expected to come from the besieged (pp. 154–8). Topped and tailed with a brief introduction and conclusion, the book ends with two appendices. One gives a brief description of the military treatises, and for the extant ones the availability of texts and translations. A. M. Devine's translation of Aelian should be added (*The Ancient World* 19 [1989], 31–64), as should J. G. DeVoto's texts and translations of Arrian's *Tactica* and *Expedition against the Alans* (Chicago, 1993). The second appendix provides another translation of the latter.

This is a difficult book to review. Despite its origin as a doctoral thesis in London (p. 8), it is aimed at a wide audience: 'for all interested in the Roman army and ancient warfare' (p. 11). What they get is 'hard core' military history. This is a book concerned with *Realien*, not *mentalites*. In terms of the historical novel, it is Bernard Cornwell, not Patrick O'Brian. For example, religion features twice: the practical Romans make use of the religious scruples of others to catch them at a disadvantage (p. 94), and the effect on Roman morale of the taking (and manipulation) of the auspices and the interpretation of omens is discussed (pp. 101–2). Analysis seems set at a rationalizing level and religion is sidestepped: 'whatever the religious beliefs of commanders and soldiers, and whether or not they believed in the omens' (p. 102). No place here for the divine apparitions found in art (e.g. scene xvi of the column of Marcus) and literature (e.g. Herodian 8.3.8–9)

The main appeal for the specialist is the bringing together of the theoretical treatises and the 'reality' we construct from histories and archaeology. Although aware of the problems, above all that the claim to utility may be a literary topos (p. 10), G. reads the manuals (or some of them) in practical terms. Despite two emperors setting up versions of 'Alexander's phalanx' (Suet. *Nero* 19.2; CD 78.7.1–2; Herodian 4.8.2; cf. Plut. *Ant*. 54.6), Asclepiodotus, Aelian, and Arrian's *Tactica* do not feature in the analysis (cf. p. 10). One reason that the anonymous *De Rebus Bellicis* does not even make it into the appendix may be that it is just too obviously divorced from reality.

With so few literary passages linking such treatises to practicalities, and all of these from the republic (Polybius and Cicero), a systematic study of their later reception might be helpful in forming an appreciation of their perceived utility in Roman times (cf. p. 10). Vegetius was read in practical terms in the medieval west (P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* [Oxford, 1984], pp. 211–12), and a wider range was thus considered in the Byzantine world (J. Haldon, *The Byzantine Wars* [Stroud, 2001], p. 146). Psellus claimed that it was the learning he had acquired from such works that made Romanus IV demand his presence on campaign (*Chronographia* 7.6–7; cf. 11–12).

Some might consider that a concentration on reading these treatises in terms of of the realities of war can only give a partial explanation of the genre (or genres), and could close down other approaches (cf. A. Xenophontov, 'Polyaenus: a Greek Job-seeker in the Roman world', in E. N. Ostenfeld [ed.], *Greek Romans and Roman Greeks* [Aarhus, 2002], pp. 212–15).

*Lincoln College, Oxford and University of Warwick* HARRY SIDEBOTTOM

S. P. MATTERN: *Rome and the Enemy. Imperial Strategy in the Principate*. Pp. xviii + 259, maps, ills. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999. Cased, $35. ISBN: 0-520-21166-9.

Mattern's overview of Roman strategy covering the period 31 B.C. to A.D. 235, but including earlier and later material (p.5), uses literary evidence rather than frontier

© The Classical Association, 2003

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.172 Published online by Cambridge University Press

archaeology (pp. xiii, 20–1). The opening chapter (pp. 1–23), on the mentality of decision makers, offers sensible synopses of various scholarly arguments: that literary authors came from the same élite as the *amici* of emperors (pp. 1–2), and thus strategic thinking in literature closely reflects debate in the *consilium*, the informal nature of the *consilium* (p. 8), the degree of independent action by governors (pp. 8–14), and the élite's lack of specialization and training (pp. 14–20). Two concerns can be mentioned here. At a very specific level Herodian may not be the best opening example to use for the thinking of the élite. As M. notes (p. 3), his status is unknown (see now M. Zimmermann, *Kaiser und Ereignis. Studien zum Geschichtswerk Herodians* [Munich, 1999], pp. 302–19). At a more general level M.'s 'reductionist' line, that the Romans only debated in the ways that surviving literature shows them debating (to adapt the phrase of Clifford Geertz, this could be 'thin description'), might be to ignore the conventions of ancient literary genres. The majority of our evidence comes from histories, and, as Herodian stated (2.15.6–7), they should not get bogged down in too much detail. The ancient élite may not have thought differently when advising the emperor and when writing, but probably there were more precise details in the former.

The second chapter, 'The Image of the World' (pp. 24–80), first looks at the army: including the use of itineraries and *periploi*, the manipulation of information in despatches, commentaries, and memoires, the unreliability of merchant's reports, the rarity of long-range 'reconnaissance', and the tendency that increases in geographic knowledge followed military campaigns (pp. 26–41). It then turns to geography, arguing that while 'map consciousness' was low, the available mental images of the world could affect military decisions.

