Articles

Nozick's Anachronistic Libertarianism

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ABSTRACT: The conclusions on libertarianism Robert Nozick reaches are appropriate for a bygone era. In a modern market economy, libertarianism requires that employable people have the option of taking up a publicly provided income instead of employment. This is the only way to compensate the involuntarily unemployed that a market economy requires and to ensure that all employment is voluntary. Taxation on voluntary exchanges is unobjectionable because it alters prices, not property, and no one has a right to a particular price. The best way to provide state incomes for the capable unemployed is through a negative income tax.

RÉSUMÉ : Les conclusions de libertarisme que tire Nozick valent pour une époque révolue. Dans une économie de marché moderne, le libertarisme exige que les gens aptes au travail puissent opter pour un revenu de source publique plutôt que pour un travail. Voilà le seul moyen de compenser les sans-emploi involontaires que requiert l'économie de marché et de s'assurer que chacun travaille volontairement. Imposer les échanges volontaires est acceptable parce que cela affecte les prix, non la propriété, et que nul n'a droit à un prix prticulier. Le meilleur moyen pour l'État de fournir un revenu aux sans-emploi aptes au travail passe par un impôt sur le revenu négatif.

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Introduction

The prevailing view on Robert Nozick's libertarianism is as follows:

> [T]he political implications [of his theory] are clear. Taking from someone what he has acquired by his labor, or by transfer, violates the fundamental right not to be treated as a means to the purposes of others. Redistributive policies aimed to correct inequalities produced by a free market economy are therefore illegitimate.[1]

In fact, the political implications follow from arguments that assume the false proposition that market economies are relevantly similar to pre-market economies.

The same libertarian principles have different implications depending on the situation to which they are applied. Obviously, a market economy is radically different from a pre-market economy. No recessions occurred before the development of the market economy, for instance. In a pre-market economy, any person who is capable of working, who has the opportunity to work, but who does not work, is a parasite. People who support themselves by, say, producing what they need on land they have cleared themselves can reasonably and legitimately tell this "parasite" that he should do what they themselves have already done. As for those who cannot work, any help extended to them is supererogatory: taxation for the purpose of supporting them makes the supererogatory obligatory and it violates the rights of the people compelled to pay the tax. In that context, Nozick is right when he asserts that "taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor."[2] In contrast, in a typical modern market economy, the capable unemployed have a right to a public income, i.e., an income paid by the state out of tax revenues; there is no libertarian bar to providing the same support to the needy, and taxation is not at all like forced labour.

As a result of making the illicit assumption, Nozick misapplies libertarian principles. The consequence of the misapplication is that he ends up becoming an apologist for the powerful instead of an advocate of liberty. He is not the only libertarian who falls into error because he does not understand the nature of market economies. However, his work is well known, the objections are readily transferable, and limiting the discussion to his views prevents repetition.

Why the World Owes You a Living, 1: Involuntary Unemployment

Involuntary unemployment is inevitable in market economies. A market economy has a natural rate of unemployment, comprising frictional and structural unemployment and technically known as the non-accelerating inflationary rate of unemployment. The rate will be positive as long as the

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economy is changing, and a market economy is always changing. If the unemployment rate falls below the natural rate, the rate of inflation tends to increase because employer demand for employees puts the latter in a position to demand higher salaries. Central banks typically raise interest rates in order to maintain the natural rate of unemployment, to prevent inflationary spirals, and thus to keep the economy functioning well. Consequently, the efforts of the unemployed to obtain employment will be stymied when they begin to be more than randomly successful. Central banks have even been made independent of governments in order to remove the temptation to implement popular, temporarily successful, but ultimately disastrous, policies to "solve the unemployment problem."

It might be objected that the unemployed are typically inferior to the employed in some respect and that it is their fault that they are unemployed because they have not taken the trouble to improve themselves. Naturally, rational employers will choose to hire and retain the more promising workers. Certainly, worker characteristics often explain the allocation of unemployment, but they do not explain its occurrence. As for its occurrence, if demand for "inferior" workers can cause increases in the rate of inflation, so can demand for non-existent workers. Hence, the unemployment rate cannot be reduced to zero without an accelerating inflation rate resulting. It follows that market economies require some level of unemployment in order to function well.

