Introduction: Imagining History

TILOTTAMA RAJAN

THIS SPECIAL TOPIC CAME ABOUT IN WHAT MIGHT ALMOST seem an accidental way, though a deeper logic often underlies accidents. The two members of the 1999 Editorial Board who worked in historical periods were expressing frustration at how recent special topics, though technically extensible to earlier periods, appeared to invite submissions on modern and contemporary culture. This seemed symptomatic of a larger problem: increasingly (though not for the first time in history) the past was being given a place in the academy only insofar as this past could be retrodetermined by contemporary concerns and brought into the current "world picture," to use Martin Heidegger's term. Gianni Vattimo has described this world picture as the pluralist consensus resulting from a society of "generalized communication" instituted by the mass media, in which, "with the demise of . . . a central rationality of history, . . . local rationalities—ethnic, sexual, religious, cultural or aesthetic"—come into their own (1, 9). Vattimo rightly distinguishes the histories or narratives produced by the "academic postmodern" (as David Simpson more critically calls these local rationalities) from the grand narratives of modernity. Yet the two share more than one might think. Both are part of a project of modernization, given a definition of "modernity" as the "epoch in which simply being modern became a value in itself" (Vattimo 1), and it is merely the form of this being modern that has changed in the late twentieth century. Indeed, one could ask whether globalization, with its foreshortening of geographic and cognitive as well as temporal differences, does not once again collectivize Vattimo's disparate rationalities within a "unilinear conception of history" (4), thus subsuming the academic postmodern—against the grain of its deeper impulses—into modernity. The displacement of the

TILOTTAMA RAJAN is Canada Research Chair in English and Theory at the University of Western Ontario. Her most recent book is *Deconstruction and the Remainders of Phenomenology: Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, Baudrillard*. She is working on studies of Romantic narrative and of encyclopedic thinking from post-Kantian idealism to deconstruction.

© 2003 BY THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

category "postcolonial" into "world literature in English" is an example of this tendency. In the ensuing, ongoing (post)modernization of the academy—of which "theory" and "literature" have also become casualties—there seems to be a loss of history as a site of something different from the present. Not history per se, since historical work (e.g., the investigation of nationalism or the queering of earlier periods) is still done, especially insofar as it also serves the polemicizing purposes of various (post)modern interests. At issue, rather, is history as our own unassimilable alterity, our difference from the directions in which "history" is pushing us; history as the condition for an internal distanciation and for self-reflection on what we do and perhaps as the original force behind those local rationalities, which have now become routinized, even commodified, as repeatable techniques.

This loss of history—epistemological and ontological more than empirical—is less evident in pedagogical practice, where the presence of several generations in a department results, at its best, in a palimpsest of understandings. It is more evident in the contemporary mutation of what Jürgen Habermas calls the "sphere of publicity":[1] in publishing and in the way departments market themselves on Web sites and repackage existing courses in programs with new titles that foreclose the disseminative force of the complex, sedimented histories of the institutional *habitus* we inhabit. Publishing, in particular, is undergoing seismic changes that are as much ideological as economic. Some years ago the term *monograph*, which originated in botany and zoology and meant a specialized study of a single topic, oddly attached itself to single-author studies. In a form of metonymic contagion, the word is now used to dismiss, as inherently overspecialized, not only the tenure monograph (Waters) but all books on literature. Many university presses have replaced "literary studies" with a more marketable "cultural studies." Stanford is phasing out its translation series, downsizing its theory and literature lists, and consolidating literature and the entire humanities under the patronage of a single acquisitions editor: ironically, the editor for history. These changes of nomenclature and jurisdiction are by no means innocuous. For, as Heidegger presciently recognized in 1938, publishing is a form of governmentality that, "through the prearranged and limited publication of books and periodicals," as well as through "series, . . . collections and sets . . . bring[s] the world into the picture for the public and confirm[s] it publicly" (139).

