In opposition to the Cartesian conception of mind as a nonphysical homunculus that is "conscious of" both sensory material and itself, Fechner conceived the mind to be a bundle of conscious sensations – where particular sensations are subjective aspects of particular neural events, and where such events are not always above the *limen* or threshold for innervating the illusion of self-consciousness. Extending Fechner's framework to clinical theory, Prince (1910) articulated the conceptual basis for dissociation:

> If it is true that dissociated brain systems can functionate . . . and if it is true that they have psychical equivalents, then whether we are self-conscious of any given state of consciousness must depend . . . upon whether the brain process, correlated with it, is synthesized in a particular way with the larger system of brain processes which is correlated at a given moment with the self-conscious personality. And in so far as a brain process can occur detached from the main system of brain processes, so far can consciousness occur without self-consciousness. (p. 94)

Prince (1925) further extended this theoretical framework to the interpretation of clinical data:

> The introspective testimony of my dissociated subjects, who in [hypnosis] recalled vividly and precisely these subconscious experiences [of trauma], has been unanimous that these experiences were without self-consciousness. . . . The conscious events were just sensations. (p. 182)

Freud's early approach to hypnotically uncovered traumas, like Prince's approach, presumed them to be real traumas that had become *dissociated from self-consciousness*. But later, after incestuous trauma was uncovered in his own therapy, Freud reattributed such uncoverings to universal wishes which, not only in patients but also in "normal" people, are *repressed from consciousness* (Davis 1990). And in order to accommodate the repression of universal wishes, Freud (1916/1922) abandoned double-aspect materialism for a new version of Cartesion dualism:

> The unconscious system may therefore be compared to a large ante-room. . . . Adjoining this is a second, smaller apartment, a sort of reception-room, in which consciousness resides. But on the threshold between the two there stands a personage with the office of door-keeper, who examines the various mental excitations, censors them, and denies them admittance to the reception-room when he disapproves of them. . . . The excitations in the unconscious, in the ante-chamber, are not visible to consciousness, which is of course in the other room, so to begin with they remain unconscious. When they have pressed forward to the threshold and have been turned back by the door-keeper, they are "*incapable of becoming conscious*"; we call them then *repressed.* But even those excitations which are allowed over the threshold . . . only become [conscious] if they succeed in attracting the eye of consciousness. (pp. 305–306)

What is new about Freud's version of substance dualism is that it posits two homunculi: the "door-keeper" and the "eye of consciousness."

Freud's (1900/1913) *Interpretation of Dreams* supposedly provided symbolic evidence for the universality of incestuous wishes "in the ante-chamber." However, laboratory studies have demonstrated that the second level of meaning in a "symbolic" dream arises from lingering emotions that consciously accompany the dream, not from unconscious wishes (Hartmann et al. 2002–2003; Kunzendorf & Maurer 1988–1989; Kunzendorf & Paroskie 2000–2001; Kunzendorf et al. 1999–2000). Thus, Hartmann (1998) describes rape victims who have complete memories of their traumas, without any signs of repression – and who also have "symbolic" dreams of ocean waves that become overwhelming tidal waves, as their dream images begin to contextualize their consciously lingering feelings of being overwhelmed.

Recently, the non-Freudian notion of *dissociation from self-consciousness* has been clinically revived by Spiegel (1986; 1990) and Bliss (1986; 1988), and has been theoretically refined by Kihlstrom and Cantor (1984) and Kunzendorf (2000). According to Kunzendorf, one's illusory experience of a self-conscious subject "having" sensations is subjectively manifested as either the tacit knowledge that one is "imaging" sensations or the sensationless knowledge that one is "perceiving" them. Furthermore, the tacit knowledge that one is imaging is the subjective aspect of a neural mechanism monitoring the central innervation of imaged sensations, and the tacit knowledge that one is perceiving is the subjective quality of the same mechanism monitoring the peripheral excitation of perceived sensations.

