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Towards an Interdisciplinary Conceptualization of Trust: A Typological Approach

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ABSTRACT Adopting a diversity-in-unity perspective that identifies all shared dimensions and typical delineations, both as structure-similar yet content-diverse configurations, this paper proposes an interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust with primary trust ideal-types. This conceptualization contains three components: (i) a typology of four trust dimensions related to trust conditions and trust functions; (ii) a typology of four trust delineations derived from the four trust dimensions; and (iii) a typology of four trust ideal-types built upon the first two typologies. These typologies jointly serve as a salient platform to unify the fragmented trust literature.

KEYWORDS diversity-in-unity, duality, trust-as-attitude, trust-as-choice, typology of trust

There has been a dramatic surge of scholarly interest in the role of trust for organizational management in general and strategic alliances in particular (Gambetta, 1988; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Zaheer and Harris, 2006). Trust is important for cooperation in risky situations (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001; Luhmann, 1979) between individuals (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Giddens, 1990) and organizations (e.g., Dyer and Chu, 2003; Uzzi, 1997). However, largely due to a narrow focus based on discipline-bounded perspectives, this intense effort has resulted in little cumulative theory building. Thus, there is no integrated framework to interpret the extant empirical data and guide future research on the nature, feature, content, process, antecedent and consequence of trust (Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002). As Child (2001, p. 275) points out, 'trust remains an under-theorized, under-researched, and therefore, poorly understood phenomenon'. The problem is especially acute for organizational trust (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001, 2002; McEvily et al., 2003; Sydow, 1998; Zaheer and Harris, 2006).

To help clarify the conceptual confusion, this article conducts a comprehensive survey of the trust literature so as to: (i) provide an integrated conceptualization of trust; and (ii) highlight the imperative for developing an integrated framework of

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trust in general and organizational trust in particular. This paper adopts a diversity-in-unity perspective. It offers a multidimensional and interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust with three components: (i) a typology of four trust dimensions with two related to trust conditions and two related to trust functions; (ii) a typology of four trust delineations derived from the typology of trust dimensions; and (iii) a typology of four trust ideal-types based on the first two typologies. These three typologies will provide a platform to unify the fragmented literature. Hence, the unique contributions of this article lie in two aspects. First, it introduces an integrative perspective on typology development. Second, it applies this view to trust towards the typologies of trust dimensions, delineations and ideal-types.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I propose a new perspective to find a structural unity in the diverse literature. Second, I apply this perspective to the identification of four dimensions. Third, I apply the typology of trust dimensions to the classification of four delineations of trust. Fourth, I propose a typology of four trust ideal-types. I conclude with a discussion of the key implications of trust dimensions, delineations and ideal-types for the development of an integrated framework of trust.

THE DIVERSITY-IN-UNITY PERSPECTIVE OF TRUST

Despite its increasing importance, trust has no universally accepted definition, and there is no consensus regarding its essential nature and features. At best, researchers only agree to disagree (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). Some scholars even argue that trust is so elusive (Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002; Shapiro, 1987) that it almost defies vigorous conceptualization (Kramer, 1999; Moellering, 2006; Nooteboom, 2002; Williamson, 1993). There seems to be a serious problem of *homonymy* (i.e., one label to cover multiple constructs), so the biggest challenge could be to differentiate various types of trust and synthesize them into an integrated framework (Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002; Moellering, 2006; Nooteboom, 2002). The diverse conceptualizations of trust in part are due to discipline-bounded perspectives (Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Kramer, 1999; McKnight et al., 2002). Scholars have called for an interdisciplinary and integrated framework to accommodate diversity within a holistic system (Bigley and Pearce, 1998; McEvily et al., 2003; Rousseau et al., 1998).

This paper is in response to the call that 'for trust to be a useful concept, its principle components must be identified, operationalized, and measured' (Koza and Lewin, 1998, p. 259). I take issue with both the premature optimism about apparent consensus (e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007) and the outdated pessimism about apparent chaos (e.g., Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Hardin, 2002; Kramer, 1999; McKnight et al., 2002). I adopt the view that a consensus is indeed emerging concerning the generic dimensions of trust, but the views on the specifics remain diverse. Hence, a typological approach, which

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identifies a set of ideal types of a phenomenon according to the most relevant dimensions (Doty and Glick, 1994; McKelvey, 1982; Rich, 1992), would be very helpful for developing an integrated framework of trust. Despite its popularity, the typological approach is misunderstood often as a system of classification rather than a form of theory (cf. Bacharach, 1989). Most of the extant typologies are criticized as inadequately developed because of their overemphasis on describing ideal types and their underemphasis on developing the underlying logic for the ideal types (Doty and Glick, 1994). Despite the controversial distinction between classification system and typology, the latter cannot be developed without the former because the underlying dimensions should be identified before classifying the interrelated ideal types in accordance with the set of common dimensions (McKelvey, 1982; Rich, 1992).

Following Rich (1992), I adopt the approach of nominal typology for an integrated conceptualization of trust with its key features of being theory based, nominally constructed, multidimensional, empirically supported and interdisciplinary. Integrating the notions of dimension classification and ideal-type typology, I propose a new perspective. This perspective requires identifying a common set of dimensions for all the components of a phenomenon, and then developing a typology as a two-tiered theory: a grand theory at the typological level and a set of middle-range theories at the ideal-typical level (Doty and Glick, 1994). Since both typology and ideal-type exist as structure-similar (i.e., a common set of dimensions) yet content-diverse (i.e., a set of different values attached to such dimensions) configurations, this new perspective is referred to as the *diversity-in-unity perspective.* This perspective was inspired by the deeply-rooted value of diversity-in-unity in the Chinese culture. For instance, the symbol of the dragon embodies the notion of diversity-in-unity in China by combining the body parts of different animals into a single unified frame. Further, according to Confucius, diversity-in-unity is a desirable quality of noble men. In Book 13 of his 'Analects', Confucius states that noble men are harmonious but not homogenous, while mean men are homogenous but not harmonious (cf. Waley, 1989). This view is in sharp contrast to the notion of homophily in the West, i.e., homogenous thus harmonious (McPherson et al., 2001). The notion of diversity-in-diversity is built on the epistemological lens of duality, also referred to as the dialectical logic for paradox, which takes each phenomenon or entity as consisting of two contrary (even contradictory) yet interdependent elements like two sides of the same coin (Li, 1998, 2007; Sydow, 1998). Applying this perspective to the analysis of trust, I identify three typologies: trust dimensions, trust delineations and trust ideal-types towards an interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust.

