Studies in American Political Development, 33 (October 2019), 139–177.
doi:10.1017/S0898588X19000105
ISSN 0898-588X/19
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Transatlantic Anxieties: Democracy and Diversity in Nineteenth-Century Discourse

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This article reconstructs a set of widely disseminated nineteenth-century ideas about the relationship between diversity and democracy and details how these informed state-building and political action. An emerging argument in nineteenth-century discourse held that representative governments in diverse societies would degenerate into anarchy without "amalgamation," extermination, expulsion, or enslavement: Only in societies where there was sympathy across the entire community, constantly renewed through intercourse among social equals, could free institutions be sustained. This argument gave support for state-builders to regulate diversity either through an imperial politics of "moving people" or by interposing the state in intimate encounters of sexual and social intercourse. The intimate and imperial dimensions of state-building were thereby conceptually linked. This account helps explain important features of nineteenth-century politics, including the frequent criticism of abolitionists that by supporting racial civic or political equality they were encouraging "racial amalgamation." In responding to this charge, American antislavery discourse contributed to a distinction between political and social equality that would fundamentally shape state-building after the Civil War. The article shows scholars of American political development how our accounts might be revised by situating debates and developments within a transnational perspective.

"Their freedom and their rights we admit, but we admit them 'with a difference.' They have no right to sit at our tables, to hold by our arms in the streets, to marry our daughters, to sleep in our beds, and to jostle us on the public promenade. They are not free to share with us and mix with us in the enjoyments of social life. *Black* unto *Black* and *White* unto *White*; the great law of social intercourse."[1]

—*The New York Enquirer*

"Amalgamation! Remember this, the youngest of you, that on the 4th day of July, 1863, you heard a man say that in the light of all history, in virtue of every page he ever read, he was an amalgamationist to the utmost extent. I have no hope for the future, as this country has no past, and Europe has no past but in that sublime mingling of races which is God's own method of civilizing and elevating the world."[2]

—Wendell Phillips, American Abolitionist

"Surely you never want to 'get rid' of people whom you love."[3]

—Angelina E. Grimké, American Abolitionist

"Every passion of the human heart is a material for the mould of the legislator as for the observation of the philosopher."[4]

—George Knox, Member of the Irish House of Commons

1. THE YUCATÁN

Southerners were anxious for news, brought in on the *Invincible*, the *Decatur*, and the *Amistad Campechana*, from Havana, from Vera Cruz, from Belize, from Tampico, and from Campeche. The Yucatán was in revolt, "the whole Indian population" had "risen against the whites, and in some districts massacred entirely the white population, with the exception of

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1. "From the *New York Enquirer*." *Statesman & Gazette* (MS), October 25, 1827, 2.

2. Quoted in Samuel S. Cox, *Miscegenation or Amalgamation; Fate of the Freedman.* (Washington, DC: The Constitutional Union, 1864), 6.

3. Gerda Lerner, "The Grimké Sisters and the Struggle Against Racial Prejudice," *The Journal of Negro History* 48, no. 4 (1963): 277–91, 280.

4. *The Parliamentary Register, or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons of Ireland*, 5th Parliament, 3rd Sess., vol. 12 (Dublin: P. Byrne and J. Moore, 1793), 148.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the women, whom they only spared for a fate still worse than death."[5]

The Yucatán "caste war" erupted in the summer of 1847, as American forces were preparing to advance on Mexico City. A year later the state's governor appealed to the United States for assistance, and the ensuing debate over intervention saw the caste war framed as a validation of long-standing American anxieties. The war, these Americans claimed, was only partially a response to the many exactions complained of by the Maya. While the Yucateco whites were held to blame, it was less for their oppressions than for their supposed egalitarianism. By extending political equality to the Maya and mobilizing them in support of competing political factions, the Yucateco whites had failed to recognize the ostensibly sanguinary consequences of egalitarian ideals in a diverse society.

The *New Orleans Delta* blamed the whites for "having considered the Indians as their equals—having bestowed upon them the right of citizens [and] furnished schools for their instruction."[6] "The sufferings which had fallen on Yucatan," reported the *Richmond Whig*, were "the unavoidable consequence of elevating a race, closely allied to the class of slaves, to an equality of rights and privileges with the white race."[7] Justo Sierra O'Reilly, the Yucatán "Commissioner," blamed "our absurd policy" of extending political equality.[8] Lewis Cass saw the cause of the violence in "a false philanthropy [which] may have given them the political qualifications of citizens," while John Calhoun blamed the "indiscriminate liberality with which political rights had been given to the Indians."[9] Reflecting on this point, he remarked that "these whites have no very enlarged views of political science."[10]

Many American slaveholders, their political allies, and their public apologists had for decades been warning of a similar danger in the United States. Conspiratorial theories that the revolt in the Yucatán had been encouraged by foreign agents seemed to validate domestic anxieties that regularly conjured up schemes by foreign powers, abetted by colluding citizens, to undermine the republic by distributing abolitionist propaganda to divide the whites, embolden oppressed African Americans, and serve as a pretext for territorial encroachments.[11] The idea of equality itself, along with visiting antislavery emissaries and the English government that supposedly financed them, was a dangerous spark in the supposedly inflammable material of diverse societies.

And so while southern papers kept their readers abreast of the news, they also sought to avoid any of its unintended conveyancing beyond a white readership. In the middle of detailing what was presented as an extermination campaign, southern newspaper columns would abruptly stop, stating that "we do not enter into the details of this affair, as they possess little interest save to the people of Yucatan themselves." Or, that while "we have a great mass of information on this subject … it is not of such consequence as to demand a place in our columns." Or, perhaps more directly, "consider that the predominance of the Indian race is as bad for us as that of the African race—consider the necessity of maintaining the predominance of the whites—but I need not go into details upon such a question as this, a word to the wise is sufficient."[12] In a society where Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vessey, and Nat Turner were blamed on Haiti and France, on the Missouri Crisis debates, and on English support for the antislavery movement, the news of an oppressed race striking for freedom was a potent danger, whose circulation needed to be rigidly controlled.[13] As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, Americans' deep anxiety was manifested in the South by a deafening silence: "they do

5. *Daily National Intelligence* (Washington, DC), September 11, 1847, 3; *Charleston Courier* (SC), March 2, 1848, 2; April 29, 1848, 2.

6. Quoted in "Letter from Yucatan." *The Southern Patriot* (Charleston, SC) February 7, 1848, 2.

7. "Yucatan." *Richmond Whig* (VA), May 2, 1848, 2.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Message from the President of the Unites States*, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 49, 2; "Correspondence of the Courier." *Charleston Courier* (SC), April 29, 1848, 2.

9. Cass conceded that "it is very probable" that the Maya had been "oppressed," but considered it "the inevitable consequence of the effect of power exercised by a civilized caste over a savage one." Lewis Cass (MI), *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., 1848, 619–20; John C. Calhoun (SC), *Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., 1848, 770. A few denied altogether "that this is a war between the races." John Davis (MA), in James A. Houston, *Proceedings and Debates of the United States Senate*. 30th Congress, 1st Sess., 1848, 611.

10. "Correspondence of the Courier." *Charleston Courier* (SC), May 22, 1848, 2.

11. Cass noted that the guns used by the Maya bore the English Tower mark indicating that they had been supplied by the British state. *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, May 11, 1848, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., 619; U.S. Congress, Senate, *Message from the President of the Unites States*, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. 42, 6-7; William Brock, "The Image of England and American Nationalism," *Journal of American Studies* 5, no. 3 (1971): 232–34; Michael Butter, *Plots, Designs, and Schemes: American Conspiracy Theories from the Puritans to the Present* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 174–85; William W. Sleigh, *Abolitionism Exposed!* (Philadelphia: C. Schneck, 1838), 20–24; David Brion Davis, *The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from the Revolution to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 135–43.

12. "Letter from Yucatan," *The Southern Patriot* (SC), August 30, 1847, 2; "From Tampico," *The Daily Picayune*, March 8, 1848, 1; "Correspondence of the Courier," *Charleston Courier* (SC), May 22, 1848, 2.

13. Even a sympathetic scholar of the slaveocracy noted that the expected "disastrous effect of sudden liberation upon the whole economic life" of the South led the slave-owning class to curtail the ability of the press to discuss slavery. "Almost invariably the appeal was made to the need of safeguarding the community from the danger of servile insurrection," and the "policy of silence which they sought to impose" was achieved first through "the silent pressure of public opinion" on publishers and later by restrictive legislation. Clement Eaton, *Freedom of Thought in the Old South* (New York: Peter Smith, 1951 [1940]), 91, 162–63.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

not speak about the future with strangers; they avoid talking about it with friends; each person hides it so to speak from himself."[14]

This article seeks to recover a set of nineteenth-century ideas about the relationship between diversity and democracy and to detail how these informed strategies of state-building and political action.[15] An ancillary objective is to persuade the reader that understanding important political developments in America often requires these be situated within a transnational context.[16]

Over the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I argue, a diverse group of political thinkers and public figures converged on a broad claim that free institutions could not survive in deeply divided societies without extermination, expulsion, or enslavement as their consequence, or without this heterogeneity being gradually effaced through "sexual amalgamation." Representative government, these writers argued, rested not only on popular consent, but on the ability of the public to sympathize with each other, which was seen as necessary to mitigate the conflicts over factional interests and social and material status provoked wherever governing authority was allocated through a contest for popular support. Only in societies where there was a rich sympathy, encompassing the entire community and constantly renewed through intercourse among social equals, could democratic institutions be sustained; wherever "natural" or artificial distinctions divided the public and impeded social intercourse on terms of equality, democratic institutions would serve only to organize conflict along communal lines, arraying the groups defined by these distinctions into antagonistic parties with ultimately destructive consequences.[17]

Like other social theories, its terms were not the product of disinterested speculation. They were invoked by the advocates of particular political projects and by participants in concrete policy debates. But they were available and used by persons across the political spectrum and in the service of widely diverging purposes, by writers and speakers who seemed to believe that the logic of these claims and their supposed grounding in historical and comparative evidence could persuade a broader public of the soundness of their interpretation or policy prescriptions.

These interpretations in turn carried important implications for state-builders and political activists. By resting the stability of states on the ties of sympathy among their subjects, it gave intellectual support for either regulating social diversity or adopting forms of rule that were compatible with it. The ostensible need to regulate diversity could lead state-builders to attend to what Paul Frymer has recently detailed as central to imperial rule—the process of "moving people" on a continental scale—or to what Ann Laura Stoler has described as the "microphysics of rule," the interposition of the state in the most intimate encounters of sexual and social intercourse.[18] The account I offer here, then, shows how the intimate and imperial dimensions of state-building, usually treated separately, could be conceptually linked.

It is now well established that the regulation of sexual activity was essential to defining civic statuses in colonial and antebellum America, creating a reproducible property in slaves, "strengthening white men's sexual control over women of both races," and recasting "slave women's bodies [as] valued for their reproductive and productive capacities."[19] The regulation of social and sexual intimacy as a strategy of state-building, by contrast, has received less attention among scholars of American political development. Julie Novkov's *Racial Union* stands as an important exception, detailing how the "crime of miscegenation"—a Civil War–era neologism—came to be understood as a "fundamental threat to the state," the suppression of which was driven by "state actors'

14. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Eduardo Nolla and James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2012), 575.

15. On the importance of such "interpretive" work, see Rogers M. Smith, "Ideas and the Spiral of Politics: The Place of American Political Thought in American Political Development," *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 3 (Spring 2014): 135.

16. An excellent example of a transnational perspective that goes beyond comparison is Paul Frymer's analysis of Mexico. Paul Frymer, *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017). See W. Caleb McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery: Garrisonian Abolitionists & Transatlantic Reform* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2013), 13; Joshua Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution: Imperialism and Independence in American and Latin American Political Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Daniel R. Ernst, "Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932," *Studies in American Political Development* 23, issue 2 (2009): 171–88; Sidney A. Rothstein, "Macune's Monopoly: Economic Law and the Legacy of Populism," *Studies in American Political Development* 28, no. 1 (2014): 80–106.

17. As we shall see, the relevant axis of division could be race, language, religion, class, arbitrary legal distinctions, distance, or any other factor that impeded social intercourse on equal terms.

18. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*; Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 16.

19. Kathleen Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Victoria Bynum, *Unruly Women: The Politics of Social and Sexual Control in the Old South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Peter W. Bardaglio, "'Shamefull Matches': The Regulation of Interracial Sex and Marriage in the South before 1900," in *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*, ed. Martha Hodes (New York: New York University Press, 1999): 112–39, 116; Durba Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India: The Making of Empire* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

interests in maintaining a certain configuration of conservative political power."[20] Novkov's account, along with those of Peggy Pascoe, Martha Hodes, and others emphasizes the importance to state-builders of stabilizing the racial legal and political categories that social and sexual intercourse constantly threatened to mix together, through the suppression of interracial intimacy or its bifurcation into a "legitimate" form that recreated social hierarchies and an "illegitimate" form that destabilized them.[21]

Within the pattern of discourse I sketch below, by contrast, state-builders' stance on sexual intimacy across linguistic, national, religious, or color lines could vary with their strategic objectives. With a perhaps surprising frequency, "intermixing" appeared to them less as a danger to be prohibited than as a felicitous development that ought to be encouraged. With few exceptions this was not indicative of a principled commitment to egalitarianism; rather, "amalgamation" was seen as a potential tool of statecraft, a way of managing populations in the service of geostrategic or state-building aims. As such, it could be just as valuable to state-builders as erecting the discrete and strictly regulated bio-civic categories that undergirded white supremacy after Reconstruction or the expulsions in pursuit of whiteness that animated both "Indian removal" and the colonization movement during the antebellum era.[22]

This possibility, recognized in the literature on colonial studies, has largely escaped notice of scholars of American political development, for the very good reason that there were far fewer persons in America willing to promote "amalgamation" than were willing to violently denounce it.[23] Even Greg Carter, who documents the existence of what he calls an "understudied optimist tradition," refers to it as "utopian," suggestive of this particular group's egalitarian objectives but also their distance from political power.[24] When placed within a broader transatlantic context, however, the prescriptions, if not the motivations, of these "utopians" seem more conventional, while their near total lack of influence in the United States merits explanation.

The line of political theorizing detailed in this article helps render some largely unaccounted-for aspects of American discourse more comprehensible. For one, it sheds new light on the attention given to "racial amalgamation" in nineteenth-century politics and helps to explain the oft-asserted connection between political and social equality, with the first necessarily implying the latter and the latter necessarily implying sexual union. This connection has often been treated as logically fallacious, an effort to arouse white racism but lacking any conceptual coherence.[25] While it was certainly intended to provoke the anxieties of whites, I suggest that there was an underlying logic to the rhetorical progression from civic or political equality to sexual intimacy, one that rested on the social underpinnings that many political thinkers saw as requisite for democratic government.

Recovering this logic sheds new light on the theoretical importance of "social equality," a concept that would become central to Reconstruction-era debates. Often treated as "a term of opprobrium"—and occasionally as a simple shorthand for interracial sex—social equality is said to have rested upon a well-defined distinction between "a pre- or extrapolitical realm—that is, society—and one subject to legal regulation—that is, politics."[26] In antebellum and transatlantic discourse, however, this distinction appears much less settled. I suggest instead that it

20. Julie Novkov, *Racial Union: Law, Intimacy, and the White State in Alabama, 1865–1954* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 7, 38–39, 76.

21. Peggy Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Martha Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Peter Bardaglio, *Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the Nineteenth Century South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 184–85; Nancy Cott, *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Kathleen S. Sullivan, "Marriage and Federal Police Power," *Studies in American Political Development* 20 (Spring 2006): 45–56; Patricia Strach, *All in the Family: The Private Roots of American Public Policy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

22. Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally*, 8; Frymer, *Building an American Empire*.