Two shifts in literary historical nomenclature are exemplary for this reframing. The first is the replacement of *Renaissance* by *early modern*, to which Linda Woodbridge returns in her afterword. *Early modern* is an epistemic filter that restricts the study of this field to the constitutive features of modernity and to its critique: gender, new economic formations, nationalism, travel, and the beginnings of colonialism. More recent is the absorption of Romanticism into the nineteenth century, to the point where it no longer appears in the overview of the MLA convention program, although "Late Eighteenth Century" remains a separate listing. *The nineteenth century* is not a neutral chronological term with the innocent side effect of cutting off part of the careers of Blake, Wordsworth, and Godwin (not to mention European Romanticism, which began earlier). It writes its components into history conceived as sequence, a notion critiqued in this issue by Christopher Lane. In this chrono-logic, Victorian concerns with nation, empire, governmentality, and more recently technology retrodetermine how we read, what we read from, and how we value the earlier part of the period. Indeed, when Mary Poovey describes herself as working on "British cultural formation in the first half of the nineteenth century," she revealingly identifies this "first half" as 1830–64: the first half of the Victorian period (*Making* 1).

Poovey's Freudian slip makes visible a subtle change. Despite the many scholars still working on literature from 1780 to 1830, the

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

process of modernization that has recently revitalized Victorian studies by bringing it into the world picture through a focus on technology, mediality,[2] and governmentality has reduced Romanticism from an epistemically distinct category to a chronological addition to the century that laid the grounds for the twentieth. There are several interrelated consequences of this shift, which reflects a larger turn from literary to cultural studies and from the humanities to the human (or social) "sciences": what Poovey calls "the sciences of wealth and society" (*Fact* 147). There is the loss of the French Revolution as the anchor for a period now conservatized around the Regency. There is the insularization of Romanticism as British Romanticism despite the ambivalence of many Romantics to Britishness: their desire for "the experience of the foreign," a phrase by which Antoine Berman signals neither exoticism nor colonialism but an opening of the self toward its own disruptive alterity. This insularization has less to do with how knowledge actually traveled in the long Romantic period than with the current emergence of English as *the* world language and with the recent partition of academic publishing between the United States, which has taken charge of global culture, and Britain, which is responsible for the management of its own (past) cultural resources. Yet this insularization also results in a disciplinary specialization: Romanticism is not read as the intertextuality of literature with aesthetics, philosophy, and science, a necessarily comparatist activity.[3] Thus, it is not placed in the domain of letters in the older sense but reconstituted as a purely literary domain that is then made dependent on, and subject to, the judgment of the disciplines that began to emerge in the eighteenth century under the umbrella of "political economy." Yet Romanticism was the textual field by which theory entered Anglo-American thought in the seventies, which has meant that, unlike other areas, it is still sometimes read aslant earlier and contemporary Continental philosophy. Thus, a far-reaching disciplinary shift is embedded in its absorption into the nineteenth century: from philosophy, the metadiscipline of the university system at Jena and Berlin during the German idealist period, and from a philosophical category called literature that (after Friedrich Schlegel) was a Romantic opening up of this idealism, to political economy and anthropology, which have been the metadisciplines of British thought beginning with the eighteenth-century renewal of Scottish universities.

The nineteenth century also occludes Romanticism's historic function. Romanticism has a double genealogy. In its own time it was theorized in Germany as a typological rather than chronological category that signified perpetual dissatisfaction, in contrast to classicism, which Hegel associated with totality and the "adequate embodiment of the Idea" (1: 77). In the twentieth century Romanticism was constructed as a canon of exceptions around six poets who were unrecognized by their contemporaries. The historicist claim that this canon overlooks the writing popular at the time (Butler) or that it is a masculine Romanticism that ignores the different, un-Romantic writing of Anna Letitia Barbauld and Hannah More (Mellor) misses the literary historical point of Romanticism as a curricular category that made a space for singularity and alterity—what did not fit. As Kari Lokke's essay argues in connecting Germaine de Staël, Mary Shelley, and George Sand to "nineteenth-century idealist historiography," this Romanticism is the condition of possibility for recovering a different kind of woman writer. The novelists Lokke discusses, as well as 1790s writers such as Mary Hays and Eliza Fenwick, were not like Jane Austen and cannot be assimilated into a liberal feminism that idealizes domesticity and manners as the sphere of women's political economy. This "not being like" that Romanticism discerns can be set against the nineteenth century's concern with governmentality: the "technologies and theoretical accounts" that render "individuals . . . thinkable as

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

governable subjects" (Poovey, *Fact* 147), in exchange for which early and later modern subjects earn the consolation prize of various cultural, sexual, and national self-fashionings.

