(p. 133)—dynamis (p. 170); random use of italics (p. 33: *Thumos* et Eris, p. 39: Les *Travaux et les Jours*, on p. 98: *Pindar* in italics suggests it is a title, just like 'l'*Iliade*' and 'l'*Odyssée*'), capital letters (p. 92: le Vrai et le Juste but p. 105: le vrai et le juste, Le *Turannos* (p. 137) but le tyran and le Tyran (p. 140), l'ardeur (p. 120) but l'Ardeur (p. 122), on p. 193: VERNANT the only name throughout the notes to be written in capitals), inconsistency in interpretation of grammatical gender (le *phrên* (passim) but la *sunesis* (p. 117)), typographical style (À (p. 72) but A (p. 101), sometimes oe, and sometimes œ (p. 81)) or omission of quotation marks (l'ardeur tourmentée' (p. 68), l'âme (p. 71)), as well as erroneous word division (p. 46: obs- ervateur, p. 131: retro- uvent etc.) and typing errors (p. 21: *kradiê kait thumos*, p. 36: noûs (instead of nous), p. 37: toutte, p. 61: Porthumeisthai, p. 78: m'on, p. 87: seonde, p. 93: thumô (whereas on p. 102: thumôi), p. 95: acérée ne contestation, p. 178, esentielle, p. 191: vuc- toire, etc.—typing errors can also be found in quotes taken from translations). The structure of the composition is heterogeneous with the titles of sections, subsections and subsubsections given in different formats. Quote references are sometimes given in the body of the text and sometimes in the footnotes (e.g. p. 49). Note 19 on p. 102 is empty. I shall pass over other editorial errors in the layout such as the omission of indentations, spaces, double spaces, lack of line spacing etc. The bibliography contains errors, e.g. LONIE, P.M., Medical History, XVII, 1973 (p. 198, the title of the article on p. 192, but without page number and with a typing error: *hearth*) or LAURENTI, R., 'L'euthumia di Democrito', Seneca, Sic. Gymn., 33, 1987 (p. 198, on p. 106 the title of the article and page number are correct, but the year of publication is wrong).

It is difficult to tell whether the above shortcomings are the result of incompetence on the part of the publisher/editors or a clumsy style on the part of the author (the fact that the price given on their web page differs from that which figures on the book's cover suggests the former). It is a shame that in F.'s work interesting insights are overcast by their negligent presentation. It is to be hoped that this should not lead to its mistaken marginalization as has happened with F.'s *Les Grecs et le désir de l'être. Des Préplatoniciens à Aristote* (1981), which, if *L'Année Philologique* is to be believed, had only one review. M. R. Wright concluded this review as follows: '. . . a topic that causes some unease, and so tends quietly to be ignored' (*CR* 33 [1983], 242). In the case of *Ardeur et courage*, this remark could unfortunately be extended to the form of the book as well. Perhaps, therefore, the editorial work should be corrected and this inspiring work should be published once again.

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EMOTIONS IN PLATO

L. PALUMBO: Eros, Phobos, Epithymia. *Sulla natura dell'emozione in alcuni dialoghi di Platone*. Pp. 111. Naples: Loffredo Editore, 2001. Paper, €11.36. ISBN: 88-8096-819-X.

P.'s work concerns the rarely analysed topic of feelings and emotionality in ancient philosophy in the period up to Plato. Because P. focuses on Plato, her study may be treated as a supplement to the analyses of B. Williams, who reveals his dislike of Plato (*Shame and Necessity* [Berkeley, 1993], e.g. p. 155). P. aims to analyse the conditions applying to

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the appearance of emotions and the nature of emotion. The Greek words *eros—phobos—epithymia* should be understood as keywords rather than as the scope of the investigation (cf. Chapter 3: 'A proposito del coraggio. Ma anche del piacere e del dolore'). The real subject matter is characterized by 'Sulla natura dell'emozione'. In fact, this investigation—'alcuni dialoghi'—actually includes six dialogues of Plato, one early, two middle and three late ones in the following order: (1) the beginning of the *Republic* (also *Timaeus* and the *Laws*); (2) *Republic* 4 (and *Philebus*); (3) *Protagoras*; (4) the beginning of the *Laws*; (5) *Phaedrus*; (6) *Republic* 8 and 9; and (7) the *Laws*.

P. adopts a logico-phenomenological method, which is significant, since the subject matter of emotionality—if taken up at all—is considered from a historical point of view through the prism of post-Platonic philosophy, which in turn entails adopting hidden assumptions. The reader is introduced to the main points from the first pages: 'Egli [Plato] descrive il ruolo fondamentale che l'emozione ricopre nella vita umana, in gran parte determinata dalla sua attività' (p. 10)—although I am not quite sure whether the majority of the thoughts expressed in it are P.'s theses, or the outcomes of her analyses (I lean towards the latter because of the lack of a conclusion to the book, cf. p. 101: 'Con questa citazione . . . chiudiamo per ora la nostra ricerca sull'emozione in Platone').

The author decides to read Plato 'da vari punti di vista' (p. 10). This uncommon and rather affected ability to differentiate points of view emerges several times, e.g. in the methodological problem of differentiating various layers of description (cf. p. 57: 'il pensiero componente dell'emozione dal pensiero che riveste l'emozione per descriverla'). In the first note (p. 9 n. 1) P. refers to the correspondence between the words *emozione* and *pathos*. It has a marginal function because the book's chief topic consists of individual feelings (*eros*, *epithymia*, and *phobos*, as well as *andreia*, *phobos*, *lype*, etc.) and feeling as a category, not the Greek word *pathos*.