A TYPOLOGY OF TRUST DIMENSIONS

Despite disagreement over the specifics of trust, scholars share the view that trust is highly complex with multiple dimensions. Further, despite its diversity, the

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literature on trust seems to converge towards four quintessential dimensions of trust reflected in most trust definitions (see Table 1). The four dimensions are: (i) trustor's *uncertainty* of trustee's dependability; (ii) trustor's *vulnerability* of dependency; (iii) trustor's *expectation* of trustee's trustworthiness; and (iv) trustor's *willingness* of trustfulness (referred to as the desire or intention to place trust in others). To clarify the confusion about the distinctions and links between the four dimensions of trust, I explicitly redefine each dimension. Among the set of four common dimensions, the first two, uncertainty and vulnerability, can be taken as necessary and sufficient *conditions of trust*. The last two, expectation and willingness, can be taken as necessary and sufficient *functions of trust* (cf. Rousseau et al., 1998). While the conditions for trust are related to the necessity and feasibility of trust for social exchange, the functions of trust are related to the role and effect of trust in social exchange.

Further, the four dimensions of trust are embedded in a shared fundamental assumption about exchange that trust serves as the anchor (i.e., condition or antecedent) and embodiment (i.e., function or consequence) of special social ties for exchanges in and across individual and collective domains (Moellering, 2006; Seligman, 1997). Hence, trust condition and function constitute a major part of trust. Finally, while the dimension of trust expectation (of trustee's trustworthiness) relates more directly to that of trust uncertainty, the dimension of trust willingness (of trustor's trustfulness) relates more directly to that of trust vulnerability. In sum, all trust elements derive from a set of trust dimensions as the basis for the conceptualization of trust as a holistic (defined as systematic and inclusive), dynamic (defined as evolutionary and changing) and dialectical (defined as paradoxical and dualistic) construct. I now discuss the specific details of each dimension and offer a systematic analysis of the links between the four dimensions.

The First Trust Dimension: Uncertainty of Dependability

The general consensus is that trust will not matter if there is resolute certainty regarding a trustee's dependability. Uncertainty of dependability – the risk of depending on others – is generally regarded as the first condition for trust. Nevertheless, scholars differ in their specific views on such uncertainty. The first view narrowly perceives such uncertainty as the imperfect predictability of the macro-level system, including the unintended outcomes of legal and moral institutions (e.g., Hosmer, 1995; Pearce, 2001). I refer to this as system risk, which is objective and partially calculable. The second view broadly sees such uncertainty as the imperfect predictability of both macro-level systems and micro-level exchanges (e.g., Barber, 1983; Nooteboom, 2002; Zand, 1972). Micro-level exchange is generally subject to two types of risk: (i) the ability or competence of exchange partners to manage the system risk for the shared benefits of exchange partners; and (ii) the intention or motive of exchange partners to avoid the opportunism to take advantage of partners (Das and Teng, 2001). I call the former ability risk

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Table 1. A typology of trust dimensions

A set of four dimensions	*Uncertainty of dependability*	*Vulnerability of dependency*	*Expectation of trustworthiness*	*Willingness of trustfulness*
Nature of Dimensions / *Features of Views*	*1st Trust Condition*	*2nd Trust Condition*	*1st Trust Function*	*2nd Trust Function*
1st Narrow View	Macro-Level System: *System Risk*	Failure of Informal Mode *Formal Mode as a Substitute*	Confidence in Depersonalized Outcome	Psychological Attitude: *Affective Intention*
Broad View	Macro-Level System + Micro-Level Exchange: *System Risk* + *Ability Risk* + *Intention Risk*	Failure of Strong-informal Mode *Formal Mode* + *Informal Mode As Supplements*	Confidence in Depersonalized Outcome + Depersonalized or Personalized Intention	Psychological Attitude: *Cognitive Intention* + *Affective Intention*
Moderate View	Micro-Level Exchange: *Ability Risk* + *Intention Risk*	Failure of Formal Mode *Weak-Informal Mode as a Substitute or Weak-*+ *Strong-Informal Modes as Supplements*	Confidence in Depersonalized Ability + Depersonalized or Personalized Goodwill	Behavioural Choice: *Cognitive Commitment*
2nd Narrow View	Micro-Level Exchange: *Intention Risk*	Failure of Formal & Weak-Informal Modes *Strong-Informal Mode as a Substitute*	Confidence in Personalized Goodwill	Behavioural Choice: *Cognitive Commitment* + *Affective Commitment*

Note: All issues are viewed from the perspective of trustor towards trustee.

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(objective and calculable) and the latter intention risk (subjective and partially calculable). The third view treats such uncertainty as the imperfect predictability of the micro-level exchange with both intention and ability risks (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001; Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995). The fourth view treats uncertainty only as intention risk (e.g., Hardin, 2002; Lewicki et al., 2006; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Li, 1998, 2007; Shapiro, 1987; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994).

The central issue of uncertainty of dependability is that trust is not related to all types of risk; rather, trust is related only to the special risk of depending on others (Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). Further, this risk can be objective or subjective (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Zand, 1972). Objective risk refers to the actual unpredictability of future events regardless of human attitudes, while subjective risk refers to the perceived unpredictability of future events subject to human attitudes (Zand, 1972). It is evident that trust is more related to subjective risk than objective risk (Krishnan et al., 2006), supporting the view that trust is primarily concerned with perceived risk rather than actual risk (Gambetta, 1988; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Rousseau et al., 1998). Even so, there is no consensus regarding the relevance of various risks to trust (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Luhmann, 1979).

To help clarify the link between risk and trust, it is critical to differentiate impersonal or system (referred to as *depersonalized*, which is relationship free, universalistic and unilateral in nature) bases and contents of trust from personal or relational (referred to as *personalized*, which is relationship specific, particularistic and reciprocal in nature) ones (Giddens, 1990; Hardin, 2002; Hogg and Terry, 2000; Li, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002; Seligman, 1997; Shamir and Lapidot, 2003; Williamson, 1993). However, scholars (e.g., Jones and George, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995) tend to mix up depersonalized elements (e.g., ability, integrity and benevolence) with personalized elements (e.g., shared interests, shared values and shared affects). Hence, I draw an explicit distinction between depersonalized and personalized elements as the primary rationale for conceptualizing trust as a truly multidimensional construct. Specifically, the relationship free system risk and ability risk are treated as depersonalized, while intention risk is either depersonalized (if it is relationship free and unilateral) or personalized (if it is relationship specific and reciprocal). Even though system risk influences ability risk and intention risk (with the latter as the core of transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), the emerging consensus tends to treat system risk as indirectly relevant to trust; intention risk as directly relevant to trust, and ability risk as somewhere between system risk and intention risk (Kramer, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Zand, 1972).

