very moderate (indeed, the bibliography is somewhat scanty on titles in general linguistics and discourse analysis). L. illustrates the audience-orientedness of Aristotle's discourse by means of analyses of two whole works (the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*), as well as two comparative case studies of different Aristotelian treatments of the same topic (the discussions of *eudaimonia* in *EN* I, *Rhet*. I 5 and *Pol*. VII 1–3, and the discussions of animals in *PA* II–IV and *HA* I–VI). These analyses show how differences of style, emphasis, and degree of detail, and even apparent differences in doctrine between the various treatments, can be better understood from the overall nature of the text and its orientation towards particular types of audience or users. Thus, L. points out that the *EN* strongly involves the audience in the argumentation and is typically a text that would be suitable for oral presentation, whereas the *Rhet*. has much more the nature of a reference work, serving the varying needs of individual readers; and he reaches similar conclusions regarding the difference between *PA* and *HA*. This point about intended audience is of course somewhat problematic, since we know so little about what ancient audiences could or could not master, and especially in cases where the intended use is not so clear (such as the *De anima*), or where there is a mixture of styles within one text (as in the *Metaphysics* or the *Politics*, neither of which can really be regarded as a unity), there is the danger of the fallacy of audience limitation—quite apart from the fact that texts can be, or sometimes can even be meant to be, user-unfriendly. Yet even if not all of L.'s conclusions can be warranted in all detail, there is much to be appreciated in his treatment of the actual material. He discusses and compares a whole range of stylistic and argumentative procedures, expository techniques, formulae, and mannerisms which will be familiar to every student of Aristotle (and, indeed, of most ancient scientific and philosophical prose), such as Aristotle's habit of giving the wrong answer before putting things right, his aporetic style, his method of finding the right answer by means of elimination, his use of direct and indirect questions, rhetorical and disjunctive questions, his presentation of imaginary opponents, his use of formulae expressing caution (potential optatives, use of δοκεῖν, ἐοικέναι, φαίνεσθαι, ἴσως, etc.), announcements, pauses, summaries halfway through, definitions, enumerations, catalogues, and addressing the reader. What gradually unfolds from L.'s analysis is a kind of 'grammar' or 'rhetoric' (in the sense of a set of formal procedures) of Aristotelian discourse, and one feels a growing appreciation for the craftmanship that has gone into an Aristotelian argument and for the care that has been taken in the selection of the relevant formal techniques. This is all very illuminating, both for students in linguistics and for Aristotelian scholars. L. deserves to be congratulated for this pioneering piece of work, which will hopefully stimulate further research in this much neglected but deeply fascinating field. There is a very useful index of topics and of modern authors, though regrettably no index of passages discussed.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne PHILIP VAN DER EIJK

ARISTOTLE AS ETHICAL TEACHER

T. W. Smith: *Revaluing Ethics. Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy*. Pp. xiv + 325. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. Paper. ISBN: 0-7914-5142-9 (0-7914-5141-0 hbk).

Smith reads the *Nicomachean Ethics* as a protreptic work that seeks to transform the

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deepest convictions of ambitious young men attracted to noble action. Although some may incline to moral virtue, S. maintains that they are more likely to be animated by an understanding of nobility that celebrates 'beauty, physicality, life, and competition'—'a shining vitality that demands recognition from others' and expresses itself in self-assertive acts of domination (p. 35). Aristotle's pedagogical strategy proceeds dialectically: he first finds common ground with his audience by making explicit their attachment to noble action, then links their drive for glory to their desire for honor, and finally reveals how the problematic character of honor might conceal a deeper and potentially more satisfying desire for virtue.

The second and central part of S.'s book explains how Aristotle 'revalues' ethics by simultaneously presenting and undercutting the most reputable understandings of virtue that pervade his culture. Failure to attend to the many ambiguities, paradoxes, ironies, and even contradictions in this account has led many scholars to the facile but incorrect view that Aristotle merely mirrors pervasive Greek notions about human excellence (pp. 72–5). S. goes through Aristotle's catalogue of virtues, and in each case brings to light the critical and pedagogic stance that animates his analyses. He contends that Aristotle proceeds by means of a 'negative dialectic'; his goal is not to impart propositional information, but to show that his audience's conception of the good life breaks down on its own terms. Aristotle's negative dialectic culminates in his discussion of the 'crown' (*kosmos*) of human achievement—the comprehensive virtue of magnanimity (*megalopsychia*). S. utilizes different meanings of *kosmos* (both Olympic crown and female ornament) to point to a kind of Socratic irony that pervades Aristotle's treatment: the 'real man' concerned to exhibit greatness through the acquisition of honor is likened to a woman decked out in jewelry (p. 120). Whereas Aristotle began by identifying with his audience's desire for noble action, his portrait of the great-souled man 'tends to an empty, sterile inactivity' (p. 115). Although one might question the adequacy of S.'s account of *megalopsychia*, he maintains that it is supplanted by Aristotle's discussion of the second and more promising comprehensive virtue of justice that follows. The drive for self-sufficiency implicit in *megalopsychia* is superseded by a new notion of virtue based on the fact of human dependence and interdependence. It is this fact that grounds the priority S. assigns to equity (*epieikeia*), a virtue that embodies the 'whole of excellence' and is subsequently identified with practical wisdom (*phronesis*) (pp. 153, 162–3).

