ancient temples and rituals (note the prominence of the words *divum domus* in the notoriously short notice of Rome), and a similar nostalgia for the sanctified past is found in the allusions to watercourses and trees (the olive of Athens, the laurel of Antioch), which to fourth-century Gauls could have carried a similar charge. Side by side with this religious theme is that of 'l'uomo', meaning architecture and town-planning; this is indeed a prominent feature, often the result of observation. Ausonius is compared with Le Corbusier and other architects, and a few pages later he is credited with a tenuous rôle in the tradition of the tourist guidebook. A more interesting idea (this is the main item under '*Fortuna*') is that this work influenced poems of Paulinus of Nola, including his nineteenth, with its reflection on the sacred sites of Western Christendom.

In the section on the manuscript tradition Di S. draws up useful lists of the errors of the various families, and of modern emendations. He discusses problematic passages at considerable length, with fifteen pages on the problem of adjudicating between the readings *Hispalis* and *Emerita* in l. 82. (One may not choose both, or label them as authorial variants.) One of the arguments for reading *Hispalis* was in fact anticipated by me in *Actas del VIII Congreso Español de Estudios Clásicos* (Madrid, 1994), II, pp. 679–83. Judging whether to admit modern emendations is a bigger problem. Far be it from the reviewer to laud his own remedy at l. 5; but the defence of *ambarum* that Di S. makes is not easy to understand, and perhaps familiarity breeds assent. However, at l. 91 the continued obelization is reasonable, notwithstanding interesting suggestions from Frassinetti (*Graium*) and Mondin (*Cressas*).

The commentary is full, and concentrates on minor textual problems, on translation, on Ausonian usage, and on history and topography. With up to 1000 words per line of Latin, and full quotation of parallels and other passages, it should support the new reader well. On l. 148 and the lines that follow, English and French readers would benefit from consulting the relevant chapter of P. J. Adam, *La Construction Romaine, Matériaux et Techniques/Roman Buildings: Materials and Techniques* (Paris, 1984/ London, 1994), to visualize the appearance and function of what is described, presumably a reservoir or *castellum aquae* as well as a *fons*. No fewer than eleven indexes (including ones on *Economia e Commercio*, *Popoli*, and *Studiosi*) attest the editor's great industry and the breadth of this study.

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PUNISHMENTS IN ATHENS

D. S. Allen: *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens*. Pp. xiii + 449. Princeton: Princteon University Press, 1999. Cased. ISBN: 0-691-05869-5.

As citizens of modern democracies, we punish our children or pupils; but if we are victims of crime we leave the actual work in discovering offenders, prosecuting, and determining sentences to a variety of professionals, and only become directly involved as witnesses or jurors. Ancient Athens shared with other pre-modern states the characteristic that individual citizens played far more significant and direct rôles in the prosecution of wrongdoers; the United States in the colonial period appears to be the first state where the legal system was founded from the outset on the idea of public prosecution, which spread in Britain only gradually from the eighteenth century. Hence citizens in pre-modern societies had to acquire greater experience in

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their society's practices and principles of punishment if they were to achieve justice through the state; and in societies like Athens, many citizens were involved to a remarkable extent, as jurors, as *nomothetai*, and as prosecutors seeing their cases through from the initial charge to the enforcing or overseeing of the penalty. This fact is the starting point for this bold, wide-ranging and largely successful attempt to understand Athenian institutions, practices, and debates about punishment, and to pursue their implications for the nature of the democratic government. Allen keeps her gaze firmly focused on the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of laws and procedures, and hopes, with reason, that her book will appeal equally to ancient historians and to contemporary legal and political theorists, following well-established traditions of the universities to which she has been attached (Princeton, Cambridge, Harvard, and now Chicago; the book is a revised version of a Cambridge PhD supervised by Paul Cartledge). She demonstrates that Athenian citizens were often seriously engaged in debates on the fundamental concepts underlying the justice system, such as anger, revenge, desert, honour, reciprocity, and the public interest; arguably the greatest originality and value of the book lies in the justified emphasis placed on, and the detailed exploration of, conceptualizations of anger and revenge.