On Kunzendorf's account, abnormal individuals attenuate self-conscious source-monitoring not only during sleep but also during trauma, thereby encoding the trauma as an imaginary or dreamlike experience, and ultimately remember the trauma not as a real happening but only as an unbidden image. In research confirming this source-monitoring account of dissociation, Kunzendorf and Karpen (1996–1997) demonstrated that the dissociative experience of amnesia is associated with attenuated source-monitoring and, employing Holmes' (1990) paradigm, Kunzendorf and Moran (1993–1994) further demonstrated that traumatic stress induces "dissociation from self-conscious source-monitoring" and *source amnesia*, rather than "repression from consciousness" and *content amnesia.* Moreover, the *return* of dissociated trauma – the unbidden image – is contingent on neither free association as posited by Freud nor hypermnesia as posited by Erdelyi, but on shifting one's recall criteria from "previously perceived" sensations to "familiar" (perceived or imaged) sensations (Kunzendorf 1989–1990; Kunzendorf & Boisvert 1996).

Finally, Erdelyi's distinction between "repression from consciousness" and "distortion of consciousness" misses the important source-monitoring relationship between dissociation and hallucination. In persons whose wakeful source-monitoring is unstable and unreliable, dissociative symptoms tend to emerge when the realities of abuse are defensively inferred to be nightmarish imaginings instead of traumatic percepts, and psychotic symptoms tend to emerge when mental images of the taboo are defensively inferred to be percepts beamed into the head by the devil or the C.I.A. instead of self-generated images. Indeed, among persons subjected to extreme childhood abuse and diagnosed with dissociative identity disorder (Kluft 1987a), Kluft observed first-rank symptoms of delusion and hallucination in 30 out of 30 cases (Kluft 1987b). However, neither dissociative inferences about traumatic percepts nor psychotic inferences about taboo images are likely to arise in persons whose wakeful source-monitoring is robust: Kunzendorf et al. (1997–1998) observed dissociative symptoms primarily in those abused patients who scored high on Tellegen and Atkinson's (1974) test for Absorption in Fantasy – a test which Rader et al. (1996) found to be predictive of unstable source-monitoring.

Repression and the unconscious

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Abstract: We argue that repression is primarily an unconscious process and that the position of Erdelyi is not coherent with Freud's views on the matter. Repression of ideas is a process that takes place without the knowledge of the subject. In this respect, it is essentially different from suppression, where ideas are acted upon by a conscious will.

Erdelyi rightly emphasizes that there is a "Babel of misunderstandings" (target article, Abstract) in psychology about the

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notion of repression. Therefore, we should welcome the attempt he makes in his "unified theory of repression" to clarify this notion and to integrate different experimental results into the theory. Nevertheless, Erdelyi's account has serious difficulties of its own, especially concerning the relationship between repression and the role of the unconscious.

In leveling out the difference between suppression and repression, Erdelyi neglects the fundamental distinction between conscious and unconscious processes, which is essential for repression. Freud wrote that "repression [. . .] cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity" (Freud 1915a/1957, p. 147) and added that there had to be a strong connection between repression and what is unconscious (Freud 1915a/1957, p. 148).

Freud assumed a hierarchy of defense ("Abwehr"), reaching from the most basic defense mechanisms – such as flight from external danger – up to highly sophisticated mechanisms such as judgments of condemnation. Repression stands between these extremes; the only difference is that it is not directed at an *external*, but at an *internal* source of danger – an instinctual impulse, whose satisfaction would be incompatible with other demands of the mental apparatus. Repression is an instinctual vicissitude (Freud 1915a/1957, p. 148); and instincts or instinctual representatives also constitute the core of the unconscious (Freud 1915b/1957, p. 185). This relationship is ignored by Erdelyi; the connection between repression and instinctual impulse remains unclear.

According to Freud, there are three stages of repression: primal repression, repression proper (or after-pressure), and the return of the repressed (Freud 1915a/1957, pp. 148, 154). In the first stage of repression, the instinctual representative is barred from entering into the conscious realm, and a fixation in the unconscious takes place. With primal repression, an attraction pole for further repressions is created, where neither the content of the repressed idea nor the attraction itself is conscious to the subject. Unfortunately, Erdelyi does not take this into account. The after-pressure – the second stage of repression – is connected in an associative manner with what was primarily repressed; the primal repression provides a path for the repression proper and precedes it logically (Freud 1915a/1957, p. 148; 1926a/1959, p. 94).

