boone's dismay). In Pittsburgh, a city considered at the outset by Sargent Shriver as a model OEO program, local authorities chose to use established agencies to serve new populations rather than create a parallel system of institutions. Jewish Family and Children's Service, an FSAA affiliate in Pittsburgh, supplied the local community action agency with casework services (while at the same time JFCS was running its unsuccessful ENABLE program). Similarly, in New Orleans, the Family Service Agency ran both an ENABLE program and sold casework services to an OEO-funded community center in the impoverished Irish Channel neighborhood. Family and Child Services of Washington, D.C., contracted with the United Planning Organization, the local community action agency, to provide "intensive social services" in six neighborhood centers across the city.[52]

Other voluntary agencies participated in the War on Poverty even more aggressively. Perhaps most visibly, settlement houses with voluntary legacies reaching back to the Progressive Era eagerly sought War on Poverty funds. Poverty activists, including Richard Cloward, had been as critical of settlement houses as they had of family agencies. However, many OEO programs, such as Head Start, paralleled previous settlement-house programs, and the physical location of settlement houses in poor neighborhoods made settlements attractive to local poverty planners eager to get programs up and running. Very rapidly, many settlement houses expanded staffs to run new federal programs. Hull House, Jane Addams's pioneer settlement, received $1 million in OEO funds in 1965 and added 140 staff members. "It was kind of a joke among us," said one OEO evaluator, "that the War on Poverty revived the settlement houses."[53] Other traditional voluntary agencies also became intertwined with the War on Poverty. The Catholic Church became a major recipient of antipoverty funds and was deeply involved in community action programs.

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Planned Parenthood of America agencies would deliver a substantial portion of the OEO's family planning services.[54]

As the ideological resistance within the OEO to the use of voluntary agencies was diminishing, the practice was becoming quickly embedded in other policy arenas. The 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act were publicly associated with "workfare" requirements for some welfare recipients, but among its other provisions included language allowing public welfare agencies to use federal dollars to purchase social services from other institutions, including the voluntary sector. As Martha Derthick has shown, the purchase of service provision, combined with the lack of a cap on federal spending, helped fuel the dramatic expansion of federal social service spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The voluntary sector was a major beneficiary of this expansion, with not only service providers but voluntary fund-raisers such as the United Way collaborating with local public welfare officials to maximize their take of federal money. Between the OEO and the 1967 amendments, the funding mix for voluntary agencies by the early 1970s took on an increasingly public character. Family service agencies, with their mix of middle-class and poorer clientele, showed a modest but significant increase in public financing; FSAA agencies received 13.8 percent of its funds from public agencies in 1967, and 23 percent by 1973. Other institutions, such as settlement houses, showed a more dramatic transformation, moving toward an average of half their financing from the public sector by the mid-1970s.[55]

Many of the questions that have since surrounded the issue of public financing of voluntary agencies were asked during the 1960s, principally the autonomy of voluntary agencies. For family agencies, the attractiveness of a new source of funding seemed to have outweighed both the philosophical and logistical challenges of a closer relationship to public institutions. In St. Paul, for instance, where Family Service of St. Paul had fought a running battle with an antagonistic community action agency over Project ENABLE, the family agency (along with Catholic Social Service and Jewish Family Service) was nonetheless eager to avail itself of a subsequent contract with the Ramsey County Welfare Department to provide casework services to public assistance clients—made possible by the 1967 Social Security amendments. Despite problems such as increased paperwork, relatively poor communication with public-sector caseworkers, and the uncertainty of financing on year-by-year contracts, all the agencies reported their enthusiasm for continuing

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the program, and a local citizen's group encouraged the public welfare departments in St. Paul and Minneapolis to find ways to expand their work with the voluntary sector.[56] The funding formula for purchase of service with the 1967 amendments, which allowed voluntary funds to be counted as part of the money to be matched by the federal government, in fact provided incentives for public agencies to seek out partners in the voluntary sector. With the urging of local United Ways, which saw public funding as a way to ease their fundraising burden, voluntary agencies that might have sat on the fence began to be drawn into contracts with public agencies.[57] Despite some misgivings at the time, the tensions inherent in this new voluntary-public partnership would not be thrown into sharp relief until the across-the-board cutbacks in social service spending in the 1980s. The erosion of the New Deal's "New Alignments," as Elizabeth Wickenden lamented, aroused only the faintest drumbeats of concern as it occurred.[58]