A. is as happy to unpack ideas expressed in drama and philosophy as those in the arguments of the forensic speeches. Thus, Chapter 2, on the 'Institutional Context', makes use above all of Aeschylean drama to bring out two points. First, she undermines the traditional distinction between old-style revenge and new-style state justice by demonstrating just how much the *Oresteia*'s new court, backed by the *Semnai*, rests on the expression of communal anger and delivery of state-backed vengeance. Secondly, she brings out the centrality to the concept of punishment of the idea of 'authority', i.e. that the penalty is acquiesced in by the community, by using the *Prometheus* as a paradigm (hence the book's title): its central focus is seen as falling on the contestation of Zeus' claim to be imposing deserved punishment, rather than acting from his own desire for revenge. Two further chapters continue to set the conceptual scene. Chapter 3 ('Cultural Context') elegantly demonstrates how the legitimation of punishment rested on the combination of the channelling of proper anger, tied to the idea of the restoration of honour and respect for reciprocity (especially the negative variety), with the application in public view of the norms of 'social memory' through the litigants' narratives. It is to be noted that such 'modern' terminology is deployed throughout in conjunction with a scrupulous attention to the behaviour of fundamental Greek terms such as *orgē* and *thymos*, *timē* and *timōria*, *zēmia* and *kolasis*; while a Greek font is not used, much of the complexity of Greek discourse is laid out intelligibly enough for the general reader. On the recent controversy involving above all David Cohen and Gabriel Herman, A. hits the mark pretty accurately, in my view, by accepting that Herman has identified an Athenian civic ideal of crisis-resolution through legal and public procedures which recognized the honour of others as fixed by the city, while firmly contradicting his claim that this involved any diminution of importance of *timōria*, still firmly conceptualized as revenge, albeit to be achieved by a legally restrained restitution of honour.

Chapter 4 explores how problems thrown up by the corralling of revenge into civic modes were explored in tragedy, and cunningly uncovers some of the 'conceptual grammars' of anger, much of the time following methods associated above all perhaps with Vernant and Padel. Significant chains of metaphors are skilfully unpacked, above all those which connect anger and the desire for revenge with disease, the internal organs, and the eyes. Tragic revenges may seem troublesome through excessive

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brutality or illegitimate appropriation of power or civic laws, whereby they challenge the city's norms of restraint and proper procedure; this chapter also undermines much of the argument of Burnett's *Revenge in Attic and Later Tragedy*, though that book appeared too late to be taken into account. Some of the analyses struck me as overstated, perhaps through brevity. The claim (pp. 92–3) that the problem at the heart of the *Antigone* is that both Creon and Antigone act as authors of their own laws rests heavily on two highly contestable statements of the chorus (821, 875) that Antigone is *autonomos*, with an *autognomos orge*; Antigone, it might be argued, had to act against the 'norms' preventing women from acting in 'politics' if she were to defend the laws of the Greeks and their gods. The more general argument that in tragedy laws which have recent and named human authors are tyrannical or unacceptable is also perhaps as over-simple as the view she seeks to replace, that unwritten laws are *ipso facto* superior; rather, laws may be seen as problematic if the authority they stem from is suspect on other grounds.

Chapters 5 and 6—initiating revenge/punishment—are focused on the privileged access to legal modes of punishment of male citizens, in both fact and ideology. They combine good discussions of slave torture and women's exclusions from legal processes, with rather more problematic treatments of the complex moral psychology of anger in tragedy and elsewhere. Here I felt she was in danger of suppressing legitimate alternative views. I was not convinced that in tragedy women's revenge is almost always to be seen as involving guile, not legitimate anger, and can therefore be classifiable as 'murder' (her use of the Greek term *phonos* as equivalent to murder is also dubious, as *phonos* can be legitimate). She seems also at times to assimilate too closely the open and legitimate expression of anger and revenge to that which is in 'hot blood' or 'spontaneous': in fact, anger which is fulfilled through legal process may be seen to be sufficiently open and legitimate when it is also calm and controlled, not necessarily speedy, and may involve rhetoric as well as action. For example, on Lysias 1 she concedes too much to Herman's view in arguing that Euphiletos' evident care in planning the killing in advance and in collecting supporters prevents him from making 'an argument based on anger and honor' (p. 126); in fact, he does present, repeatedly, his sense of having been insulted, and indeed bases the argument that he is acting as the agent of the city's laws on the view that those laws exist to protect the poor citizen's honour against this most serious form of *hybris* (2–4, 25, 33, 49, etc.).