In his *Metapsychology*, Freud holds the view that an idea can only be repressed if it is already attracted by unconscious contents. In this way, he presupposes an unconscious, which – as the attracting force – cannot itself be something that has been attracted. The unconscious therefore seems to be the product as well as the precondition of individual repression. The construct of primal repression is supposed to dissolve this seeming contradiction in providing a starting point. In the third stage, a "return of the repressed"may happen. Repression is a precondition of symptom formation (Freud 1916–1917/1961, p. 294); the breach – "the return of the repressed" – occurs at the point where a fixation has taken place in the past. This is the reason why repression is also regarded as a main factor for the development of psychoneuroses (Freud 1905/1958, p. 101), dreams, and parapraxes.

But Freud not only specifies the *result* of repression as unconscious and describes the repressed idea as inapt for consciousness (Freud 1916–1917/1961, p. 296), he also characterizes the *process* of repression as something that happens without being noticed by the ego (Freud 1916–1917/1961, p. 294). Erdelyi neglects this aspect. In the second topic model of the mental apparatus, which Freud developed between 1920 and 1923, the unconscious is no longer presented as a closed system, but rather as a constituent of all three instances (id, ego, and superego), controlling one of the instances – the id – completely. This explains why the repressed is associated with the ego, but only with the unconscious part of it (Freud 1923/1961, p. 18, 24). The conceptual confusion which may be caused by talk of repression by the ego, can be dissolved if we notice that only the *unconscious* part of the ego is supposed to be doing the repressing (Freud 1933/1964, p. 69), and that there is no conscious process of repression by the ego, contrary to what Erdelyi postulates.

The strength of the "unified theory of repression"depends on how exactly repression is defined. When repression is defined as an intentional suppression of an experience, then there is no controversy, and Erdelyi is right when he states, "If repression = suppression, then everybody believes in repression. The *myth* morphs into the obvious" (sect. 2). But when we construe repression as something that operates unconsciously, refers to instinctual representatives, and presupposes a primal repression attracting instinctual representatives, then Erdelyi has not presented an integrating account, but instead an account that excludes Freud's position.

The proposed unified theory of repression is not a theory of repression at all; the conception of the Freudian unconscious has no place in it, and neither has psychoanalysis, which is the science of the unconscious, according to Freud (cf. Freud 1926b/1959, p. 265). The "unified theory of repression"leads in the last instance to the identification of the mental with the conscious – a view that has been firmly rejected by Freud (cf. Freud 1916–1917/1961, p. 22).

Is Erdelyi's swan a goose?

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Abstract: Erdelyi's argument for integrating clinical data on repression, mainly Freudian, with laboratory findings suffers from logical and factual errors concerning Freudian repression and about experiments on forgetting.

Erdelyi's argument for integrating clinical data on repression, mainly Freudian, with laboratory work on forgetting is marred by a serious logical flaw: that is, by his virtually restricting consideration of Freudian repression to the initiating motive, by his avoiding primary and secondary repression, and by misunderstandings of the work on forgetting, especially that of Ebbinghaus and Bartlett.

First, regarding the logical problem: Erdelyi cites Freud's saying that the essence of repression lies in keeping something out of consciousness. But it does not follow that everything that is kept out of consciousness is kept out because of repression. It's the old problem of the white swan: Because all swans are white birds, and this bird is a swan, it certainly follows that this bird must be white, but it is fallacious to assert that any given white bird is a swan. The similarity between repression and forgetting proposed by Erdelyi is based on such a fallacy.

Second, regarding the restriction to motive: As Erdelyi says, *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud 1895/1955) contains many instances of Freud's patients telling him they had deliberately tried to keep some unpleasant memory or thought out of consciousness. But that is only the beginning of the story. In what Freud initially called *defence hysteria* – soon the only form of hysteria he recognised – an initial effort of will brought about a split in consciousness in which symptoms formed. The patient did not intend to cause the split and generate symptoms – his intention was different but unsuccessful (Freud 1894/1962, pp. 46–47). Thus, an obsessional patient said, "I tried to put it away from me and tried not to think about it . . . but then I got this other thing" (i.e. the symptom) (Freud 1894/1962, pp. 52–53). Freud said quite explicitly that he hoped his theory would fill the gap between the act of will and the emergence of the symptom. His central theoretical proposal was the separation of the sexual idea from its charge of affective energy. In hysteria, the affect was converted into motor or sensory symptoms; and in obsessions, it was attached to or

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