23. George M. Fredrickson, "Mulattoes and Métis. Attitudes toward Miscegenation in the United States and France Since the Seventeenth Century," *International Social Science Journal* 57, no. 183 (2005): 103–12; Ann Laura Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History," *Journal of American History* 88, no. 3: 829–65, 832; Damon Ieremia Salesa, *Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); Ronald Hyam, *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990); Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India*; Victoria Freeman, "Attitudes toward 'Miscegenation' in Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, 1860–1914," *Native Studies Review* 16, no. 1 (2005): 41–69.

24. Greg Carter, *The United States of the United Races: A Utopian History of Racial Mixing* (New York: New York University Press, 2013); David A. Hollinger, "Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the History of the United States," *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 5 (2003): 1363–90.

25. Novkov identified a few rationales, but notes that more commonly "pamphleteers did not explain precisely how [the disruption of the entire social order] would happen." Novkov, *Racial Union*, 38–39.

26. Nell Irvin Painter noted that "'social equality' meant associating as equals, which, according to the logic inherent in the slogan, would lead inexorably to black men's marrying white women." Pamela Brandwein, *Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 61, 65, 72; Nell Irvin Painter, "'Social Equality,' Miscegenation, Labor, and Power," in *The Evolution of Southern Culture*, ed. Numan V. Bartley (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988): 47–67, 53; Rebecca J. Scott, "Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the *Plessy* Challenge," *Michigan Law Review* 106, no. 5 (2008): 777–804, 781.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

was carved out in an effort to conceptually reconcile democracy with the persistence of stark inequalities.[27]

More generally, the methodological approach offered in this article invites scholars of American political development, and especially of America's racial orderings, to consider how our accounts might be revised by situating debates and developments within a transnational perspective. As I document below, examining American debates from such a perspective helps us to reconstruct the discursive and political context in which these debates occurred, and thereby to recover ideational shifts and to connect these to patterns of institutional development.[28]

Doing so can also help refine our approaches to the study of race in American political development. Consider the "racial political orders" account of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, which emphasizes conflict between varyingly composed coalitions over egalitarian and white supremacist commitments.[29] A transnational perspective provides support to Frymer's recent critique of that framework, insofar as it highlights commonalities and points of agreement across these distinct coalitions and invites our attention to imperial encounters with categories of persons defined separately from the black/white boundary.[30] But while King and Smith, as well as Frymer, emphasize motivating commitments on race—competing egalitarian or white supremacist commitments for the former, and shared commitments to whiteness for the latter—what the discourses recovered here reveal are broadly shared premises in which actors' stances on racial policy questions (such as "intermixing" or "colonization") varied, often for the same individual, with how they were situated vis-à-vis a particular state-building project. This makes it difficult to confidently categorize many of the writers and political actors as operating within one or the other coalition. But it also suggests that while commitments to racial hierarchy were for many the primary motivation for their positions on racial policy questions, for some subset of state-builders, the manipulation of these hierarchies might have been as much an instrument in the pursuit of other geostrategic or material objectives.[31]

A transnational approach also offers a different perspective on Frymer's recent recasting of American political development as an imperial project. By placing the discourse of American state-builders into comparison with other imperial state-builders, we are able to identify what I suggest was the distinguishing feature of American imperialism, namely, that the country's quasi-democratic institutions required state-builders to be more responsive to the priorities of potential settlers and attentive to the possible ramifications of racial orders constructed at the frontiers of empire on enfranchised constituencies in the core. The biopolitical strategies available to the builders of American empire were, as a result, more constrained relative to what their counterparts in metropolitan Britain or France could consider. By examining American patterns of discourse alongside those produced elsewhere in the Atlantic world, we can identify the points of similarity in how the problems of imperial expansion were conceived, and better understand divergences in the strategies pursued.

Finally, attending to the transnational dimension of political discourse can help us identify shifts over time and connect these to important institutional developments. For one, the ideas detailed below provided intellectual justification for projects of removal and colonization that recurred throughout the antebellum and Civil War eras. Frymer has shown that these schemes revealed substantial state incapacity, but their pursuit provoked intense and formative political opposition and their failure had long-term repercussions in channeling American imperial policy.[32] More speculatively, the emphasis on social intercourse might have served as a precedent for the subsequent attention given by state-builders to regulating social intimacy. While directed toward different aims—such as fostering, or imposing, domestic associations that would shore up patriarchal authority—the post–Civil War and progressive-era discovery of "the family" as a site meriting state regulation had antecedents in nineteenth-century beliefs about the importance of fostering or impeding sexual intimacy.[33]

27. This complicates the more common chronological ordering of the "civil," "political," and "social" emerging as distinct spheres of rights and proper concerns of states. I suggest instead that republican government was early on understood as requiring a foundation of social equality, and that the juxtaposition of social and political rights cohered later as an effort to preserve deep inequalities despite looming or real democratic expansions. T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

28. Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, "'Without Regard to Race': Critical Ideational Development in Modern American Politics," *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 4 (2014): 958–71.

29. Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, "Racial Orders in Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 1 (2005): 75–92.

30. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 278; Kevin Bruyneel, "Hierarchy and Hybridity: The Internal Postcolonialism of Mid-Nineteenth-Century American Expansionism," *Race and American Political Development*, ed. Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and Dorian T. Warren (New York: Routledge, 2008): 106–24.

31. As Kathleen Sullivan has argued, "race was not only an object of state government policy but an instrument of governance," with racial categories enlisted in projects of state-building. Kathleen Sullivan, "Charleston, the Vesey Conspiracy, and the Development of the Police Power," *Race and American Political Development*, ed. Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and Dorian T. Warren (New York: Routledge, 2008): 59–79, 60.

32. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 15.

33. Status categories that carried distinct rights and privileges had long regulated intercourse in the home and family, demarcating the proper subjects of family formation, buttressing patriarchal authority, and establishing a stable religious or racial ordering to family units. Julie Novkov, "Making Citizens of Freedmen and Polygamists," in *Statebuilding from the Margins: Between Reconstruction and the New Deal*, ed. Carol Nackenoff and Julie Novkov (Philadelphia:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Perhaps the most important developmental consequence, however, came out of the strategic response of white abolitionists to the question of how they could accommodate political equality without endorsing as its consequence sexual amalgamation. African American writers had generally dismissed white fears of amalgamation. Social equality, they argued, would if anything slow down this process by impeding the systematic rape of black women by white men. These writers often noted that amalgamation would take place on an individual scale, but only after a considerable softening of prejudice (and that whites should not flatter themselves). A small number of abolitionists, white and black, outright endorsed amalgamation, out of a sincere commitment to racial equality or a belief it would be necessary to stabilize a post-emancipation republican regime. But the intensity of white racism left them with little ability to effectively promote this position. More important for the long-term development of American discourse was the stance of a growing number of white writers and politicians opposed to slavery, who began to deny the relevance of social equality to democracy altogether, treating formal legal equality as all that was required and necessitating no additional invitations into social (and thus commercial and familial) circles.

This distinction would have profound consequences for American jurisprudence. As Pamela Brandwein has compellingly argued, the conceptual separation of "social" from "political" or "civil" equality undergirded Republican ambivalence toward civil rights legislation after the war.[34] This left erstwhile egalitarians receptive to arguments justifying segregation, and the development of state capacity to enforce it, as not only compatible with democracy but as somehow essential to its survival in diverse societies. I speculate in the conclusion that this transformation in political thought, soon validated by organized social scientific disciplines, would constitute the intellectual basis for a "race relations" framework that treated the denial of social equality as an appropriate means of regulating frictions inherent to a diverse society, as an essential buttress of democracy rather than its outright denial. The post-Reconstruction white supremacist state, as Novkov has shown, rested on the development of an infrastructure for regulating social intimacy in order to stabilize a particular racial hierarchy; the account provided here helps us better understand the alternatives and arguments the architects of this system could invoke in their opposition to social equality.

The analysis presented here is cross-sectional, reconstructing from speeches, books, pamphlets, newspapers, and government reports the ways in which a theoretical logic emerged and was articulated across a wide variety of contexts.[35] The disadvantage of this approach is that there is no corpus of canonical texts to study, but rather a messier compilation of repeated themes across different issues. It also means that there is no straightforward evolution, but a more disjointed emergence and transformation of shared themes across different texts. While I flag distinct periods and changing contexts and argue that there is a subtle but definite shift in the content of these ideas, this development is not neatly chronological. There is, moreover, a temptation to treat such patterns of discourse as the recovery of some settled and shared doctrine, as a more or less closed system rather than a more fragmentary set of similar conclusions and arguments perhaps indicative of shared assumptions and similar educations or engagement with texts.[36] It is important, in surveying such a diversity of texts, to remember that the elucidation of these arguments was embedded in specific discursive communities and were framed toward concrete political issues or narrative tasks.[37]

The advantages of this approach, however, are that it allows us to recover a pattern of discourse that might otherwise be neglected or treated as the unique premises of individual thinkers; to engage with a broader range of political thinkers and actors, many of them now obscure but whose writing and speeches gave practical substance to abstract concepts and whose choices connected theory with policy, and in doing so to recover specific questions that animated, and premises that informed nineteenth-century political discourse about democracy and diversity, not for the purpose of rehabilitating their answers but to help us—"the inhabitants of a different discursive situation"[38]—to better understand the particular ways in which these informed political practice.

This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the key premises and implications of this line of argument, drawing on material from across the late eighteenth century and antebellum era. While reference is made to the different historical events around which the tenets of this theory were articulated and disseminated, this section's objective is to establish it as a recurring pattern of

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 34; R. A. Lenhardt, "Marriage as Black Citizenship?" *Hastings Law Review* 66, no. 5 (2015): 1317–64, 1327–38.

34. Pamela Brandwein, "Reconstruction, Race, and Revolution," in *Race and American Political Development*, ed. Joseph Lowndes, Julie Novkov, and Dorian T. Warren (New York: Routledge, 2008): 125–54.

35. The sources are mostly English, Irish, American, or French, as well as some from the Spanish-speaking Americas.

36. Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53.

37. Adolph L. Reed, Jr. *W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought: Fabianism and the Color Line* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11–13.

38. Ibid., 89.

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discourse and to elucidate its theoretical logic. Section 3 then situates this discourse in more historically specific contexts, examining how imperial state-builders in the early American republic, reform-era United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the transatlantic world conceptualized the regulation of diversity in similar terms while pursuing diverging strategies for its management. I argue here that this was a product of the different degree to which they needed to sustain the support of settlers and others invested in the status and material benefits accompanying particular civic hierarchies. Section 4 uses this historical context as a backdrop for a new analysis of the American antislavery movement, explaining why abolitionists could be attacked as encouraging racial amalgamation—despite their repeated insistence to the contrary—and the consequences of their response for the American state. I conclude by suggesting that the conceptual framework that would undergird segregation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew heavily on reframed arguments about the relationship between diversity, democracy, and equality.

2. SYMPATHY AND EQUALITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES

The events in the Yucatán validated an emerging argument that representative government could not exist in heterogeneous societies, because the "powerful obstacle interposed by the arrogant expedient of caste" inevitably impeded social intercourse and the sympathies it engendered.[39] Sympathy was a key term of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political thought, a central concept of the Scottish Enlightenment that helped establish a vision of representative government compatible with commerce and a diversity of interests. While varying across different thinkers, sympathy was generally held to provide a binding force of social solidarity, most influentially in the work of David Hume and Adam Smith.[40] According to Hume, sympathy allowed one "to receive by communication [other people's] inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own."

> So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or less degree. And though … my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments and way of thinking; yet it seldom is so weak as not to disturb the easy course of my thought, and give an authority to that opinion, which is recommended to me by his assent and approbation.[41]

Sympathy, then, provided a psychological basis for government founded on public opinion and organized around contestation for office, mitigating the critique that republicanism could only exist in small states with homogeneous interests. So long as social intercourse brought different opinions into contact, and the human faculty for sympathy dissolved these into a smooth gradient, a form of republicanism could exist that was not immediately susceptible to the danger of factional polarization. "Our history abounds with many instances of this sympathy of the whole part with any and every part," reflected a young John Calhoun. "When it ceases to be natural, we shall cease to be one nation. It constitutes our real union. The rest is form."[42]

While this could work across all social ranks, it operated best when people were situated on terms of social equality. Often treated as an ill-defined concept, social equality in the early nineteenth century generally referred to the form of interactions and hospitality that persons of different circumstances could expect to receive and be expected to offer to others, for example, the forms of calling upon, vouching for, accessing transportation, making profitable marriages, or working collaboratively that were essential to social and economic life. Such an equality of treatment was not generally compatible with stark differences in wealth. Even Smith, who argued that it was easier to sympathize with those above than below you—establishing a basis for aristocracy in human sentiments—maintained that stark inequalities

39. "Stability of American Institutions," *Daily Globe* (Washington, DC), February 17, 1857, 1.

40. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853 [1759]). See also, Harriet Martineau, *How to Observe Morals and Manners* (London: Charles Knight, 1838), 41; Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (London: N. Hailes, 1824), 40; John Stafford, "The Power of Sympathy," *Midcontinent American Studies Journal* 9, no. 1 (1968): 52–57, 54; Glenn R. Morrow, "The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith," *The Philosophical Review* 32, no. 1 (1923): 60–78, 61; Ruth Scurr, "Inequality and Political Stability from Ancien Régime to Revolution: The Reception of Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* in France," *History of European Ideas* 35, no. 4 (2009): 441–49; John W. Danford, "Adam Smith, Equality, and the Wealth of Sympathy," *American Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 4: 674–95, 690; Lisa Pace Vetter, "Sympathy, Equality, and Consent: Tocqueville and Harriet Martineau on Women and Democracy in America," in *Feminist Interpretations of Alexis de Tocqueville*, ed. Jill Locke and Eileen Hunt Botting (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 151–76. On the importance of Hume and Smith in articulating a view about the centrality of human sociability and sympathy to the state, see Paul Sagar, *The Opinion of Mankind: Sociability and the Theory of the State from Hobbes to Smith*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

41. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (London: T. and J. Allman, 1817), 1:412, 2:322.

42. Richard Crallé, *The Works of John C. Calhoun*, vol. 2 (New York: D. Appleton, 1856), 79; Thomas Finch, *Essays on the Principles of Political Philosophy* (Lynn: W. G. Whittingham, 1812), 8; Rachel Fanny Antonia Lee, *An Essay on Government* (London: T. Gillet, 1808), 81–89.

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impeded social intercourse and sympathy. "The fortunate and the proud," he wrote, "wonder at the insolence of human wretchedness, that it should dare to present itself before them, and with the loathsome aspect of its misery presume to disturb their happiness." Refusing intercourse with the poor, they could not learn their sentiments nor impart their own.[43] Social intercourse on relatively equal terms was essential for sympathy's formation. "Society is in its true and healthy state," wrote John Hill Burton, "when all are pressing forward amicably together—not when it is divided into two sections, looking across at each other in hostile hatred." "Such an absence of common grounds of sympathy and intercourse—must lead to convulsions."[44]

The danger that social inequality would obstruct intercourse and weaken the sympathies required of popular government was a central reason that republicans in particular had to be "deeply concerned in smoothing as far as practicable all the inequalities and unevenness which obstruct the intercourse of society."[45] Even nondemocratic supporters of representative governments argued that social inequality ought to be limited by buttressing the economic and political position of the middle classes: "It is in them alone," wrote Jean Charles Léonard Sismondi, "that the sentiment of social equality, on which all justice is based, can be kept alive. We must see our equals, live with them, meet them daily and hourly, encounter their interests and their passions, before we can get the habit of seeking our own advantage in the common weal alone."[46]

The geographic and historical circumstances of America were frequently claimed to foster social equality, making the country a propitious site for the establishment of popular government.[47] Frederick Grimké repeated a common argument in noting that "in the United States there is no foundation upon which to build an aristocracy. Landed property is very equally distributed." The result was that "the great desideratum is obtained—that of bringing about an association among the different orders of men of which the state is composed…. The general intercourse which is thus established gives the most ordinary mind some tolerable insight into public affairs, initiates the uninstructed into the conduct of public men, and the import of public measures."[48] The abolition of odious distinctions among whites were in turn credited with facilitating the social intercourse and amalgamation needed if a population was to be rendered compatible with representative government. Francis Bowen wrote that emigrants to America submitted "themselves to the crucible of our republican institutions, [and are thereby] fused in the course of one or two generations into one homogeneous mass."[49] For Grimké, the stability of American government rested on the success of its institutions in encouraging intercourse and maintaining the homogeneity of its people. It was of "infinite importance … to melt down all the different [European] races into one race," ideally assimilating the "foreign" into an Anglo-American mould.[50] "This unity of the American people and nation," argued another, "is in fact, one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of nations," the product of "the amalgamating influence and equality of our republican principles.[51]

It was Alexis de Tocqueville who most famously developed the importance of social equality to American democracy, arguing that it made political inequalities intolerable and expanded the sphere of sympathy. Persons in aristocratic societies felt a "continual and active sympathy" only for those of the same class: "there are real sympathies only between similar people…. When ranks are nearly equal among a people, since all men have more or less the same way of thinking and feeling, each one of them can judge in a moment the sensations of all the others."[52] This pervasive sympathy resulted in a more homogeneous public opinion, an essential feature of democracy and, for Tocqueville, a potent danger.