Shifts such as the one described here will always produce new forms of knowledge, but the role of history is to reflect on them. Thus, a restlessness with the ramifications of the world picture—any world picture, since earlier literary historical categories also underwrote world pictures[4]—was behind our uneasiness with special issues as an aspect of academic media(tion). In response to this uneasiness, another Editorial Board member suggested we propose an issue on literature before 1900. Among various ideas, the topic that appealed to the board was Imagining History, partly because we had just accepted an essay that seemed an example of literary history and yet defamiliarized the terms *literature* and *history* through the unsettling history of their relation. This article, by Matthew Wickman, cannot have caught the board's attention because of its subject: James Macpherson's *Fingal*, which even the most historically minded might find esoteric. The essay's appeal was archaeological in Michel Foucault's sense, meaning that Wickman tried to get at some "radical event" by reading its "signs, shocks, and effects" as they appeared "distributed across . . . the visible surface of knowledge" (217). It was not simply that the essay read cultural and literary history archaeologically, rather than empirically for their contents. It appealed to us as an effect or a shock that called on the discipline to reflect on a more profound "archaeological event," of which this article was symptomatic (Foucault 231).

That another *PMLA* article, originally meant for this topic, also deals with Macpherson leads me to ask what disciplinary primal scene occurring in this period now calls for revisiting.[5] The Ossian poems raise the question of literature within the framework of history in its double sense of modernization and retrospection: a reflexive folding back of history on itself through an awareness of its temporality—an awareness that literary and intellectual history are perhaps particularly qualified to provide. Wickman approached *Fingal*, as one might expect, in terms of the displacement of an older Highlands society by the commercial society of the Scottish Enlightenment. However, he did so at the symptomatic site in legal practice where the charismatic testimony of direct witnesses gave way to the judicious third-person weighing of evidence according to probability. Wickman used this perplexing fold between literary and institutional history to convey how history, because it contains other histories that move in other directions, cannot be read transparently.[6] Thus, he showed how in the interstices within a history of improvement that moves from the auratic to probability and to the ethos of the novel, literature—or poetry in the nongeneric sense elaborated by Percy Bysshe Shelley's *Defence of Poetry*—is constituted so as to preserve a space for the other, the improbable, and genius (Wickman 182–85, 190).

Insofar as this Romanticism is a nostalgic commodity, it can be absorbed into a history of modernity that proceeds onward to the critique of literature or of the aesthetic as a separate, specialized, elite realm (Siskin; Crawford). The story of the Ossian poems is, after all, the history of a fraud that exposes literature's symbolic capital as false consciousness. Yet this narrative of modernization leaves something unexplained in the literary historical scene of reading that crystallizes around Macpherson and Thomas Chatterton: namely, the mourning that followed the exposure of what had become inauthentic partly because the conditions for its authenticity no longer existed. As a simulacrum the public wanted, Macpherson's Ossian poems refract back to us questions of authenticity and of the manufactured element in the very category of history. Thus, in the interstices of the literature that modernization produces as its nostalgic reflex, there emerges another literature responsible for interrogating the premises of (its own) history. Moreover, Wickman's article seemed intriguingly embedded in the issue of the cognitive figures

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

that subtend the imagining of history: progress and enlightenment, or mourning and return. Perhaps history, if it is to become "thought re-apprehending itself at the root of its own history" (Foucault 217), must be partly mourning, given that mourning, as Jacques Derrida says, is not nostalgia but "affirmation" (143) or, in Walter Benjamin's word, "remembrance." Benjamin distinguishes remembrance from "memory," which is the "destruction" of "impressions" (160). Memory, Hans Kellner argues, entails the destruction of other information (*Language* 39, 53) and is a form of what Derrida and Paul de Man see as the violence of inscription. But perhaps because the history in literary history is a metaphor (like the economy in political economy),[7] literary and intellectual history are disciplines where history (as what really happened) is reconstituted by being displaced into discourses whose notion of an event is more problematic. In this issue, Kellner uses an aesthetic category, the sublime, to rethink the event outside an academic history that explains and beautifies it. While Lane opposes a literature that sees "anorthoscopic[ally]" to a historicism that reads for sequence, Kellner finds this literature *in* history, in ways that recall Benjamin's reconstitution of history around the experience of "shock" (162, 255).

