technological advance brought new perils, but it was an advance, when all is said and done. This seems to me to underplay the opposition one might draw between material and moral advance, and I rather side with Schütrumpf's defence of the view that D. had people better off—morally at least—earlier on. Apart from anything else, there is a certain consistency in attributing to D. an anti-teleological view of history—compare the anti-teleological implications of his reductionist psychology. What all three writers communicate, in any case, is the sophisticated and nuanced character of D.'s model, and this is brought out well again in White's discussion of a cognate aspect of his historical work: his 'biography of philosophy'. White argues that D.'s interest was focused on the distinctive conceptions of philosophy which emerged as the subject evolved from the maxims of earlier sages—a fact that explains why the only individuals mentioned in our evidence are Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, who (D. thinks) shaped these different conceptions. But change brought good and bad, which leads White to the moderate conclusion (with which all sides might agree) that D. was 'neither a triumphalist nor a primitivist' in any simplistic sense (p. 235).

The value of philosophy and its rôle in social evolution is a theme implicit too in D.'s preference (against Theophrastus) for the 'active' over the theoretical life. Huby's discussion of this point takes in an examination of D.'s contribution to political philosophy, and eventually leads her to the daring suggestions that D. might have authored the Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens* (p. 325), as well as the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* presently to be found among Aristotle's fragments (532–45 Rose). Strangely placed after Huby's piece are papers by Luppe and Dorandi surveying the papyrological evidence for D. (They seem natural neighbours for M., especially since Dorandi discusses *inter alia* the arguments which led to the inclusion of two of the new fragments in his edition—both from Philodemus.) Luppe, whose ostensible interest is in fact what we might learn about lost plays of Euripides, adds some new *incerta*: Oxyrhynchan papyri which conceivably preserve fragments of D.'s *Hypotheses of the Plays of Euripides and Sophocles*. Keyser's fascinating piece on 'The Geographical Work of D.', with which the collection ends, would have followed on nicely from Huby as evidence for D.'s practical interests.

The order in which the contributions are set out is not the only editorial infelicity in this volume. I find odd the way in which M.'s indexes are presented on their own as a kind of fence between his edition of the sources and the essays which discuss them; frustrating the minimal indexing of the essays themselves (there is only an 'Index of Ancient Sources', from which Dicaearchus himself is excluded); and untidy the lack of consistency in primary references (e.g. Source 17 is given and indexed as '*Academici Libri* 2.124', but then turns up in an essay as '*Acad. pr.* 2.124', to which the relevant index reference is '*Lucullus* 124'). None of this does justice to the uniformly high standard of the material in this volume; nor, in particular, does it help the reader make best use of the essays as resources complementary to the texts.

University of Durham GEORGE BOYS-STONES

STOIC DIALECTIC

J.-B. GOURINAT: *La dialectique des Stoïciens*. Pp. 386. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2000. Paper, €38.11/frs. 250. ISBN: 2-7116-1322-4.

Aristo of Chios, one of Zeno of Citium's pupils, wished to discard both Physics and

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Logic to leave only Ethics remaining of the three canonical Stoic parts of philosophy. Dialectical arguments, he is supposed to have said, are like spiders' webs; they display a kind of artistic skill but are of themselves useless (DL 7.160–1). Aristo's dislike of the webs of Stoic logic and dialectic is perhaps understandable. It certainly takes a skilled and careful guide to blow away the cobwebs and show not only the content of the Stoics' formidably complex taxonomy of dialectical categories but also make clear what purpose and use this might have had in the larger context of Stoic philosophy as a whole.

In this reworked version of a 1993 Paris doctoral thesis, Gourinat set himself a difficult task: the elucidation of that part of Stoic philosophy which they called dialectic. There has been a tendency to talk of 'Stoic logic' and to concentrate on those parts of their philosophy which fit most comfortably into the modern category of logic, but, as G. reminds us, for the Stoics themselves 'logic'—one of the three parts of philosophy—is a much broader field. He concentrates on only a part of this field, 'dialectic' (the part of 'logic' which is not 'rhetoric'), but even this comprises a large variety of questions not normally found in a modern history of logic or a logic textbook. Rather, this branch of philosophy takes in areas of epistemology, grammar, philosophy of language, etymology and poetic criticism, and elements of metaphysics and ontology. (See DL 7.43–8; in contrast, discussions of the material G. gathers here can be found scattered through the recent *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* under separate sections on 'Logic', 'Language', 'Epistemology', and 'Metaphysics'.) 'Si l'on admet donc que la dialectique des stoïciens a pu constituer une entité originale, qui n'appartient pas seulement à l'histoire de la logique, de la grammaire et de la linguistique, sa destination et sa fonction précise peuvent faire l'objet d'une enquête' (p. 13).