S. maintains that Aristotle's analysis effectively stands reputable Greek opinion on its head. After moving from an initial understanding of 'virtue-as-virility' to an understanding of 'virtue-as-equity' in the second part of his book, S. continues to chart Aristotle's pedagogical reversals in part three, where he addresses the themes of friendship and philosophy. The supreme value initially accorded to honor is displaced by friendship, which proves to be the most important 'external good'. Initial identification of happiness with the acquisition of non-shareable external goods is replaced by the cultivation of psychic activities that increase with sharing. And an original disparagement of philosophy as inactive and impractical gives way to an appreciation for philosophy that is both active and practical because it is indispensable to the most persistent of all human concerns—the desire for happiness (p. 245). Aristotle's notion of virtue-as-equity invests thought with a new and crucial rôle within which practical wisdom becomes the central and guiding virtue of a good and happy life (p. 265).

S.'s distinctive reading of the *NE* exhibits excellent knowledge of Greek, good command of the secondary literature, and a consistently clear and engaging style of writing. He develops a teaching profoundly at odds with the most pervasive

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assumptions of modern liberal societies, but one that S. brings to life as a vital and attractive alternative, at least on an individual level. One might, however, question whether he does full justice to the most radical demands of the philosophic life. S. ends his book by invoking a *zetetic* Aristotle—a 'true skeptic' who understands the 'socially dangerous' character of an activity that reveals the human situation with 'terrifying clarity', while at the same time resolutely resisting the temptation to ease the anxiety it provokes (pp. 282–3). But this final note seems oddly discordant with a more pervasive assurance about the ultimate harmony of the good, the true, and the beautiful (esp. p. 229) that permeates the book as a whole, an assurance that issues in characteristic counsels to 'wonder and thanksgiving'. S.'s Aristotle exudes at times an almost religious serenity, something that contributes to S.'s willingness to collapse the distinction between theoretical and practical virtue and renders him virtually tone deaf to the tension between them. Notwithstanding this serious limitation, S.'s attentiveness to the pedagogical architecture of the *NE*, careful analyses, and consistently thoughtful reflections make dialectical engagement with this book a fruitful and philosophically provocative experience.

Furman University ARISTIDE TESSITORE

ARISTOTLE ON THE LIFE CYCLE

R. A. H. KING: *Aristotle on Life and Death*. Pp. ix + 214. London: Duckworth, 2001. Paper, £14.99. ISBN: 0-7156-2982-4.

The book, the revised version of a Cambridge doctoral thesis, presents itself as a study of Aristotle's concept of nutrition and life-cycle. Yet the author's actual, and quite laudable, task is to make more intelligible Aristotle's view of the soul and living body, according to which soul is the form and living body is the matter (*De anima* 412a20–1) and that the soul is the actuality of the natural body (ibid. 412a28–9). K. is right to believe that Aristotle's view can be elucidated through the study of his physiological writings, that is, the so-called *Parva naturalia*, especially the treatises *On the Length and Shortness of Life* and *On Young and Old Age, Life and Death*. The author tries to show how the theoretical investigation in the *De anima* is continued in the *Parva naturalia* from a physiological or biological point of view. These writings are rich in material concerning questions such as what a living body is according to Aristotle, how a body operates as a living body (e.g. how it grows and maintains itself), and what happens when it dies. It is these questions that the book addresses.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first and final chapter examine Aristotle's conception of life-cycle, while the three central ones discuss nature (Chapter 2), the soul (Chapter 3), and the body (Chapter 4). In the first chapter, K. argues that his approach is innovative in that it examines Aristotle's view of life not in terms of substance, matter, and form, but in terms of life-processes, among which nutrition is fundamental. This approach would be welcome, but despite the assumed continuity between Aristotle's philosophical and biological works, K. makes little effort to relate the physiological processes with Aristotle's philosophical theory, and often makes statements that inspire little confidence. He says, for instance, that the soul as actuality

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