Conclusion

Viewed from the perspective of established nonprofit agencies, the War on Poverty was both affront and opportunity. Excoriated as a symbol of the failure of social welfare, the voluntary sector found itself marginalized at the outset of the poverty program. Reinserting itself into the increasingly crowded field of social service provision meant demonstrating a willingness to modify methods and embrace groups it had once shied away from. Project ENABLE offered a chance to prove that the establishment could be rehabilitated, a chance to reach out to new clients, and a chance to join in the attack on poverty. The fact that ENABLE accomplished few of these goals in any measurable way is not surprising, particularly given the disintegration of many of the high hopes that surrounded the community action program as a whole. The struggles of the ENABLE program revealed the deep and continuing gap between the outlook and capacities of the social service sector and the populations in the direst need of assistance.

But the example of ENABLE gives us insight not only into the politics and limits of Great Society social services, but shows the manner in which the Great Society undermined a cardinal value of New Deal welfare policy: the bright line separation of public welfare money and voluntary agencies. The ENABLE experience and the

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War on Poverty in general can be seen as a step in the fundamental reordering of the social service sector. This was not the democratization that poverty planners had hoped; rather, it was the increasingly blurred line between public and private social provision. As voluntary agencies became accustomed once again to the taste of public money, and as the War on Poverty unleashed a new breed of nonprofit agency into social service delivery, a fundamental tenet of the New Deal Order of "New Alignments" was eroded.

Union College

Notes

1. Ellen Manser, *Project ENABLE: What Happened* (New York: Family Service Association of America, [1968]), i.

2. Elizabeth Wickenden, "Purchase of Care and Services: Effect on Voluntary Agencies," in Iris Winogrond, ed., *Purchase of Care and Services in the Health and Welfare Fields* (Milwaukee: School of Social Welfare, University of Wisconsin, 1970), 43. Wickenden referred to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, or FERA, created by the Roosevelt administration in 1933.

3. Lester Salamon, *Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State* (Baltimore, 1995), has emphasized the intermingling of the nonprofit and public sector. See also Ralph Kramer, *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981). Michael Lipsky and Steven Rathgeb Smith, *Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), address some of the issues raised by public contracting by voluntary agencies generally, and Michael B. Fabricant and Robert Fisher, *Settlement Houses Under Siege: The Struggle to Sustain Community Organizations in New York City* (New York, 2002), examine the impact of contracting on one particular set of social agencies since 1975.

4. Donald T. Critchlow and Charles H. Parker, in Critchlow and Parker, *With Us Always: A History of Private Charity and Public Welfare* (Lanham, Md., 1998), 7. On pre–New Deal voluntarism, useful starting points are Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); David T. Beito, *From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890–1967* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Linda Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare* (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). Judith Trolander shows how one set of voluntary institutions co-evolved with an expanding welfare state in *Professionalism and Social Change: From the Settlement House Movement to Neighborhood Centers, 1886 to Present* (New York, 1987), and Ken Cmiel, *A Home of Another Kind: One Chicago Orphanage and the Tangle of Child Welfare* (Chicago, 1995), is a case study of one particular voluntary institution over the course of twentieth-century public-policy shifts. A recent wave of scholarship has addressed the "mixed" post–New Deal welfare state in other policy arenas, notably pensions and health insurance; see Jacob Hacker, *The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States* (Cambridge, 2002), and Jennifer Klein, *For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare State* (Princeton, 2003).

5. Standard works on the limits of the War on Poverty are Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New

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York, 1969); Henry Aaron, *Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective* (Washington, D.C., 1978), and Allen Matusow, *The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York, 1985). Recent explorations of the impact of the Great Society on local politics include Kent Germany, "Making a New Louisiana: American Liberalism and the Search for the Great Society in New Orleans, 1964–1974" (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 2000); William Clayson, "'The Barrios and the Ghettos Have Organized!' Community Action, Political Acrimony, and the War on Poverty in San Antonio," *Journal of Urban History* (January 2002): 158–83; Lisa Hazirjian, "From Intimidation to Mobilization: The Impact of Neighborhood Organizing among Working-Class African Americans in Rocky Mount, North Carolina," presented at the Southern Historical Association annual meeting, Fort Worth, Texas, November 1999.

6. Important exceptions are Alice O'Connor, "Neither Charity Nor Relief: The War on Poverty and the Effort to Redefine the Basis of Social Provision," and Donald Critchlow, "Implementing Family Planning Policy: Philanthropic Foundations and the Welfare State," in Critchlow and Parker, *With Us Always;* and Trolander, *Professionalism and Social Change*.