The argument that social equality and intercourse were essential to generate the sympathy required for representative government was repeated countless times.[53] George Washington Woodward explained

43. Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 73–75, 87, 93, 100.

44. John Hill Burton, *Political and Social Economy: Its Practical Application* (Edinburgh, UK: William and Robert Chambers, 1849), 175; Finch, *Essays on the Principles of Political Philosophy*, 175; Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, *A Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws*, trans. Thomas Jefferson (Philadelphia: William Duane, 1811), 33, 41.

45. Frederick Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions* (Cincinnati, OH: H. W. Derby, 1848), 284.

46. Jean-Charles-Léonard Sismondi, *History of the Fall of the Roman Empire* (Philadelphia, PA: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1835), 117.

47. One conservative reviewer was sick of reading these travelogues, and announced that this "whole doctrine of social equality" was the "doctrine of vanity, envy, and hypocrisy," which could only be approximated in America because of the availability of land. "Art. V. Tours in America," *The London Quarterly Review* 54 (September 1835): 205–15, 213.

48. Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*, 306–308.

49. Francis Bowen, "Review," *North American Review* 146 (January 1850): 84–85.

50. Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*, 281–82, 283, 312.

51. "Foreign Newspapers in the United States," *The Weekly Herald*, October 3, 1849, 317.

52. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 900, 989–90, 993; "An Essay on the Advantages of the Discovery of America to the Happiness of Mankind," *Academic Recreations* 1, no. 5 (1815): 169–78, 198–201.

53. This emphasis on social equality could be read as counter to Hofstader's claim that the American political tradition rested on a consensus about the "the economic virtues of capitalist culture." Richard Hofstader, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxxvi. Antebellum conceptions of social equality, however, saw it as a sensibility

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that political rights "depend, for their preservation and right exercise, on social intercourse and equality."

> Not that every man, must associate with every man in the community, but I hold there must be that free and unrestrained interchange of sentiments on public questions, which can only attend a state of general equality…. Every man, from the highest to the lowest, has his sphere, and his appropriate circle of friends, and in his daily intercourse with them, both in the business and pleasures of life, opinions become formed and matured…. These separate circles or little societies which wealth or adventitious circumstances, and not our political institutions, have made distinct, have connecting links that extend the opinions thus formed by the contact of minds, from and to the extremities of the body politic, and keep up a sympathy between the whole and all its parts; and here is the foundation of the system of universal suffrage. For suffrage is only the expression of the opinions which are perpetually maturing under the influence of social intercourse and equality.[54]

Gustave de Beaumont argued that because of their social equality, "every American has the same good will toward all other Americans that members of the same class in our country have toward each other."[55] "The sympathy of class," wrote the English traveler Alexander Mackay, "becomes in America the general sentiment of society. There is no man there whose position every other man does not understand; each has in himself the key to the feelings of his neighbour, and he measures his sympathies by his own. The absence of arbitrary inequalities banishes restraint from their mutual intercourse, whilst their mutual appreciation of each other's sentiments imparts a kindness and cordiality to that intercourse, which in Europe are only to be found, and not always there, within the circle of class."[56] Another traveler commented on how there was "no separation between the genteel part of society and the less polished" in public conveyances. The result was that "the wealthy merchant, the learned lawyer, and the independent gentleman, are likely to feel sympathy and respect for their less fortunate neighbours when they meet on the same footing."[57] "Social equality is the vital principle of Republican Government," wrote the *Richmond Enquirer*. "It is the great vivifying principle that sustains the political system…. By this mutual contact and attrition, a certain uniformity of feeling and opinion, is communicated to all classes. The statesman thus prepared, enters public life, perfectly acquainted with the character of his fellow citizens, and deeply imbued with popular sympathies."[58]

Each of these authors was aware that American sociability and equality was strictly demarcated by racial hierarchies.[59] And while most suggested that the ostensible social equality among whites was the product of abundant land, at least a few suggested that it could also have its origins in slavery, which fostered "a display of conscious equality, throughout all ranks and conditions. The poorest White person seems to consider himself nearly on a level with the richest."[60] Rather than contradicting their belief about the foundational importance of social equality, whites' insistent denial of it to black Americans was interpreted as evidence of the difficulties in reconciling diversity with democracy.

2.1. Sympathy and Diversity

The social equality ostensibly enjoyed by American whites did not make questions of institutional design irrelevant for democracy's sustainability. At a theoretical level, however, socially equal intercourse, and the sympathy this was supposed to engender, helped mitigate the problem of factionalism, which Montesquieu had famously argued made republican government unsustainable within complex societies. While this had been controverted by Hume, as well as Publius, Montesquieu's warning continued to be influential well into the nineteenth century.[61] Building on themes developed by Scottish philosophers, in the early nineteenth century a diverse range of

expected to be cultivated by commerce while essential to its realization. Beaumont, *Marie*, 224–31.

54. John Agg, *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, vol. 10 (Philadelphia: Packer, Barrett, and Parke, 1838), 22.

55. Gustave de Beaumont, *Marie, or, Slavery in the United States: A Novel of Jacksonian America*, trans. Barbara Chapman (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), 224–31.

56. Alexander Mackay, *The Western World; or, Travels in the United States in 1846–47*, vol. 1 (London: Richard Bentley, 1850), 196.

57. Isaac Candler, *A Summary View of America* (London: T. Cadell, 1824), 39–40. See Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, *New Travels in the Unites States of America*, trans. Joel Barlow (London: J. S. Jordan, 1792), 175; R. W. Russell, *America Compared with England: The Respective Social Effects of the American and English Systems of Government and Legislation* (London: J. Watson, 1849), 83.

58. "Scene in New York," *Richmond Enquirer* (VA), May 18, 1847, 1.

59. A few, however, rather prematurely claimed that "to the honor of this country, the *odious distinctions* of color are fast doing away." "An Essay on the Advantages of the Discovery of America to the Happiness of Mankind," *Academic Recreations* 1, no. 5 (1815): 169–78, 198–201, 201.

60. This was observed both in mainland America and the West Indies. Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies*, vol. 2 (London: John Stockdale, 1793), 7.

61. See, for instance, the antifederalists belief that the cultural heterogeneity of an extended republic was a danger. Jacob T. Levy, "Beyond Publius: Montesquieu, Liberal Republicanism and the Small-Republic Thesis," *History of Political Thought* 27, no. 1 (2006): 50–90, 63; Isaac Kramnick, "The 'Great National Discussion': The Discourse of Politics in 1787," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (1988): 3–35, 9–10.

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writers argued that wherever social intercourse on equal terms was impeded—by distance,[62] language,[63] laws establishing "odious distinctions" or favoring one religion over another,[64] because of strongly felt group prejudices, or, with an increasing frequency as biblical and biological notions of race gained adherents, because of "providential" or "natural" racial distinctions—then there was no assurance that sympathy would act as a solvent of divergent opinions.[65] "I know," commented one U.S. Senator, "what was once considered as a problem is now regarded as settled—that extent of territory is no serious obstacle to a free and representative Government; but, sir, whether your territory be great or small, it is indispensable to the maintenance of a representative Government that its population should be homogeneous people."[66]

Across the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, writers and political actors regularly expressed the belief that "two distinct races of people" who did not have social intercourse as equals would not sympathize with each other.[67] "A continuance of distinctions in language, among people who are mingled in the same country and live under the same government, is by no means to be wished," insisted an author in *The Eclectic Review*. "They interrupt that freedom and familiarity of intercourse…, [and] serve to perpetuate the feelings of reciprocal fear and enmity."[68] "Unity in fundamental opinions constitutes the spiritual essence, the very life and soul of nationality," argued one member of Congress, while "difference in race inevitably develops a corresponding difference in primary belief … [and] must tend naturally to social and political anarchy, inasmuch as it leads to fundamental antagonisms in opinion, feeling, and habit."[69] Willbur Fisk "challenged any to show how there could be political equality or even harmony where there was not domestic equality. Domestic relations were the foundation of all others—here in the domestic circle the elements combine and amalgamate, and from these elementary bonds the different parts of society become consolidated."[70] "The true foundation," argued others, "of all our political, religious, and moral privileges, lies in the fostering of domestic associations. The basis of these is laid even in the nursery."[71]

Social diversity did not necessarily lead to violent social conflict, but without free and equal intercourse, the probability increased that public opinion would be polarized, a danger in any state that rested on popular consent and direction. This would be compounded by the likelihood that political conflict would be organized on the basis of intracommunal sympathies and intercommunal antagonisms. And if interactions were not on equal terms but were regulated by oppressive legislation, then the favored class would look on the lower ranks with scorn and be looked on in turn with resentment. Factional conflict would draw strength from the sympathy members within each group held for each other, and from the antipathies that unequal laws and social exclusion would inevitably nurse between them. Politics would be organized around what today we might call distinct identities, with elections amplifying animosity between them and making violent conflagrations more likely.

For this reason, Simón Bolívar warned the Second Congress of Venezuela that "the diversity of racial origin will require an infinitely firm hand and great tactfulness in order to manage this heterogeneous society, whose complicated mechanism is easily damaged, separated, and disintegrated by the slightest controversy."[72] Alexander de Humboldt argued that "the mixture of races of which the interests are diametrically opposed" had in Spanish America been "an inexhaustible source of hatred and disunion."[73] A writer in the *Edinburgh Review* expanded on this analysis to argue that "the dangers of discord and division, arising from the mixed

62. Crallé, *The Works of John C. Calhoun*, 189–90. Tracy argued that modern transportation had obliterated the small state difficulty, but insisted "that the extent of a state be such as not to contain within itself, people differing too much in manners, character, and particularly language." Tracy, *A Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws*, 79.

63. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, *Memoir Concerning the Commercial Relations of the United States with England* (Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1809), 6, 14.

64. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, vol. 2 (London: W. Strahan, 1778), 586.

65. Fonna Forman-Barzilai, *Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

66. Samuel S. Phelps, *Speech of Mr. Phelps, of Vermont, on the War and the Public Finances* (Washington, DC: J. & G.S. Gideon, 1848), 11; "The Acquisition of California," *The Tri-Weekly Ohio Statesman* (OH), August 28, 1846, 2; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 276.

67. John L. Carey, *Some Thoughts Concerning Domestic Slavery* (Baltimore, MD: Joseph Lewis, 1838), 34, 36–39; *The Daily Picayune* (LA), April 27, 1849, 2.

68. "Art. V," *The Eclectic Review* 1 (May 1809): 446–59, 446.

69. "Stability of American Institutions," *Daily Globe* (Washington, DC), February 17, 1857, 1.

70. "Remarks of the Rev. Dr. Fisk," *The Evening Star* (NY), May 19, 1835, 2.

71. "Relief and Improvement of the Colored Race," *Commercial Advertiser* (NY), June 22, 1835, 1.

72. Bolívar was obsessed with the possibility that "when admixture permeates society, but does not create a single, homogenous, entirely identical group, political interests can generate conflict and inequality." Diego A. von Vacano, *The Color of Citizenship: Race, Modernity and Latin American/Hispanic Political Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 62, 66; Aline Helg, "Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of 'Pardocracia': José Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 3 (2003): 447–71; Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution*, 104–109; John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar: A Life.* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

73. Alexander de Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, vol. 1, trans. John Black (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1814 [1811]), 259–62.

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population," would only be intensified under republican governments.[74] William Robertson blamed Spanish-imposed civic distinctions, which had produced an implacable "antipathy between the two races."[75]

Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, writers argued that such heterogeneity produced convulsions, especially in republics. "The presence of different tribes in the same country," wrote Grimké, "and yet separated from each other by unequal privileges, and consequently by dissimilar habits, has been the most fruitful source of internal dissensions and civil disturbances."[76] The Abbé Raynal noted that civic inequalities "cherish perpetual hatred and everlasting division, between people who inhabit the same region, and live under the same laws."[77] "Two distinct classes of men," argued one Massachusetts writer, "could not live upon terms of equality in the same country and under the same government" without "mutual hostility of the two races" and ultimately a "war of extermination."[78] It was the "common rule" of politics, that "when races meet, they struggle for the mastery," and that under a representative government they would each try to win power for their own advantage.[79] The result would be the organization of politics along communal lines and its degeneration into chaos and violence. It was an "utter impossibility" to harmonize peoples of different origins and habits "under a representative Government," argued one member of Congress, citing recent strife in Canada: The result was that whenever elections were held the people were "arrayed on the side of their respective races, and their dissensions, instead of being diminished by lapse of time, were only increased" until the "interposition of the Crown became necessary."[80]

While pitched in general terms, in the American context this argument was most prominently deployed in opposition to abolitionism or in support of depriving political rights from free persons of color. The supposed danger of enfranchising free black Americans, it was repeatedly claimed, was that electoral contests would become racial ones.[81] So long as freed slaves could remember their treatment, their participation in "the privileges of citizens, political and social" could only lead to conflict and race war.[82] Emancipation "without political rights," argued John L. Carey, "would be no blessing," while "with political rights it would be ruinous to ourselves."[83] It would lead to electoral strife, to racial domination in government, and ultimately to extermination: "shall not we too kill," asked John Randolph, "shall we not react the scenes which were acted in Guatemala and elsewhere, except, I hope, with far different success."[84]

These arguments were neither uniquely American nor were they used only to justify the oppression of black Americans. As we shall see in Section 3.1, however, in the United States they gained traction among the orators and writers of the American Colonization Society, which provided an institutional network through which these arguments could be refined and disseminated. In addition, American debates over abolitionism and slavery in the 1830s radically revised American understandings of race, republicanism, and diversity, overthrowing an elite discourse of racial "paternalism" and installing a more popular and vitriolic language of mass egalitarianism premised on racial hierarchy, metastasizing emerging notions of biological essentialism into a form of "racial modernity."[85] Indeed, the increased prevalence of biological and ethnological arguments about race in American political discourse is more readily interpretable when we recognize that the function of such arguments was to render "race" as a distinctive type of difference that ostensibly could not be diffused through amalgamation.[86] Organized

74. Prefiguring arguments used later to attack U.S. abolitionism, one English author asked, "will the pride of the creole admit the Indian and mulatto to a real equality with himself? Will the hatred and jealousy of the inferior casts suffer the political power of the whites?… If they [New Spain white republicans] should have recourse to artifice or chicane for the purpose of excluding their sable or copper-coloured brethren from an equal participation of political power, do they suppose that, fresh from the lessons of natural right, the degraded casts will submit quietly to the disfranchisement? And, superior as these are in numerical population, if admitted to a political equality with the whites, will they not in effect be their masters" and seek to settle those "old accounts [that] are still open." "Art. VII," *Edinburgh Review* 19, no. 37 (1811): 164–98, 177–79.

