ταὐτόν). But there are parallels for such an 'unnatural' position of ἆρα. For example, at *R.* 487a7–8, Socrates asks τελεωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ ἆρα οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;, where the theme of the question certainly includes μόνοις; and, at *R.* 405a6–7, ἆρα μή occurs in a group of words which separates a complement from the noun it completes, this noun being the true theme of the question (Τῆς δὲ κακῆς τε καὶ αἰσχρᾶς παιδείας ἐν πόλει ἆρα μή τι μεῖζον ἕξεις λαβεῖν τεκμήριον ἤ. . .).[9] The contrary situation is also possible: for example, at *R.* 437d8–10, we read δίψα ἐστὶ δίψα ἆρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλίγου, ἢ καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ποιοῦ τινος πώματος;, though the theme of the question is merely the first δίψα, the second going with the genitives which follow.

The position of ἆρα at *Phlb.* 27a8 as I propose to read it does therefore not seem incompatible with the way Plato uses grammar, and might perhaps be explained by a willingness to emphasize not only what is placed before (ἄλλο), but also what is placed after (καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν), both forming the whole theme of the question.

(2) Another alternative, suggested to me by David Sedley, would be to keep ἄρα and to put a full stop after ἄλλο ἄρα, which in this case would relate to the distinction between the cause and the product, while in the rest of his intervention Socrates would simply assert that the cause is also different from the components of the mixture, an assertion then confirmed by Protarchus.

In any case, both alternatives would make the argument sounder without really emending the text.

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[9] *Euthphr.* 6b7–8 (Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγῇ σύ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. . .;) may be another parallel, but one could here as well print ἄρα, as for example A. Croiset does in the Budé series (Paris, 1941[2]).

ARISTOTLE ON THE HOMERIC NARRATOR

Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλου ἀγωνίζονται, μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις· ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα προοιμιασάμενος εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι ἦθος, καὶ οὐδὲν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἐχόντ' ἤθος.

There is near consensus among scholars about the interpretation of the above passage from the *Poetics* (1460 a 5–11, text R. Kassel): Homer is praised because his poems have so little narrative and so much speech. This interpretation is defended by Bywater, Else, Lucas, Fuhrmann, and Halliwell.[1] In 1987 I suggested a different interpretation: Homer is praised because only in the proems he speaks in his own voice.[2] At that time I was neither aware that this was such

[1] I. Bywater, *Aristotle. On the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), 100–1, 118–19, 316–17; G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Cambridge, MA, 1957), 620–1; D. W. Lucas, *Aristotle* Poetics (Oxford, 1968), 226–7; M. Fuhrmann, *Aristoteles* Poetik(Municn, 1976), 101 n. 10; S. Halliwell, *Aristotle's* Poetics (London, 1986), 126–7; *The* Poetics *of Aristotle* (London, 1987), 171–3.

[2] I. J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers. The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1987), 5–8.

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a heterodoxy[3] nor that a handful of others had made—more or less—the same suggestion before (Ridgeway, Kitto, and Dupont-Roc & Lallot).[4] Since the whole matter was very much in the margin of the main topic of my book, I did not spend much time on it.

Seeing that one of our foremost experts on the *Poetics*, S. Halliwell, in his latest study on that text still defends the orthodoxy and in a footnote briefly dismisses the heterodoxy,[5] and feeling that both interpretations have not been tested to the full, I return to the passage once more.[6]

Let me first go through the main points and consequences of the standard interpretation.

(1) *Mimesis* here has a different, more restricted, meaning than elsewhere in the *Poetics*, notably chapter 3: instead of referring to the epics as a whole, it refers only to the speeches within the epics. Or, to put it differently, whereas in chapter 3 both speeches and narrative parts were called mimetic, the narrative parts are now considered not mimetic. This is noted without comment by Lucas ('this is a restricted sense of *mimesis*'); commented upon by Bywater ('a grave inconsistency'), Else ('Aristotle does not dodge the paradox, he states it boldly'), Fuhrmann ('eigentümlicherweise'), and Halliwell ('an intolerable contradiction of the basic narrative status of epic poetry ... this passage in ch. 24 ultimately remains unassimilated into the overall argument of the treatise'; 'an ineliminable discrepancy');[7] and explained—in different ways—by Else ('[the paradox] is inherent in Aristotle's conception of Homer as a man between two worlds: epic poet, but also precursor and in a sense inventor of the drama. If this is treason to the epic as such, it springs from allegiance to a greater cause, that of poetry as a whole of which tragedy is the exemplar and Homer was the first prophet.') and Halliwell (because in antiquity the poet was generally held responsible for what is said in a poem and because Aristotle 'needed to clear a distinctive "space" for poetry outside the sphere of directly affirmative and truth-seeking discourses such as history, philosophy, and science', he attempts in this chapter 'to exclude the voice of "the poet himself" from poetic mimesis').[8]