7. Richard Cloward, "Social Class and Private Social Agencies," in *Education for Social Work: Proceedings of the Annual Program of the Council on Social Work Education, 1963* (New York, 1963), 128–34. Cloward revised and expanded the paper with Irwin Epstein, presenting it as "Private Welfare's Disengagement from the Poor: The Case of Family Adjustment Agencies" at the SUNY–Buffalo School of Social Welfare in May 1965.

8. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Social Welfare Assembly, and U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Salaries and Working Conditions of Social Welfare Manpower in 1960* (New York, 1960), 35–36; William McCurdy, *Characteristics of the Professional Staff of Family Service Agencies* (New York, 1960), 2; "Facts About Manpower in Family Service," 2 March 1964, Folder 38, Box 17, Family Service Association of America Records, Social Welfare History Archive, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; on social work education, see Ernest Hollis and Alice Taylor, *Social Work Education in the United States* (New York, 1951); on early professional social work, see Roy Lubove, *The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880–1930* (New York, 1973).

9. The history of the Charity Organization Societies has been treated extensively; for starting points, see Frank Dekker Watson, *The Charity Organization Movement in the United States* (New York, 1922), and Michael Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York, 1996), 60–87. For the connection between the Charity Organization Society movement and the family service agencies, see Margaret Rich, *A Belief in People: A History of Family Social Work* (New York, 1956).

10. Josephine C. Brown, *Public Relief: 1929–1939* (New York, 1940), 186. Brown had previously worked as a field agent for the Family Welfare Association of America, the national organization of family service agencies, and the predecessor of the Family Service Association of America.

11. For the reaction of these voluntary agencies to the expansion of public welfare in the 1930s and beyond, see Andrew Morris, "Charity, Therapy, and Poverty: Private Social Service in the Era of Public Welfare" (Ph.D., University of Virginia, 2003).

12. Dorothy Brown and Elizabeth McKeown, *The Poor Belong to Us: Catholic Charities and American Welfare* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 155–56. For an examination of legal challenges to the subsidy of sectarian child-care institutions in New York in the 1970s, see Nina Bernstein, *The Lost Children of Wilder: The Epic Struggle to Change Foster Care* (New York, 2001).

13. Edward Berkowitz, *Mr. Social Security: The Life of Wilbur J. Cohen* (Lawrence, Kan., 1995), 191–98; Gareth Davies, *From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism* (Lawrence, Kan., 1995), 41–42;

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Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (Princeton, 2001), 158–65; Frank Mankewicz, quoted in Michael Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty* (New York, 1996), 151.

14. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 109–19; James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle Against Poverty, 1900–1985* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 138–41; Kravitz quoted in Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 111.

15. Yarmolinsky quoted in Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty,* 77.

16. *The Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson,* vol. 1, p. 106, Box 106B, Entry 14, RG 381, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; Boone quoted in Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 117.

17. "Fund Waste Laid to Health Units," *New York Times,* 23 May 1961, 43; "Charities Scored on Fiscal Report," *New York Times,* 31 July 1961, 1; "U.S. Curbs Urged on Charity Funds," *New York Times,* 11 October 1961, 32; "Family Agencies Chided on Funds," *New York Times,* 15 November 1961, 36; Robert H. Hamlin, *Voluntary Health and Welfare Agencies in the United States: An Exploratory Study* (New York, 1961); FSAA, Board of Directors Minutes, 12 November 1961, Folder 3, Box 5, FSAA.

18. Linton Swift, *New Alignments Between Public and Private Agencies in a Community Family Welfare and Relief Program* (New York, 1934); Brown, *Public Relief,* 413–19.

19. Sidney Hollander to Elizabeth Wickenden, 23 May 1961, Box 74, Section III, Hollander Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore. Hollander was on the board of the FSAA and the National Conference of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, among many others, and had helped underwrite staff positions at the FSAA and the National Social Welfare Assembly (an umbrella organization of national voluntary welfare agencies) in order to sharpen their attention on "public issues."