The occurrence of unemployment in a market economy may be overdetermined. Consider a model developed by Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz.[3] Employers often cannot monitor their workers adequately. Consequently, some employers offer better than average pay. They do so in order to impose a penalty on anyone caught shirking: dismissal and a lower wage at any new job. The better than average pay thus provides an incentive that lessens the probability of shirking. But, if other firms do the very same thing, labour costs increase as a consequence, demand for labour declines, and unemployment follows. The situation persists because workers are motivated by the prospect of a period of joblessness not to shirk. Naturally, there is no guarantee that all shirkers end up unemployed, or that all unemployed people are shirkers. Many conscientious workers will inevitably be put out of work. This outcome is not just.

In a typical modern market economy, all non-human productive resources have already been appropriated and incorporated into the economy. In order to function well, a market economy requires that some people, i.e., those who lack sufficient non-human productive resources to be self-supporting, be unemployed, whether to prevent inflation, to "discipline" those who are employed, or for other reasons. Naturally, for unemployment to serve any function, the unemployed must be capable of working. Nozick asserts that "there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall *social* good. There is no

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justified sacrifice of some of us for others."[4] Involuntary unemployment is the sacrifice of some for others in order to maintain the market economy, a social good. In a pre-market economy, people who do not work are parasitic on people who do. In a market economy, people in work (and others) are parasitic on the capable unemployed.

Nozick also asserts "that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke."[5] He formulates the proviso as follows: "A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened."[6] He allows that appropriators may compensate others instead of refraining from appropriation.

> Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso may still appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.[7]

He excludes certain ways of worsening people's position. Preventing others from appropriating the thing by appropriating it oneself does not count as worsening their position. Neither does appropriating it in order to compete with another in providing products or services to the market. However, these exemptions are irrelevant to the question at hand. A market economy in which all non-human productive resources have been appropriated inevitably makes some worse off by denying them not only the opportunity to be independently self-supporting but also the opportunity to be employed. In light of Nozick's principles, the involuntarily unemployed deserve compensation because they have been made worse off. If not, the appropriation of non-human resources that is the foundation of a market economy is illegitimate.

Even leaving aside the unjustified contempt, hostility, and opprobrium the involuntarily unemployed endure because people mistakenly think they are responsible for their own situation, their situation is doubly unjust. Since market economies require unemployment, the involuntarily unemployed also deserve compensation because they contribute to the economy. They contribute to the economy although they contribute to no firm. They contribute through their very existence rather than their actions. The involuntarily unemployed own themselves, are used by the market economy, and, hence, deserve compensation for their contribution. In a market economy, libertarianism entails that the involuntarily unemployed have a right to a public income.

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Why the World Owes You a Living, 2: Involuntary Employment

There is an involuntary element in much employment in a typical modern market economy. Albert O. Hirschman distinguishes between freedom as voice and freedom as exit.[8] Freedom as voice is the freedom to speak, deliberate, and participate in decision-making. Freedom as exit is the freedom to quit. Employees may exit particular firms. The freedom that is unavailable is the freedom to exit the employment relationship altogether.

Not everyone in a market economy lacks the freedom to exit the employment relationship. Someone who owns enough in the way of non-human productive resources can choose either to support himself using them or to take up employment. Someone who was in a position to appropriate enough in the way of non-human productive resources to support himself could choose to appropriate them instead of taking up employment. Both actual and potential owners of sufficient non-human productive resources are freer than someone who has no alternative but to become an employee. If owners of non-human productive resources are employees, their status as employees is voluntary in a way that the status of the externally propertyless, i.e., people who own only themselves but who do not own non-human productive resources, is not. The people with resources have chosen to become employees. They could have chosen not to. They are freer than the externally propertyless.

Much employment in a typical market economy is involuntary because all non-human productive resources have already been appropriated and not all people have appropriated a sufficiency. Since all non-human productive resources have already been appropriated, people who are not successful appropriators are effectively denied a right to exit the employment relationship voluntarily, although, as we saw in the previous section, they can be forced out. The complete appropriation of non-human productive resources thereby worsens the lot of the involuntary employees by reducing their autonomy. If an employee is not free to exit the employment system, he will be involuntarily subordinate to and directed by another in significant ways and to a significant extent by virtue of this lack of choice.