G. offers a work in three parts ('La notion de dialectique', 'Les règles de la signification', 'Les raisonnements'). The primary concern throughout—besides the bare elucidation of the Stoic theory itself—is the interconnection and unitary nature of the Stoic system. For G., Stoic dialectic—for all its internal complexity—never strayed too far from the notion of dialectic more familiar from Platonic contexts: a practice of discussion and argument between two interlocutors. (It is wrong, therefore, to forget this background and also incorrect to attempt too close an assimilation to Aristotelian dalectic, pp. 9–13). G. is consequently keen to draw a link between the two characterizations of dialectic which appear in DL 7.42—that it is 'the science of correct dialogue in arguments using questions and answers' and that it is 'the science of what is true, what is false, and what is neither'—and insists that only by recognizing the dialogical origin of Stoic dialectic can it be understood just why it eventually came to comprise so many apparently different areas of philosophical inquiry: 'La dialectique est la science du dialogue, mais posséder cette science, c'est à la fois comprendre la théorie des signifiants et des signifiés et avoir cette vertu de l'assentiment qui fait donner son assentiment au vrai, le refuser au fauz, et le suspendre devant l'obscur et l'incertain' (p. 328). The first part, therefore, sets out to explain what Stoic dialectic does and does not include and also offers some remarks on the authorship and evidential value of Diogenes' catalogue of Chrysippus' works. Although G. takes an interest in the developments in Stoic dialectical theory in later phases of the school, it is—unsurprisingly, perhaps—Chrysippus who is the real hero of the story (p. 329; after all, he was 'so renowned in dialectic that most thought that if the gods ever took it up they would use Chrysippus' system': DL 7.180) and it is his notion of dialectic which is pursued in particular, including, as it seems to have done, discussions of the criterion of truth and the theory of definitions, which others excluded or reclassified (see DL

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7.41–2 and cf. 7.55). Here, and in the eventual conclusion to the whole, are the most interesting and fertile sections of the book.

The second and third parts are to a large extent expositional, carefully setting out and distinguishing various elements of the Stoics' categorization (e.g. Part 2, Chapter 6; 'La classification des propositions'). In general, I found these sections, while they deal comprehensively with the Stoics' theory and point where appropriate to the connections with other areas of Stoic thought, less engaging and less innovative. Some of the material in these parts will be more familiar than others, and occasionally G.'s desire to cover and explain every element within this area of Stoic philosophy leads to a sense of unnecessary repetition. Even so, the explanations are clear and the examples, drawn from the ancient texts themselves, well-deployed and illustrative. There is nevertheless a clear overlap in these sections between G.'s work and other expositions of 'Stoic logic', and despite the plausible overarching claim that this material is only here being placed in its proper context along with the rest of Stoic dialectic, this general interpretative thesis sometimes fades a little into the background. Perhaps less emphasis could have been placed in these sections on the expositional material and more on G.'s more interesting claims about the systematic interconnection of Stoic philosophy as a whole and the unity of Stoic dialectic in particular.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge JAMES WARREN

EPICTETUS

A. A. Long: *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life*. Pp. xiv + 310. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £19.99. ISBN: 0-19-924556-8.

A. A. Long has been a vital force in the revival of interest in Stoic philosophy during the last three decades. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, to find him now moving forward to explore the still relatively neglected work of the later Stoic philosopher Epictetus. Epictetan studies remain dominated by the two works by A. Bonhöffer (Stuttgart, 1890, 1894). Only two monographs in English exist: B. Hijmans (Assen, 1959; restricted in scope) and J. Xenakis (The Hague, 1969; of limited value). Recent editions and commentaries by G. Boter (Leiden, 1999) and R. Dobbin (Oxford, 1998) have made valuable contributions, but L.'s volume is the first comprehensive survey of Epictetus' philosophy in English.

This volume is aimed at a general audience, presuming no previous acquaintance with either Epictetus or Stoicism. It includes 146 numbered quotations, ranging from a single line to over a page in length, almost forming an anthology embedded within the text. Although not compromising L.'s usual high standards of scholarship, notes are kept to a minimum and each chapter ends with advice for further reading. Thus, this is very much a guidebook for those new to Epictetus, reflecting its origins in one of L.'s seminars at Berkeley. The first half (Chapters 1–4) focuses upon Epictetus' style, pedagogy, and methodology. Chapter 5 offers close readings of two extended passages (*Diss*. 1.20, 4.9). The second half (Chapters 6–9) examines a number of philosophical themes, including theism, ethics, the self, freedom, and the emotions. The volume concludes with a brief epilogue on Epictetus' later influence. Although written with the beginner in mind, with a text extending over 270 pages this is no superficial introduction.

The volume has a number of virtues. First is L.'s sensitive attention to the literary

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