Coordinating a special topic in *PMLA* resembles Louis Althusser's process without a subject, since the majority of articles are chosen by an Editorial Board that does not include the topic coordinators. Many of the fifty-one submissions did try to bring literature before 1900 into the current world picture. But, interestingly, these were not the ones accepted. Lauren M. E. Goodlad comes closest to absorbing the past into modernity by focusing on what Victorian thought and practice contribute to a history of governmentality. But she works back from a frequent modernizing imposition of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* onto Victorian governance to a more nuanced reading that places the gaps between this text and Foucault's later theories of governmentality alongside the aporias in Victorian liberalism and Britain's "idiosyncratic modernization." What Mikhail Bakhtin calls the "loophole" one creates by not proceeding from past to present but overlapping their edges (Wall 213) lets Goodlad open up the unresolved relation between the state and civil society through the Victorian ideal of pastorship. Key to her "critical imagining" of history is the way this figure, still invisibly present today, is projected and unsettled between the Victorians and us and between political theories and Victorian texts that fail to find it adequately embodied in the institutions of the state or civil society. Similarly, Caroline Weber's essay apparently brings the Enlightenment into the current world picture by unearthing a colonial subtext in the sentimental history of bourgeois virtue in Denis Diderot's play *Le fils naturel*. But her emphasis is as much on what makes this reading possible: a folding back of Dorval's family history onto its narration and performance, through multiple extra- and intradiegetic frames that stage the performance of this history.

Might the fold between literature and history implicit in imagining history translate into a sense of history, too, as embedded in its own history? In her afterword Linda Woodbridge discusses the explosion of historical writing in the Renaissance: not just pamphlets on or chronicles of current or past events but also literature that performs those events or creates them as history. This writing, to borrow a concept Mark Salber Phillips develops in this issue, operates at a closer "distance" than the Enlightenment "universal history" he sees as imagining a "science of humankind" or than the texts Walter Scott writes (whether *Ivanhoe* or *Waverley*) about a time that is definitively past. Literature exists side by side with history, as well as with thinking about history, as Donald Hedrick suggests in his discussion of "historiographic moments" in Shakespeare's plays, which draw historiography into the polyvocality of writing. The effect, to anticipate Maura B. Nolan's terms in her essay, is to recast the relation between the "empirical" and "transcendental." Because the "generalities

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and particularities" that make up the field of history exist "next to each other," the transcendental categories used to interpret history are generated as empiricities, "side by side" with history or literature. One cannot, then, abstract history into a gloss that renders literature transparent: the charge Lane levels against various literary-critical historicisms, including new historicism.

A history embedded in its own history is, differently, the concern of the period after 1770. If history in the Renaissance was dialogically constituted by conjunctions between events and the practices of writing about them, as several essays suggest, history, in the later part of the period covered here, was differently opened up by becoming the theory of history. It is a truism that this period saw a shift from spatial disciplines such as the oddly named natural history to temporal discourses such as history and biology. On this basis Foucault famously calls the period beginning at the end of the eighteenth century "the age of history" (217). The designation seems to associate history with modernization and with a new (or not so new) sense of time as future rather than past. The future can signify potentiality, but all too often it means "the end of history" in an infinite extension of the present. Thus, "the age of history" seemingly evokes a Hegelian imperialism of "Spirit" that Todd Samuel Presner's essay sees as generating its ghostly critique but strictly from outside a dominant nineteenth-century discourse that links history to (cultural) nationalism.