It is controversial whether or not ability risk is relevant to trust (cf. Das and Teng, 1998, 2001; Hardin, 2002). Some (e.g., Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994) argue that ability risk relates to *confidence* rather than to trust, but they mix up the institutional sources of depersonalized trust with the relational sources of person-

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alized trust by regarding both as confidence rather than trust. Others claim that confidence applies to all depersonalized elements, while trust applies to all personalized elements (e.g., Luhmann, 1979; Seligman, 1997). Hence, it is imperative to specify the links between distinctive types of risk and trust in light of the unique distinction between depersonalized and personalized elements. This is especially acute in the cultural contexts of the East and the West, with depersonalized elements prevailing in the West and personalized ones pertinent in the East (Li, 1998, 2007; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Yuki et al., 2005). In sum, related to the risks of system, ability or intention, uncertainty of dependability is the first trust dimension necessary for trust to serve as a mode to manage exchange risk.

The Second Trust Dimension: Vulnerability of Dependency

Directly related to the uncertainty of dependability, the emerging consensus is that trust will not matter if there are perfect modes of exchange governance (hereafter referred to as *exchange mode*) to eliminate uncertainty of dependability. Hence vulnerability of dependency as the lack of a perfect mode to reduce risk is regarded as the second condition for trust. Nevertheless, scholars differ in their specific views on such vulnerability. Many fail to explicitly differentiate vulnerability from uncertainty (e.g., Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Seligman, 1997), while some consider uncertainty as all risks inherent in dependency, while vulnerability as only acceptable non-controllable risk (e.g., Gambetta, 1988; Hosmer, 1995; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Mayer et al., 1995; Moellering, 2006). Others even regard vulnerability as an opportunity to test and build trust (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Molm et al., 2000; Zand, 1972).

Vulnerability can be differentiated from uncertainty in three areas. First, vulnerability is narrower in scope than uncertainty. While uncertainty consists of objective and subjective risks as well as controllable and non-controllable risks, vulnerability can be viewed as retaining only subjective non-controllable risk. Second, vulnerability is dependent on the type of risk and the type of measures to reduce the risk, while uncertainty is independent of the type of risk and the type of measures. For instance, while system risk cannot be reduced by any measure, ability risk is reducible by depersonalized measures, and intention risk is partially reducible by either depersonalized or personalized measures. Third, vulnerability can be an opportunity to build trust. While uncertainty is generally regarded as a negative threat, vulnerability can be voluntarily created and increased as a positive opportunity to test and build personalized trust (Giddens, 1990; Li, 1998, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Molm et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997; Zand, 1972). In this sense, depersonalized trust is a psychological attitude in terms of confidence resulting from the adoption of control or a tolerance for risk without control, while personalized trust is a behavioural choice of increasing one's vulnerability without control. It is in this sense that we can treat trust as an exchange mode. In sum, I refer to

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vulnerability as the subjective risk of accepting or forgoing various imperfect exchange modes of control, in contrast to uncertainty as the broad objective risk of depending on others.

Related to the notion of trust as one of the three primary exchange modes (market price and hierarchy authority as the other two exchange modes, Adler, 2001; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; McEvily et al., 2003; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997), it is helpful to differentiate two basic exchange modes to manage vulnerability of dependency (Li, 1998, 2007; cf. Das and Teng, 2001; Moellering, 2005). The first is the exchange mode of *control* as an externally imposed sanction, including *formal control* (i.e., market price and hierarchy authority) and *informal control* (i.e., social or group norm and peer pressure as social or clan control). The second is the exchange mode of *commitment*, which is defined as internally motivated goodwill of voluntary choice for building and maintaining personalized relationships (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Kollock, 1994; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). Similar to control, commitment also has two forms: (i) *weak-informal commitment* (i.e., shared values and shared interests with no or weak shared affects); and (ii) *strong-informal commitment* (i.e., shared interests, shared values and shared affects) (Gibbons, 2004; Jones and George, 1998; Li, 1998, 2007; Saparito et al., 2004). The notion of commitment, in contrast to control for compliance, characterizes trust as a unique exchange mode. I further differentiate personalized trust as a mode of commitment from depersonalized trust as a control based confidence or assurance (Hardin, 2002; Luhmann, 1979; Seligman, 1997). I explicitly differentiate control and personalized trust as two categorically distinctive exchange modes, and also differentiate weak and strong versions of each mode by evoking the notions of formal and informal exchange modes (Li, 2005; cf. Das and Teng, 2001; Flynn, 2005; Moellering, 2005).

To differentiate 'formal' from 'informal' and 'weak-informal' from 'strong-informal,' I need to explicitly define formality and informality. I identify five basic dimensions of formality-informality (Li, 2005, 2007): codification, formation, enforcement, power and personalization. Informality refers to the nature of the social tie or event as implicitly assumed, endogenously embraced and flexibly enforced by horizontal peer pressures in a personalized process (e.g., subjective, affective, people based and sentimental). Formality on the other hand is explicitly prescribed, exogenously imposed and rigidly enforced by vertical authority powers in a depersonalized process (e.g., objective, cognitive, task-based and instrumental). Personalized trust, strong social ties, affective commitment, relational contracts, organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB), non-verbal communication, tacit knowledge and intuition are all *strong-informal* in nature; clan control, religion, culture, ethics and transformational leadership are all *weak-informal* in nature; law, state, ownership, hierarchy form, transactional leadership, verbal communication, explicit knowledge and analytic cognition are all *strong-formal* in nature; market and delegation are all *weak-formal* in nature. Hence, this full spectrum from strong-

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formal to strong-informal can cover all types of social entities and their specific components.