75. William Robertson, *The History of the Discovery and Settlement of the Americas* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1837 [1777]), 357–58.

76. Grimké wished that earlier writers had more explicitly framed their histories in terms of race; that they had not suggests that it was not, for them, as obviously important as it would be for later writers. Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*, 280, 283–84.

77. Abbé Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*, vol. 2 (London: A Strahan, 1784), 234.

78. James T. Austin, *Remarks on Dr. Channing's Slavery* (Boston: Russell, Shattuck, 1835), 45.

79. "Stability of American Institutions," *Daily Globe* (Washington, DC), February 17, 1857, 1.

80. "Speech of Phelps," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), February 16, 1848, 2; Carey, *Some Thoughts*, 39.

81. "Abolition versus Colonization," *The Evening Star* (NY), Tuesday, May 19, 1835, 2.

82. Thomas Branagan, *Serious Remonstrances* (Philadelphia: Thomas T. Stiles, 1805), 66–67.

83. Carey, *Some Thoughts*, 51.

84. "Mr. Randolph's Motion," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), March 6, 1826, 1.

85. Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Race: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London: Verso), 1990; James Brewer Stewart, "The Emergence of Racial Modernity and the Rise of the White North, 1790–1840." *Journal of the Early Republic* 18, no. 2 (1998): 181–217.

86. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson's suspicions about whether persons of African descent were a distinct species were elaborated in the context of explaining why incorporation could never occur.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

opposition to black Americans' rights and continued presence in the United States provided a vehicle through which biblical and biological accounts of racial difference and hierarchy could be disseminated, casting "racial" distinctions as especially impermeable and thus especially likely to result in persistent conflict.

But while debates over slavery and emancipation were important occasions for its exposition, similar tropes had also been invoked in opposition to liberal naturalization laws;[87] in recurring debates over the British penal laws against Catholics;[88] in discussions about establishing a representative government in Trinidad;[89] in inquiries into the East India Company;[90] and in interpreting the various conflicts of the transatlantic world in Haiti,[91] Canada,[92] France,[93] and the Yucatán. In his report on the disturbances in Canada—what would become the definitive liberal statement on colonial policy—Lord Durham insisted that conflicts in heterogeneous societies, even those "which appear to have another origin, are but forms of this constant and all-pervading quarrel," framing a local conflagration as but an instance of a more general phenomenon.[94] His traveling companion, Charles Buller, agreed, later endorsing proposals to strip the West Indies colonies of their representative assemblies on the same grounds. "No man is more inclined than I am," he claimed, "to adopt the will of the majority as the only safe rule of Government." But the oppressions visited on the former slaves would be remembered, while the former masters—like the settlers in Ireland—had shown a determination to maintain their privileges. The result was to expose "society to the worst passions that can actuate men." "Establish representative Government as extensively and as fully as you can; but establish it in homogeneous societies, and in circumstances which will give it some chance of fair play." Prime Minister John Russell would later remark, that "in those [European] States which are composed of people of different races and nationalities" representative institutions did not provide a popular bulwark against despotic government but gave "greater scope to those popular feelings of jealousy, and perhaps of dislike which prevail among those races," arraying "national parties against each other" and encouraging dissension and oppression.[95]

The opinions of European and Latin American political thinkers were shaped by their engagement with American discourse, just as Americans learned from transatlantic texts and events.[96] Whether the belief that plural societies posed a problem for representative governments had a longer lineage,[97] or whether it emerged gradually as political actors interpreted the events of the era, it was increasingly being claimed as "an axiom in politics" that "where there are two races in the same land, which, for any reason whatever, cannot amalgamate by intermarriage, they can only exist in peace in the relations of master and slave, or the oppressors and the oppressed."[98] The Yucatán "caste war" was another link in a long chain of evidence, one that connected

87. Anonymous (Lucius Crassus), "Politics," *The Port Folio* 2 (January 1802), 28.

88. *The Parliamentary Register*, v. 12 (1793), 148; Thomas B. Clarke, *Memoirs of the King's Supremacy; and of the Rise, Progress, and Results of the Supremacy of the Pope* (London: J. J. Stockdale, 1809), 243; "Art. V," *The Edinburgh Review* 21 (July 1813): 340–64, 346; John Joseph Dillon, *The Claims of the Irish Catholics, Considered, as They Regard the Institutions of Scotland, Civil and Religious* (Glasgow: W. Lang, 1813), 27–28.

89. Lord Liverpool, in rejecting an assembly for Trinidad, argued that heterogeneity made representative government difficult, that the population was not versed in British government, and that the proposed disfranchisement of free persons of color would inflame antagonisms. "A Political Account of the Island of Trinidad," *Antijacobin Review* 28 (October 1807), 166; *Papers Relating to the Island of Trinidad*, 1810–11, sessional papers, vol. 11, H. C. Papers [184], 333-35(1-3).

90. *Hansard*, HC, 1st series, v. 25, 1813, cc. 858–59.

91. Bryan Edwards, *An Historical Survey of the Island of Saint Domingo* (London: John Stockdale, 1801 [1797]), passim; Joseph Marryat, *Thoughts on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and Civilization of Africa* (London: J. M. Richardson, 1816), 205–13; "The Crisis of the Sugar Colonies," *The Edinburgh Review* 1 (October, 1802): 216–37, 227; "Art. VIII," *The Foreign Quarterly Review* (July, 1844): 239–248.

92. One writer denounced representative institutions in Canada for inflaming hostility across lines of nationality, property, and religion, regretting that "social intercourse," which "often modifies other distinctions and softens the contrarities of habits or political discordance," was impeded by the social inequality between them: "There is little communication betwixt the English and the Canadians by which evil impressions might be softened," as the Canadiens "cannot cope with the English in expense, and therefore shrink from an association in which they must appear to disadvantage." "Politics of Lower Canada," *The Monthly Magazine* 53, no. 3 (1822): 193–98.

93. France, according to many historians, had for centuries been "the grand theater of civil wars" because it had failed to amalgamate the Franks with the Gauls, who now constituted the country's aristocracy and peasantry. "Stability of American Institutions," *Daily Globe* (Washington, DC), February 17, 1857, 1; Nell Irvin Painter, "Was Marie White? The Trajectory of a Question in the United States," *The Journal of Southern History* 74, no. 1 (2008): 3–30, 10.

94. John Lambton, *Report on the Affairs of British North America* (London: J. W. Southgate, 1839), 8–9.

95. *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 47, 1839, cc. 833-34; 3rd series, v. 162, 1861, c. 1867.

96. Robert Walsh defended the disenfranchisement of black Americans by recalling the Duke of Wellington's position on Ireland, which itself resembled tropes about black Americans. Robert Walsh, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the United States of America* (London: John Miller, 1819), 389–90; William Bishop and William Attree, *Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of New York* (Albany, NY: Evening Atlas, 1846), 1043.

97. Kenneth McRae, "The Plural Society and the Western Political Tradition," *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique* 12, no. 4 (1979): 675–88; Janet Ajzenstat, *The Political Thought of Lord Durham* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens' University Press, 1988).

98. "Colonization," *Alexandria Gazette* (VA), January 31, 1851, 2.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Ireland, Canada, the United States, Colombia, and, above all, Haiti into a metropolitan narrative about the difficulties of reconciling diversity, equality, and republican government.

2.2. The Problem for State-Builders

The emphasis given by orators and writers to factors that impeded intercourse and sympathy subtly inscribed the supposed problem on to the physical presence of whichever group was deemed to be "heterogeneous."[99] This framing was often coupled with an explicit listing of the supposed solutions, each of which was premised upon the elimination or neutralization of diversity: (1) foregoing representative government; (2) expulsion; (3) extermination; (4) the subordination of one or more classes, whether through enslavement or the deprivation of political and civil rights; and (5) amalgamation.[100] Additional commitments might further curtail these options. Extermination was often decried as barbarous, although it remained a viable option and could even be decided policy. The erection of status hierarchies was not inherently objectionable, but these had to entail a deprivation of political rights—and thus a substantial limit on democracy—as well as restrictions on civil rights. Enslavement was not an entirely appropriate suggestion for English colonial officials after the 1830s (nor did expulsion make sense for a government concerned with maintaining sugar production[101]), just as abandoning representative government was not proposed in the United States. This last, however, was pursued by different English ministries for their colonies: Trinidad and the Cape Colony were denied representative assemblies on the grounds that self-government could not be safely extended under conditions of racial diversity, while Jamaica would lose its assembly after the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865.[102] "Representative government," wrote the *London Review* on that occasion, "is out of place in an island where two bitterly hostile races contend for mastery: it can only end in the supremacy of one, and in the subjection of the other."[103]

The set of alternatives varied, but over and over we find the same basic offering. "The law of races," argued one speaker, "renders the existence of two peoples … in the same land, on a footing of social equality, impossible. Amalgamation, extirpation, or emigration, would seem to be the only alternatives."[104] The necessary consequences of diversity were "first: The conquered people are reduced to slavery; or, secondly: They are removed from the country by extirpation or expulsion," or "union [is] brought about by amalgamation … intermarriages [being] a necessary condition of a harmonious blending."[105] Two races could "never thoroughly amalgamate until they ceased to be distinguished by their physical peculiarities," and until this had occurred, they "would never rest until one had obtained the ascendancy over the other, or driven them away, or exterminated them."[106] Lewis Cass noted that the question before "our forefathers" was "shall we put [the Indians] in reservations; shall we incorporate them; or shall they be driven before the great advancing tide of civilization?" The first two options had failed, and so the indigenous "can die; they know how to die."[107] The British Empire had "only three alternatives," wrote Herman Merivale, a key liberal theorist of colonialism: "the extermination of native races," their expulsion into reservations, or "their amalgamation with the colonists."[108] Even the ancient Egyptians had supposedly had "but one of four plans to adopt" vis-à-vis the Hebrews: "either to expel the Hebrews, or to amalgamate them with the Egyptians, or to see the Egyptians inferior to the Hebrews, or to enslave, if possible, the Hebrews."[109]

99. As Barbara Fields has noted, pro-assimilationist thought has often mistaken the effect for the cause, to believe that race and racial diversity was the problem rather than racism, leading to mistaken assumptions that "intermarriage would promote assimilation, which would eliminate the problem by eliminating the problem people." Barbara J. Fields, "Of Rogues and Geldings," *The American Historical Review* 108, no. 5: 1397–1405, 1403.

100. This list bears a resemblance to taxonomies developed in the contemporary literature on ethnic conflict. The main difference is that the historical taxonomy was premised on the belief that multicultural states would not be stable outside of monarchical government. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 1–40.

101. The choice to import indentured Indian labor for sugar production shows that the elimination of diversity was by no means the paramount consideration of imperial governments. But the increased diversity that this introduced would be repeatedly cited as a reason why self-government, or later independence, could not be granted.

102. *Cape of Good Hope, &c*, sessional papers, vol. 29. H.C. Papers [400], 11-12(6-7); *New Zealand. Copies or Extracts of Further Correspondence*, sessional papers, vol. 30, H. C. Papers [337], 230(74).

103. "With such a division of races and political ideas, the British government would not establish a legislative council and took the safe course, taken in other Crown colonies of mixed population, of establishing an advisory council." Gladstone, *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 246, 1873, c. 951. "The Insurrection in Jamaica," *The London Review* 11, no. 283 (December 1865): 580–81, 581; *Memorials from the Island of Trinidad*, 1831–32, sessional papers, vol. 31, H. C. Papers [212], 353-54(31-32); John Manning Ward, *Colonial Self-Government: The British Experience, 1759–1856* (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), 137.

104. "Address of John H. B. Latrobe," *The African Repository* 40, no. 2 (1864): 47–57, 52.

105. Carey, *Some Thoughts*, 44, 52.

106. "Abolition vs. Christianity," *The United States Magazine and Democratic Review* 27, no. 145 (July 1850): 1–16, 2–3.

107. "Speech of Cass," *The Daily Globe* (Washington, DC), January 28, 1857, 49; "Art. IV," *The Quarterly Review* (May 1809): 293–304, 293.

108. Herman Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization and Colonies* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1841), 179.

109. "Philadelphia," *The Emancipator* (NY), June 21, 1838, 31; *An Universal History, From the Earliest Account of Time*, vol. 2 (London: T. Osborn, 1747), 188.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

These claims were made in very different contexts, about groups defined along lines of nationality, race, religion, and class; they were comparative as well as historical claims and were invoked to explain repeated conflicts throughout the transatlantic, perhaps most influentially with respect to Haiti. But they were also being invoked as evidence to strengthen particular arguments and projects that had their own political and material motivations. What is striking, however, is the commonality of the alternatives and the underlying logic that tied them together. Where sympathy was impeded by inequalities or by persistent distinctions between groups or by proscriptive laws, representative government could only exist if the heterogeneity was eliminated, whether peacefully and gradually or not.

These were rhetorical tropes, which came up most often in broad-ranging public debates over colonialism, abolition, immigration, or economic inequality, or in sweeping histories of empire and state-formation. But they also arose in concrete political fights over narrower policy questions, such as the civil and political rights that should be accorded to different groups; or how to arrange colonial government; or how intercourse along the frontiers of empire should be regulated. While the claims rested on a theory of human sentiment and the consequent requisites for democracy, their rhetorical value lay in the ability to jump from these foundations to sensational predictions of race war and to policy prescriptions of removal, subjugation, or colonial tutelage. Writers could move from the facts of a particular conflict to a claim that this was simply a case of a general phenomenon with a set of well-defined alternatives. As one author wrote about conflict between black Haitians and the country's *gens de coleur*, "the first feature that strikes us, is the difference, the next the rivalry of races. Without seeking farther; this is the fertile source of dissension and misery."[110] This author proceeded to argue that extermination or amalgamation were the only possible alternatives "in a country where any of the principles of republicanism were recognized in theory." In this way, the theory offered a way to interpret past or concurring events or to envision the long-term implications of policy as the unfolding of an underlying logic: So long as conflicts could be interpreted in terms of this theory, their specific features could be ignored, divergent facts disregarded, and bold pronouncements about inevitabilities and defined alternatives given the presumptive benefit of comparative authority.

Each of the options inherently implicated state policy. The state-building implications were perhaps clearest when it came to denying representation, exterminating, subjugating, or expelling populations, tasks that generally required a substantial coercive and infrastructural apparatus. The implications of amalgamation, making one community out of many by intermingling and mixed procreation, were subtler. While amalgamation was expected to be the natural result of human intimacies, it nonetheless required action on the part of state-builders: to slow, if necessary, the process of expansion or immigration or to deny representative institutions until sufficient time had passed to efface the pride and prejudice that impeded intercourse, and to arrange governing institutions so as to ensure that the tender affections and attractions that should develop naturally were not impeded by artificial impediments.[111]

When nineteenth-century writers surveyed the historical record, they instead found institutions to have been drawn up by the stronger community in order to preserve their own interests, to exclude the weaker from any access to privileges and rights, and to remind the latter that their appropriate station was underfoot. As Frederick Grimké warned, "it is in the power of governments … to create artificial races among their own population."[112] This was repeatedly emphasized by liberals as justifying their own vision of social and political development. The result of illiberal laws could be seen in Hungary, one example of many where the "dominant races" had ensured their supremacy: "in their ordinary employments and in military service, in the civil, political, and religious institutions of the country, the dividing line between them and the 'subject nations' is very broadly marked. This distinction, so universal and conspicuous, having been acknowledged and uncontested for centuries, has prevented any amalgamation of the different races with each other."[113] English observers of Spanish America noted that the "casts" there were "not more distinguished from one another by differences of physical constitution and appearance, than alienated by sentiments of mutual prejudice and aversion," which they blamed on Madrid's policy of "preserv[ing], rather than … extinguish[ing] these differences," part of its goal to divide and conquer the subject populations.[114]

The same failure of amalgamation, with the same underlying cause of proscriptive legislation, was

110. Perhaps they should have sought further, for they quickly noted that in fact "an upper class had by degrees been formed in Hayti, composed of the two races … apt, like the aristocracy of England, to combine against the lower orders. This circumstance had diverted attention of many from the incessant action of the rivalry of the two races, which in reality is the cause, proximate or remote, of almost every event that has taken place of late in Hayti." "Art. VIII," 239–247, 240, 245.