(2) Aristotle grossly underestimates the amount of narrator-text in the Homeric epics and overestimates the amount of speech. This is admitted by Fuhrmann ('Die Aussage vermittelt ein übertriebenes Bild von dem Anteil, der den direkten Reden im ganzen der homerischen Epen zukommt'), while others back up Aristotle's

[3] I am happy to take up this characterization of the two interpretations from M. Leigh, *Lucan. Spectacle and Engagement* (Oxford, 1997), 35–6 n. 52; as a matter of fact, he considers the heterodoxy more convincing.

[4] W. Ridgeway, 'Three Notes on the *Poetics* of Aristotle', *CQ* 6 (1912), 235–41; H. D. F. Kitto, *Poiesis: Structure and Thought* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), 25; R. Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, *Aristote. Du Poétique* (Paris, 1980), 380.

[5] *The Aesthetics of Mimesis. Ancient Texts and Modern Problems* (Princeton, 2002), 167–71; the footnote is on p. 168. The orthodoxy is also repeated by E.-R. Schwinge, 'Aristoteles und die Gattungsdifferenz von Epos und Drama', *Poetica* 22 (1990), 11; the heterodoxy is defended by R. J. Rabel, *Plot and Point of View in the Iliad* (Ann Arbor, 1997), 8–21.

[6] I note that there are also scholars who combine both interpretations: A. Gudeman, *Aristoteles. Peri Poiētikēs* (Berlin, 1934), 105–6, 407–9: Homer speaks himself only briefly in the proems [heterodoxy] and the narrative parts, too, are small in comparison to the speeches [orthodoxy]; and B. Effe, 'Personale Erzählweisen der Erzählliteratur der Antike', *Poetica* 7 (1975), 141: 'der homerische Erzähler enthält sich 'auktorialer' Eingriffe und Stellungnahmen[=heterodoxy]; er lässt das Geschehen sich weitgehend dramatisch, d.h. durch direkte Reden, entfalten [=orthodoxy].'

[7] Lucas (n. 1), 207; Bywater (n. 1), 100; Else (n. 1), 620; Halliwell (n. 1) 1987, 171; Halliwell (n. 5), 171.

[8] Else (n. 1), 620; Halliwell (n. 1) 1987, 171–2.

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assessment (Gudeman: '... die rein erzählenden Stellen, besonders in der Odyssee, stehen in gar keinem quantitativen Verhältnis, weder an Zahl noch an Umfang, zu den übrigen Partien [=speeches] ... Jene narrationes konnten daher als eine quantité négligeable hier ausgeschaltet werden'; Schwinge: 'Die Hervorhebung des dramatischen Charakters der homerischen Epen scheint der Befund zu entsprechen'), or simply pass over this point in silence.[9]

(3) The expression *αὐτὸν ... λέγειν* refers to the narrative parts or narrator-text of the Homeric epics. Cf. Fuhrmann (the passage 'gilt den direkten Reden des Epos und deren Verhältnis zu den Partien, die der Dichter 'in eigener Person' vorträgt'); Lucas ('Anyway the distinction is between narration and impersonation'), and Halliwell (''the poet himself" ... means all narrative, as opposed to passages of "impersonation" or direct speech'.[10]

(4) If, in this passage, *mimesis* refers to impersonation, then *ἀγωνίζονται* must refer to the narrative parts of epic texts. This is admitted, with misgivings, by Lucas ('*ἀγωνίζονται*: in place of *λέγειν*. *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* is used of public appearance in a competitive situation whether of actor, rhapsode, or orator in the courts. It makes a poor contrast to *μιμοῦνται*, since actors can equally well be said *ἀγωνίζεσθαι*.').[11]