20. Ruth Lindenberg, "Hard to Reach: Client or Casework Agency?" *Social Work* (October 1958): 26.

21. Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux, *Industrial Society and Social Welfare,* 2d ed. (New York, 1965), 172; FSAA Mid-Atlantic Regional Executives' Workshop, 6 May 1960; Notes on Committee on Range and Emphases, 16–17 September 1960, both in Folder "Function 1958–1960," Box 31, FSAA; Family-Centered Project Group Discussion Minutes, 7 January 1955, Folder 8, Box 1, St. Paul Family-Centered Project Records, Social Welfare History Archives.

22. Whitney Young, "The Racial Crisis—Implications for Family Service," *Family Service Highlights* (February 1964): 35–44; FSAA BoD, 27–28 April 1964, Folder 5, Box 5; Dennis Dickerson, *Militant Mediator: Whitney M. Young Jr.* (Lexington, Ky., 1998), 125–26.

23. "Family Service for a Changing World," FSAA Western Workshop, October 1962, Folder "Function 1961–1964," Box 31, FSAA.

24. Herman Levin, "The Future of Voluntary Family and Children's Social Work," *Social Service Review* (1964): 167.

25. FSAA Executives' Conference, 8–10 May 1958, Folder 20, Box 7, FSAA; "Selected Data on the General Population and on FSAA Member Agencies in the Ten Most Populous Standard Metropolitan Areas in the United States," January 1960. Folder 12, Box 33, FSAA; FSAA BoD, 11–12 May 1961. According to the United Community Funds and Councils of America, federated fund-raising had grown slightly faster than disposable personal income (from which charitable contributions would presumably be drawn) from 1945 to 1961; see UCFCA, *Trends in Giving, 1962* (New York, 1962), 2.

26. FSAA Ad Hoc Committee on Use of Public Funds, "Report," 28 April 1964, Folder 5, Box 5; FSAA Executives' Conference, 8–10 May 1958; FSAA Committee on Public Issues Minutes, 16 April 1963, Folder 1, Box 14; FSAA BoD, 29–30 No-

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vember 1962, FSAA. Most representatives of voluntary agencies testifying in 1962 cautiously endorsed the idea of purchase of service, though they stipulated that government funding should not be the majority of any given agency's funds. See testimony of Blackburn, Msgr. Raymond Gallagher (National Conference of Catholic Charities), and Brad Mintener (National Conference of Churches of Christ), in Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. *Public Welfare Amendments of 1962,* 87th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1962). The House removed from the 1962 bill the provision allowing purchase of service from voluntary organizations; see Martha Derthick, *Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants* (Washington, D.C., 1975), 10.

27. "The 1956 Budget Request," July 1955, in Folder Board of Directors 1955, Box 2, Family Service of St. Paul Records, Social Welfare History Archives; James Turrentine, "A Historical Perspective," in "Family Service for a Changing World"; Clark Blackburn to Member Agencies, 26 October 1961, Folder FSAA Biennial 1960, Box 3; Stanley Davies, Memorandum, 11 May 1961, Folder 27, Box 22, FSAA.

28. Elizabeth Wickenden to Theodore Shuchat, 5 February 1964, Folder Wickenden Social Policy, January–April 1964, Box 57, National Social Welfare Assembly Records, Supplement 2, Social Welfare History Archives; FSAA BoD, 27–28 April 1964, Folder 5, Box 5.

29. "Explanation of Budget Request," July 1947. BoD 1947 folder, Box 2, FSSP; "Preventative Casework," *Journal of Social Casework* (May 1948): 193–94; John G. Hill and Ralph Ormsby, "The Value of Cost Analysis to the Family Agency," *Journal of Social Casework* (October 1952): 330–37; FSAA BoD, May 13–14, 1963, Box 5.

30. Clark Blackburn, "A Family Agency's Role in Programs Combating Poverty," 18 September 1964, Folder "Function 1961–1964," Box 31; Marian Schmitz to Franklin Parks, 1 December 1964, Folder 37, Box 41; FSAA Board of Directors, 29–30 April 1965, Box 5, all FSAA; Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 265.

31. Manser, *Project ENABLE,* 5–9. Kravitz's office was funding at the same time a controversial organizing project by Saul Alinsky in Syracuse, New York, that used OEO money to organize poor voters to challenge the local political establishment. See O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge,* 167–73, Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 248. Kravitz had an intimate understanding of the world of private welfare, having finished his social work dissertation on voluntary-sector welfare planning councils in the early 1960s (at the same time he was working on the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency). The dissertation criticized such councils, particularly their elite lay leadership, for their distance from and ignorance of public welfare. Sanford Kravitz, "Sources of Leadership Input for Social Welfare Planning" (DSW, Brandeis University, 1963).

