short phrases gives some openings for further discussion of how ideas relate to one another within this fascinating text.

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EPICUREAN ETHICS

J. WARREN: *Epicurus and Democritean Ethics. An Archaeology of Ataraxia*. Pp. xiv + 241, ills. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Cased, £40. ISBN: 0-521-81369-7.

There is something about Hellenistic philosophy, especially as practiced by the Symposium Hellenisticum, that seems to evoke alliteration. Their use of *A* in *Assent and Argument* has now been followed in Warren's subtitle (and concurrently one-upped by A. L. Giesecke's *Atoms, Ataraxy, and Allusion: Cross-generic Imitation of the* De Rerum Natura *in Early Augustan Poetry* [Hildesheim, 2000]). W.'s is an inherently difficult subject, since nobody of relevance before Epicurus exists in anything other than fragments (and even Epicurus is more fragmentary than not). Furthermore, there is very little among these fragments that can stand as direct quotation, which means that nothing that a later source says about an earlier thinker should be taken at face value, even when the citator belongs to the same school. That between the atomists Democritus and Epicurus in this list lie the Sceptics does not help matters. It is not W.'s fault, therefore, if the site of his archaeological dig has suffered major earthquakes and other degradations that have produced discontinuities.

W.'s overall structure follows the succession laid out by Diogenes Laertius and elsewhere: Democritus to Metrodorus to Anaxarchus to Pyrrho to Nausiphanes to Epicurus, with important asides dedicated to Timon of Phlius for Pyrrho and to Polystratus, Philodemus, and Hecataeus of Abdera for Epicurus. Suppose that Diogenes is right (W. never questions any of these links, but Diogenes and the doxographic tradition cannot be relied on for the Presocratics); there remains the serious problem of what it means when someone is said to be someone else's student. The historical link from Socrates to Plato to Aristotle is guaranteed, but who could have predicted how the two last names would have turned out on the basis of each one's teacher?

Within the overall structure just described, W. pursues two methods. The first is an attempt to recreate the ethical bases and arguments, which is necessary and obvious. The second is a less orthodox tracing of certain key metaphors from philosopher to philosopher, which he uses as a complement and reinforcement of the first method. Thus, pigs, jellyfish, Apollonian imagery (such as tripods), monophthalmia, and life as a stage drama are all traced from their individual origins to Epicurus (and, not surprisingly, to Lucretius as well, who would have been happy to employ philosophically meaningful imagery). Not all are compelling; one can borrow a metaphor without the accompanying argument. In the face of all these methodological problems, W. is most successful when sketching in the gaps in individual strata, less so when suggesting the change from one stratum to the next. (A chronological overview would help the reader unsure of when each of his minor figures lived.) Certainly, any student

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wishing an introduction to Anaxarchus or Nausiphanes could profitably visit the relevant chapters here.

W. begins quite naturally with Democritus' statements that, when taken together, link sense perceptions, pleasure(s), and the lives led on the basis of these. As is well known, however, we have no direct quotations on atoms, so that we must fill in the blanks from the secondary testimony, which are less than clear how he got from *is* to *ought* (which suggests the title *Atoms and Actions*; cf. also Sextus *PE* 14.18.5.2 on Pyrrho), so that the philosophical basis for Democritus' strictures (δεῖ, B 191) and absolute statements ('the same thing is good and true for all men', B 69) has to be inferred. By and large, W.'s explication, starting with the longish B 191, is satisfactory, however many questions remain. One can readily see from his account the rudiments of Epicurean ethics, which also calls for a life lived in accordance with simple physical pleasures and the more satisfying mental pleasures Democritus seems to allude to in B 194: 'The great joys [*terpseis*, which W. nicely distinguishes from *hedonai*] come from contemplating the beauty of deeds'—a thought that underlies much of Plato and Aristotle as well.

Motivating an excavation such as this should be the assumption of an influence of an earlier thinker on a later one. Influences, however, can be negative as well as positive, and Epicurus was notoriously negative towards his predecessors. In the case of the sceptics, furthermore, he had every reason to be negative, if he was to come up with an ethical program: 'The thought which originated in phrases such as [Democritus] B9 was extended first by Anaxarchus and Pyrrho into a vision of a blank moral canvas, and later by Timon and Nausiphanes into a broad metaphysical thesis. Epicurus rejected all of these conclusions, and saw Democritus himself as the source of the general malaise' (p. 198). 'Epicurus begins with an ethical goal, and builds a natural philosophy in order to attain that goal' (p. 199). This sounds as though Epicurus conducted his own digging in the texts in his search for what he found useful, but if so, he would have owed nothing to any succession sketched out by Diogenes Laertius. He may have differed in important ways from Democritus (as W. points out), but their common grounding of an ethics in atomic matter makes the latter the primary source for the former. For all that W.'s sketches of some minor figures are deftly outlined, ultimately even he has to admit that what Democritus and Epicurus share with Anaxarchus and Pyrrho is of minor importance for the development of Epicurus' thought; and that, if one is concerned with what he rejected, Plato and Aristotle make more interesting subjects. Still, we have all read lots of and on these two giants. W.'s trenches off the main site has unearthed some interesting shards.