111. "Art. VII," 164–98, 178; *Daily National Intelligencer*, May 21, 1838, 2.

112. Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*, 282.

113. Bowen, "Review," 78–136, 84–85.

114. "Art. VII," 164–98, 178. Robin argued that by promoting intermarriages, the Spaniards had been spared the violence of the French side of the island. Charles-Cesar Robin, *Voyages dans l'interieur de la Louisiane, de la Floride occidentale, et dans les isles de la Martinique et de Saint-Domingue*, vol. 1 (Paris: F. Buisson, 1807), 280–81.

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frequently invoked to explain the persistent unrest in Ireland. The "odious distinctions" demanded by the English settlers imposed a civic hierarchy that extended throughout Irish society. They "establish[ed] two descriptions of your people: the one trusted, and therefore protected; the other whom your laws stigmatise with disaffection, and whom their fellow-subjects are therefore taught to regard with jealousy."[115] By raising settlers to a favored status, the laws encouraged them to adopt an attitude of "lofty superiority" and an expectation of an "unlimited submission."[116] This was the "very worst of tyrannies that can exist," argued Thomas Macaulay, "the tyranny of race over race." He went so far as to declare that the settlers should have completed their schemes to exterminate the native Irish, as this would have been more "humane in reality" than being "doomed to be what the Helots were in Sparta, what the Greeks were under the Ottoman, what the blacks now are at New York."[117]

Macaulay and other Whigs were insistent that amalgamation of the races in Ireland had been possible and desirable.[118] The amalgamation of the Normans and the Anglo-Saxons, romanticized by Walter Scott, was commonly claimed as having established the necessary conditions for representative institutions and free government in England. "Celt and Saxon—Dane and Norman—all have been fused down and melted together, to form the great and united English people. A similar amalgamation, we might have hoped, would have taken place in Ireland." The fault lay explicitly with the English, whose policy had been to establish artificial privileges and prerogatives that settler jealousy and chauvinism had insisted on maintaining well after they served any original purpose of encouraging settlement. "The diabolical policy on which England has always acted towards Ireland has been to prevent an amalgamation of races—to keep up a race, on which the people of another race might practise all the arts and mysteries of oppression."[119]

By ending these distinctions, and releasing the "Protestant from the deplorable power of tyrannising over his Catholic fellow subject," the "prejudices" of both would be removed.[120] "Every passion of the human heart is a material for the mould of the legislator as for the observation of the philosopher," declared one Irish legislator in favor of allowing intermarriages between Catholics and Protestants.

> If he wishes to smooth the asperities, and soften the acrimony of society, he will seek for that passion which all animated nature acknowledges, but which, united to taste, and blended with sympathy, becomes in the human breast the source of every benevolent and every generous feeling…. By resorting to [matrimonial love] we shall not only subdue the violence of individual prejudice, but we shall unite families…. By the intermarriage of Protestant and Papist, therefore, we unite them more closely to ourselves and, above all, we break that bond of union which linked them to each other.[121]

The common feature of aristocracy, however, whether of wealth, skin, or religion, was its contempt and hatred of the equality that would be suggested by intermarriages.[122] For this reason, a legally privileged class could never be expected to remove these distinctions on their own, making democracy potentially incompatible with the removal of illiberal proscriptions.

Mathew Carey, the influential American polemicist who had fled Ireland for his defense of Catholic rights, placed considerable stress on the lost opportunity of amalgamation. "In most cases of conquered nations," he wrote in 1819, "the subjugated people … generally become amalgamated with their conquerors."

> But to the ill-fated Irish such happiness was unfortunately denied. The sordid and selfish views of the Irish administrations issued a mandate of proscription against them. Age

115. *Debates in Both Houses of Parliament on the Catholic Petition* (London: P. Stuart, 1809), 206.

116. Arthur Young, *A Tour in Ireland, with General Observations on the Present State of That Kingdom*, vol. 2 (Dublin: James Williams, 1780), 40.

117. Thomas Macaulay, *Speeches of Lord Macaulay* (London: Longmans, Green, 1866), 141.

118. That the same liberals could participate in the denigration of the Irish as an inferior race suggests not only the changing significance and content of "race" over the nineteenth century but also that they believed amalgamation would make the Irish more like the English: "British and Irish intermarriage was always acceptable and not regarded as miscegenation." Michael de Nie, *The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798–1882* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 268. While state and church regulations on intermarriage between non-co-religionists continued, an 1825 parliamentary committee heard that such mixed-marriages "were very frequent even among the lower orders." Raymond M. Lee, "Intermarriage, Conflict and Social Control in Ireland: The Decree '*Ne temere*,'" *The Economic and Social Review* 17, no. 1 (1985): 11–27, 13.

119. Augustin Thierry, *History of the Conquest of England by the Normans*, vol. 1, trans. William Hazlitt (London: H.G. Bohn, 1856), xxii; Thomas Macaulay, *The History of England, from the Accession of James the Second*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: E. H. Butler, 1856), 5; *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 72, 1844, c. 1172; 3rd series, v. 190, 1868, c. 1765; 3rd series, v. 96, 1848, cc. 476–77; *The Morning Chronicle* (UK), September 20, 1828, 2.

120. *Debates in Both Houses of Parliament on the Catholic Petition*, 76.

121. *The Parliamentary Register*, v. 12 (1793), 148, 240.

122. George Ensor, *On National Government*, vol. 1 (London: Johnson, 1810), 182–83. This argument is similar to contemporary arguments that whites will cling to the privileged distinction of color when their own position in the civic hierarchy is seen to be in decline. David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London: Verso, 1991).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

> succeeded age, and found a wretched system in constant operation, to prevent the amalgamation of the two nations…. [The] inevitable tendency—indeed, its grand object—was to draw an eternal line of separation between the two descriptions of inhabitants—the English and their descendants, and the native Irish, and to perpetuate a deadly, rancorous and interminable hostility between them.[123]

That Carey was a consistent defender of similar proscriptions against free persons of color in the United States was evidence of his antipathy toward black Americans, but a perfect consistency in his political thought: Carey advocated expelling black Americans through colonization, resting this on the same grounds that he championed amalgamation in Ireland.[124]

3. AMALGAMATION AND STATECRAFT

We should not confuse an endorsement of amalgamation with a principled commitment to egalitarianism. Some political thinkers, such as John Crawfurd, Madame de Staël, the Abbé Grégoire, Sismondi, and others, saw in the amalgamation of different races and nations a potent source of progress and national revitalization.[125] Like the "utopians" identified by Carter, they seemed to embody what Gary Nash has identified as a common belief in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries "that the fusion of peoples across ethnic and racial lines could produce a more vigorous society."[126] More common, however, was the claim of Lord Durham that amalgamation would efface the distinguishing characteristics of a conquered or formerly enslaved people: Its end goal was a nonviolent extirpation of that class of the people held to be "heterogeneous," "foreign," or "inferior."[127] The implied hierarchy was present in almost all discussions of amalgamation, where it was coupled with a gendered hierarchy in which the "agents" of amalgamation were expected to be the men of the superordinate and the women of the subordinate class.[128] In either case, however, its potential appeal for state officials was the possibility that a supposedly homogeneous society could be achieved without the difficulties raised by extermination or expulsion. Amalgamation could be envisioned as a tool of statecraft, as useful in some circumstances and towards some ends as the erection and regulation of strict civic statuses could be in others.[129]

The analysis so far has been largely synoptic, and might suggest more coherence and more of a crystallized doctrine than was actually the case. While the occasions that generated this pattern of discourse tended to be histories of empires, contemporaneous interpretations of major events—such as in Haiti, Canada, Ireland, or the Yucatán—or interventions into political debates about the rights, privileges, and disabilities that accompanied distinct social status, it has been presented in a manner that might obscure the specific historical contexts in which it was articulated.

The remainder of the article examines how the supposed insight of this line of reasoning were invoked in specific historical instances, focusing first on debates among state-builders (and would-be state-builders) in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and then turning in Section 4 to an analysis of how these debates in turn shaped the choices of the transatlantic abolitionist movements and their opponents. Rather than defining the objectives of state-builders, I argue, this pattern of discourse reveals a set of background premises about how diverse societies could be arranged in the pursuit of geostrategic advantages, economic opportunities, or the maintenance of domestic or colonial order. The availability of the different policies detailed above, however, varied considerably across the imperial geography. Paul Frymer, for instance, has recently highlighted the geostrategic vulnerability and general weakness of the coercive state in the United States, and how this limited the ability to engage in a

123. Mathew Carey, *Vindiciae Hibernicae* (Philadelphia: R. P. Desilver, 1837), 25–26, 210.

124. Mathew Carey, *Letters on the Colonization Society* (Philadelphia: Young, 1832), 2, 27.

125. John Crawfurd, *History of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh, UK: Archibald Constable, 1820), 96; Francis Jeffrey, *Contributions to the Edinburgh Review*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846 [1813]), 79–135, 86; Sismondi, *History of the Fall of the Roman Empire*, 59.

126. Carter, *The United States of the United Races*, 3; Gary B. Nash, "The Hidden History of Mestizo America," *Journal of American History* 82, no. 3 (1995): 941–964, 955.

127. English Liberals' position on the Irish was that they should be made "less Catholic, and therefore more English." Jonathan Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 107. In some cases, writers favored the creation, through "intermixing," of an intermediate class that could exercise influence among the indigenous while accessing privileges conferred by the imperial state.

128. Placing native women under the patriarchal authority of a white European settler would invest in the husband the authority and responsibility for ensuring that the family would replicate European cultural practices.

129. Raynal recognized both the erection of distinct statuses and the fostering of amalgamation as tools of statecraft. "Tyrants soon discovered how far it was proper for them to separate, *or connect*, their subjects, in order to keep them in a state of dependence. They formed men into separate ranks by availing themselves of their prejudices: because this line of division between them became a bond of submission to the sovereign, who maintained his authority by their mutual hatred and opposition." Alternatively, "they connected families to each other in every station, because this union totally extinguished every spark of dissension repugnant to the spirit of civil society." Abbé Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*, vol. 3 (Dublin: John Exshaw, 1776), 192–93.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

forthright project of expulsion.[130] And as I detail in the next section, amalgamation depended on the willingness of local populations to accept intercourse and pursue marriages. While such a sensibility could be cultivated at a young age or by the deliberate organization of institutions to foster mutual dependence, doing so under representative government required the support of the majority, who might instead prefer to sustain unique privileges. As a tool of statecraft, then, it was accordingly more readily available to metropolitan state-builders than to representatives responsive to public opinion in slaveholding or settler societies.

3.1. The Impassable Barrier of Prejudice

American state-builders had long recognized the advantages of racial intermixing for the purpose of securing territory and establishing secure and stable political systems. In the colonial era, William Byrd "commended what he called the 'modern policy' of intermarriage employed in French Canada and Louisiana by which alliances rather than warfare were effected." John Lawson suggested that "ordinary people, and those of a similar rank" be given financial incentives to take Indian women for wives, while Edmond Atkin proposed that English officers in Appalachia should be rotated out of the region quickly unless they took indigenous wives, "by which means our interest among the Indians will be strengthened."[131] Having observed sexual intimacy between white men and indigenous women across the frontier, Lawson, Byrd and others desired it back east, in order to better amalgamate the nations in a way compatible with settler colonial state-building projects.

This willingness to consider amalgamation in order to facilitate settler expansion continued into the early republican era. In response to ongoing conflict on the frontier, Patrick Henry in 1784 championed and nearly won passage of a law in Virginia offering 10-pound bounties for "white-Indian marriages," with a 5-pound bonus for each child as well as tax relief and free education for each male child.[132] During the first term of his presidency, Thomas Jefferson expressed his hope that "our settlements and theirs meet and blend together, to intermix, and become one people." He was also clear about the state and economic interests at stake: "while [the indigenous nations] are learning to do better on less land, our increasing numbers will be calling for more land." Amalgamation would be part of a larger process aimed at "familiariz[ing] them to the idea that it is for their interest to cede lands at times to the US."[133] Jedidiah Morse believed that "while Indians remain in their present state, the minds of civilized people must revolt at the idea of intermarrying with them," but maintained that "by educating female children … the principal obstacles to intermarriage with them would be removed."[134] Secretary of War William H. Crawford went furthest by drafting a policy report that would see "intermarriages between [the indigenous nations] and the whites, be encouraged by the government."[135]

As with Jefferson, amalgamation for Crawford and Morse was seen not as an alternative to territorial expansion but as facilitating the acquisition of land and its settlement by loyal citizens, with loyalty closely associated with whiteness. The goal was territorial expansion, which as Frymer has demonstrated was designed to advance through concentrated white settlement.[136] Insofar as amalgamation could play a role, it was in facilitating this process. As Nicholas Guyatt notes, the vision of American Indian policy that "animated presidential policy until the Monroe administration" involved a reinforcing process of encouraging Indians to engage in agriculture, freeing up land that could then be transferred to whites, eventually allowing intermingled communities and "intermarriage of the established Indian residents and the new white arrivals."[137] Even James Barbour's plan of Indian removal was predicated on amalgamation, which would be encouraged among the Indians removed beyond the Mississippi but also

130. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 22–23.

131. Robert Beverley, *History and Present State of Virginia*, ed. Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 38–39, 159; Richard Godbeer, "Eroticizing the Middle Ground: Anglo-Indian Sexual Relations along the Eighteenth-Century Frontier," in *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*, ed. Martha Hodes (New York: NYU Press, 1999): 91–110, 94; Nash, "Hidden History of Mestizo America," 943; William K. Boyd, ed., *William Byrd's Histories of the Dividing Line betwixt Virginia and North Carolina* (Raleigh: The North Carolina Historical Commission, 1929), 3–4; Olive Dickason, *The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984), 278; Cornelius Jaenen, *Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 165; Sidney Kaplan, "Historical Efforts to Encourage White-Indian Intermarriage in the United States and Canada," *International Social Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1990): 126–132; Wilbur R. Jacobs, *The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967 [1954]), 80.

132. John Marshall regretted that "our prejudices … oppose themselves to our interests and operate too powerfully for them." Kaplan, "Historical Efforts to Encourage White-Indian Intermarriage," 128.

133. Paul Leicester Ford, *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 9 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905), 447–49; Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 108–109.

134. Jedidiah Morse, *A Report to the Secretary of War of the United States on Indian Affairs* (New Haven, CT: S. Converse, 1822), 74–75.

135. Chase C. Mooney, *William H. Crawford: 1772–1834* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1974), 89.

136. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*.

137. Nicholas Guyatt, "'The Outskirts of Our Happiness': Race and the Lure of Colonization in the Early Republic," *Journal of American History* 95, no. 4 (2009): 986–1011, 994–95.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

for those that remained among the whites: "a peaceful but sure remedy, which may be safely left to time alone to produce."[138]

Intermarriage with the indigenous nations had always been viewed with some ambivalence in colonial and republican America. The "Pocahontas myth"—the repeated claim by Virginia's enslaving aristocracy that they were descendants of Pocahontas, who had willingly "turned her back on her people and her title"—served as an important marker of elite status but also, for some, a "foregone golden opportunity for a mixing of the two races into a single 'American' people."[139] But Pocahontas's marriage to John Rolfe was safely in the past, and ongoing intermixing was generally treated with hostility among settled European populations.

