publicani was to ignore any change in legal status which might be to the advantage of tax-paying communities (p. 150), and play hardball until someone tried to oppose them. In particular, when tax-free status was granted, tax-farmers were not compensated in relation to the unexpired period of the tax-contract. They would carry on trying to collect, which was 'in gewisser Weise legitim' (p. 153).

Other strong chapters include that by Frank Kolb, tracing how and when there came to be a Roman province of Lycia ('Lykiens Weg in die römische Provinzordnung', pp. 207–22), Peter Herrmann, discussing the *koinon* of the Ionians under the Roman Empire ('Das koinon ton Ionon unter römischer Herrschaft', pp. 223–40), and that of Peter Weiss, continuing a long-standing debate over whether 'Asiarchs' and 'Chief Priests of Asia' (Archiereis tes Asias) were identical ('Asiarchen sind Archiereis Asias: eine Antwort auf S.J. Friesen', pp. 241–54).

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ANTIOCHUS VS. ROME

J. D. GRAINGER: *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great.* (*Mnemosyne* Supplementum 239.) Pp. xii + 386, maps. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2002. Cased, €120, US$140. ISBN: 90-04-12840-9.

The war between the Roman Republic and the Seleucid King Antiochus III (191–189 B.C.) was one of the most important conflicts of the ancient world: following shortly after their victories over Carthage and Philip V of Macedon, it humbled the last remaining rival great power and established the Romans as effective masters of the Mediterranean world. Considering its significance, the war has been relatively little studied. However, it has recently been set in context by J. Ma's brilliant analysis of Antiochus' relations with Greek cities (*Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* [Oxford, 1999]), and G. now provides the first book-length study of the origins and course of the war. This is a work of narrative political history, but G. deploys critical judgement throughout and, although some of his interpretations are questionable, the book is an important addition to the literature.

As might be expected from the author of three earlier books on Seleucid themes, G. seeks to write as far as possible from a Seleucid perspective. Sympathy for the Seleucid point of view in fact leads him to something like partisanship. Antiochus' aspirations are throughout presented as moderate and reasonable, he is exonerated from any responsibility for the war, and G. concludes by praising him for statesmanship in not fighting on after his defeat at Magnesia. This is a one-sided assessment of one of the most ambitious warrior rulers of the Hellenistic world. Tension with Rome was the inevitable consequence of Antiochus' determination to extract the maximum possible advantage in the eastern Aegean from the aftermath of Rome's conflict with Philip in 197–196, while, as for his decision to sue for peace after Magnesia, it seems unlikely that he considered any alternative.

The outbreak of the war came only after protracted diplomatic exchanges between Antiochus and the Romans (196–192), and this long delay is evidence of reluctance to resort to war on both sides. G. follows earlier interpreters such as Badian and Gruen in stressing this reluctance and the rôle of third parties such as the Aetolians in bringing

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on the conflict, and in arguing that even up to a very late stage war could have been avoided. In some respects, he takes this view further than any of his predecessors, and he is enabled to do this by his readiness to challenge the surviving ancient narratives and substitute what he regards as more probable reconstructions. It is true that we are almost wholly dependent on Polybius' account of events, for the most part mediated through Livy, and a robustly critical stance towards this version is to be applauded. However, at times G. seeks to overturn the Polybian story with a good deal more boldness than plausibility.

Polybius reports Roman representatives as presenting a series of demands in 196, two of which remained as stumbling blocks throughout the subsequent negotiations, namely that Antiochus should have no military presence in Europe and that he should keep away from the free Greek cities of Asia. G. rejects this account of the Roman position in 196 as deriving from later propaganda. He prefers to suppose that, as long as Flamininus remained in Greece, frequent communications passed between him and Antiochus which established a good understanding, marred only by a minor dispute over the free cities in Asia. Relations only worsened in 193, after Flamininus' return to Rome, as a result of Roman anxieties and internal conflicts. This analysis constitutes a radical and unwarranted departure from the Polybian version and implausibly minimizes the gap between the two sides. A more cogent interpretation would insist not only on the protagonists' reluctance for war, but also on the extent to which from 196 they took up incompatible positions which put them on a collision course (so rightly J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy Books XXXIV–XXXVII* [Oxford, 1981], pp. 30–3).

By 192 war had surely become inevitable, but it was precipitated by the Aetolian invitation of spring 192 for Antiochus to intervene in Greece and by the king's arrival there later in the year. Using Livy's Polybian account selectively, G. argues that Antiochus' aim in Greece was merely to restore stability to the region and that he continued to hope that war with Rome might be avoided. This is perverse: Antiochus' presence in Greece was bound to be unacceptable to Rome, and the king can have been under no illusion on this score. As Polybius saw (3.6.3), in crossing to Greece Antiochus was beginning the war with Rome.

