Introduction: Attacks of "9/11"

On September 11, 2001, a sunny Tuesday morning, nineteen terrorists hijacked four American passenger planes in coordinated suicide attack missions directed at landmark sites in America. The first plane, American Airlines Flight 11, hit the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City at 8:46 a.m. Seventeen minutes later, while all the world's media were covering the story without knowing exactly what happened, a second hijacked plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. At 9:37 a.m., a third plane crashed into the Pentagon. Passengers aboard a fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, fought back against hijackers who intended for it to hit a Washington, D.C. target, perhaps the U.S. Capitol; it instead crashed into farmland in Pennsylvania shortly after 10 a.m. In less than two hours, nearly 3000 people of several nationalities perished in the four coordinated attacks.

Members of the U.S. government learned of the first crash into the North Tower from CNN and assumed it was a pilot error. The possibility that the attacks were acts of terrorism became apparent after the second attack. Key American leaders assembled a videoconference and within hours, intelligence pointed to the Al Qaeda network under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, who was born in Saudi Arabia and operating in Afghanistan under the Taliban government.[2]

The visual spectacle of the collapsing World Trade Center towers transfixed people all over the world, and foreign leaders immediately released diplomatic statements of condolences for the victims, condemnation of the perpetrators, and support for American counter-terrorism efforts. One day after the attacks, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368, expressing the readiness of the international community to take steps to bring the perpetrators to justice. This involved implementing mechanisms designed to ensure global cooperation against terroristic threats.

The first foreign leader whom Bush contacted was British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had just declared, "This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. Vowing to "stand shoulder to shoulder" with "our American friends," Blair aggressively sought to build an international coalition to fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, traveling worldwide to have 54 meetings with foreign leaders in the first two months after the attacks.[3]

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[2] Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957, and killed by the United States in Pakistan in 2011.

[3] "Tony Blair's Corrosive Allegiance to George Bush Laid Bare for the First Time," *London Evening Standar*d, October 27, 2007, retrieved from www.standard.co.uk

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War Against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

With coalition support, on October 7, 2001, Bush announced that the United States and Britain had begun "carefully targeted" strikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. A month later, Bush pushed for further global support by insisting that partners must help America fight its "Global War on Terrorism" in a world that offers no room for fence-sitting,[4]

> Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity…You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) quickly authorized the intervention in Afghanistan and sent in its own multinational coalition in January 2002. Before 9/11, many believed NATO would become obsolete without the cold war. Originally mandated to oppose post-World War II Soviet communism, NATO members included Western European countries, the United States and Canada. Leaders found an opportunity to redefine NATO's role in a global context by supplying Bush with multinational forces involving as many fifty nations, putting into action the fifth article of the original NATO Treaty, enacted in 1949 and designed to work in concert with the United Nations charter,[5]

> Article 5
> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Axis of Evil: Broadening the "War on Terror"

When Bush took office in 2001, his attention was on East Asia. Bush's first secretary of state, Colin Powell, assured that, "We do plan to engage with North Korea and pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."[6] On the occasion of his 2002 State of the Union address four months after 9/11, Bush broadened the scope of the conflict. He

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[4] Cited in "Bush says it is time for action," *CNN*, November 6, 2001, retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2001/U.S./11/06/ret.bU.S.h.coalition/index.html

[5] "The North Atlantic Treaty," *NATO*, April 4, 1949, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

[6] "Kim's Nuclear Gamble: Chronology," *PBS Frontline*, 2003, retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/etc/cron.html

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claimed that a terrorist "axis of evil"—North Korea, Iraq and Iran— "threaten the peace of the world" because, he said, they seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and are likely to traffick arms to terrorists, attack American allies or "blackmail" the United States.[7] The American government further monitored weapons in North Korea and Iran while planning a full-scale invasion of Iraq.

Although the UN, NATO, and much of the international community gave their endorsement to the American-led intervention in Afghanistan, the same was not true when the Bush administration expanded its counterterrorism strategy to Iraq. Even some of America's key allies such as France and Germany believed that the invasion of Iraq constituted an unjust and illegal act of aggression. Unlike the Taliban government leading Afghanistan at the time, the Iraqi government was not linked to the Al Qaeda terrorists responsible for the attacks on America. Moreover, as is well known by now, Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, the main rationale for the pre-emptive strike ordered by the United States and allies as a counterterrorism strategy in 2003.