Quibbles: most of the errors in the printed Greek texts, usually in accents and breathing, are quite minor (one of which he took over from Diels's text of Philodemus' *De Dis*), but some have led his translation astray. Printing ἦξε (D.L. 4.16) as ἧξε, he translates as if from a nonexistent aorist of ἥκω ('he came', p. 161). The failure to print the accent in πῶς causes him to translate a typical Philodemean rhetorical question as a positive statement, with the now enclitic word being translated meaninglessly as 'in a way' (p. 167). In this same passage of Philodemus *Rhet.* col. 17, W. construes αὐτῶν with τις rather than with πυνθάνοιτο, as the next sentence makes clear (τίνες οὐ φήσουσιν;). Of some philosophical import is the question of how to construe the ὡς at Pl. *Phil.* 21c6; W., with most, takes it substantively ('how to'), but I think Hackforth is right in having it introduce indirect speech. The point surely is that, without reason and memory, one will not even think *that* one will find pleasure in the future. Also with some philosophical significance is his occasional translation of

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φαίνομαι + participle as 'seems to'. His taking ἀπόφησιν (Ar. *Met*. 1008a32, p. 107) as noun rather than verb produces an inelegant but not inaccurate translation.

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AN ANTHOLOGY OF LETTERS

M. B. Trapp (ed.): *Greek and Latin Letters. An Anthology with Translation*. (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics.) Pp. xi + 348. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Cased, £47.50 (Paper, £17.99). ISBN: 0-521-49597-0 (0-521-49943-7 pbk).

As a glance at this book's bibliography will show, the last few years have seen an upsurge of scholarly work in ancient letter-writing. This is very welcome, as we have a huge bulk of surviving Greek and Latin letters, written over many centuries, very diverse in nature and offering a many-faceted appeal to modern readers. Yet epistolography as a literary form seems not to have been taken particularly seriously by many ancient theorists and writers on rhetoric. As Michael Trapp points out in the introduction to his excellent anthology (pp. 45–6), relatively few discussions of epistolography survive in the large volume of rhetorical theory that we have from antiquity, though of course there are some important discussions, notably Demetrius' section on letters in his treatise *On Style* (223–35). But to whatever extent training in writing a letter was part of a formal rhetorical education, clearly people of all ranks and in many walks of life enjoyed writing letters, and the first thing that strikes us as we read the surviving Greco-Latin corpus is the great range of style, content, and intention it reveals. Nor are the types of letter mutually exclusive, and any anthologist has to make arbitrary decisions on the criteria of categorization. There are many varieties of both private and public letter, and cutting across all of them is the further distinction of 'real' letters (genuinely written and sent from A to B) or 'fictional' ones (invented and either anonymous or attributed deliberately to a well-known historical character). In his introduction, T. discusses the problems of classifying letters and explains his own principles of choice and grouping. Of the seventy-six letters (two of them with attached replies), sixty are grouped as 'Private Letters'; ten as 'Public Life and Official Correspondence'; two as 'Embedded Letters' (letters quoted and discussed piecemeal in a larger context (Plautus' *Pseudolus* and Cicero's Verrines); and four (strictly three treatises and a letter) as 'Epistolary Theory'. The 'Private' letters in turn are subdivided into eight subgroups: general affairs of the heart; invitation; recommendation; instruction and exhortation; condolence and consolation; apologetics; and literary matters. The difficulties of definition are illustrated by the appearance of two other 'embedded' letters among the private examples, but T. makes a good case for a fluid approach here, and clearly we cannot expect exclusive groupings. Most of the letters naturally are in prose, but there are examples of the verse epistle from Horace and Ovid. The time span covered is over 900 years, from the earliest surviving Greek letter of *c.* 500 B.C. (the so-called 'Berezan letter') to the late fifth-century A.D. 'De forma epistolari', falsely attributed to Libanius. This range is one of the strengths and interests of the book, along with

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