(5) *φροιμιασάμενος* is taken by Bywater to refer to the narrative parts ('Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum (*ἀλίγα φροιμιασάμενος*, comp. *ἐλαχιστα λέγειν*)'), by all the others to the proems (e.g. Gudeman: 'Homer dagegen führt nach kurzen einleitenden Worten gleich in medias res'; Else: 'Homer uses straight narrative only for a brief prologue').[12]

(6) If *mimesis* refers to direct speech, then the remark that the other poets *μιμοῦνται ... ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις* must mean that Aristotle here states that other epic texts do not contain much direct speech, a statement which is taken for granted by Halliwell ('This somewhat startling remark can refer only to the prevalence outside Homeric epic of the ordinary narrative mode, narrative without direct speech'), but qualified as surprising by Lucas ('it is surprising if all the poets of the cycle, to say nothing of later epic poets, denied themselves the pleasure of putting speeches into their characters' mouths ... In fact passages of direct speech occur in the scanty fragments ... one may wonder how he [Antimachus] expanded twenty-four Books ..., if he did not give them a generous allowance of speeches.').[13]

(7) *εἰσάγει* is a theatrical metaphor: after a brief prologue, Homer brings on stage characters, who then take over and speak for themselves.

Let us now turn to the heterodox interpretation and go through the points again.

(Ad 1) *Mimesis* is used with the same meaning as in chapter 3 and refers to the Homeric epics as a whole, and Homeric narrative is still seen as mimetic.

(Ad 2) My main reason for challenging the common interpretation in 1987 was that in the course of my research I had counted—both by hand and with the help of a computer—the narrative parts or narrator-text of the Homeric epics, and found out that they take up no less than 55% of the *Iliad* and 34% of the *Odyssey*. A similar observation was made by Ridgeway ('in as much as the narrative portions of the poems are often very long').[14] Can we really assume that Aristotle was prepared to ignore such quantities?

[9] Fuhrmann (n. 1), 101; Gudeman (n. 6), 105–6; Schwinge (n. 5), 11.
[10] Fuhrmann (n. 1), 101; Lucas (n. 1), 227; Halliwell (n. 1) 1987, 171.
[11] Lucas (n. 1), 226–7.
[12] Bywater (n. 1), 119; Gudeman (n. 6), 408; Else (n. 1), 620.
[13] Halliwell (n. 1) 1986, 126; Lucas (n. 1), 226.
[14] Ridgeway (n. 4), 237; de Jong (n. 2), 7.

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(Ad 3) Ridgeway suggests that *αὐτὸν λέγειν* is more likely to mean 'speak one's own feelings' (as opposed to the *ἀπαγγέλλειν* of chapter 3, which means 'speak as a messenger, who brings back news from the battles, scenes in the house at Ithaca'), while I suggested 'to speak personally, referring to himself in the first person'. We both noted that Homer does speak personally in the proems (see sub 5), while Ridgeway also pointed at the other Muse-invocations in the *Iliad*.[15]

Ridgeway's suggestion to connect non-mimetic epic discourse with Muse-invocations was rejected by Halliwell ('it would require us to suppose that Cyclic poets spend most of their time invoking Muses'), who also rejected the idea that *αὐτὸν λέγειν* might mean 'speak personally': 'The phrase 'speak in his own person' may at first sight mislead, since it might wrongly be taken to mean first-person utterance of the kind we identify directly with the poet himself, or at least with his persona. But Aristotle does not immediately have in mind such things as the passionate utterance of the love-poet or the moralising of the elegist …, for in ch. 24 he is discussing epic poetry.'[16] I will come back to these points in my conclusion.

(Ad 4) *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* is a strangely strong verb to refer to simple narrating. It seems more likely that it means: 'obtrude their own personalities'(Ridgeway'), 'treten uns durchgängig entgegen' (Gudeman), 'speak personally and assert themselves'(de Jong). The best interpretation comes from Kitto: 'taking a part in the game themselves. That is, because their constructive and mimetic powers were not good enough, they had to *talk*—to comment, to explain, to underline, like the comic strip artist who uses balloons'.[17] In other words, the other epic poets are overt narrators, stepping forward with their own opinions and feelings throughout their poems.

Can we substantiate Aristotle's observation? Unfortunately, the fragments of the cyclic poets and e.g. Antimachus of Colophon are very short, but, next to the proems featuring first-person references, I do note the narrator using emotional words in *Cypria* fr. 10, *Thebais* fr. 2, *Ilias parva* fr. 4; *Cypria* fr. 24 and Antimachus frs 8, 22, and 58, and an apostrophe in Antimachus fr. 7.