While most scholars acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that a trustor's vulnerability derives from the failure of formal exchange modes (e.g., market price and hierarchical authority), they often confound the weak-informal mode of social control with the strong-informal mode of personalized trust as commitment (e.g., Adler, 2001; Das and Teng, 2001; Powell, 1990). It is imperative to differentiate uncertainty from vulnerability in light of exchange mode. While the former is independent of exchange mode since uncertainty exists irrespective of which exchange mode is adopted, the latter is dependent on exchange mode because the nature and level of vulnerability differ with each exchange mode. In this sense, uncertainty can be treated as a mode free risk, while vulnerability is a mode specific risk. Finally, the controversy about the link between control and trust as either complementary or conflicting (cf. Das and Teng, 2001; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Moellering, 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) can be resolved by differentiating personalized trust as an exchange mode from depersonalized trust as a confidence resulting from control. While personalized trust will be in conflict with control as a direct substitute, depersonalized trust can complement control as a direct supplement.

Based on formal-informal and strong-weak exchange modes, four different views about vulnerability can be identified. First, vulnerability can be viewed narrowly as a perceived failure or imperfection of informal mode, and thus in favour of a formal mode as a single substitute towards depersonalized system trust (e.g., Pearce, 2001; Zucker, 1986). Second, vulnerability can be seen broadly as the perceived failures or imperfections of both formal and informal modes, and thus in favour of combining formal and informal modes as a pair of supplements towards a mixed trust (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001; Giddens, 1990; Kramer, 1999; Shamir and Lapidot, 2003; Shapiro, 1987; Uzzi, 1997). Third, vulnerability can be viewed moderately as a perceived failure or imperfection of either a formal or strong-informal mode, and thus in favour of either weak-informal mode as a single substitute towards a moral trust (e.g., group norm, Adler, 2001; Hosmer, 1995; Ouchi, 1980), or combining weak- and strong-informal modes as a pair of supplements towards a mixed trust (e.g., blending group norm and personal tie, Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Gambetta, 1988; Jones and George, 1998; Powell, 1990; Rousseau et al., 1998). Fourth, vulnerability can be seen narrowly as the perceived failures or imperfections of both formal and weak-informal modes, and thus in favour of a strong-informal mode as a single substitute towards personalized strong trust (e.g., Gibbons, 2004; Granovetter, 1985; Li, 1998, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Molm et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997; Zand, 1972). In sum, related to the failure of formal or informal control mode, vulnerability of dependency is the second trust dimension and a necessary condition for trust to serve as a mode to manage exchange risk.

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The Third Trust Dimension: Expectation of Trustworthiness

Related to the above two dimensions, especially the second, the emerging consensus is that trust serves as a trustor's expectation of a trustee's trustworthiness. This expectation reflects the trustor's attitude towards, and judgment of, the trustee's trustworthiness despite the real uncertainty and perceived vulnerability of depending on others. Hence, expectation of trustworthiness can be regarded as the first function of trust. Scholars differ in their specific views on expectation of trustworthiness. The first view narrowly perceives expectation of trustworthiness as a positive prediction of depersonalized *outcome* in terms of performance reliability (e.g., Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Gambetta, 1988). The second view broadly regards expectation of trustworthiness as a positive prediction of both depersonalized outcome and depersonalized or personalized *intention* (e.g., Barber, 1983; Kramer, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). The third view moderately treats expectation of trustworthiness as a prediction of specific depersonalized *ability* and personalized *goodwill* (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001; Levin and Cross, 2004; McAllister, 1995). The fourth view narrowly takes expectation of trustworthiness as a prediction of personalized *goodwill* (e.g., Barney and Hansen, 1994; Gibbons, 2004; Hardin, 2002; Li, 1998, 2007; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997).

There are three key controversies concerning expectation of trustworthiness. The first controversy concerns different targets of trust in terms of the reliability of natural things (e.g., climate and computers as the targets of trust) and the credibility of social entities (e.g., social ties and institutions as the objects of trust) (cf. Hardin, 2002; Nooteboom, 2002). The second controversy concerns different sources of trust in terms of the credibility of depersonalized sources (e.g., target-generic ability and character of individuals as well as target-generic rule and norm of formal and informal institutions) and the credibility of personalized sources (e.g., target-specific care and goodwill towards friends) (cf. Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986). The third controversy concerns the distinction between depersonalized expectations of trustee's trustworthiness (e.g., target-generic ability, integrity and benevolence) and personalized expectations of mutual trustworthiness (e.g., target-specific shared interests, shared values and shared affects) (cf. Jones and George, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995). The former derives from relationship free depersonalized sources, while the latter from relationship specific personalized ones. In sum, related to the prediction of outcome, ability or goodwill, expectation of trustworthiness is the third trust dimension and a necessary function for trust to serve as a mode to manage exchange risk.

The Fourth Trust Dimension: Willingness of Trustfulness

Despite its importance, the explicit distinction between expectation of trustworthiness and willingness of trustfulness has never been well established (Dietz and den

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Hartog, 2006; Lewicki et al., 2006), and the function of trustfulness has rarely been empirically studied (see Gillespie, 2003; Mayer and Davis, 1999; Mayer and Gavin, 2005 for exceptions). To avoid the typical mistake of equating trust to expectation of trustworthiness, I explicitly refer to the intention or decision to place trust as willingness of *trustfulness* (Dietz and den Hartog, 2006; Gillespie, 2003; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002). Hence, willingness of trustfulness should be regarded as the second function of trust. Nevertheless, scholars differ in their specific views on the trustor's willingness of trustfulness. First, willingness of trustfulness is narrowly perceived as a psychological state of *affective attitude* towards personalized trust (e.g., Gibbons, 2004; Saparito et al., 2004; Settoon and Mossholder, 2002; Williamson, 1993). Second, willingness of trustfulness is broadly viewed as a psychological state of either *cognitive or affective,* or even dispositional (i.e., a subconscious predisposition due to personality) *attitude* towards depersonalized or personalized trust (e.g., Hardin, 2002; Hosmer, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). Third, willingness of trustfulness is moderately treated as a behavioural choice of both *cognitive and affective commitments* towards personalized trust (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Li, 1998, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Moellering, 2006; Uzzi, 1997; Zand, 1972). Fourth, willingness of trustfulness is narrowly taken as a behavioural choice of *cognitive commitment* to depersonalized trust (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Kollock, 1994; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).