Amalgamation, however, could also be raised as a possible accompaniment to the emancipation of enslaved African Americans. In 1789, future U.S. Attorney General William Pinkney explicitly defended incorporating newly freed slaves into the white community through intermarriage.[140] Theologian Jonathan Edwards in 1791 pointed to "ancient and modern events" to prove that the "natural and necessary course of events" was that slaveholders would be either exterminated, "driven out," or "reduced to the same level and … be mingled with [the former slaves] into one common mass." Slaveholders "will be necessitated by Providence to make in one way or another compensation to the Negroes for the injury which they have done them. In the first case, by taking them into affinity with themselves, giving them their own sons and daughters in marriage…. In the other case, by leaving to them all their real estates." Edwards held that amalgamation should follow abolition in northern states, something that he regretted but believed necessary.[141] Kentucky minister David Rice in 1792 argued similarly, acknowledging that emancipation would result in amalgamation but insisting that while he and his generation might find this offensive, it was only because of "our prejudices of education," which would themselves change as intermarriage became more common.[142]

William Short, the American ambassador and member of the French *Société des Amis des Noirs*, wrote his mentor Jefferson about the prospect of devising policy to "remove the aversion (wch. it is so natural shd. Exist … with those who have been [bore & bred] among blacks all of them in the state of degradation inseparable from the most mitigated degree of slavery) to the mixture of the two colors." He considered the options: "keeping 700,000 people & their descendants in perpetual slavery," or "having that number of free people living in the same country & separated from the rest of the community by a marked & impassable line," or "the expopulation of the U.S. of so great a number of their inhabitants." The first was contrary to republicanism, the second sure to produce strife, and the third an extreme solution. Short hoped that over time the black skin of the Africans would turn white, but even if not, he wondered whether this would be such a bad thing. "I don't know if you ever saw, a Mrs. Randolph afterwards Mrs. Tucker,—There is no country that might not be content to have its women like her."[143]

Jefferson had in a sense already given his reply in his *Notes on the State of Virginia*, where he argued that mutual prejudices and a supposedly natural repulsion between whites and blacks would prevent their amalgamation—prejudices rooted in their historical statuses as oppressor and oppressed and repulsion that resulted from a distinction of race. Echoing arguments made by Raynal and others, Jefferson insisted that the enslaved would want vengeance for their treatment, and that the whites, educated in prejudice, would never forego their claim to a higher status.[144] As a result, freedom would "divide us into parties, and produce convulsions, which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race."[145] This, along with his extremely influential elaboration on human difference, combined to pose an impassable barrier to amalgamation—a remarkable claim given his own relations but one he would maintain to the end of his life.[146]

Samuel Stanhope Smith shared Jefferson's belief that the two races could not live together in peace so long as white prejudices prevented social equality. While Jefferson endorsed "expatriation" or "diffusion"—organizing America's expansion to spread the black population over a large territory (i.e.,

138. *Appendix to the Register of Debates in Congress*, 19th Congress, 1st Sess., 40–43, 42.

139. Robert S. Tilton, *Pocahontas: The Evolution of an American Narrative* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12–13.

140. "Speech of William Pinckney, Esq.," *The Freeman's Journal* (PA), April 27, 1790, 2.

141. Jonathan Edwards, *The Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave-Trade and of the Slavery of the Africans* (New Haven, CT: Thomas and Samuel Green, 1791), 37.

142. David Rice, *Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and Good Policy* (London: M. Gurney, 1793), 16–17. When George Bourne reprinted passages from Rice he "took a scalpel to the text and removed Rice's admissions that a free society would involve the blending of the races." Nicholas Guyatt, *Bind Us Apart: How Enlightened Americans Invented Racial Segregation* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 167.

143. Guyatt, *Bind Us Apart*, 115–17; Barbara B. Oberg, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 30 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 146–54.

144. Brissot de Warville, *New Travels in the United States of America*, 281; Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History*, vol. 3, 173.

145. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (Richmond: J. W. Randolph, 1853), 149–51.

146. Jefferson's relations with Sally Hemings were widely suspected. The best source remains Annette Gordon-Reed, *Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: An American Controversy*. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

open new states for slavery)—Smith proposed an alternative state-backed solution: to create a colony of freed persons in the West where racial amalgamation would be financially subsidized by the government. "To obliterate those wide distinctions which are now created by diversity of complexion, and which might be improved by prejudice, or intrigue, to nourish sentiments of mutual hostility, every white man who should marry a black woman, and every white woman who should marry a black man, and reside within the territory, might be entitled to a double portion of land."[147] This creative use of land policy to socially engineer the demographic character of the society would be replicated with successive land acts and homestead bills; but these were effectively limited to whites, so that the new territories might be made racially homogeneous.[148] The influential republican Joel Barlow—who had become a member of the *Société des Amis des Noirs* in Paris—also seems to have believed that the state could play a role in encouraging amalgamation, having "propos[ed] to encourage mixt marriages by premiums offered for that purpose" as a means of facilitating abolition.[149] Another member of the *Société*, the Kentuckian Gilbert Imlay, conceded that it would "require a length of time to generalize marriages between the whites and blacks," but argued that there "would always be some whites who would marry blacks for property," just as many French colonists to Saint Domingue and Sénégal married into the ranks of the free people of color in order to acquire property and commercial connections.[150] But he also had "no doubt, when prejudices are worn away, [that] they would unite from more tender and delicate sentiments."[151] As late as the Missouri Crisis, some Americans would suggest that "blending colors" through state-engineered amalgamation was the only way by which "the dreadful shock of contest be avoided." "Antipathies about looks are surmountable; but hatred to oppression can never be eradicated."[152]

Amalgamation between whites and indigenous persons occurred regularly along the frontier and would often be pointed to by some as a basis for opposing expulsion or in favor of political rights. The Cherokee, for example, were defended by their supporters as "hav[ing] more nearly realized the theory of Benjamin Franklin and William H. Crawford, of an amalgamation with the whites, than any other portion of the aboriginal stock." Those who were demanding their lands, such as Georgia Governor Troup, in turn made the rejection of amalgamation a central point in their argument, often pointing to the Seminole as a group that had amalgamated with African Americans and constituted a community hostile to both settlers and slavery.[153] Amalgamation was a practical reality among traders in the "middle ground" and was a possible biopolitical tactic for state-builders in Washington and along its agential networks; it had much less support among the settlers upon which the state-building project ultimately rested, who were unwilling to accept the continued presence of large indigenous communities. Crawford's proposal was met with an uproar in frontier settlements, who appealed to both anti-Indian and anti-black racism: If amalgamation might be an effective means for dispelling hostilities between white settlers and the indigenous nations, then it could also facilitate the abolition of slavery.[154] The controversy hurt Crawford's prospects in the 1824 presidential election, the same year a congressional bill to reward intermarriages of whites and indigenous Americans died in committee and the Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions repudiated its earlier encouragement of intermarriages.[155]

Amalgamation between blacks and whites was viewed with even more hostility, and while it did occur, it had fewer defenders and American policymakers never seriously considered encouraging it. Brissot de Warville, the founder of the *Société*, described some of the interracial couples he found as he traveled along the frontier in the Ohio Valley, but noted that were these couples to marry, the North "would revolt."[156] More common than

147. Stanhope Smith, *The Lectures, Corrected and Improved*, vol. 2 (Trenton: James J. Wilson, 1812), 176–77; Bruce R. Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 69; Guyatt, *Bind Us Apart*, 127; Painter, "Was Marie White," 6.

148. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, ch. 4.

149. Henri Grégoire, *An Enquiry Concerning the Intellectual and Moral Faculties, and Literature, of Negroes*, trans. D. B. Warden (Brooklyn: Thomas Kirk, 1810), 67.

150. Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, UK: Belknap Press, 2004), 61–62, 70; H. Oludare Idowu, "Assimilation in 19th Century Senegal," *Cahiers d'études africaines* 9, no. 34 (1969): 194–218, 206.

151. Gilbert Imlay, *A Topographical Description of the Western Territory of North America* (Dublin: William Jones, 1793), 189, 192.

152. Frater [Anonymous], "On Slavery," *City of Washington Gazette*, August 15, 1820, 2; Guyatt, *Bind Us Apart*, 163.

153. "Georgia and the Cherokees," *Connecticut Courant*, July 24, 1826, 2; "Indians and Negroes," *National Democrat* (Lecompton, KS), September 1, 1859, 2; Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 196.

154. "The Hon. William H. Crawford," *The Gleaner* (PA), May 10, 1816, 3; see also, "The Federal Whig Candidates," *North Carolina Sentinel*, July 6, 1836, 3; "From the Raleigh Standard: General Dudley an Amalgamationist," *North Carolina Sentinel*, July 20, 1836, 1; "Indian Lectures," *The North Star* (NY), March 16, 1849, 1.

155. Elise Lemire, *"Miscegenation": Making Race in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 49; Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 108–109, 196–97.

156. J. P. Brissot de Warville, *Memoire sur les Noirs de l'Amerique Septentrionale* (Paris: Patriote Francais, 1789), 30–31. Contemporaries noted that black and white couples were especially common among "degraded" whites, and on the basis of census records and contemporary observations, Carter G. Woodson has argued that "race admixture was common." Carter Woodson, "The Beginnings of Miscegenation of the Whites and the Blacks," *Journal of Negro History* 3, no. 4 (1918): 335–53, 348, 352.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

consensual relations was sexual exploitation.[157] Sexual intimacy across the color line was generally prohibited by social sanction, while rape might be in the pecuniary interest of the slaveholder, a deliberate strategy to reinforce patriarchal authority, secure reproducible property in slaves, and, by prohibiting autonomous and consensual intimacies, foreclose the possibility of alliances between whites or Native Americans with persons of African descent.[158]

White racism was the primary reason for this prohibition, but it also grew out of the deepening investments in human bondage and the resulting security imperatives for slaveholding communities and the American state. The example of Haiti was frequently pointed to by American slaveholders as illustrating the dangers of a mixed-race population, as well as the extension of political rights to "heterogeneous" groups. Children of interracial sex would be mixed-race and comparatively more likely to be born free or manumitted.[159] A long-standing refrain of slaveholder discourse, however, held that "free men of colour have a very ill effect upon slaves."[160] The problem was twofold. Their existence supposedly undermined the association between color and slavery, for "if the blacks see all of their color slaves, it will seem to them a disposition of Providence, and they will be content. But if they see others like themselves free, and enjoying rights, they are deprived of, they will repine." More worrying was that free people of color might travel in relative freedom, allowing them to "organize insurrection."[161]

The danger posed by free persons of color in America's slave societies would be compounded if they were allowed civil and political equality. In that case, it was regularly claimed that they would enter into a struggle with whites for supremacy. It was a false "philanthropy," argued John Nicholson, to recognize political rights for free persons of color: "the French Revolution has taught us a lesson on this subject, which ought never to be forgotten—the history of the island of St. Domingo," where supposedly the grant of political equality for free blacks had divided the free population of the island into competing parties organized on the basis of race, divisions that ultimately emboldened the slaves to rebel.[162] This ostensible danger was invoked to justify the eradication of free people of color, whether through colonization, the succession of laws in slaveholding states expelling free blacks, or by prohibitions on interracial marriage.

But the threat that politics would be organized along lines of race, with cross-racial sympathies impeded by memory and prejudice, stood as an imposing barrier to abolition as well. As John Taylor wrote, "the history of parties in its utmost malignancy is but a feint mirror for reflecting the consequences of a white and a black party. If badges and names have been able to madden men in all ages, up to robbery and murder in their most atrocious forms, no doubt can exist of the consequences of placing two nations of distinct colours and features on the same theatre, to contend, not about signs and sounds, but for wealth and power."

> Do [abolitionists] … suppose that the negroes could be made free, and yet kept from property and equal civil rights; or that both or either of these avenues to power could be opened to them, and yet that some precept or incantation could prevent their entrance? As rivals for rule with the whites, the collision would be immediate, and the catastrophe speedy. Divested of equal civil rights and wealth to prevent this rivalship, but endowed with personal liberty, they would constitute the most complete instrument for invasion or ambition.[163]

Robert Walsh warned that already Anglo-Americans had "felt the inconvenience of naturalized Europeans exercising those privileges in distinct bodies, collected and animated by national feeling; the risk of the African race voting and legislating with the *esprit de corps*, is too serious to be incurred." While he was pleased that so far, to his knowledge, free persons of color were "not ambitious of civil rights," he quoted southern authorities that "to prevent the generation of such an ambition, appears necessary; for if it should ever rear its head, its partizans, as well as its opponents, will be enlisted by nature herself, and always ranged against each other."[164] William Drayton asked whether political equality could be denied post-abolition: "If so, they would, in the

157. Thomas Brown, "The Miscegenation of Richard Mentor Johnson as an Issue in the National Election Campaign of 1835–1836," *Civil War History* 39, no. 1 (1993): 5–30, 5, 14, 18, 24; Fay A. Yarbrough, "Power, Perception, and Interracial Sex: Former Slaves Recall a Multiracial South," *The Journal of Southern History* 71, no. 3 (2005): 559–88.

158. William S. Willis, "Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast," *The Journal of Negro History* 48, no. 3 (1963): 157–76; Rachel F. Moran, *Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race & Romance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 20.

159. Those born of free women, regardless of the father, would be free. Those whose parents included a free man and an enslaved woman would be enslaved, but may have been more likely to be manumitted. Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 4.

160. Everett S. Brown, "The Senate Debate on the Breckinridge Bill for the Government of Louisiana, 1804," *The American Historical Review* 22, no. 2: 340–64, 352.

161. "House of Delegates," *The Virginia Argus*, Richmond (VA), January 17, 1806, 2–3.

162. "To the Freemen of Talbot, Caroline, and Queen-Ann's Counties," *The Republican Star* (MD), September 20, 1803. Gerald Horne, "The Haitian Revolution and the Central Question of African American History," *Journal of African American History* 100, no. 1 (2015): 26–58, 38.

163. John Taylor, *Arator*, 3rd ed. (Baltimore, MD: J. M. Carter, 1817), 82–83.

164. Walsh, *Appeal from the Judgment of Great Britain*, 395.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

exultation and boastfulness of newly acquired importance, demand it. Pleased with a pretext for collision, they would at once fall upon the whites, and wrest, or attempt to wrest, the political power of the Southern states from their hands … [leading to] a war of extermination." And if political rights were conceded, the result would be the same, only preceded by the more circuitous route of party warfare, organized along lines of race and competing over economic redistribution but "without kindred connections, without social or sexual intercourse," to mitigate the polarization of sentiment or interests.[165] As long as white prejudice impeded the equal "interchange of sentiments," whites would have "no common interest with, no bond of union" with free blacks, who would in turn forge new and dangerous solidarities with slaves, foreign powers, or with "adventurous men." Instead of a blending of sentiments into a subtly shaded public opinion, black Americans would be a group perpetually set apart, with ideas and aspirations in conflict with the social commitments and economic priorities of the white portion of the electorate.[166]

In such a context, the only alternative would be expulsion or amalgamation through civil, political, and social equality. "You must," argued Joseph Konigmacher, "if you recognize them as citizens, place them on an equality with all other citizens, in social as well as political relations." To enfranchise free blacks without establishing social equality "would be to bring an irritated and bitter enemy into the body politic, who could never be reconciled by a vote [for the ballot] for the insult to his feelings and pride, in his exclusion from your society."[167] Any extension of social equality, however, would require integration of schools and other social institutions and the diversion of economic opportunities to persons of color. The cultivation of tender affections through social intercourse, as well as the pursuit of economic connections with newly wealthy black Americans, both raised the prospect of interracial marriages.[168] It was for this reason that "political equality necessarily brings about social equality; social equality produces amalgamation."[169] "With equal political rights," declared W. F. Bullock, "the barrier to social equality is at once removed, and practical amalgamation is the consequence."[170] Over the course of the antebellum era, these rationales were supplemented, but never wholly displaced, by a biological claim that amalgamation would degenerate white Americans' physical and intellectual capacities.