As for objections to the claim that involuntary employees are made worse off because their autonomy is reduced, it is irrelevant that work has always been unavoidable. The inevitability of work in the past was often a matter of natural conditions; for instance, growing one's own food required physical labour to clear land and tend a garden. The inevitability of work now is a matter of the actions and decisions of other human beings. We do not have rights against the physical world. We do have rights against other human beings. Trying to justify involuntary employment on the ground that work was unavoidable in the past is like trying to justify murder on the ground that people die from natural causes. It is irrelevant that the externally propertyless can choose one employer over another.

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The problem is that they have to be employees at all. The argument that a person is free because he is free not to work for any particular employer is an instance of the fallacy of composition. It is irrelevant that employees are compensated for their work. The problem is that they no longer have the option of eschewing employment completely. The fact that employees are paid indicates that working for nothing is worse than doing nothing for nothing, not that employees have adopted that status voluntarily. The fact that there are limits to the degree of subordination achievable by employers does not entail that there is no subordination at all. The fact that many employees are well paid indicates that there is competition among employers, or some other morally irrelevant factor. It is irrelevant that some employees go on to acquire their own share of non-human productive resources. The possibility that someone will be free in the future does not justify denying him freedom in the present.

The total appropriation of non-human productive resources worsens the position of people left externally propertyless by making them subordinate to others. This loss of autonomy is a bad thing in itself; it would be wrong to enslave another even if one did not profit from holding him in captivity. Nozick tends to interpret the "worsening [of] the position of others" that necessitates their being compensated in material terms, however. In a footnote in which he mentions an argument for compensation for hunters/gatherers who have to give up their way of life, Nozick writes: "This compensation would be due those persons, if any, for whom the process of civilization was a *net loss*, for whom the benefits of civilization did not counterbalance being deprived of these particular liberties."[9] The "particular liberties" in question are liberties that would enable a person to support himself in the old way. Of course, a change in one's mode of livelihood does not necessarily result in a loss of autonomy. A subsistence farmer can be as free from subordination to others as a hunter. The problem I am discussing arises because, in contrast, having to become an employee does diminish a person's autonomy.

It is naturally troubling that "entitlement theorists [like Nozick] tend to neglect the value people may place on the kind of power relations in which they stand to others."[10] It is not necessary to argue that Nozick's materialistic notion of "worsening" is too narrow because he ignores autonomy, however. The loss of autonomy also makes involuntary employees worse off materially. Once all non-human productive resources have been appropriated, externally propertyless employees are materially worse off on average than they would be if they had the option of appropriating non-human productive resources to support themselves instead. They are worse off because the incentives offered by employers do not have to be as high as they would have to be if people could exit the employment system completely. The fact that there would be a difference indicates that the involuntarily employed are exploited because they lack that liberty. The

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actual difference between what it now costs to induce people to work as employees and what it would cost if the capable unemployed had a legal as well as a moral right to a public income is a measure of the extent to which they are exploited. This is a sacrifice of some for others in Nozick's sense. If we want to eliminate and prevent the sacrifice of some for others, the appropriation of resources must not result in anyone acquiring the power, whether legally sanctioned or not, to subordinate others to any degree. Of course, it is true that the employed have no right to a particular price for their labour. It is also true that disadvantageous circumstances can force someone to accept a lower wage than he would like. The moral problem of exploitation arises because the people who benefit from exchanges with employees in the disadvantageous circumstances under discussion are the same people who have created the circumstances.

Here is another perspective on the same issue. Nozick holds that people "are entitled to [their natural assets], and to what flows from them."[11] In the case of involuntary employment, some of what flows from their natural assets is diverted to the owners of non-human productive resources because their ownership in a situation of total ownership gives them the power to divert it. Prices are higher in a company store; it stands to reason that wages offered would be lower at a company labour exchange. The difference between what employees actually receive and what they would get does not flow from the natural assets of the owners unless their power over involuntary employees is one of their natural assets. A libertarian must deny that it is. Indeed, the diversion means that the employer owns his employees in part.