The controversy regarding this dimension is concerned with the distinction between two fundamental views of trust as a psychological attitude or as a behavioural choice (Dietz and den Hartog, 2006; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki et al., 2006). The former regards trust as a trustor's evaluation of, and desire to rely on, a trustee's trustworthiness prior to a decision to place trust, thus defining both trustworthiness and trustfulness in psychological terms (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). In contrast, the latter views trustfulness as a trustor's choice of commitment as a decision to demonstrate or prove his/her own trustworthiness, especially for initiating a trust-building process, thus defining trustfulness in behavioural terms (e.g., Luhmann, 1979; Zand, 1972). As a duality of trust, the distinction and link between psychological attitude and behavioural choice are critical to the proposed conceptualization of trust. In sum, related to the intention of psychological attitude or behavioural choice with cognitive or affective motive, willingness of trustfulness is the fourth trust dimension and a necessary function for trust to serve as a mode to manage exchange risk.

A TYPOLOGY OF TRUST DELINEATIONS

Based on the typology of trust dimensions, I develop a typology of four trust delineations (see Table 2). In particular, I focus on the two dimensions of trust condition in terms of broadly or narrowly defined uncertainty of dependability and

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Table 2. A typology of trust delineations

1st Trust Delineation: Broad-Attitude	***3rd Trust Delineation: Narrow-Attitude***
Necessary Conditions of Trust:	*Necessary Conditions of Trust:*
1. **Uncertainties** as All Relevant	1. **Uncertainty** of Intention as Relevant
2. **Vulnerability** of Formal/Informal Modes [in favour of a combination of both modes]	2. **Vulnerability** of Formal/Strong-informal Modes [in favour of only weak-informal mode]
Feasible Functions of Trust:	*Feasible Functions of Trust:*
3. **Expectation** of Depersonalized Goodwill or Ability [Trust-As-Attitude]	3. **Expectation** of Depersonalized Goodwill [Trust-As-Attitude]
4. **Willingness** of Cognitive Trustfulness [Trust-As-Attitude]	4. **Willingness** of Cognitive Trustfulness [Trust-As-Attitude]
2nd Trust Delineation: Broad-Mix	***4th Trust Delineation: Narrow-Choice***
Necessary Conditions of Trust:	*Necessary Conditions of Trust:*
1. **Uncertainties** as All Relevant	1. **Uncertainty** of Intention as Relevant
2. **Vulnerability** of Formal Mode [thus in favour of all informal modes]	2. **Vulnerability** of Formal/Weak-informal Modes [thus in favour of only strong-informal mode]
Feasible Functions of Trust:	*Feasible Functions of Trust:*
3. **Expectation** of Personalized or Depersonalized Goodwill or Ability [Trust-As-Attitude]	3. **Expectation** of Personalized Goodwill [Trust-As-Attitude]
4. **Willingness** of Cognitive or Affective Trustfulness [Trust-As-Attitude or Trust-As-Choice]	4. **Willingness** of Cognitive-Affective Trustfulness [Trust-As-Choice]

Note: The horizontal dimension is concerned primarily with the issue of ***trust condition*** in terms of broadly or narrowly defined uncertainty and vulnerability, while the vertical dimension is concerned primarily with the issue of ***trust function*** in terms of psychologically or behaviourally defined trustworthiness and trustfulness.

vulnerability of dependency as well as the two dimensions of trust function in terms of psychological attitude or behavioural choice.

To respond to the call for 'connecting the psychological and sociological micro-foundations of trust with the macro-bases of organization' (McEvily et al., 2003, p. 91), the typology of four trust dimensions is applied to the conceptualization of trust in developing a typology of four trust delineations. This typology delineates the multidimensional and interdisciplinary nature of trust. Hence, this typology overcomes the typical problem of not specifying the underlying causal logics (Doty and Glick, 1994) and is used to organize the extant literature.

The First Delineation: A Broad-Attitude View

This view focuses on a trustor's cognitive willingness as a psychological attitude. It treats trustfulness as a psychological antecedent and/or consequence, rather than

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a behavioural choice, of a trustor's dependency on a particular trustee. This willingness derives from the trustor's *depersonalized expectation* of the trustee's trustworthiness in terms of ability and goodwill. Both willingness and expectation occur under the conditions that all uncertainties (i.e., system, ability and intention risks) are relevant to the formation of trust as a psychological attitude. The relevant vulnerability lies in the failures of informal and formal modes of exchange, thus combining formal and informal modes of exchange as a joint base for trust. This is the most typically used definition in the literature (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). For instance, Rousseau and colleagues (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395) define trust as a 'psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.'

The Second Delineation: A Broad-Mix View

This view focuses on a trustor's cognitive willingness primarily and affective willingness secondarily. It is primarily a psychological attitude and secondarily a behavioural choice towards a particular trustee. This willingness derives from a trustor's primarily personalized and secondarily depersonalized expectation of a trustee's trustworthiness in terms of ability and goodwill. Both willingness and expectation occur under the conditions that all uncertainties are relevant to the formation of either trust as a psychological or a behavioural choice. The relevant vulnerability lies in the failure of a formal mode, thus emphasizing a weak-informal mode (e.g., group norm) or a strong-informal mode (e.g., personal friendship) as the sole base for trust. This is the second typical definition in the literature (e.g., Adler, 2001; Hardin, 2002; Moellering, 2006; Nooteboom, 2002). For instance, Nooteboom (2002, p. 48) defines trust as 'an expectation that things or people will not fail us, or the neglect or lack of awareness of the possibility of failure, even if there are perceived opportunities and incentives for it.'

The Third Delineation: A Narrow-Attitude View

This view focuses on a trustor's cognitive willingness as a psychological attitude towards a trustee. This willingness derives from the trustor's depersonalized expectation of a trustee's trustworthiness in terms of goodwill. Both willingness and expectation occur under the condition that only intention risk is relevant to the formation of trust as a psychological attitude. The relevant vulnerability lies in the failures of both formal and strong-informal control modes, thus emphasizing the weak-informal mode (e.g., ethical norm or personal morality as social control) as the sole base for trust. This is the third typical definition of trust (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Hosmer, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). For instance, differentiating ability as confidence from goodwill as trust and personal-

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ized trust as assurance from depersonalized trust, Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, p. 139) specifically argue that 'whereas knowledge-based trust is limited to particular objects [people or organization], general trust is a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general and thus not limited to particular objects. . . . Knowledge-based trust is a by-product of committed relations, and thus does not play an important role in our theory of trust.'