Japan's Immediate Response to the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq

Participating in the wars was politically complicated for many of the states that agreed to send troops and other assistance, a fact that the United States and United Kingdom failed to appreciate. This was especially true in the case of Japan, since Article Nine of its Constitution prohibits the use of force to resolve international disputes. It states:

> (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or Use of force as means of settling international disputes.
> (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

During the Gulf War of 1991, when a US-led, UN-mandated coalition fought Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein over his invasion of Kuwait, Japan handled that prohibition by offering substantial sums of money (and land mine clearance equipment) to the coalition, but no personnel. Allies criticized Japan for "checkbook diplomacy" that risked no Japanese lives. In response, immediately after that conflict, Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (1992) enabling its Self-Defense Forces to participate in UN Peacekeeping

[7] George W. Bush, State of the Union (Washington, D.C.: The White House), January 29, 2002, retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html The key speechwriter, Canadian David Frum, wrote that he was given an assignment specifically "to provide a justification for a war," assumed to mean a war with Iraq. Frum aimed to analogize the new enemy with the "axis" of World War II, and his superiors instructed him to use the theological tone of "evil." Iran and North Korea were added to the troika, perhaps, speculates Hendrick Hertzberg, to follow a "rule of three," to broaden the global reach of the enemy, or, most likely, as "affirmative action": North Korea was "bused in to lend diversity to what would otherwise have been an all-Muslim list." See Hendrick Hertzberg, "Axis Praxis," The New Yorker, January 13, 2003, retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/

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Operations. Since then, over 10,000 civilian and military personnel have deployed overseas in nearly thirty operations including in Cambodia, East Timor and Sudan. This participation can only legally take place in situations where all parties to an armed conflict have already agreed on a cease-fire.

In 2001, Japanese ambassador to the UN, Sato Yukio, cited the responsibility of Japan to support the American confrontation of Al Qaeda as something imperative to benefit the whole international community. In his October 2, 2001 address to the UN General Assembly, he signaled Japan's willingness "to engage even more actively in international cooperation, both within and outside the United Nations, to eliminate international terrorism."[8] On October 29, 2001, Japanese lawmakers passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, allowing Japan to provide "rear area" support to U.S. military operations on foreign territory. Japan's leaders from the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) also viewed participation in the conflicts in terms of duty to the U.S.-Japan alliance, as well as "a rare opportunity to promote their own visions of Japanese national interests," as Michael Penn sums up, which for this administration meant legitimizing and strengthening the Japanese military.[9]

Within weeks, three Japanese naval vessels sailed from Sasebo naval base to the Indian Ocean to begin refueling support for the U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Japan's role was minimal compared with contributions from other key allies of the United States, and still limited to humanitarian work, yet this participation was nonetheless momentous given Japan's history of pacifism after the Second World War. When it joined America's "coalition of the willing" in Iraq, Japan sent its first deployment of ground troops to an ongoing conflict not supported by the United Nations since 1945. Before 9/11, North Korea had been Japan's main foreign policy concern, so the "axis of Evil" declaration helped link Japan to cooperative counterterrorism efforts with the United States and other allies. Yet the actions in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly heightened Japan's overseas military presence. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement included here shows, the Japanese government also emphasized the humanitarian goals of its actions in Afghanistan, but this has not satisfied critics who want to maintain the tradition of pacifism, as the essays in Section III show.

Since Japan's Withdrawal

The Marine Self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean, the Ground Self-Defense Forces in Iraq, and the Air Self-Defense Forces who conducted airlifting missions from a base in

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[8] Yukio Sato, "Statement by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Permanent Representative of Japan Mr. Yukio Satoh at the 56th United Nations General Assembly, Oct. 2, 2001. Cited in Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japan Alliance* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014), p. 171.

[9] Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the U.S.-Japanese Alliance* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 2-3.

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Kuwait suffered no fatalities among its armed forces, although there were some hostage-taking incidents and deaths involving other Japanese citizens. At the end of 2003, just before Japan joined the coalition of the willing in Iraq, two of its diplomats were killed in an ambush attack. These sparked intense controversy in Japan, as discussed in Part III.

In Fall 2007, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law that allowed the J-MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to support multi-national troops in Afghanistan was set to expire. The LDP government wanted to renew the law but it was not popular among opposition leaders and the general public. Then Prime Minister Abe (LDP), in office for just one year in his first administration, resigned abruptly after publicly staking his career on the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Though many factors likely led to his unusual resignation, Abe formally connected his exit to the need "to turn the tide" against domestic opposition to American-led counterterrorism activities. Abe declared, "Under a new prime minister, the government should aim to continue the fight against terrorism, and to provide a breakthrough in this situation."[10] Nonetheless, the Anti-Terrorism Law expired in November 2007, and the administration of Prime Minister Fukuda enacted a new law, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, on January 11, 2008, which narrowed Japan's involvement in the Iraq conflict and only allowed refueling to continue until January 2010. Then in 2010, newly installed Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio ended the law as part of his Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) platform to reduce Japan's dependence on the United States and to support Article Nine of the Constitution. The DPJ had opposed participation in the US-led conflicts from the beginning, and had just taken over the premiership of Japan after almost continuous postwar leadership of the LDP.