P. draws attention to the distinction 'fra le tre varietà di fenomeni psichici: il pensare, il sentire e il volere o tendere' (p. 10, cf. also p. 19; although e.g. in 'la descrizione della biga alata' in *Phaedrus* P. mentions as the three components: 'una sensazione, un sentimento, un pensiero', p. 48). Since, according to Plato, none of the three possesses a simple character but each is 'fenomeno complesso', because they consist of 'componenti ancora più semplici' (p. 10), P. proposes to designate each as a 'set' ('un insieme', p. 44; 'un insieme strutturato', p. 48). Having examined the descriptions of Plato, P. affirms that 'evento emozionale' includes two 'componenti': a sensational (*sensazione*) and a thinking one (*pensiero*): 'emozione . . . mescolanza di una sensazione e di un pensiero', (p. 24, cf. also pp. 58–59: 'componente sensazione . . . componente pensiero'). Finally, P. introduces the formula 'il pensiero emozionale' (p. 69) and further on 'pensiero–sentimento' (p. 84, compare M. Nussbaum's presumably independent formulation in *Upheavals of Thought* . . . (2001): 'emotion–thoughts'). It evolves from the fact that 'pensieri non sono puri pensieri: sono pensieri sentimentalmente connotati, sentimenti che si exprimono come pensieri' (p. 52 = p. 83).

An approach in which emotion is interpreted as a combination of physical sensation and thoughts resulting from *logistikon* (p. 84) avoids the simplification of rationalism/irrationalism (or emotionalism). This is thus replaced by a crosswise division of rational/emotional thoughts ('pensieri emotivi', p. 12), although the latter 'non *accompagnano* l'emozione, ma ne sono parte integrante' (p. 12). Moreover, what is more important from the anthropological point of view, such an approach proposes a vertical model instead of a horizontal one: not only feelings, but also thoughts are multilevel (cf. p. 13: 'la verità, l'opinione vera, la semplice cognizione, il vero sapere, intuizione incerta' etc.), and—which is not so clearly shown by P.—desires (cf. *Rep.* 1.580 d).

The way in which P. locates *epithymia* in relation to *emozione* is interesting: is it an

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emotional or a volitive phenomenon? Is the replacing of the words *emozione—sentimento* (e.g. p. 84) intentional or accidental—and how should this terminological licence be related to Plato? The author's ambivalent relation to Dodds is also puzzling (cf. p. 27 and p. 56, whose text is 'bellissimo', but it includes an 'affermazione' which is not 'vera'). P. dares to criticize this author, but she also adopts his distinction of 'razionale e irrazionale' (p. 27, cf. p. 75: 'razionalità e irrazionalità'). Dodds indeed dominates P.'s work in numerous places, cf. *Indice dei nomi*, p. 110. A weaker point of P.'s book is her analysis of the description of the set in *Phaedrus*. P. omits the charioteer's emotional nature, although she notices an interesting thing: that 'l'esistenza dell'anima . . . sarà proprio un'emozione, cioè quella dell'amore . . .' (p. 45 n. 71). Saying that 'l'auriga corrisponde all'intelletto' (p. 49) would probably be an overinterpretation—for how could one explain that the charioteer-intellect is 'preso da timore e venerazione' etc. (p. 49)?

The slips and typos I came across are rare: *Leing* for *Laing* (p. 21, n. 28, p. 105, p. 110), *de* for *the* (p. 22, n. 50, p. 105), Frère's paper was published not by Vrin (p. 79, n. 122, p. 105), but by Les Belles Lettres. Also p. 70: *capopolo*, but two lines earlier correct *capopopolo*.

The impression of insufficiency in this book may be caused by the selectivity of its material, and by the difficulty in defining the criteria of selection. This may not however be a reason for reproaching the author, who herself calls her valuable study 'un piccolo contributo' (p. 15). But then I would request the author to withdraw from 'momentanea chiusura' and to write a further study, this time *un po' più grande*. In this way she would contribute still further to the rehabilitation of the position of feelings both in current research on Plato and in anthropology.

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PLATONIC PROSOPOGRAPHY

D. NAILS: *The People of Plato. A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*. Pp. xlviii + 414, maps. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002. Cased, £49. ISBN: 0-87220-564-9.

The people are chosen from the *corpus Platonicum* (including the *Letters* and the *spuria*), the Socratic works of Xenophon, and a few other λόγοι Σωκρατικοί. To be elected you must be an historical figure who either appears in one of those texts or else is mentioned therein as alive or recently dead—but a few friends and relations, hangers-on, and homonyms also get in. They number 300: 190 from Plato, a further eighty from [Plato] and the *Letters*, and then the odds and sods.

Each entry sets out what is known or conjectured about its subject. An entry may occupy anything from a line to six pages, its length depending on the nature of the evidence rather than on the significance of the subject in its Socratic setting. Sources—at least, early sources—are listed. Contestable claims are supported by argument. Complicated interrelationships are illustrated by genealogical trees. The entries are interrupted by four historical excursuses and followed by four appendixes. One of the appendixes catalogues some 300 'Peripheral Persons' (who are also intercalated among the entries). There are maps, a glossary, a bibliography, etc.

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