(Ad 5) In his proems, *φροιμιασάμενος*, the Homeric narrator indeed speaks as himself and about himself, referring to himself with *μοι* and revealing his status as professional singer through his invocation of the Muse. In these proems Homer is therefore no *μιμητής*: 'as it is clear that in these few lines the poet neither imitates by narration nor yet by making his characters tell their own stories, Aristotle is again perfectly right in his statement that in such lines as his invocation to the Muse the poet is not an imitator'.[18]

(Ad 6) If *mimesis* has the same, broad meaning as in chapter 3 and does not refer to direct speech only, we need no longer assume Aristotle makes a 'surprising' statement, and instead can point at the instances of (in)direct speech in the other epic poets (e.g. *Thebais* fr. 3; *Cypria* fr. 15; *Ilias Parva* frs 2, 3; Antimachus frs 7, 28, 59).[19] But we are confronted with another question: what does the phrase *μιμοῦνται δὲ ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις* mean? In 1987 I had no answer, but I now realize that the answer has been

[15] Ridgeway (n. 4), 237–8; de Jong (n. 2), 7.
[16] Halliwell (n. 1), 126; reiterated in Halliwell (n. 5), 168 n. 44.
[17] Ridgeway (n. 4), 238; Gudeman (n. 5), 408; de Jong (n. 2), 7; Kitto (n. 4), 25.
[18] Ridgeway (n. 4), 238.
[19] It must be admitted that J. Griffin, 'The Epic Cycle and the Uniqueness of Homer', *JHS* 97 (1977), 49–50, remarks that the Epic Cyclic poets often refrain from direct speech where Homer would have used it.

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given by Kitto: the 'constructive and mimetic powers' of the other epic poets are less than Homer's, who 'succeeds in putting everything into his *mimesis*'.[20]

(Ad 7) As Gudeman notes, εἰσάγει need not be a theatrical metaphor, but can also mean 'introduce a character in a literary text' (e.g. Pl. *Rep*. 2.381d: μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ' ἄν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν . . .').[21]

Having broken up Aristotle's text into pieces, let me now try to assemble them again. What is he saying in this passage? Having called Homer (and, we may assume, the Cyclic poets) mimetic in chapter 3 (as opposed to a non-mimetic author like Empedocles), what does he mean when he now calls part of their work unmimetic? In 1987 I suggested on account of αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλαχιστα λέγειν that perhaps we could credit Aristotle with the invention of the narratological notion 'narrator'as distinct from 'author', because after the proems Homer does not speak as himself anymore but as a *mimetes*.[22] I am now less convinced of this suggestion, because it does not sit well with what Aristotle has to say about the other epic poets; are we to assume that they only act as narrators 'sometimes and for a little while'? This does not accord with the narrative status of their works. I now think that what Aristotle is referring to is the well-known covertness of the Homeric narrator, who, apart from the proem and Muse-invocations, is invisible as a person and only rarely—though more often than Aristotle here admits—comments openly on his story or his characters.[23] This is exactly the interpretation of Kitto ('Homer . . . imitates or represents personages who speak and act; we do not see or hear Homer: we hear his personages speak, and what they do is described to us in entirely objective narrative') and Dupont Roc-Lallot ('l'excellence d'Homère se marque ici par son aptitude, unique, à s'effacer derrière des personnages de fiction suffisamment consistants pour occuper eux-mêmes la <scène> épique et éclipser le poète qui les a créés').[24] I now can also answer Halliwell's objections against Ridgeway: the expression αὐτὸν λέγειν means the same as ἀγωνίζεσθαι; with it Aristotle refers to the stepping forward of the—epic—poet as a person and a commentator, not only in the form of Muse-invocations but also of first-person utterances and narratorial interventions. It is at such moments that a poet is not mimetic, in that he is talking about himself and not about his characters.

What we therefore can credit Aristotle with is the anticipation of the modern narratological distinction of 'telling' (a narrator is visible and sums up or interprets for the readers what is happening) versus 'showing' (the story seems to tell itself

[20] Kitto (n. 4), 25. A more or less similar interpretation is given by R. Meijering, *Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia* (Groningen, 1987), 23: 'the trouble is that, although they [the other epic poets] do narrate of gods and men, these do not come to life through lack of personality and individual ἦθος. Homer . . . at once becomes a real μιμητής in introducing characters οὐδέν' ἀήθη ἀλλ' ἐχόντ' ἤθος.'