By then, the U.S.-led wars, particularly in Iraq, had become more unpopular and many major countries had withdrawn from the coalitions. Indeed, Americans elected Barack Obama as President in 2009 in part because of his opposition to the discredited Iraq intervention while he was a state senator in Illinois. Aiming to keep his promise to end both wars, Obama initiated America's withdrawal from the Iraq conflict in 2011 and began a "drawdown" from Afghanistan in 2014 (though he was unable to complete this). By then, even government and military insiders had become more pessimistic about the prolonged conflicts that failed to result in decisive victory. Daniel Bolger, a retired lieutenant general, titled his 2014 memoir, *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan War,* and begins it bluntly: "I am a United States Army general, and I lost the Global War on Terrorism." Bolger affirms that the American-led wars were "two long, indecisive counterinsurgent struggles" that overstretched their limited purposes because of initial euphoria, arrogance and lack of adequate domestic debate or military opposition.[11]

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[10] Brett Murphy, "Japan PM resigns amidst fight over anti-terror law renewal," Jurist, September 12, 2007, retrieved from http://jurist.org/paperchase/2007/09/japan-pm-resigns-amidst-fight-over-anti.php; Norimitsu Onishi, "Prime Minister of Japan to Step Down," *New York Times*, September 12, 2007, retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/world/asia/12cnd-japan.html?ex=1190260800&en=3ba45a84c63534ae&ei=5065&partner=MYWAY&_r=0

[11] Daniel Bolger, *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014, pp. xiii, xvi, 442)

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Just as Americans increasingly described themselves as "war-weary," in Japan a more confidently repackaged Abe Shinzo returned as prime minister in late 2012, vowing to reinstate Japan's cultural pride and military strength. Prime Minister Abe's current campaign is to revise the pacifist Constitution to allow Japan to possess a full-fledged military. Abe began promoting the need for Constitutional reform to the LDP coalition partner, Komeito in earnest in 2014. Abe succeeded in passing two new security laws through parliament to effectively reinterpret Article Nine. One law explicitly allows Japan to provide logistical support for foreign troops in situations that affect Japan's security, and the other allows Japan to protect allies under attack under the concept of collective self-defense. The new security legislation went into effect in March 2016. Abe is expected to continue his campaign for full revision of the Constitution.

Japan's attention to Afghanistan and Iraq subsided as new military tensions in East Asia challenged the military relationship between the United States and Japan. One of the main issues at stake throughout decades of postwar debate on Article Nine has been the fear that Japan would get dragged into America's wars. That issue remains important. Since Japan's pullout from Iraq and the Indian Ocean a second concern is whether Americans would protect Japan in a possible war with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.[12] The tiny, uninhabited islands are claimed by both Japan and China but are administered by Japan. The area they occupy in the East China Sea has become increasingly contentious since 2012, with both nations making provocative shows of military strength in the area to the extent that war might break out at any time. As one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complained, fearing American reluctance to get involved in more military conflicts, "Is the Obama administration really to be counted on?"[13] And it is not at all clear that it is in the best interests of the United States to support Japan if this dispute flares up into all-out war. Security expert Doug Bandow has advised Americans not to be dragged into war against China on behalf of allies such as Japan, over a territorial dispute such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. "Benefits to America are indirect and limited," he warns, and the impression that the United States will "bail out" allies who are in trouble only encourages them to possibly "underinvest in defense, take greater risks, reject compromises, and dismiss negotiations."[14] So far, however, the governments of both Japan and America have continued to express a strong commitment to each other's security.

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[12] U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has formally stated that, "Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands," obliquely signifying U.S. support for Japan. U.S. Dept. of Defense, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," November 23, 2013, retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392

[13] Takashi Oshima, "Japan Questions Whether It Can Still Rely On U.S. Alliance," *Asahi Shimbun/AJW*, February 4, 2014.

[14] Doug Bandow, "Americans Shouldn't go to War with China over Asian Territorial Disputes," *Forbes*, August 5, 2016 (commentary).

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The extent to which America's post-9/11 conflicts affected state and society in Japan at the beginning of the 21st century may seem unimportant amid other global problems such as acts of terrorism conducted by ISIS and the global rise of authoritarian, nativist politics often directed at immigration and refugee problems. In Japan, too politicians and citizens have turned their attention to the "3.11" earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster, new levels of conflict with China, and debate over Constitutional revision. Yet the post-9/11 "war on terror" mainly involving American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq deserves renewed attention. Many of these transnational problems have roots in the discredited foreign policy decisions of the "war on terror," including the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and even ISIS itself. The officials who seek to redefine Japan's security role also draw from their experience in Japan's first overseas mission to a conflict zone since the end of World War II.

Japan's participation in the U.S.-led wars still matters to its sociopolitical climate—both regarding international relations and domestic politics. That experience raised questions such as: How much should Japanese citizens trust allies' representations of international conflicts? Should Japan resume an international posture focused on United Nations support, rather than mainly the US-Japan alliance? Can citizens criticize the foreign policy decisions of their government? To reflect on those questions and other issues concerning the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, this course reader offers some of the key articles published in the *Asia-Pacific Journal* during the peak years of those conflicts.

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