The chapter concludes with intelligence and ethnography, suggesting that traditional (negative) stereotypes were much more important in determining Roman strategy (pp. 70–80). The latter is somewhat cursory. It contains only passing references to the concept of the 'noble' barbarian (p. 78; A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* [Cambridge, 1974] is notable for its absence from the bibliography), religion as a factor in thinking about barbarians (p. 74 on Druids; e.g. worship of the eastern Mithras might have had some impact on ideas of easteners), and images of barbarians in art (p. 78; at p. 195 n. 110 M. points to the need for a full-length study, now partially provided by I. M. Ferris, *Enemies of Rome. Barbarians through Roman Eyes* [Stroud, 2000]), and there is no mention of the continuance of ethnic stereotypes within the empire.

The third chapter starts with the limitations of the imperial army: its 'smallness', its attempts at territorial expansion, the dangers of stripping troops from one frontier for another, and its difficulties in holding conquered territories (pp. 81–109). While, as M. shows, the army of the principate consisted of a small percentage of the total population of the empire, its size relative to its potential enemies would seem of more importance. M. does not discuss a contemporary perception of a limitation of the army: that it was not Roman but composed of subject peoples (Tac. *Ag*. 32; Herodian 2.11.5; *Res Gestae Divi Saporis* 3; 9). On a point of detail, Caracalla did not die falling from his horse (p. 94), but was killed after dismounting to relieve himself (CD 79.5.2–5; Herodian 4.13.3–5: HA *Carac*. 7.1–3). M. goes on to set out the arguments that Roman frontiers were more to control border crossings, especially of bandits, than to defend against invasion; for the latter they relied on 'deterrence by terror' (pp. 109–22).

After the economic activities of the élite on their own estates (pp. 123–6), the fourth chapter looks at the cost of the army and the states revenues (pp.126–42), argues that

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.172 Published online by Cambridge University Press

wars were expensive and needed long-term planning (pp. 142–9), and considers the rewards of conquest (pp. 149–61). The recent interpretation of an inscription on the Colosseum that its construction had been funded by booty (G. Alföldy, 'Eine Bauinschrift aus dem Colosseum', *ZPE* 109 [1995], 195–226) supports M.'s conclusions (pp. 151–2) on the quantity of booty taken by Vespasian.

The final chapter, 'Values' (pp. 162–210), is the most original in the book. M. constructs a convincing model of the Romans as 'status warriors' whose aim is a hierarchy of states with Rome at the top. Any loss of face on Rome's part was thought to lead to barbarian arrogance (*superbia*), which in turn would lead to a contempt for Rome and thus danger. Awe and fear were the correct attitudes for barbarians. Thus any injury (*inuria*) to Rome called for revenge (*ultio*), which would be a just war (and this, of course, did not have to be the same as a defensive war). A brief epilogue (pp. 211–22) suggests that the same values had obtained under the republic.

This well-written book, well versed in ancient and modern texts, splendidly fulfils its aim to appeal to students of Rome and non-specialists alike (p. xiii). For the former it makes a valuable contribution to the debate on Roman strategy started all those years ago by Edward Luttwak's *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore, 1976).

Further nuancing of our understanding of imperial attitudes might be possible if systematic study were made of the genres of the relevant ancient texts, their 'Greekness', 'Romanness', or 'Jewishness' (cf. p. 158), where in the empire they were composed, the status of their authors, and their date of 'publication'.

*Lincoln College, Oxford and University of Warwick* HARRY SIDEBOTTOM

## COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN WAR

K. Raaflaub, N. Rosenstein (edd.): *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe and Mesoamerica*. (Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia 3.) Pp. viii + 484, ills, maps. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999. Cased, £31.50. ISBN: 0-674-94660-X.

With a span of four millennia and two-thirds of the earth's circumference, from Tokyo to Tenochtitlan, and a theme as broad as 'war and society', this book might seem impossibly ambitious. Yet it miraculously succeeds in covering its vast subject matter in depth. The editors, Kurt Raaflaub and Nathan Rosenstein, have asked some tough questions—who participated in war? How and why were wars waged and justified? How did economic, social, and political structures affect warfare? How did warfare in turn affect these structures?—all of which are gamely tackled by all sixteen contributors. This indeed is the secret of the volume's success: everyone has taken their brief very seriously and resisted the temptation to write more selectively about topics in which they happen to have a particular interest or for which there happens to be most evidence. The result is coherent and comprehensive to a degree rarely seen in edited volumes.

Greece and Rome are at the centre of the enterprise, not only in the sense that the chapters dedicated to classical antiquity come in the middle of the book (Raaflaub and Rosenstein themselves write on archaic and classical Greece and republican Rome, respectively, while Charles D. Hamilton covers the Hellenistic world and Brian Campbell the Roman empire), but also in the sense that the specialists in other areas

© The Classical Association, 2003

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.172 Published online by Cambridge University Press