G. (pp. 209–13) holds that the Roman war declaration was primarily against the Aetolians. This is based on a misinterpretation of Livy 36.3.11–12, which in fact reports the *fetiales*' ruling that a separate war declaration against the Aetolians was not required. This is not G.'s only misinterpretation of the sources: see e.g. pp. 103 (Livy 33.41.5), 198 (Micythio at Livy 35.46.9–13 said to concede that Chalcis was not free), 202 (Livy 35.50.2 represented as an Achaean declaration that the league had a treaty with Rome).

G.'s account of the course of the war is less controversial. He does, however, adopt a heterodox view of troop numbers at Magnesia (pp. 320–3, 359–61). The Polybian account, as represented by Livy (37.39–40) and Appian (*Syr.* 31), gives the Romans just over 30,000 and Antiochus 72,000 men. G. argues for much higher figures for the Romans and lower for Antiochus, giving the Romans superiority in infantry numbers. It is true that Livy's figures for individual Seleucid units add up to a substantially lower total, but explanations for the discrepancy are available (B. Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army* [Cambridge, 1976], pp. 8–9). On the Roman side, G. accepts all Livy's annalistic notices of troop deployments to the East in 192–190, and concludes that, even allowing for wastage, the Roman citizens and Italian allies alone at Magnesia will have amounted to about 40,000 men. However, this is implausibly large for what was only a two-legion army. It is more likely that the initial force taken across the Adriatic by

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M. Baebius Tamphilus in 192 was only small (P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 BC–AD 14* [Oxford, 1971], pp. 657–8; Briscoe, *Commentary*, pp. 37–8).

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THE AEACIDS

S. FUNKE: *Aiakidenmythos und epirotisches Königtum. Der Weg einer hellenischen Monarchie*. Pp. 238. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000. Paper, DM 80. ISBN: 3-515-07611-5.

In this lightly revised version of her 1995 dissertation, F. sets out to discover why the Molossian state came to have a royal dynasty at its head (p. 17). She believes that the mythical genealogy of the 'Pelasgian' Aeacids, rulers of the Molossian ethnos, provides an answer, as well as an insight into the early history of Epirus.

The monograph is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted to the mythical ancestry of the Aeacidae. In the seventh century, argues F., two different stories were in circulation concerning the return of Achilles' son Neoptolemus after the sack of Troy. One is preserved in the *Odyssey* (3.188–9, 4.4–9), according to which he went home to Phthia with the Myrmidons. The other subsisted in the Epic Cycle, where Neoptolemus was first linked with Epirus. There follows an analysis of sections from Pindar's *Paean* 6 and *Nemean Odes* 7 and 4, which report variant traditions about Neoptolemus' wanderings, including his death at Delphi. Pindar did not consciously elaborate the genealogical origins of the Molossian dynasty when he incorporated legendary elements involving Achilles and Neoptolemus in his epinician odes, and even caused offence: *Nem*. 7.53–65. (F. does not explore the admission in these lines that Pindar acted as *proxenos*: of the Molossians? See now I. Malkin, 'Greek Ambiguities: Between "Ancient Hellas" and "Barbarian Epirus" ', in I. Malkin [ed.], *Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity* [Harvard 2001], p. 202). Likewise, the fifth-century dramatists used several variants of the Neoptolemus story when handling Trojan themes (pp. 59–81). So it is not clear why F. allocates so much of her discussion to literary traditions that do little to advance her thesis. A revival of scholarly interest in the Aeacids is attributed to Theopompus' digression on the ancestry of Philip II's Molossian bride, Olympias. Meanwhile, Hector's widow Andromache was made the mother of four Epirote founder-heroes, while a different trend integrated Pyrrhus' ancestry with the Heraclids (pp. 95–101). Perhaps what the reader misses here most is a clearer spatial awareness. If location matters, as the concretion of stories that connect people—dynasties—with certain locations would suggest, why no consideration of Dodona, which the *Iliad* links, albeit in a round about way, with Achilles (*Il*. 16.234)?

The second part of the book traces the political history of the kingdom of Epirus, from the earliest regional associations recorded in the *Nostoi*, through the first documented Aeacid rulers: Alcon, one of the suitors of Agariste, the tyrant Cleisthenes' daughter at Sicyon (Hdt. 6.126–30); Admetus, who provided Themistocles with a stopping-off point *c*. 470 B.C.; Tharyps in the early years of the Peloponnesian War; and Alcetas, who joined the Second Athenian Confederacy (pp. 104–58). There are more nuances to be sought in the reign of Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Molossian (pp. 159–88). A brief review of the succeeding rulers, down to the end of

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