Again, A. perhaps pushes too far her explorations of the Athenians' tendency to legitimize anger within a legal system which licensed only male citizens to act. She gives as the reason for the restriction that 'anger was ideologically necessary to the self-understanding of male citizens as political actors' (though I would prefer myself to say that ideas of honour and its protection were central to Greek conceptions of masculinity, citizenship, and participation). But while it is correct to say that the primary rôle of achieving legitimate satisfaction for wrongdoing is given to adult males, she represses women's rôles more than seems necessary. Her argument that only one such angry actor per household is the norm, and that when close male kin quarrel, and act separately, a 'new family was created', seems over-rigid: the language of the speeches seems to me to suggest the norm that such male relatives should act together in disputes, and if on the contrary they oppose each other in court, this is often seen as a highly regrettable (if perhaps frequent) case of conflict *within* an *oikos*. Women may have been largely precluded from the public expression of their moral anger, but they might legitimately urge their sympathetic relatives in private to public action (e.g. Antiphon 1, Lys. 32), or express anger at home at a court's failure to protect their honour as wives of citizens by punishing a Neaira (ps.-Dem. 59.122).

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Chapters 7 and 8, on the community's assessment of 'desert' in relation to its anger, contrasts effectively the figures of the properly angry prosecutor, who seeks to 'spend' his anger through due process and in good time, and the sycophant. The transition to the sycophant is effected through analysis of Lycurgos' attempt in *against Leocrates* to justify his impersonal and patriotic style of prosecuting—which is vulnerable where the emphasis on Lycurgos' tendency to cite poets and Spartan laws is claimed as a novelty, but in fact (as is acknowledged in a footnote) the pioneer here was Aeschines' *Timarchus*, whose many quotations of poetry and citation of an alleged Spartan speech were then capped by Demosthenes in the *Embassy* speech. The discussion of the language used to denigrate the 'sycophant' is the most interesting approach here (though not wholly convincing), as she pursues the homology of 'iretic' and 'erotic' *orgē* to connect up (e.g.) multiple sexual associations of fresh and dried figs with the idea of the well-timed expression of 'ripe' anger.

Chapter 9 has much that is novel and illuminating on the choices of different forms of punishment, and the Athenian development of a 'code of silence' about the treatment or disposal of the punished body. The last two chapters discuss, penetratingly, Plato's radical attempt to revise theories of punishment by the removal of significant rôles for anger and retaliation (except when dealing with the 'incurables' in the *Laws*), and Aristotle's more moderate set of compromises, by means of differentiated conceptualizations of justice and honour.

In conclusion, this is a fascinating, if densely written, book, full of exciting new ideas; it contains subtle analysis of comparative principles and ideologies, and much detailed argumentation about Greek moral and legal concepts and practices (including five appendixes). Errors of fact are rare, though some I noted do affect the argument. For example, the Thargelia took place not on the 'last day of the Athenian year' (p. 85), but on the 6th–7th Thargelion, the penultimate month, which affects her statement of the meaning of the scapegoat ritual; there seems little warrant for associating Semonides specifically with 'the archaic *Athenian* literary scene' (p. 119), nor for associating the wild *orgē* of some of his animal-like women especially closely with anger and revenge; in places (e.g. pp. 152, 155) she writes as if she is confusing the *logographos* with his client; and at Aeschines 1.162–3 (p. 224) the 'stoning' of a prosecutor seeking redress for non-fulfilment of a contract for homosexual services is a hypothetical scenario, not a 'previous case'.

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GREEK SLAVES

H. KLEES: *Sklavenleben im klassischen Griechenland* (Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei, Band 30.) Pp. vii + 513. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. Paper, DM 148. ISBN: 3-515-07484-8.

This, along with his earlier *Herren und Sklaven* (Wiesbaden, 1975), completes a formidable pair of works on Greek slavery. The first looked primarily at the ideology of slave owning. This has as its focus the experiences of the slave. It is perhaps the most encyclopaedic modern work on classical Greek chattel slavery (though helot and serf-like groups are not part of its remit). It discusses everything from housing and material life (Chapter 2) to sex and family life (Chapter 5), and even whether slaves were expected to speak good Greek (pp. 248-9). Its emphasis is on Athens, but there is an impressive amount of (fragmentary) non-Athenian material too. There is

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