These themes would become central to the discourse of the American Colonization Society (ACS), which beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century appealed to white racism by raising the specter of amalgamation while justifying removal by on the grounds that a natural antipathy prevented its occurrence. The ACS is perhaps especially difficult to slot into an egalitarian or anti-egalitarian coalition as suggested by a "racial political orders" framework. It was organized in 1816 by students of Stanhope Smith inspired by his plan for abolishing slavery. But in place of Smith's state-supported amalgamation, the ACS insisted that the only solution to the problem of diversity was a permanent separation of the races. Framing removal as an alternative to enslavement, amalgamation, or perpetual conflict, the ACS drew on existing currents of political thought in order to give intellectual heft to their state-building project, which envisioned the states, federal government, and private capital coordinating around a program of removal.[171] In doing so, they influentially disseminated the terms of the theory sketched above while drawing from this their own conclusion that the only alternative to continued enslavement was colonization, with the free people of color to be removed first.[172]

Henry Clay, a major sponsor of the ACS, argued that domestic tranquility required that the country be "render[ed] one homogeneous people." Is "our posterity," he asked, "doomed to endure forever, not only all the ills flowing from the state of Slavery, but all which arise from incongruous elements of population, separated from each other by invincible prejudices, and by natural causes? Whatever may be the character of the remedy proposed, we may confidently pronounce it inadequate, unless it provides efficaciously for the total and absolute separation, by an extensive space of water or of land." If a racial war was to be "avoided, separation of amalgamation

165. William Drayton, *The South Vindicated from the Treason and Fanaticism of the Northern Abolitionists* (Philadelphia: H. Manly, 1836), 227–28.

166. Bishop and Attree, *Report of the Debates and Proceedings New York*, 1028; S. H. Laughlin and J. F. Henderson, *Journal of the Convention of the State of Tennessee* (Nashville: Banner & Whig, 1834), 92.

167. Agg, *Proceedings and Debates Pennsylvania*, vol. 10, 132–33, 95.

168. Francis Lieber, *The Stranger in America; or, Letters to a Gentleman in Germany.* (Carey, Lea, & Blanchard, 1835), 293–94.

169. "Direct Trade of the South," *De Bow's Review* 14, no. 5 (1853): 437–49, 438.

170. "Speech of W.F. Bullock," *The Examiner*, Louisville (KY), June 19, 1847, 1.

171. The support given to the ACS by prominent American statesmen is suggestive of the potential alliance between government agents and social movements organized around racial policy questions in developing state capacity, a theme developed much more fully with regard to a pro-civil rights social movement in Megan Ming Francis, *Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

172. This was both because their ostensible equality was supposed to be an immediate threat to social stability, and because it stood a better chance of attracting northern and southern support. Desmond S. King, *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation.* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55; Guyatt, *Bind Us Apart.*

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

is the only peaceful alternative" to continued enslavement.[173] Adopting the ACS's premise that amalgamation was "improbable," James Fenimore Cooper concluded that if emancipation were not paired with colonization, then "two races will exist in the same region, whose feelings will be embittered by inextinguishable hatred, and who carry on their faces, the respective stamps of their factions. The struggle that will follow, will necessarily be a war of extermination."[174] "We should have nothing but the perpetual turmoil," warned one politician, "which always existed when there were two races in the same country, antagonist to each other. One or the other must govern, and the struggle for superiority had kept all countries, where two such races existed, in constant turmoil and revolution."[175] Edmund Bellinger insisted that "all history shows that the same country cannot contain free races of men too distinct and different to amalgamate." The inevitable "contest" between the races would end "in the extermination of one, or the other, or both!… Such would be the result—the inevitable result of the alternative to *exportation*."[176] "Will they harmonize and love each other," asked Joseph Underwood, "Why, sir, during this very session of Congress, the Indians of Yucatan have been committing horrible butcheries of the white inhabitants, and in Hayti the negroes have been murdering the mulattoes. Trace these wars to their source, and we find no other cause for them as potent as the difference of color."[177]

The ACS and opponents of abolitionism could claim not only the authority of comparative and historical analyses but also that of science, as an increasingly systematized body of ethnology and race science insisted not only on the inferiority of persons of African descent but cast them as a race so distinct that amalgamation was physically impossible, with the descendants of interracial reproduction supposedly becoming sterile by the third generation.[178] Framed in this way, the problem was intractable: Unless there was amalgamation, for which social equality was a precondition and which perhaps not even time could ensure, then there could be no sympathy, resulting in persistent conflict, the expropriation of property, and the destruction of free institutions. "If there is a total defect of sympathy," wrote Grimké, "arising from causes which it is impossible to remove, all efforts to melt them into one people must fail." The "statesman" must then square up to the "two alternatives [that] seem to present themselves: to transport the African race bodily to some other country, or to retain them in their present condition."[179]

In a widely republished speech, John H. B. Latrobe claimed as the ACS's greatest success the change they had wrought in American public opinion. "How stands colonization now," he asked. At the founding of the ACS,

> we were laughed at as visionary enthusiasts. Compared to the great result to be accomplished, we have apparently done but little…. But in this interval, a mighty truth which is the sure foundation of ultimate success, has come to be universally conceded. Nearly all men now admit, that the two races white and colored … must ever be separate and distinct.—There can be no amalgamation—no social or political harmony, even, between them. If this was talked of even, five and twenty years ago, yet its consequences were rarely, if ever, discussed…. But few, if any, in those days, looked boldly in the face, the great truth, that, here, the races in question must ever be distinct, and fairly argued out the consequences…. [T]he great question [is], "What is to be the result?" where there are two races in the same land, which cannot amalgamate, and men's minds have been gradually prepared for the answer: That the safety of the weaker can be found in migration only—that the alternative must ultimately be extirpation or removal.[180]

Throughout its long career, the ACS would attract political actors inspired by both an opposition to slavery

173. News of conflict in Liberia led the *Emancipator* to remark, "unless the U.S. Government will interfere…all the colonists must be brought back to 'their own country,' or amalgamate with the larger tribes, or be exterminated. To this issue things will come at last." "Hon. Henry Clay's Speech," *Kentucky Gazette*, March 2, 1827, 1; "Mr. Clay's Speech," *Alexandria Gazette* (VA), January 22, 1848; "Address of the American Colonization Society," *Daily National Intelligencer*, November 14, 1831, 2; Henry Clay, *An Address Delivered to the Colonization Society of Kentucky* (Lexington: Thomas Smith, 1830), 14; *Journal of the Senate of the State of Ohio*, 46th General Assembly (Columbus: Chas. Scott's Steam Press, 1848), 192; "Extracts," *The North Star*, April 13, 1849, 1; "Liberia," *The Emancipator*, August 16, 1838, 63.

174. James Fenimore Cooper, *The American Democrat, or, Hints on the Social and Civic Relations of the United States of America* (Cooperstown, NY: H. & E. Phinney, 1838), 175. Cooper's literary works had shown a particular interest in amalgamation. Geoffrey Sanborn, "James Fenimore Cooper and the Invention of the Passing Novel," *American Literature* 84, no. 1 (2012): 1–29, 2.

175. Bishop and Attree, *Report of the Debates and Proceedings New York*, 1034; *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Sess., 1848, 581, 645.

176. Edmund Bellinger, Jr., *A Speech on the Subject of Slavery* (Charleston, SC: Dan J. Dowling, 1835), 16–17.

177. *Appendix to the Congressional Globe*, July 25, 1848, 1165–66.

178. Fredrickson, "Mulattoes and Métis," 107.

179. According to Angelina Grimké, their father had told her that "emancipation must come in some form or other and amalgamation will be the salvation of our country." Sidney Kaplan, "The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864," *The Journal of Negro History*, 34, no. 3 (1949): 274–343. Grimké, *Considerations upon the Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions*, 331, 338–39; James Kirke Paulding, *Slavery in the United States* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1836), 64.

180. "Colonization," *Alexandria Gazette*, January 31, 1851, 2; John H. B. Latrobe and Phinehas D. Gurley, *American Colonization Society: Addresses Delivered at its Late Annual Meeting* (New York: T. R. Dawley, 1864).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and hostility toward black Americans. But through their lectures and magazines, the ACS helped disseminate an emerging discourse of racial essentialism that rested in part upon a supposed incapacity to perpetuate the lineage of mixed-race persons or in some ostensible degeneration in their physiological character.[181] Its signal contribution to American political thought was, on the basis of these and other spurious premises, to amplify the claim that amalgamation was impossible, and to elaborate from this a solution to their self-posed question: "What is to be the result?" Whatever antislavery pretensions the organization might have had, the slogan "Can't Amalgamate" would be among the most effective arguments deployed against abolition or equal rights for decades.

3.2. Imperial Amalgamation

The representative institutions of the United States made its governing elites responsive to, and indeed drawn from, important enfranchised classes whose prerogatives rested on a codified civic hierarchy. From the early republic into the antebellum era, from Jefferson's and Stanhope Smith's ruminations to the active propaganda of the ACS, any suggested support for cross-group intimacy between either persons of color or indigenous communities with whites was heatedly opposed by those whose status and material well-being rested on the land and/or labor of those beneath them in this hierarchy. Cross-group reproduction, as opposed to intimacy and familiar ties, might be acceptable or even desirable, but only if did not undermine this racial ordering.

By contrast, for theorists of empire, colonial officers, and the imperial founders of new states, amalgamation could appear as a promising avenue for reordering society, especially when it could be envisioned as a responsibility to be undertaken by others outside their own social class. Bolívar urged the abolition of racial distinctions and at times suggested a principled commitment to racial equality, even as he expressed his contempt for *pardocracia* (rule by the persons of color). More consistent was his belief that racial heterogeneity produced intense factionalism and "race wars," informing his firm conviction "that America can only be ruled by an able despotism" and his repeated calls for amalgamation.[182]

During the French Revolution a subset of writers regularly endorsed amalgamation in outlining their vision of a more enlightened colonialism. Grégoire saw amalgamation as a source of moral and physiological regeneration; abolition and the extension of equal citizenship to freed persons of color, he argued, would be successful only if accompanied by interracial marriages.[183] Grégoire, Condorcet, and others associated with the *Société des Amis des Noirs* repeatedly argued that "emancipation [was] only the first step. Once slavery had ended, they looked to miscegenation to efface the physical differences between blacks and whites," a position that scandalized whites in the slaveholding colonies.[184]

Even after the revolutionary period there were persistent voices in French discourse in support of amalgamation. Alexis de Tocqueville perhaps best revealed the extent to which individual views could be contingent upon how they were situated relative to different state-building projects. While in the United States, Tocqueville had been exposed to arguments that there was an impassable barrier to social equality with persons of color; and that the consequences of this confronted white Americans with the choice of continuing slavery, pursuing separation through expulsion, colonization, abandonment of the South by the whites, or a war of extermination. His own elaboration of these claims in his "Three Races" chapter, foreshadowing insights of critical race theorists,[185] was an influential distillation and endorsement of this argument. Tocqueville claimed that abolition in American would have to surmount "three prejudices much more elusive and more tenacious than slavery: the prejudice of the master, the prejudice of race, and finally the prejudice of the white." These posed a more daunting obstacle to social equality than that faced by European countries that had abolished aristocracy, as whites' investment in an aristocracy of skin meant that they would never engage with black Americans in equal social intercourse. Once placed

181. Throughout the transatlantic world, race was becoming conceptualized as a determinative category of human difference, buttressing slaveholder and imperialist ideologies.

182. Marixa Lasso, "Race War and Nation in Caribbean Gran Colombia, Cartagena, 1810–1832," *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 2: 336–61, 344–46. He denounced persons of color for supposedly "want[ing] absolute equality, in the public and domestic areas alike; and next they will want *pardocracia* [rule by the persons of color], which is their natural and unique propensity, in order to exterminate the privileged class." Vacano, *The Color of Citizenship*, 62; Helg, "Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of 'Pardocracia'"; Simon, *The Ideology of Creole Revolution*, 104–109; Lynch, *Simón Bolívar*, 108–10, 149–55, 217–18; Marixa Lasso, *Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia 1795–1831* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 60–61; Gerald E. Fitzgerald, *The Political Thought of Simón Bolívar* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 63; Simon Collier, "Simón Bolívar as Political Thinker," in *Simón Bolívar: Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator*, ed. David Bushnell and Lester D. Langley (Lanham, CO: Rowman & Littlefield), 13–35, 23.

183. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution: The Making of Modern Universalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 95–96, 193.

184. Clarence J. Munford and Michael Zeuske, "Black Slavery, Class Conflict, Fear and Revolution in St. Domingue and Cuba, 1785–1795," *The Journal of Negro History* 73(1/4, 1988): 12–32, 22; Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat [Condorcet], *Réflexions sur l'esclavage des nègres* (Neufchâtel: Société typographique, 1781), 63.

185. Alvin B. Tillery, Jr., "Tocqueville as Critical Race Theorist: Whiteness as Property, Interest Convergence, and the Limits of Jacksonian Democracy," *Political Research Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2009): 639–52.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

on a footing of civil and political equality, the remaining social inequality—denial of social intercourse, but also whites' possession of land and capital—would appear to black Americans as a galling injustice. This was the argument of Jefferson, infused with a theory of human sentiment resembling that of Adam Smith, and Tocqueville drew from it the same sweeping consequences others had: slavery, extermination, or a separation that was unlikely to come about peacefully were "the only accounting that might ever be possible between the two races."[186]

But as a minister in France, Tocqueville outlined a project for abolition that rested precisely on what he had foreclosed in the United States, a vision of the future in which blacks and whites would become "*confondus*," "*assimilié*," "*amalgamé*." When called upon to explain the contradiction, Tocqueville noted that he had always allowed the possibility of amalgamation but simply denied that it could occur under democratic institutions. "If a man happens to stand outside of the prejudices of religion, of country, of race, and this man is king, he can work surprising revolutions in society," he had written in *Democracy in America*. "A despot coming to join the Americans and their former slaves under the same yoke would perhaps succeed in mixing them together." This is what he proposed for the French colonies. For amalgamation to proceed, the colonies were to be denied representative institutions and the power of the state would be shored up: "It is precisely because I thought that then, and still think it today, that I believe that the necessary prelude to any kind of emancipation is to first place the state in a superior and dominant position," which would allow it to exercise a tutelary role and "force the two refractory elements [planters and ex-slaves] to combine themselves in some way in order to form one and the same people."[187] His early writings on Algeria likewise insisted that "a new society [should be] formed from an amalgamation of [settlers and natives], including both residential mixing and eventually intermarriage."[188]

Whatever plans the revolutionary-era *Amis des Noirs* may have had for regulating colonial societies was foreclosed by their loss of influence and the reimposition of slavery under Napoleon. Decades later, Tocqueville's plans of amalgamation were never given anything more than cursory detail. Still, French colonial policy under Louis-Napoleon would center on a discourse of "*la fusion des races*," with the governor-general of Algeria proclaiming that "the great preoccupation of the government [of the colony] must be to realize the fusion of the peoples of diverse origins and races that inhabit this country. This work begins in childhood, it's in the communal schools where it must be accomplished."[189]

A similar interest in amalgamation as a tool of statecraft developed in the reform-era UK, which had long wrestled with how to respond to the cohabitation of its officers with native women.[190] By the 1830s the abstract idea of "racial amalgamation"—so long as it occurred in a "respectable" form that did not threaten imperial control—gained proponents across the English political spectrum, including "not only Whigs and 'philosophical radicals,' but Chartists as well as Tory vicars."[191] The belief that a project of imperial colonialism could benefit from the encouragement of amalgamation was most closely associated with Benthamite "Radicals," who conceived of it "not [as] that eventual and distant process … [but] an immediate and an individual process" that could be achieved by a careful attention to arranging colonial life to maximize cross-racial social intercourse.[192] Amalgamation, in their plans, would begin with the removal of artificial distinctions, the encouragement of social intercourse among persons of similar standing, and culminate in the formation of unions that would see a male British settler take a native or woman of color for his bride. "Racial amalgamation," for the vision of imperial liberalism that gained ascendancy after the 1832 Reform Act, "was a specific incarnation in a concatenation of analogous political

186. Ibid.," 643–47; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 519, 552–53, 563, 571, 572–73, 578, 1203.

187. Cheryl Welch, "Creating *Concitoyens*: Tocqueville on the Legacy of Slavery," in *Reading Tocqueville: From Oracle to Actor*, ed. Rag Geenens and Annelien De Dijn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 31–55, 32, 36, 39, 43–45; Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 572.