> If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, then they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a *part-owner* of you; it gives them a property right in you.[12]

Involuntary employment violates the individual's right of self-ownership. It makes him poorer materially as well as morally. Indeed, he is worse off materially because he is worse off morally.

The contention that the unemployed are exploited cannot be refuted by pointing out that private ownership is necessary for a market economy to function and that market economies undoubtedly make most people, including the involuntarily employed, richer over time. Historical improvement will not compensate for the exploitation I criticize. People can become richer while simultaneously being exploited. Many taxpayers, whom Nozick regards as having been sacrificed because they have been taxed, have nonetheless become richer over time. If taxpayers can be exploited and simultaneously become wealthier, so can the involuntarily

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employed who are "taxed" for the benefit of the owners of non-human productive resources. Hence, the fact that the involuntarily employed have become wealthier does not entail that they are not being exploited.

As we saw in the previous section, Nozick does not think that there is an absolute prohibition against appropriation when it would worsen someone's position. It seems reasonable to conclude that one person's right to appropriate without compensation ends where another's subordination begins. If appropriators have to compensate people who are made worse off and if involuntary employment makes people worse off, appropriators have to compensate people who are in employment involuntarily. They can do so by making it possible for them to live without having to work and, thus, eliminating the premium they would otherwise receive because their employees are not volunteers. They can do so by providing public incomes for people who do not want to take up employment. This would restore the freedom of the externally propertyless that vanished as a result of the total appropriation of non-human productive resources. It would eliminate the exploitative element in employment by countering the power of employers that derives from their ownership of non-human productive resources in a situation in which all such resources are already owned. Unless we dismantle the market system or periodically redistribute ownership of non-human productive resources, neither of which is desirable, there is no alternative way of compensating the externally propertyless. Only a public income financed by taxes collected by the state can come close to ensuring that everyone entitled to compensation can actually get it and that no one obligated to pay taxes for that purpose evades them.

Why the World Cannot Object to Taking Responsibility

The beneficiaries of a market economy include the owners of non-human productive resources and their employees to the extent that they are volunteers. If there is involuntary employment and unemployment, then some of their gains are illicit. I am not saying that the beneficiaries have set out to exploit anyone, but if they appropriate what should go to the propertyless, then they do in fact exploit them. Unwitting exploitation is still exploitation. The exploiters have an obligation to return what they have undeservedly gained. If a bank deposits money in an account by accident, the account holder has a responsibility to return the money even though he has nothing to do with its being deposited. It is the same if the bank unintentionally makes deposits in many accounts. The fact that others received some money as well does not make it right. The fact that some got money before others does not give them a right to it. It does not matter that the "lucky" account holders own the bank. All must return the money. The beneficiaries of a market economy are like the account holders.

The gains in a market economy occur as a result of exchanges. The illicit gains are bundled together with legitimate profits and spread throughout

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the entire economy. The best way to separate them is through taxation on exchanges mediated by money, taxes such as income tax, sales tax, and import duty.

Taxation on exchanges mediated by money is not expropriation. This is not merely the point that the revenues are really the property of the involuntarily employed and unemployed rather than the existing beneficiaries of the market economy. Taxation on exchanges mediated by money would not be expropriation even if that were not the case. When Nozick declares that "taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor," the image that comes to mind is of a peasant who is forced to work in the fields of his feudal master or who has part of his crop taken away without compensation by an overlord. What was true before the industrial revolution in pre-market economies is no longer true, however.

Taxation on voluntary exchanges mediated by money does not alter anyone's property rights with respect to what is exchanged. What it alters is the price. In a market without taxation on exchanges, the price received by the seller matches the price paid by the buyer. It is determined by supply and demand. If there is taxation on exchanges, however, then, from the perspective of the seller, it is as though there were less demand or a greater supply and, from the perspective of the buyer, it is as though there were more demand or a smaller supply. A libertarian argument against taxes on exchanges of property mediated by money that concluded that taxation was wrong would have to show that it is morally wrong for anyone other than buyers and sellers to have an influence on prices. There is no such argument. Alternatively, it would have to be argued that the price paid by the buyer must match the price received by the seller. There is no justification for concluding that libertarianism requires such a match. Therefore, it is hard to see that there is any libertarian objection at all to taxation on exchanges. In short, instead of being expropriation, taxation can be a legitimate determinant of what constitutes our property following an exchange mediated by money. The price is not the property.