The Fourth Delineation: A Narrow-Choice View

This view focuses on trustor's cognitive-affective willingness as a behavioural choice of relationship specific interdependency between two parties. This willingness derives from a trustor's personalized expectation of a trustee's trustworthiness in terms of goodwill. Both willingness and expectation occur under the condition that only intention risk is relevant to the formation of trust as a behavioural choice of commitment to building and maintaining strong relationships. The relevant vulnerability lies in the failures of both formal and weak-informal control modes, thus emphasizing the strong-informal mode as the sole base for trust. This is the fourth common definition of trust (e.g., Giddens, 1990; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Li, 1998, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Zand, 1972). For instance, Luhmann (1979, p. 43) argues that 'it is not possible to demand the trust of others; trust can only be offered and accepted. It is for this reason that claims to trust cannot start trust relationships off. This can only be done by what we have called investment, by discharging obligations in advance; the initiator may confer trust, or perhaps utilize an opportunity arisen by chance, to show himself trustworthy (for instance by returning a lost object which he has found). The truster sees in his own vulnerability the instrument whereby a trust relationship may be created.'

This typology of four typical trust delineations bears several key theoretical implications concerning the nature and features of trust. Consistent with the emerging consensus to treat trust as a multifaceted and interdisciplinary construct (Adler, 2001; Kramer, 1999; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Moellering, 2006; Nooteboom, 2002; Rousseau et al., 1998), all four delineations can be treated as valid with distinctive foci from distinctive perspectives. Nevertheless, scholars should explicitly identify which delineation is the most relevant to their specific research purposes and perspectives (Bigley and Pearce, 1998). For instance, if one studies trust as an exchange mode under intention risk, one should adopt the narrow-choice delineation; if one studies trust as a psychological attitude under all risks, one can adopt the broad-attitude delineation; if one studies trust related to all informal modes, one may adopt the broad-mix delineation, and if one studies weak-informal mode only, one must adopt the narrow-attitude delineation. It is worth noting that, in this typology, I treat trustor and trustee as two parties in a dyad at any level, individual or collective, who are engaged in social and economic exchanges (Hosmer, 1995; Lewis and Weigert, 1985).

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A TYPOLOGY OF TRUST IDEAL-TYPES

The Duality of Trust-as-Attitude and Trust-as-Choice

A central theme emerges from the typology of trust delineations across the dimensions of depersonalized-personalized trust and psychological-behavioural trust, which is the duality of trust as an attitude and/or as a choice. I refer to the former as *trust-as-attitude*, while the latter as *trust-as-choice*. My notion of trust duality is consistent with those of attitudinal and/or behavioural commitment (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994); motivation-as-attitude and/or motivation-as-choice (Atkinson, 1964; Vroom, 1964), and goal-intention-as-attitude and/or implementation-intention-as-choice (Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2004). Further, it is consistent with the holistic, dynamic and dialectical approach to theory building (Li, 1998, 2007).

The notion of trust duality bears critical implications for addressing the key controversies in the research on trust. First, trust-as-choice is 'a process governing choice' (Vroom, 1964, p. 6) for a behavioural pattern of reciprocal exchange to build trust and strong relationships, supporting the idea that trust is an exchange mode. For trust to be an exchange mode similar to the modes of authority for hierarchy and price for market, we have to incorporate the notion of trust-as-choice into the conceptualization of trust. As it may not result in any action from either trustor or trustee (Hardin, 2002), trust-as-attitude cannot function as an exchange mode since it lacks the elements of motivation and decision for risk-taking behaviours (cf. Bradach and Eccles, 1989; McEvily et al., 2003; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Trust-as-attitude is passive as a pre-decisional, non-committal evaluation and acceptance of trustee's trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). In this sense, trust-as-attitude is a psychological state of passively accepting a given risk, rather than an initiative to take risk, thus neither necessary nor sufficient to be an exchange mode (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Zand, 1972). Only by shifting the focus of analysis from a trustee's trustworthiness to a trustor's trustfulness can one establish trust as an exchange mode to regulate and motivate trustor's own cooperative behaviours (Moellering, 2006; Williams, 2007).

In contrast, trust-as-choice will initiate risk-taking cooperative behaviours from a trustor and, if reciprocal, also from a trustee, so it can serve as a special exchange mode (Larson, 1992; Li, 1998; Long and Sitkin, 2006; Luhmann, 1979; Uzzi, 1997). Hence, trust-as-choice is proactive and an intrinsically motivated choice of relationship building commitment rather than a passive acceptance of risk (Li, 2007; Moellering, 2006; Williams, 2007). It can be viewed as an exchange mode of commitment in contrast to extrinsically imposed control. Trust-as-choice will result in a pattern of cooperative behaviours as self-initiated and self-regulated to demonstrate or prove the trustor's trustworthiness to a particular trustee in a reciprocal trust building process. In this sense, I refer to trust building behaviours as *relationship commitment behaviour*, which is different from interpersonal citizenship behaviour.

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While the former focuses on personalized exchange (McAllister, 1995), the latter mixes up personalized exchange with depersonalized exchange at the group level (Bowler and Brass, 2006; Settoon and Mossholder, 2002). In sum, trust-as-choice is proactive and promotional in terms of the behavioural initiation of 'voice', while trust-as-attitude is passive and protective in terms of the psychological assurance of 'exit' (Seo et al., 2004). Trust-as-choice is imperative for trust building as it initiates the process of exchange between strangers (Giddens, 1990; Luhmann, 1979; Molm et al., 2000; Zand, 1972).

Further, the notion of trust duality also sheds light on the paradox of trust – that trust is at its minimum when it is needed the most, while trust is at its maximum when it is needed the least (Hardin, 2002; Seligman, 1997). The same logic holds true for trust-as-attitude that it is at its minimum when trust-as-choice is needed the most, and it is at its maximum when trust-as-choice is needed the least. The only exception is dispositional trust that always exists at the same level no matter what happens. Trust-as-choice differs from dispositional trust in two key aspects. First, while the former is personalized, the latter is depersonalized. Second, while the former is behavioural, the latter is psychological.