32. Sanford Kravitz, personal communication with author, 29 October 2003.

33. Manser, *Project ENABLE,* 7; FSAA BoD, 29–30 April 1965.

34. Manser, *Project ENABLE,* 13–15. Head Start had also emerged by the spring of 1965 as an easily implemented, popular program that community action agencies could use to absorb unallocated funds, so the sense of urgency to fund ENABLE evaporated.

35. Whitney Young to Sargent Shriver, 4 August 1965, Box 6, Entry 1036, RG 363, National Archives; Kravitz to author.

36. Manser, *Project ENABLE,* 16–21; Minutes, FSAA ENABLE Advisory Committee, 20 October 1965; 16 December 1965; 12 January 1966, Folder 28, Box 21, FSAA. Shriver singled out San Francisco and Chicago as two cities where his hands were tied from helping ENABLE. San Francisco's community action program had been thoroughly radicalized, whereas Chicago's was the province of a handpicked appointee of Richard Daley. Chicago did, however, agree to sponsor an ENABLE program. See Matusow, *The Unraveling of America,* 248–49, 260–62, for brief discussions of community action in those two cities.

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37. In fact, in forty communities, Councils of Social Agencies, dominated by the voluntary sector, were designated as the official community action agencies by early 1965, with another 150 heavily involved in planning and running antipoverty programs. XXX *People and Events*, 165.

38. This section draws heavily on the reports filed by evaluators employed by the ENABLE national office. Tal Fowler, Baltimore Program Evaluation, 19 September 1966, Folder 32, Box 21, FSAA. Baltimore's community action agency, however, itself was criticized for its "middle class" orientation by the OEO staff; see Judith Segal, memo, 22 April 1966, Folder "Poverty Program Baltimore City," Box 30, Entry 1031, RG 381, National Archives.

39. Lawrence Brown, Colorado Springs Program Evaluation, [4 October 1966]; Juanita Dudley, Stockton Report, 9 September 1966, all Folder 30; Mildred Roberts, St. Paul Report, [21 September 1966], Folder 31; Fowler, Lancaster Program Evaluation, 19 September 1966; Felton Alexander, Beaumont Report, [1 November 1966]; Selma Belewky, Philadelphia Report, [28 October 1966], all Folder 32, Box 21, FSAA. In many cities, conflict with the community action agencies centered on casework aides, as the agencies sought to supervise or absorb ENABLE aides into their own programs; see Houston and Dallas reports.

40. Fowler, Baltimore Report, 19 September 1966; Eunice Clay, Baltimore Program Evaluation, 23 September 1966; Dudley Cawley, Pittsfield Program Evaluation [5 January 1967], all Folder 30; del Valle, Houston; East Orange Report, [26 September 1966]; Cawley, New York Program Evaluation, 16 September 1966, both Folder 31, Box 21.

41. Alexander, Tulsa Report, [26 September 1966]; Folder 31; Jean Bryant, "A New Circle," filed with Salt Lake City reports, 1966, Folder 32, Box 21, FSAA; Matusow, *The Unraveling of America*, 251.

42. M. Roberts, Minneapolis Report, [16 September 1966], Folder 31; del Valle, Austin Report, [26 September 1966]; Alexander, Dallas Report [10 October 1966], Folder 32, Box 21; Fowler, Baltimore; Simulatics Corporation, *Evaluation of Project ENABLE* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. V-1. 38 percent of the ENABLE participants in the first parent discussion groups said they had personally known a member of the ENABLE staff prior to the meetings. Simulatics, p. III-16.

43. Don Hoke, Chicago Report, [26 September 1966], Folder 30; Cawley, Newark Program Evaluation, 6 October 1966; Bertha Shier, Omaha Report, 30 September 1966, both Folder 31; Philadelphia Program Evaluation, 7 November 1966; Clay, Pittsburgh Report, 3 October 1966, both Folder 32, Box 21; Roberts, St. Paul. In Pittsburgh, they found the target population had been "subject to many surveys and programs" and were suspicious of ENABLE.

44. Dudley, San Diego Report, [12 September 1966], Folder 30, Box 21; Mildred Roberts and Josie Johnson, "'More Than Meetings'—The Impact on Parents," *Social Casework* (December 1967): 618–25. New Orleans quote from Folder "Family Service Society, Current 1966–71," Box 25, Community Services Council Collection, Special Collections, University of New Orleans. Thanks to Kent Germany for this citation.