The price is not the property even with respect to one's own person and one's labour. Labour is not the same as the price of labour. No one becomes a forced labourer because the demand for his labour declines and his income goes down as well. Similarly, no one becomes a forced labourer because he is taxed on his earnings. Taxation might reduce someone's incentive to work but it does not force him to work. Taxation affects the price of labour, but it does not affect the labour itself.[13] Nozick's near-identification of taxation with forced labour is not appropriate for market economies, however accurate it may be in pre-market economies.

Steven Rieber argues that taxation reduces freedom to exchange. He writes that "even if the seller raises the price to an absurdly high level, this does not appear to reduce the freedom of the parties to exchange. By contrast, a very high sales tax does reduce this freedom—because it is

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imposed by a third party."[14] Rieber appears to presuppose that only a particular buyer and a particular seller have an influence on the price in an untaxed exchange. In fact, it is other market participants who have the most influence. There is always third-party influence on the price agreed in a transaction. Hence, he needs to say much more than he does to make his case against the state influence that exists when there are sales taxes. There is not much more he can say, however. The notion that taxation constrains freedom to exchange is just the economic banality that higher prices reduce the probability that exchanges will occur. That fact does nothing to justify a right to prices exclusive of tax.

Of course, it is possible for taxation to raise prices so high that it would be excessively damaging to an economy and, therefore, morally wrong as well as foolish. Barring that case, however, there is no moral argument against taxation, libertarian or other, on exchanges provided the exchanges are voluntary, the taxpayer can know what the taxes are and relevantly similar exchanges are taxed at the same rate. Of course, the fact that there is no moral argument against taxation on exchanges mediated by money does not mean that there is a moral argument for it. That the beneficiaries of a market economy have an obligation to compensate the involuntarily employed and unemployed leads to one moral argument for it. Presumably, the fact that some people are in need and can neither support themselves nor take up voluntary employment leads to another. There are no libertarian grounds on which to base an objection to either.

How the World Should Pay What It Owes You

There are welfare provisions in most countries with modern market economies. However, they typically involve a lack of proper respect for people who have a claim right to a public income. The capable unemployed as well as the needy must apply for welfare as though it were charity. Their expenditures are controlled and monitored. People who apply for welfare are seen as being out to cheat the working taxpayer. They are viewed as parasites who must be tolerated but who should not be trusted. The attitudes may be reasonable in pre-market economies. They are not reasonable in market economies.

The best option is to replace welfare systems with a negative income tax of the sort suggested by Milton Friedman.[15] With a negative income tax, the system would be such that, when someone's income was less than the deductions to which he was entitled, he would be paid a portion of the difference. A negative income tax would pay out public incomes automatically. There would be no need to persuade a bureaucrat of one's eligibility. No bureaucrat would monitor or control how the recipient spent his money. Moreover, a negative income tax would allow people to move voluntarily into and out of employment with ease and would allow people to take up as much or as little employment as they wished and for as long as

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they wished, provided that employment was available. A negative income tax could replace a wide range of existing programs including minimum wages, unemployment insurance, disability pensions, old age pensions, and others. Since it would be an automatic process operating through the existing income tax system, it would be possible to eliminate a great deal of government bureaucracy, to save money, and for everyone to be freer overall.

A negative income tax would end up benefiting the needy as well as the capable unemployed. At least two Nozickian justifications for welfare for the needy have been proposed.[16] However, it is not necessary to discuss them here. For one thing, as already mentioned, since there is no moral objection to taxation on exchanges mediated by money, there is no moral objection to collecting taxes in order to provide programs to help the needy. For another, even if there were, the fact that some "cheat the system" could be a tolerable side effect of ensuring that the rights of the capable unemployed are observed unfailingly and in a respectful manner. The two observations are enough to forestall any objections on the ground that a negative income tax would be inappropriate because the needy as well as the capable unemployed could take advantage of it.