Finally, the notion of trust duality can resolve the debate over the functions of trust and control: the two being complementary supplements or conflicting substitutes. Trust-as-attitude can be regarded as a complementary supplement to control because trust-as-attitude is either an antecedent or a consequence of control. Trust-as-choice can be viewed as a conflicting substitute to control because trust-as-choice is a unique exchange mode and an alternative to control. In this sense, the mixed findings about the link between trust and control can be readily reconciled (e.g., Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). It is critical to analyse the link between control and trust in a temporal order. If an ex ante trust-as-attitude exists, an ex post control will not reduce the trust-as-attitude; if an ex ante control is adopted first, an ex post trust-as-attitude will be reduced. Further, an ex ante trust-as-choice will negate the need for control and vice versa; if one is used as an ex post mode, it will not affect the other. Finally, the effect of formal control should be judged by its purpose rather than its simple presence. For instance, in many cases, a formal contract is not used as a control mode; rather, it can be used to signal one's long-term commitment (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Uzzi, 1997; Woolthuis et al., 2005; Zhou et al., 2003). In sum, trust duality helps solve the controversies over the function of trust for commitment in contrast to that of control for compliance.

Trust Duality for a Typology of Trust Ideal-Types

With the duality of trust-as-attitude and trust-as-choice at its core across the dimensions of trust function (trustworthiness and trustfulness) and trust condition (depersonalized bases with a unilateral path and personalized bases with a recip-

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rocal path), a typology of trust ideal-types emerges. Specifically, the notion of trust duality is related to the elements of trust conditions and trust functions. In terms of trust condition, trust-as-attitude is concerned with all types of trust uncertainties (i.e., system, ability and intention), while trust-as-choice is only concerned with intention risk; while trust-as-attitude passively regards vulnerability of dependency as a negative threat and willingness of trustfulness as a passive acceptance of vulnerability, trust-as-choice proactively treats vulnerability as a positive opportunity and willingness as a proactive demonstration of one's own trustworthiness via self-initiated commitment (Giddens, 1990; Li, 2007; Luhmann, 1979; Moellering, 2006; Molm et al., 2000; Zand, 1972). In this sense, trust-as-attitude can reduce subjective risk by assuming low vulnerability, while trust-as-choice reduces objective risk by increasing vulnerability for trust building (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Luhmann, 1979; Zand, 1972). In terms of trust function, trust-as-attitude often derives from depersonalized trust, while trust-as-choice only derives from personalized trust; trust-as-attitude often relates to expectation of trustworthiness, while trust-as-choice only relates to willingness of trustfulness. It is worth noting that trust-as-choice is a decision of commitment to trust building, rather than actual trust behaviour per se (cf. Coleman, 1990; Zand, 1972). As for trust behaviour, I differentiate a passive trust behaviour of accepting vulnerability due to other's trustworthiness from a proactive trust behaviour of increasing vulnerability due to one's own commitment to trust building. Hence, the notion of trust duality is similar to the duality of risk perception and risk behaviour in risky decision making (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and Weingart, 1995), so we can treat trust-as-attitude and trust-as-choice as two primary stages in the process of risky decision making (cf. Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979).

Juxtaposing trust-as-attitude and trust-as-choice into trust conditions and trust functions, I identify four ideal-types of trust (see Table 3). The first ideal-typical trust is *depersonalized trustworthiness*, which refers to a trustor's unilateral expectation of a trustee's universally trustworthy ability, integrity and benevolence. The second ideal-typical trust is *depersonalized trustfulness*, which refers to a trustor's unilateral acceptance of vulnerability due to his/her positive expectation of a trustee's universal trustworthiness or the trustor's disposition to trust everyone. The third ideal-typical trust is *personalized trustworthiness*, which refers to mutual expectations of reciprocal trustworthiness with shared interests, shared values and shared affects that underlie all strong particularistic ties between two specific parties. The fourth ideal-typical trust is *personalized trustfulness*, which refers to mutual decisions of reciprocal commitment from both parties to initiate and maintain particularistic ties in a trust building process.

There is a growing body of evidence to support the proposed typology of four trust ideal-types. First, the mediating effect of personalized trustfulness (behavioural commitment) on the link between personalized trustworthiness (trust-as-attitude) and trust behaviour (interpersonal or inter-firm cooperation) is well established in

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Table 3. A typology of trust ideal-types

Condition \ *Function*	*Trustor's expectation of trustee [with trustee as the focus]*	*Trustor's willingness towards trustee [with trustor as the focus]*
Depersonalized Base ***[Unilateral Path: Only from one party to another]***	**1st Trust Ideal-Type: Depersonalized Trustworthiness** *Trustee's* **ability, integrity & benevolence** *as three sources of trustee's trustworthiness* *Trustee's trustworthiness as perceived by trustor as trustor's* **passive trust-as-attitude**	**2nd Trust Ideal-Type: Depersonalized Trustfulness** *Trustor's* **dispositional trust & cognitive trust** *as the sources of trustor's trustfulness* *Trustor's psychological desire or intention as trustor's* **reactive trust-as-attitude** *towards trustee*
Personalized Base ***[Reciprocal Path: From both parties as mutual ex ante inputs and ex post outputs]***	**3rd Trust Ideal-Type: Personalized Trustworthiness** *Mutually* **shared interests, values & affects** *as three sources of mutual trustworthiness* *Mutually perceived as* **active trust-as-attitude**	**4th Trust Ideal-Type: Personalized Trustfulness** *Mutual* **behavioural decisions of commitment** *as the sole source of mutual trustfulness* *Mutually committed as* **proactive trust-as-choice**

Note: The horizontal dimension is concerned primarily with the issue of ***trust function*** in terms of a trustor's expectation of a trustee's trustworthiness and willingness of trustfulness, while the vertical dimension is concerned primarily with the issue of ***trust condition*** in terms of a depersonalized base (with a unilateral path from one party to another) or personalized base (with a reciprocal path from both parties as mutual ex ante inputs and ex post outputs in a trust-building process).

the literatures of social exchange and marketing (e.g., Cook and Emerson, 1978; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Second, a meta-analysis on trust in leadership (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002) shows that depersonalized trust (character based trust) differs from personalized trust (relationship based trust) as two basic ideal-types of trust; cognitive trust (similar to trust-as-attitude) relates to psychological outcomes, while overall trust with cognitive and affective trust (the latter directly linked to trust-as-choice) relates to behavioural outcomes (see McAllister, 1995; Ng and Chua, 2006 for similar findings). Finally, trust duality is consistent with the Confucian notion that one should not only place trust in others but also earn trust from others (Fung, 1970). For instance, active trust-as-choice is imperative for initiating trust building processes in China, where the institutional bases for depersonalized system trust are lacking (Child and Moellering, 2003). The proactive role of trust-as-choice is also evident in other Asian countries (Nguyen et al., 2005).