Yet one should not identify history in this period only with *The Philosophy of History*, when Hegel himself wrote many other histories. Indeed, by the age of history Foucault means something more complex, as Nolan suggests in reading him beside the nineteenth-century legal historian F. W. Maitland. "History" is the asymmetry between the empirical and "general" or transcendental (Kantian) categories we use to grasp history. Because of the inability of the mind's structures and series "to fully represent the empirical stratum that constitutes the ground of history"—or, as Kant's successor Schelling more deconstructively calls it, "unground" (*Freedom* 276)—history becomes the displacement of this difference through time: a "split," or dialogue, between the philosophical and the empirical. Somewhat unlike Phillips, who also traces an epistemic shift in this period through the category of distance, Nolan claims that this "metacritical" movement between the theoretical and the empirical is produced by a replacement of the architectural or structural by the organic as an environment for the practice of historical writing. History, the history of thought—or, in Maitland's case, of legal practice—are imagined as a "body." The organic generates a sense of "interiority . . . a hidden and inaccessible space from which history emerges only in fragments and shards," through "metaphor" as a mediation between the empirical and the transcendental. Consequently, Nolan argues, the age of history, far from being solely that of "historicism," also confronts the history that would "claim universality or limitlessness" with an "analytic of finitude" that calls in question this episteme's anthropological or modernizing visions of time.

As the locus of this analytic, history for Foucault, an archaeological rather than a positive science, bears to other disciplines "a relation that is strange, undefined, ineffaceable" (367). Since one can hardly claim that history as a positive endeavor (if not science) suddenly arose after 1770, it is this strangeness or reflexive dimension of history as the unconscious of thought that lets us speak of an age of history, where the coming of age of history is the sign or effect of something that was there much earlier. For one thing, history in this period is problematized by becoming the model for thinking other domains that provide it with new metaphors. As Stephan Jaeger argues, German Romantic thought in particular is committed not to history but to historiography. German historiography, or, more broadly, Romantic historiography, is not primary or empirical but secondary history: the historical shaping of domains such

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

as linguistics (Humboldt), aesthetics and literature (Hegel and the Schlegels), myth (Schelling), and science and superstition (Godwin).

Put differently, this period sees the emergence of something later called intellectual history, whose very name is a catachresis that potentially reconfigures history. For "intellectual" history calls into question any purely empirical constitution of the event; in the longer term, it therefore also limits positivisms that exclude what did not quite happen or what has no discursive space (Kellner, *Language* 41–44). Godwin's *Lives of the Necromancers* (1834) is an example of this doubled understanding of history, given his interest in thinking history reflexively, which begins with "Of History and Romance" (1797). In the *Lives*—which, like Schelling's *Philosophy of Mythology*, is about the historicity of belief systems as forms of cultural anthropogenesis—a history of superstition takes the place of a history of science. The text, then, generates two paradigms: a history of improvement that sees necromancy as an early modern form of science and a history that returns to the past, to question the notion of science and to recover those fragments of the past that are projects for the future.[8]

In short, the historical task in this period is complicated by two factors. First, histories always have a method, but the displacement of history into a method for other disciplines is inherently self-reflective. The methods appropriate for an account of events may not do justice to a history of art responsible to the particularity of art forms, since a history as distinct from an aesthetics must include all art forms; one can then ask whether these methods are adequate even in the domain of history. Godwin was already posing such questions of method and domain in 1797, by probing the limits of Scottish "general history" and suggesting that the private should be part of history ("History" 362, 364). The private included not just gender relations but also—as is clear in his novel *Mandeville* (1817)—the unconscious. For Godwin the unconscious, whose personal and general history were to become a concern for Freud, is always in some way political, given that the political is deeply unconscious of itself.

Second, the extension of history into other domains generates ways of thinking history that complicate both its structure (its linkage to sequence and development) and its existence as an essentially empirical discipline. Nolan's essay takes up the invisible effects of the life sciences on history. But there are further ways in which history is reconstituted by its relation to other fields. As history migrated into science, a history of the earth grounded in geology replaced a more static history grounded in physics (exemplified by Kant's *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* [1755], which provides analogies for his actual theories of history). The rise of geology—the study of the world's ages and its receding strata as sites of earlier catastrophes and losses—was one element in a larger phenomenon: an emerging sense of historicity, of memory in relation to forgetting. This recursive, archaeological history is at work in Schelling's *Ages of the World* (1811–15), whose title crystallizes his sense that history as the future (the progressing stages of the world) is bound to the infinitely receding primal scene of its past. Schelling's text is not history in any formal sense but philosophy: the history of Being in its attempt to come into being. But as such it suggests a different conception of history—one where historical thinking is the dimension in which thought becomes responsible to what is other, lost, unconscious, or potential, yet to be. On one level, then, the nineteenth century established history as a positivist discipline. But at the same time, the historiographical turn produced by history's extension into other disciplines made history more philosophical, breaking down what Foucault sees as an earlier opposition between "historical knowledge of the visible" and "philosophical knowledge of the invisible" (138; see also Rajan).