[21] Gudeman (n. 6), 409.

[22] This suggestion was taken over by Rabel (n. 5), who unfortunately chose to speak of the 'implied author' instead of the 'narrator'; see my review of his book in *Mnemosyne* 54 (2002), 221–3.

[23] For discussion of this aspect of the Homeric narrator and important qualifications (the covertness of the narrator does not imply an impersonal narrative style; there are many implicit ways to evaluate and express emotion), see De Jong, (n. 2) and J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford, 1980), 103–43.

[24] Kitto (n. 4), 25; Dupont-Roc-Lallot (n. 4), 380. Cf. also A. B. Neschke, *Die 'Poetik' des Aristoteles: Textstruktur und Textbedeutung* (Frankfurt a. Main, 1980), 169: 'Homers Gebrauch . . . dient als Beispiel dessen, was Aristoteles hier unter "Darstellung" verstanden wissen will: die Objektivität des Dargestellten soll sich in der Erzählung, analog der dramatischen Form, vom Erzähler lösen, und als fiktive Welt für sich stehen.'

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without the intervention of a narrator, the reader having to draw his own conclusions):[25] Homer shows, while the other epic poets tell. Showing is the most perfect and effective form of *mimesis*, while telling is less effective, because it involves the use of unmimetic narratorial interventions.[26]

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ARISTOTLE, *GEN. CORR.* 317A11–12: AN UNNOTICED GLOSS[1]

In the *De Generatione et Corruptione* I.2, Aristotle argues against the Atomists' conception of nature, and therefore it is no surprise that a discussion about 'points' arises. In this discussion he uses two different terms to signify 'point', *σημεῖον* and *στιγμή*, and most often they clearly mean exactly the same, namely what could justly be termed 'spatial point'. In 317a11–12, however, we find a short sentence that should make every interpreter or commentator consider whether Aristotle makes a distinction between the two words or regards them as synonymous. The sentence, as printed by H. H. Joachim,[2] runs as follows:

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐχόμενον σημεῖον σημείου ἢ στιγμὴ στιγμῆς, . . .

No general agreement concerning the interpretation of this passage has yet been reached. The purpose of this notice is briefly to state and criticize the usual interpretations, and having done this I will propose a new solution to the problem.

Joachim's view is, I think, representative of the majority of scholars. He argues that the two terms are either synonymous or (which he considers more likely) Aristotle has chosen, as he often does, to use two words that signify practically the same but not exactly the same. In such cases the first word is a wide term, covering all instances, while the second word is an explanatory term defining the first more carefully. This latter view is accepted by, for instance, J. Tricot.[3]

[25] The terms received their classic formulation in P. Lubbock, *The Craft of Fiction* (London, 1926), 62, 67. This suggestion is considered (he calls it 'tempting') but rejected by Halliwell (n. 5), 168, n. 46. In narratological handbooks one often finds the names of Plato and Aristotle linked to the telling vs. showing couple, e.g. G. Genette, *Narrative Discourse* (Ithaca, 1980) 163 or S. Chatman, *Coming to Terms. The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film* (Ithaca, 1990), 111. This is wrong for Plato (whose distinction *dihegesis-mimesis* corresponds to narrative parts-speeches, which is not the same as telling vs. showing) and Aristotle *Poetics* chapter 3 (which is usually referred to, but where we likewise find a distinction between narration and impersonation), but right for his (less well-known) chapter 24. The only narratologist to be right about this is W. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago, [1961] 1983), 4: 'Though Aristotle praises Homer for speaking in his own voice less than other poets, even Homer writes scarcely a page without some kind of direct clarification of motives, of expectation, and of the relative importance of events'; (93) 'If Homer is better than the others for appearing rarely … can we not out-Homer Homer … by not appearing at all, by *showing* everything and *telling* nothing?'

[26] I wish to thank S. R. van der Mije, R. Nünlist, and the anonymous referee of *CQ* for their valuable suggestions.

[1] I am grateful to Dr Sten Ebbesen and to the anonymous referee for the *Classical Quarterly* for comments and suggestions.

[2] H. H. Joachim (ed.), *Aristotle:On Coming-to-be and Passing-away. De Generatione et Corruptione* (Oxford, 1922 and later), 86.

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