The distinction between personalized and depersonalized trust (both trustworthiness and trustfulness) is also related to distinctive institutional systems across

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different countries (Li, 1998; Pearce, 2001). In general, the first and second trust ideal-types (depersonalized trustworthiness and depersonalized trustfulness) are prevalent in the West where both formal and weak-informal institutions are emphasized and well established, while the third and fourth trust ideal-types (personalized trustworthiness and trustfulness) are prominent in the East where a strong-informal relationship is preferred (Li, 1998, 2007; Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Yuki et al., 2005). Further, distinctive configurations of trust elements (thus different ideal-types of trust) will apply to different social ties, with the strongest trust for family members and the weakest trust for total strangers. For instance, as China's unique exchange mode of *differentiated associations* (see Fei, 1992 [1947]; Li, 1998, 2007; Luo, 2005), a trustor places different types of trust at various levels to different trustees according to each trustee's relative position in a multi-circle centrifugal web of the trustor's social ties (or *guanxi* in Chinese).

Although the typology of four trust delineations contains the same elements of the four trust ideal-types, the two typologies differ. The difference lies in the former's failure to systematically delineate trust into four complementary and consistent ideal-types according to the salient psychological-behavioural dimension and depersonalized-personalized dimension. In other words, each of the trust delineations is based on a single discipline rather than an interdisciplinary approach to trust as in the case of four trust ideal-types. Besides being holistic, the four ideal-types are also dynamic and dialectical by treating each ideal-type as either a unilateral or reciprocal ex ante input or ex post output in a context of either a single exchange or a looped process of trust building. In sum, with the duality of trust-as-attitude and trust-as-choice at its core, the typology of four trust ideal-types provides an interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust.

Unresolved Issues

Despite the potential contributions of the typologies of trust dimensions and delineations, several issues remain unresolved. First, a holistic, dynamic and dialectical framework of trust is needed to integrate the elements of stage, content, source and domain of trust. For instance, the stages and contents of trust can jointly delineate the distinctive forms of trust, while the sources and domains of trust can jointly delineate the distinctive bases of trust. Second, to incorporate the dynamic aspect of trust into an overall framework, the trust building process must be understood with distinctive stages of trust building (Larson, 1992; Levin et al., 2006; Lewicki et al., 2006; McKnight et al., 2002). For instance, the initial trust between strangers differs from the mature trust between friends. Third, reflecting different stages of trust building, the contents of trust at various stages should differ (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). For instance, the cognitive content of trust may be prominent at the initial stage, while the affective content of trust may be more at the mature stage. The lack of attention to the role of affective content of trust

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among friends is partly to blame for the ambiguity with respect to personalized and depersonalized trust (Gibbons, 2004; Saparito et al., 2004; Schoorman et al., 2007; Seligman, 1997), especially for trust building (Williams, 2007). In this sense, the idea of trust strength must be incorporated into the framework, especially the possible link between trust strength and tie strength (Child and Moellering, 2003; Jones and George, 1998; Levin and Cross, 2004; Uzzi, 1997), given the critical link between trust and social capital (Li, 2007; Seligman, 1997).

Fourth, the distinction and links between unilateral trust, bilateral trust and multilateral trust must be integrated into the framework, especially their roles as parts of organizational trust across the micro-dyad and macro-network domains as well as their interactive co-evolution in a dynamic process (Chaudhuri et al., 2002). In this sense, the distinctions and links between interpersonal trust, person-to-collective trust and inter-collective trust need to be explained. Research evidence suggests that each has its own unique characteristics (e.g., Insko et al., 2005; Jeffries and Reed, 2000; Koeszegi, 2004). In particular, the phenomenon of trust transfer (i.e., direct dyad trust being transferred to indirect network trust via third parties (Burt and Knez, 1995; Ferrin et al., 2006; Kramer, 1999; McEvily et al., 2003; Stewart, 2003; Uzzi, 1997) needs to be explained. Fifth, new measures must be developed for the proposed new constructs of trustworthiness and trustfulness, while the prevailing measure of depersonalized trust can be enhanced by differentiating the reciprocal bases of personalized trust from the unilateral bases of depersonalized trust (Gillespie, 2003; Lewicki et al., 2006; Schoorman et al., 2007). In particular, the phenomenon of trust conversion (i.e., depersonalized trust being converted into personalized trust or vice versa) deserves attention. For instance, we need to explain the micro-macro conversion in which interpersonal trust is converted into inter-firm trust (Li et al., 2006; Zaheer and Harris, 2006). Finally, the perspective of trust duality, including its applications to the dualities of attitudinal-behavioural trustfulness, depersonalized-personalized sources, dyad-network domains, initial-mature stages and cognitive-affective contents will contribute to an integrated construct of trust and an integrated framework of trust.

The above issues can be resolved potentially within a holistic, dynamic and dialectical framework that integrates all fundamental elements of trust in general and organizational trust in particular. First, this framework can be holistic by covering all four content components of trust condition, function, form and base with their specific causal links. Second, this framework must be dynamic and cover all the process components of trust building, including trust transfer and trust conversion with their specific stages or phases. Third, this framework could be dialectical by accommodating the paradoxical nature of trust dualities (see Li, 1998 for a review). In sum, the typologies of four trust dimensions, four trust delineations and four trust ideal-types not only calls for developing an integrated framework of trust but also pave the way for accomplishing it.

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CONCLUSION

In this article, I seek to make four contributions to an interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust. First, consistent with the emerging trend of balancing diversity and unity in the research on organizational issues, I have integrated the perspectives of classification-of-dimension and typology-as-theory in developing an interdisciplinary conceptualization of trust. Second, I have identified four trust dimensions underlying the diverse conceptualizations of trust. Third, I have identified four trust delineations underlying the controversies in the trust research. Fourth, I have proposed a typology of four trust ideal-types capable of solving the controversies and integrating the research streams. While the typologies of trust dimensions and trust delineations identify the underlying causes of trust related controversies, the typology of trust ideal-types offers an interdisciplinary solution to the problem of conceptualizing trust. These three typologies jointly lay the foundation for an integrated framework of trust yet to be developed.

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