Elizabeth Fay traces this interdisciplinary complexification of history through its "travel[s]"

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

into art history. Fay's reading of Hegel crosses paths with Presner's essay, which also uses travel as a metaphor for knowledge. Presner contrasts a grand narrative of colonial travel from east to west in Hegel's *Philosophy of History* with a "Jewish conception of historicity" in Heine's *Reisebilder*: a figural position that might now be filled by Homi Bhabha's cathexis of the postcolonial with a (dis)location and an intellectual migrancy that exceed specific ethnic identifications. Jewish history could play this role for Heine because the Jews were not then a nation. Yet Germany, too, was not yet a nation when Hegel published the *Phenomenology* as Napoleon was conquering Jena. Samuel Taylor Coleridge understood this when he wrote that the Germans, not having England's "occupation with commerce" and "interest in the affairs of the whole," lacked England's sense of "nationality," though they had many universities and were "forever . . . thinking" (574). Before Heine's Jewish history, there was an interest in India and China that leads Berman to make translation—between periods and cultures as well as between languages—the environment of (German) Romanticism. Hegel's "Egyptianizing of Western thought," as Fay calls it, constitutes historical understanding around this moment of translation.

For Fay, Hegel turns to art history to discover history as archaeology: archaeology not as "Enlightenment science wedded to antiquarianism" but as archaic reading. Her essay deals with the strange place occupied by Egypt in Hegel's history of "Spirit"—a spirit haunted (as Lokke also argues) by spirits, by (as the classic feminist pun goes) dead mat(t)er. Dead mat(t)er is not lost time. Rather, death, as Giorgio Agamben says, does not "immediately produce ancestors, but ghosts." Ghosts figure the past in the uncanny way that babies figure the future: as "half-dead" or "half-alive" (83), not (yet) having come into being, and thus the site of the archaic—what Agamben calls "infancy" (37, 47) and Fay calls a "prepresence, not a prehistory," that is the condition of possibility for imagining history. Encountering in Egypt's pyramids and mummies the "symbolic" stage of art as "language sealed in archaic or cipher writing," Hegel must read these ghostly artifacts neither as Egypt saw them (as "monumental" history) nor as bits and pieces to be "plundered" for our museums but as the relation that binds past and present in an enigmatic afterlife. Historical understanding becomes translation rather than philology: an in-betweenness of past and present. Inasmuch as this relation to the past is constituted within a history of aesthetic practices, perhaps archaic reading as translation can also be our figure for what history and literature give each other.

Notes

[1] While *publicity* refers to the "culture-debating" public sphere of the Enlightenment, the term already anticipates the public sphere's replacement by "the pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption" (158–59).

[2] *Mediality* is Friedrich Kittler's word for the construction of the subject not by discourse (a residually idealist category) but by material supplements such as the postal service, the typewriter, the photograph, and various systems of notation and information processing (see also Wellbery xiii).

[3] On the question of how British Romanticism is "literature-rich and relatively theory-poor," see Mileur (338).

[4] Readers who study the Renaissance will recall E. M. W. Tillyard's use of *world picture* in precisely the way Heidegger critiques.

[5] According to Ted Underwood, his article was submitted for this issue, but it arrived so early that it mistakenly got included in an earlier issue.

[6] I borrow *fold* from Gilles Deleuze, who uses it in the context of Leibniz and baroque thought (*Fold*). As Deleuze suggests elsewhere (*Michel Foucault*), the fold is the figure of Foucauldian archaeology, which creates a vanishing depth through a surface turned over onto itself.

[7] Rajan and O'Driscoll develop this point at greater length (Introduction 3–4).

[8] Schlegel writes, "The feeling for projects . . . fragments of the future—is distinguishable from the feeling for fragments of the past only by its direction: progressive in the former, regressive in the latter" (21).