Philippe van Parijs argues for a universal public income on more or less Rawlsian grounds.[17] He argues against a negative income tax. His objections to it are practical in nature and the administrative concerns he mentions are not insurmountable obstacles. More importantly, however, the libertarian does not have the option of arguing for a public income paid out universally to all. The person who owns sufficient non-human productive resources to support himself has not been made worse off by the total appropriation of non-human productive resources and, hence, has no grounds on which to claim compensation. The person who chooses employment instead of a public income in an economy in which all employment is voluntary has no grounds on which to claim compensation either. If someone wishes to be an employee when they have the option of accepting a public income, there is no libertarian justification for paying them one. The libertarian can justify no more than providing an alternative to employment.

It will naturally be feared that there would be an economically disastrous increase in the number of people who rely on the state to provide their incomes. The fear may be groundless as well as morally irrelevant. There is no justification for public incomes that are as good as someone could earn from employment and most people are willing to work much harder than they would need to work merely in order to survive. As long as the negative income tax were less than one hundred percent of the difference between the recipient's actual income and the deductions to which he is entitled, there would be an incentive for him to work. As well as fearing that public incomes might be too generous, it might be thought that they would not be generous enough. However, they do not have to be more

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generous than necessary to enable a recipient to avoid hunger, exposure, and nakedness so that he can also avoid involuntary subordination in an employment relationship. Moreover, it would be wrong to advocate a public income so high that it excessively impeded the operation of the market and impoverished everyone. A market economy is a good thing insofar as it produces more goods and services that people need, desire, or come to desire, than any other system. Public incomes for the capable unemployed are justifiable because they offset some negative side effects of the market economy. The side effects are not so bad that we can justify eliminating instead of reforming it.

Conclusion

Nozick's understanding of the economy is anachronistic. He draws conclusions that would be appropriate if the world were the same as it was two or three centuries ago for inhabitants of Britain who had the option of emigrating to North America. The world has changed. We are no longer economic atoms. We are parts of a vast, complex, and pervasive system, the modern market economy. Advocating the liberty that would have been appropriate in the past now amounts to promoting the freedom of some to an unjustifiable extent while disregarding the liberty of others. Nozick seems to see the political side of things but to overlook the economic side. He does not notice that taxation alters prices rather than property, that people are in the employment relationship involuntarily, or that people are involuntarily unemployed. In his ignorance of the way market economies work, he betrays his own libertarian principles: he opposes what is obligatory in the light of libertarianism, and approves what is forbidden.[18]

Notes

1 John Exdell, "Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights," *Ethics*, 87 (1977): 142-49, esp. p. 145.
2 Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 169.
3 Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker-Discipline Device," *American Economic Review*, 74 (1984): 433-44 (reprinted in N. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer, *New Keynsian Economics*, Vol. 2, *Coordination Failures and Real Rigidities* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991], pp. 123-42).
4 Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, p. 33.
5 Ibid., p. 178.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

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9 Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, pp. 178-79 (unnumbered note).

10 G. A. Cohen, "Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality," in *Justice and Equality Here and Now*, edited by Frank S. Lukash (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 127.

11 Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, p. 226.

12 Ibid., p. 172; emphasis in original.

13 Kenneth Arrow writes, "once it is recognized that labor is specific in nature and that there are many kinds, it becomes clear that the freedom of choice under a tax is vastly greater than that under compulsory labor" ("Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice," *Philosophia* [Israel] 7, [1978]: 265-79, esp. p. 270). Forced labour does not become free because the labourer is given a choice of tasks to do for the master, however. It is forced labour because another compels him to work for the latter's benefit.

14 Steven Rieber, "Freedom and Redistributive Taxation," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 10 (1996): 63-73, esp. p. 71.


15 Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

16 Michael Davis, "Nozick's Argument *for* the Legitimacy of the Welfare State," *Ethics*, 97 (1987): 576-94, and Gillian Brock, "Is Redistribution to Help the Needy Unjust?" *Analysis*, 55, 1 (1995): 50-60.

17 Philippe van Parijs, "Basic Income Capitalism," *Ethics*, 102 (1992): 465-84, and "Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 20 (1991): 101-31.

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