Schroeder-Negru relates the consequences for local Germans of a Soviet-inspired uprising in Bessarabia in 1924. The three remaining contributions observe non-Germans. Franz Sz. Horvath studies the attitudes of the Magyar minority in Romania toward National Socialism and fascism in 1922–1940, and Meinolf Arens and Daniel Bein investigate the status of Moldavian Hungarians, or *Tschangos*, in the years 1940 to 1944. Finally Ivo Goldstein analyzes the "*Judengenozid*" in wartime Croatia, thereby adding value to extant literature on the Holocaust in Eastern Europe.

All thirteen contributions reflect meticulous research, demonstrate knowledge of subject matter, and direct scholars to valuable sources for continued inquiry. Unfortunately the particularistic nature of their subject material will mostly attract specialists, not the general reading public. Nonetheless each piece has the potential for expansion into a larger work and subsequently whetting the interests of a broader reading audience, a goal to which all historians should aspire. Dropping arcane and doctrinaire notions such as fascism from the historical repertoire will also go a long way in making these histories more publicly accessible. After all, history should tell a good story, not perpetuate tired, old debates.

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Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse. By Richard DiNardo. Foreword by Dennis Showalter. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xiv + 282. $34.95. ISBN 0-7006-1412-5.

What makes a wartime coalition effective? Leaving out Japan, Richard DiNardo approaches this timely issue by focusing on the military relationship between Nazi Germany and each of its wartime European allies. Although his archival sources are only German, DiNardo is able to make several points. Beyond "parallel wars" (in which allies in effect fight side by side in segregated spheres), German armed forces had little institutional experience with coalitional war-making. While World War I haphazardly provided such experience, its lessons were neither prioritized nor systematically drawn. Interwar military education paid scant attention to the idiosyncrasies of coalitional war-making, or even to the cultivation of languages. During World War II, the Axis powers' chains of command remained separate or were only clumsily coordinated. The navies did best, the armies, worst. Technological sharing was rare, unstandardized, and fraught with contractual hurdles, and there was no institution remotely comparable to the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. The

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Germans rarely shared plans with their allies, frequently deceived them, and conferred only bilaterally, never multilaterally, as the Allies sometimes did. Only once—Mussolini's Balkan adventure—did a German ally rather than the Germans take the war-making initiative (in turn deceiving the Germans), and the results were disastrous. On other occasions, ranging from Italian operations in North Africa to Hungarian and Romanian operations on the Russian front, an ally's resources, military competency, or level of preparation proved inadequate for either parallel warfare or integrated efforts. The Romanians, who (in the German estimation) fought better than the Italians, provide some telling examples: their advancement was slowed because their bread supplies had to be pulled through Russian bogs by oxen, and their airplanes came from so many different countries that Axis antiaircraft forces could not be trained to recognize them and avoid shooting them down. Just as important, the Germans failed to assign clear operational goals to Romanian forces under their command. But having had to rescue the Italians when they had been assigned a sphere of competence in North Africa, the Germans had good reason to lose confidence in the capabilities of their allies.

DiNardo delineates how the special circumstances of each ally awarded or denied it leverage in its dealings with the Nazis. Italy's status offered Mussolini opportunities for competitive and counterproductive glory-seeking not only in the Balkans but also on the Russian front. Expecting a quick German victory, Mussolini, not Hitler, insisted on Italian participation in Russia. The result was to drain off resources from North Africa. Meanwhile Finland, more peripherally located and less influenced than the others by fascist-inspired territorial rapaciousness, successfully resisted German pressure to extend its operations beyond retaking lost territory. Hungary's territorial aggrandizement through Hitler's destruction of Czechoslovakia lured Admiral Horthy into a Faustian position, while Romania's territorial gains from World War I, endangered both by the Soviets and by the Germans' Hungarian ally, seemed best secured by cultivating German good will.

As these examples show, conflicting war aims affected the cohesion of the Axis grouping. Here, explicit comparison with the situation of the Grand Alliance would have been helpful. From a coalitional perspective, one reason the Grand Alliance was more effective than the Axis was that the Allies, thanks to the Blitzkrieg, were far less burdened than the Germans by weak and headstrong affiliated armies whose territorial sway had to be integrated into their plans. The Anglo-Americans profited from linguistic and cultural as well as ideological affinity, and they and the Soviets really did conduct widely dispersed parallel wars. Their power was better balanced, and they were better situated to stay out of each other's way. Thus, divergent war aims could be postponed in favor of the common overwhelming priority of reversing Germany's conquest of the continent.

The weight of DiNardo's detailed narrative is inclined toward the proposition that the Axis coalition's problems derived less from ideology or from German

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smugness than from geography and from the plain fact of the imbalance of power, preparation, expertise, and resources within the Axis grouping. Yet, greater multilateral coordination might have alleviated those problems, and the Germans consistently avoided it. They neither prepared nor seemed to desire coordinated coalitional warfare, and even their own interservice coordination eluded them. While the reasons lay partly in the pre-Nazi institutional culture of the German armed forces, ideology also played a role. To be sure, neither lopsided alliances, nor military overextension, nor haphazard planning are afflictions exclusive to right-wing ideological coalitions. But there was a crucial difference between the Nazis' racial war of territorial aggrandizement, with its ideologically driven recklessness and jackal-like opportunities and simultaneous risks for allies that came late to the party, and their opponents' war of national and international viability.

While DiNardo's examples vividly illustrate all of these points, it would have been worthwhile had he more explicitly sorted out the issue that is everywhere between the lines here—namely, the extent to which the internal nature of the Nazi regime (and its "fascist" partners) systematically exacerbated the underlying problem of coalitional lopsidedness. Greater dialogue with the body of literature on the Nazis' general patterns of institutional polycracy might have added an intriguing dimension here. A table of abbreviations and legends that explain the symbols on the maps would also have been helpful. But these comments should not obscure DiNardo's achievement. What DiNardo demonstrates is the importance of taking seriously the notion of the Axis as a military coalition, albeit a dysfunctional one. By examining not only the traditional area of strategic and battlefield dispensations but also some aspects of the educative and administrative culture of the military, DiNardo engagingly illuminates an often overlooked element in the military history of World War II. In the process, he offers an opportunity to contemplate the timeless problem of how to assess the factors that influence a great power's effectiveness when it conducts coalitional warfare.

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Witnesses of War: Children's Lives Under the Nazis. By Nicholas Stargardt. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2005. Pp. xvii + 493. $30.00. ISBN 1-4000-4088-4.

What constituted child's play in Germany, Poland, and Lithuania in the late 1930s and early 1940s? In this riveting book, Nicholas Stargardt offers some answers. Christoph Meyer, only eight, implored his older brother to send him

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