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Works Cited

Agamben, Giorgio. *Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience*. Trans. Liz Heron. London: Verso, 1993.

Benjamin, Walter. *Illuminations*. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1969.

Berman, Antoine. *The Experience of the Foreign: Culture and Translation in Romantic Germany*. Trans. S. Heyvaert. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.

Bhabha, Homi. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1992.

Butler, Marilyn. *Romantics, Rebels, and Revolutionaries: English Literature and Its Background 1760–1830*. New York: Oxford UP, 1981.

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *Lectures 1818–1819 on the History of Philosophy*. Ed. J. R. de J. Jackson. Vol. 2. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. 2 vols.

Crawford, Robert. *Devolving English Literature*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

Deleuze, Gilles. *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.

———. *Michel Foucault*. Trans. Séan Hand. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988.

Derrida, Jacques. *Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994*. Ed. Elisabeth Weber. Trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.

Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage, 1972.

Godwin, William. *Lives of the Necromancers*. London: Mason, 1834.

———. "Of History and Romance." 1797. *Things As They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams*. Ed. Maurice Hindle. London: Penguin, 1988. 359–73.

Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Trans. Thomas Berger. Cambridge: MIT P, 1991.

Hegel, G. W. F. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*. Trans. T. M. Knox. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1975.

Heidegger, Martin. "The Age of the World Picture." "*The Question concerning Technology" and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper, 1977. 115–54.

Jaeger, Stephan. "Is German Romantic Historiography Possible?" Romanticism and History. 10th Annual Conf. of the North Amer. Soc. for the Study of Romanticism. U of Western Ontario. 24 Aug. 2002.

Kant, Immanuel. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*. Trans. Stanley L. Jaki. Norwich: Scottish Academic, 1981.

Kellner, Hans. *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked*. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1990.

Kittler, Friedrich. *Discourse Networks 1800–1900*. Trans. Michael Metteer and Chris Cullens. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990.

Mellor, Anne. *Romanticism and Gender*. New York: Routledge, 1993.

Mileur, Jean-Pierre. "The Return of the Romantic." *Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Contemporary Theory*. Ed. Tilottama Rajan and David L. Clark. Albany: State U of New York P, 1995. 325–48.

Poovey, Mary. *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998.

———. *Making a Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830–1864*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995.

Rajan, Tilottama. "Spirit's Psychoanalysis: Natural History, the History of Nature, and Romantic Historiography." *European Romantic Review* 14.3 (2003): forthcoming.

Rajan, Tilottama, and Michael J. O'Driscoll, eds. *After Poststructuralism: Writing the Intellectual History of Theory*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2002.

———. Introduction. Rajan and O'Driscoll, *After Poststructuralism* 3–21.

Schelling, F. W. J. *Ages of the World*. 1815. Trans. Jason M. Wirth. Albany: State U of New York P, 2000.

———. *Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom and Related Matters*. Trans. Priscilla Hayden-Roy. *Philosophy of German Idealism*. Ed. Ernst Behler. New York: Continuum, 1987. 217–84.

Schlegel, Friedrich. *Philosophical Fragments*. Trans. Peter Firchow. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991.

Simpson, David. *The Academic Postmodern: A Report on Half Knowledge*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995.

Siskin, Clifford. *The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in Britain, 1700–1830*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998.

Tillyard, E. M. W. *The Elizabethan World Picture*. London: Chatto, 1943.

Underwood, Ted. "Romantic Historicism and the Afterlife." *PMLA* 117 (2002): 237–51.

Vattimo, Gianni. *The Transparent Society*. Trans. David Webb. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992.

Wall, Anthony. "Contradictory Pieces of Time and History." Rajan and O'Driscoll, *After Poststructuralism* 197–226.

Waters, Lindsay. "A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Books of the Members of the MLA from Being a Burden to Their Authors, Publishers, and Audiences." *PMLA* 115 (2000): 315–17.

Wellbery, David E. Foreword. Kittler vii–xxxiii.

Wickman, Matthew. "The Allure of the Improbable: *Fingal*, Evidence, and the Testimony of the 'Echoing Hearth.'" *PMLA* 115 (2000): 181–94.

https://doi.org/10.1632/003081203X47741 Published online by Cambridge University Press