45. Carter Lowe to Cawley, 11 July 1966; both Folder 30; Mary Guaridani to Dudley Cawley, 28 July 1966; Newark Report, [26 September 1966]; both Folder 31, Box 21, FSAA; "The Enabler" (October 1966), Folder 29, Box 21, FSAA; "A New Way to Help Families Through Personal Involvement of the Poor," *Family Service Highlights* (September–November 1967): 8–12.

46. Franklin Parks to Manser, 24 November 1965, Folder 37, Box 41, FSAA; Lancaster Report; Beaumont Report.

47. FSAA ENABLE Advisory Committee, 2 May 1966, Folder 28, Box 21; Memo, Ellen Manser to National Staff, 28 June 1966; Manser to FSAA Agency Executives, 25 August 1966; Helen Weisbrod to Manser, 16 September 1966; Manser

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to Urban League and FSAA Executives, 9 December 1966, Folder 26, Box 21; *Poverty Knowledge*, 167–73.

48. Simulatics Corporation, *Examination of Project ENABLE*, p. IV-2.

49. Minneapolis Report, 16 September 1966, Folder 31, Box 21; Oklahoma City Report, 4 October 1966; Udell LaVictoire to Manser, 4 January 1967; Simulatics Corporation, *Examination of Project ENABLE*, p. IV-(33–35), V-8.

50. Kansas City Report, 26 September 1966, Folder 31, Box 21; ENABLE Executives' Meeting, St. Louis, 16–17 March 1967, Folder 21, Box 27; Manser, *Project ENABLE*, 73.

51. Blackburn telegram to Shriver, 14 March 1967, Folder 21, Box 27, FSAA; FSAA BoD, 15–16 May 1967; 17 November 1967, Folder 9, Box 8, FSAA.

52. "Report of FSAA Contact—New Orleans," 28 February 1968, Folder 39, Box 41, FSAA Supp. 1; C. Michael Firmin Jr., "Characteristics of Clients at Family and Child Services Prior to and Subsequent to the Establishment of Neighborhood Centers in 1965," Part I (MSW, Catholic University, 1968); Neil Gilbert, *Clients or Constituents?* (San Francisco, 1970), 45–49; Kenneth Heineman, "Model City: The War on Poverty, Race Relations, and Catholic Social Activism in 1960s Pittsburgh," paper presented at the Policy History Conference, St. Louis, 2002.

53. Trolander, *Professionalism and Social Change*, 185–87.

54. Catholic social service agencies received 15 percent of their funds from government agencies in 1960, which increased to 50 percent by the mid-1980s. Mary J. Oates, "Faith and Good Works: Catholic Giving and Taking," in Lawrence Friedman and Mark McGarvie, eds., *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History* (Cambridge, 2003), 291; Critchlow, "Implementing Family Planning Policy."

55. Derthick, *Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants*, 12–14; Neil Gilbert, "The Transformation of Social Services," *Social Service Review* (December 1977): 624–61; Candace Mueller, "Purchase of Service Contracting from the Point of View of the Provider," in Kenneth R. Wedel et al., *Social Services by Government Contract: A Policy Analysis* (New York, 1979), 46–54; Herman Levin, "Voluntary Organizations in Social Welfare," *Social Work Year Book* (New York, 1971), 1520; idem, "Voluntary Organizations in Social Welfare," *Encyclopedia of Social Work* (Washington, D.C., 1977), 1578; Trolander, *Professionalism and Social Change*, 186.

56. Community Health and Welfare Planning Council of St. Paul, "Purchase of Service at Catholic Social Service, Family Service, and Jewish Family Service," 21 December 1972; Citizen's League, "Overcoming Obstacles to Purchase of Service," 14 January 1974; both in Minnesota Historical Society Library, St. Paul.

57. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, *Purchase of Social Service: Study of the Experience of Three States in Purchase of Service by Contract Under the Provisions of the 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act* (Washington, D.C., 1971); F. Ellen Netting, "Secular and Religious Funding of Church-Related Agencies," *Social Service Review* (December 1982): 588–89.

58. Gordon Manser, "Implications of Purchase of Service for Voluntary Agencies," *Social Casework* (June 1972): 421–27; Robert Rice, "Impact of Government Contracts on Voluntary Social Agencies," *Social Casework* (July 1975): 387–95.

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