188. In the Algerian case he eventually concluded that the pride of the settlers would, as in America, impede amalgamation; this again led him to conclude that a settler state would require continued tutelage and a powerful administration to interpose between native and settler. Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 225.

189. This belief in "fusion" as the best way for France to govern its imperial colonies would persist into the Third Republic, when it was displaced by a discourse that gave greater weight to the newly enfranchised settler classes. In neither case were the interests or well-being of the colonized the motivation for the policy or actually reflected in government actions. Valérie Assan, *Les consistoires Israélites d'Algérie au XIX^e siècle: l'alliance de la civilisation et de la réligion* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012), 277; Benjamin Claude Brower, "Rethinking Abolition in Algeria: Slavery and the 'Indigenous Question,'" *Cahiers d'études africaines* 195, no. 3 (2009): 805–28; Naomi J. Andrews, "D'Eichthal and Urbain's 'Lettres sur la race noire et la race blanche': Race, Gender, and Reconciliation after Slave Emancipation," *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 39(3/4, 2011): 240–58, 241, 243.

190. Even as colonial administrators on occasion looked to encourage intermarriage between officers and indigenous communities in America, they periodically tried to suppress interracial intercourse and socializing in India and elsewhere. Hoping to "mak[e] empire respectable," colonial administrators sought to correct the sexual behavior of British agents and limit the widespread practices of concubinage. Ghosh, *Sex and the Family in Colonial India*, 2, 10, 26, 251.

191. Salesa, *Racial Crossings*, 36.

192. Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization*, 180–81.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

and discursive projects, ranging through much of the Empire and Britain … perhaps even a modular solution" to the political problem of racial diversity and dispossession.[193]

Perhaps the most urgent political problem to which the idea of amalgamation was offered as a solution was the question of how peace and imperial authority could be sustained in the West Indies and other slavery-based colonies if a general abolition were enacted. As the English abolitionist movement gained steam in the 1820s, "liberals" associated with both the Whig and Tory Parties began to consider how society in these territories might need to be reordered so as to ensure peace, a limited form of representative institutions, and economic production. At the top of their agenda was the need to abolish civil and political legal distinctions between whites and free persons of color, which they saw as a necessary prelude and accompaniment to abolition. Before emancipation, antislavery activists demanded that discriminatory laws be abolished immediately in order to dispel prejudices of color. "By removing all political distinctions among the free class," wrote John Jeremie in 1828, "they will mix and marry together. Nature will right herself." If freedom came before amalgamation had begun, however, the distinction between black and white would result in "antipathies and jealousies."[194] In Parliament, liberal members regularly argued that it had been the racial discriminations in civil and political rights that had prevented "the due amalgamation of the European and African races," claiming that these constituted the "only reason" for European prejudice in social relations,[195] while the colonial office demanded that the legislatures of the West Indies show a willingness to respect the civil rights of free persons of color. Even Tories promised to support policies that aimed to "amalgamate two distinct and separate races." Robert Peel argued that "the distinction of colour" posed a greater difficulty than liberals would admit, but even he maintained that the "amalgamation between the slave and the free population … all must admit to be desirable."[196]

After emancipation, discriminatory laws and social practices would be denounced as impeding the amalgamation that would need to take place to secure the well-being of the colony. Lionel Smith, governor of Barbados, regularly fought planters over ensuring the removal of political discriminations while insisting on social intercourse between similarly situated persons of different races in official functions.[197] Stipendiary magistrates—an office charged in post-emancipation with protecting the freed persons, but who, through social intercourse, often sympathized with the former owners—were instructed to report on the degree to which prejudice of color was diminishing in their districts.[198]

Racial amalgamation was seen as not only essential for the success of abolition but also capable of rendering colonialism humane. Liberals maintained that the racial distinctions imposed by settlers and the colonial state had prevented "the amalgamation of the native population with the English settlers."[199] Such claims were especially common in discourse about New Zealand. As *The Economist* noted, the whole sweep of empire had been "but one history of the extermination of native races in order to make room for strangers." The promise of New Zealand was that the Maori were seen as an "advanced" race "whose character, intellect, and pursuits, render [amalgamation] a comparatively easy work." A presumed compatibility in social and sexual relations in turn raised "the hope that we would in the future possess at least one colony to which we could point with the proud satisfaction of having made it a portion of the British dominions, to the mutual benefit of this country and that of the aborigines."[200] Of the many organized colonization societies proposing a settlement program in New Zealand, every one of them placed an active policy of encouraging racial amalgamation at the core of their proposal.[201]

In the 1840s, it was often official policy to arrange colonial institutions—including the sale of land, the prohibition of legal distinctions, the establishment of schools, the provision for mixed hospitals, and the recognition of marriages—in order to ensure "the ultimate amalgamation of the two races."[202] Landholding patterns in Canada, New Zealand, and the Cape Colony, for example, were to be arranged so as to place "the land for the natives among the whites, so that, if there was any possibility of amalgamating them, to do it."[203] Integrated schools were seen

193. Salesa, *Racial Crossings*, 42.

194. John Jeremie, *Four Essays on Colonial Slavery* (London: J. Hatchard and Son, 1831), 69–70.

195. *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 18, 1833, cc. 479–80.

196. "Speech of Sir Robert Peel on the Colonial Slavery Question," *Richmond Enquirer* (VA), July 30, 1833, 2; *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 18, 1833, c. 342.

197. Lionel Smith to the Earl of Aberdeen, March 29, 1835, H. E. Sharpe to the Lionel Smith, February 23, 1835, National Archives, CO/28/115/27, fs.189–199.

198. *Papers Relative to the West Indies*, 1841–42, sessional papers, vol. 29, Command Papers [374], 63, 105.

199. *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 96, 1848, cc. 584–85.

200. A "civilizational" hierarchy, itself bearing the imprint of Scottish Enlightenment thought, allowed writers to construct some groups as more immediately compatible for amalgamation with Europeans. "New Zealand," *The Economist* 3, no. 30 (July 1845): 693–94, 693.

201. Salesa, *Racial Crossings*, 28.

202. Earl Grey, *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, vol. 2 (London: Richard Bentley, 1853), 253.

203. *Select Committee on State of Colony of New Zealand*, 1844, sessional papers, vol. 13, H. C. Papers [556], 223 (190); *Papers Relating to Aboriginal Tribes*, 1834, sessional papers, vol. 44, H. C. Papers [617], 438 (95).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

as especially important crucibles where distinctions of race, origin, or former status could be eradicated and tender affections fostered.[204]

Imperial state-builders in London regularly expressed concern over policies that might impede social intercourse, and parliamentary inquirers pushed their agents for information.[205]

> [Question] 428. *Are there any distinctions established at the* [*Cape*] *colony between white and coloured people?*—None whatever.
> 429. *Do you mean that a native is not excluded from any privilege on account of his colour?*—Certainly not now.
> 430. *Does any process of amalgamation between the Europeans and the native race ever take place?*—Very considerable; the race between the Dutch colonists and the Hottentots are very fine active people; they are called Baastard Hottentots.
> 431. *Are there any legitimate marriages between the Europeans and any of the mixed blood?*—Yes, amongst many of the slaves. I know instances where respectable individuals have married their slaves; that is, with those where there is a great approximation to European colour; I know of none, as to any completely dark colour in our part of the country; but in the Dutch part, there has been a greater amalgamation….
> 432. *Has there ever existed any amalgamation as to the tribes called the Caffres?*—No, none whatever.
> 433. *You stated that there are no legal discriminations; are there any distinctions prejudicial to intercourse founded on colour?*—No; I think less in our colony than any other. I have seen slightly coloured ladies and gentlemen in the same room with Europeans; everything depends on their education and conduct.
> 434. *Would it be thought an affront to an European to be invited to meet a native man of colour?*—No, certainly no; provided his rank in society was the same; there is no distinction of that kind.[206]

While metropolitan policymakers could be supportive of amalgamation, it was always in the service of imperial interests.[207] When Earl Grey proposed a representative assembly for New Zealand, for example, he limited voting rights to those able to read English, ensuring that the colony's institutions would be responsive to a class of white settlers in which the ministry's reposed its confidence. The Aborigines' Protection Society, the governor, and many MPs rejected the scheme as an impediment to amalgamation.[208] "If ever there was a plan cunningly devised," argued the Earl of Lincoln, "to produce not friendship but hostility—not to promote but to prevent the amalgamation of the native population with the English settlers—it was this…. If ever there was a plan to postpone indefinitely the amalgamation of the two races—a plan most successfully to separate them—it was this."[209]

Insofar as it held the attention of state-builders, amalgamation was—like subjugation, expulsion, or extermination, each of which were pursued by the British in some places at some times—a means to a given end, providing a liberal veneer for imperialism. But its value to state-builders was real, even if instrumental; recognizing this, colonial elite often defended their appeals for representative institutions by claiming to have made progress toward the achievement of equal social intercourse. John Montagu, the government secretary for the Cape Colony, acknowledged that while "this distinction [of color] has ceased to be the badge of civil disabilities and moral wrongs, yet … it still forms a bar to social intercourse and intimate relations." But he put considerable stress on his claim that near perfect equality in political matters had been achieved and insisted that with a new constitution this would be furthered, and that "the prejudices, feelings, and habits thought to result from diversity of race and origin, are daily passing away."[210] Colonists knew what the ministries wanted to hear, and insistent claims that illiberal privileges in law and exclusiveness in social intercourse had been eradicated, that racial animosity was declining, and that amalgamation was soon to begin in earnest became a mainstay of ministerial correspondence with colonial elites from the 1840s to the 1860s.

The interest of successive English ministries in fostering amalgamation did not reorder colonial society in a more racially egalitarian direction, and colonial correspondence claiming otherwise was little more than a Potemkin facade. Not only was the eradication of legal distinctions always conditional upon furthering the long-term interests of the imperial state, but the settler populations, former slaveholders, new immigrants, and the natives and freed people themselves all had their own priorities and proclivities.[211] In fact, settlers and the former owners of enslaved persons were persistently seeking ways to disfranchise

204. *Report from the Select Committee on the West Coast of Africa; Together with the Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index, Part I*, 1842, sessional papers, vol. 11, H. C. Papers [551], 556.

205. *Papers Relative to the Condition of Native Inhabitants of Southern Africa, Part II*, 1835, sessional papers, vol. 39, H. C. Papers [252], 228 (98).

206. *Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines*, 1836, sessional papers, vol. 7, H. C. Papers [538], 43 (37).

207. "The United Irishmen and the Repeal Agitation," *Westminster Review*, August 1843, 68.

208. Salesa, *Racial Crossings*, 143–44; Julie Evans, Patricia Grimshaw, David Philips, and Shurlee Swain, *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies, 1830–1910* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 74.

209. *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 96, 1848, cc. 612–20, 854–55.

210. *Correspondence Relative to the Establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope*, 1850, sessional papers, vol. 38, Command Paper [1137], 123, 126, 136 (13, 16, 26).

211. *Papers in Explanation of Measures to Give Effect to Act for Abolition of Slavery: Part 3*, 1836, sessional papers, H. C. Papers, vol. 48, 166-1, 343 (309).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the indigenous or freed populations, searching for qualifications that while "carefully worded to counter Colonial Office concerns about discriminating on the basis of race … simply coded race in other ways."[212] The realization of their own particular goals, after all, were much more directly premised on the maintenance of social and economic hierarchies. Accordingly, many of the efforts to encourage amalgamation were derailed in their local implementation. After the Indian Mutiny and other colonial conflagrations, there was a definitive reorientation of colonial policy away from even the limited fostering of social intercourse that had occurred.[213]

4. AMALGAMATION AND AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM

In devising schemes of imperial expansion and colonization, both American and European state-builders had seen human intimacy as a tool that could be manipulated in service of their interests. By the 1830s, however, the different political circumstances that conditioned their separate choices had produced a sharp divergence in elite discourse. While European state-builders spoke of, and to some extent even pursued, a "fusion of the races" or an "amalgamation" between natives or freed persons with settlers and whites, the ACS, the developing American school of ethnology, and a host of pro-slavery writers and politicians were denouncing this as against nature and/or a threat to whites' civil statuses. These charges would reach a fever pitch in the backlash to the American antislavery movement that emerged in the 1830s, with abolitionists presented as fanatics looking to bring about a racial amalgamation through sexual intercourse but also as treasonous colluders with a foreign power.[214] "British arms have been tried in vain," wrote one South Carolina newspaper, "and British philanthropy is now our most dangerous enemy," financing "itinerant lecturers, to undermine the very foundations of society, and inculcate on our wives and daughters the beauties of amalgamation."[215]

Anti-abolitionists and colonizationists found considerable rhetorical value in refining and widely disseminating the by now common trope posing extermination, continued enslavement, expulsion, and amalgamation as the only available alternatives to racial diversity, developing these themes into an effective rhetorical cant. Were we to focus exclusively on American patterns of discourse, however, we would obscure the broader transatlantic context in which these were embedded, extracting them from their sites of meaning and attributing to them a potentially anachronistic significance. The critiques leveled against the American abolitionists are instead best understood when placed within a longer and broader transatlantic context. English abolitionism had been promoted by activists and state-builders in the metropole, who were less responsive to—and often quite hostile toward—the preferences of white colonial settlers and slaveholders. Their educational and political efforts were targeted at a growing domestic and enfranchised "middle class," whose investment in slavery was often indirect and whose own civic statuses rested more on local religious and national distinctions than on racial ones; at metropolitan state-builders, for whom the continuation of slavery or legal racial hierarchies were important but not paramount considerations; and at a public who had little reason to believe that abolition would fracture the Union or the Empire. Many English abolitionists could explicitly offer amalgamation as a tool for reorganizing post-emancipation societies precisely because their political influence rested on the compatibility of their goals with imperial imperatives.

The efforts of American abolitionists, by contrast, were fundamentally circumscribed by their

212. Evans et al., *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights*, 6.

213. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, Benjamin Disraeli complained that "the mutual suspicions and prejudices between rival religions and different races, which were the cause of segregation between powerful classes in that country, have of late years, in consequence of our policy, gradually disappeared, and that for them has been substituted an identity of sentiments, and those sentiments, I am sorry to say, hostile to our authority." "Our empire in India was, indeed, founded upon the old principle of *divide et impera*," and it was time to return to that method. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, English colonial policy was committed to a firm adoption of the "color line" as a tactic of rule. While the developmental consequences of "amalgamation" policies were limited, they left a legacy in the varied cultures of racial hierarchy across the empire, cultures that nonetheless "occurred within the structure of dominance" imposed by the imperial regime and white settlers. *Hansard*, HC, 3rd series, v. 147, 1857, c. 444, 447; 3rd series, v. 177, 1865, cc. 1573–74; Arvel B. Erickson, "Empire or Anarchy: The Jamaica Rebellion of 1865," *Journal of Negro History* 44, no. 2 (1959): 99–122, 102; Arnold A. Sio, "Race, Colour, and Miscegenation: The Free Coloured of Jamaica and Barbados," *Caribbean Studies* 16, no. 1 (1976): 5–21, 21; Marilyn Lake and Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality* (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University, 2008), 63, 131, 226–32; Freeman, "Attitudes toward 'Miscegenation,'" 46, 48–49, 54.

214. American abolitionism provided an occasion for one of the United States' periodic panics about foreign influence in its domestic affairs. American statesmen saw in English abolition a vital threat to the interests of their own country, and President Tyler even instructed one member of Congress to accuse American antislavery activists' of being "paid foreign agents" whose "entire antislavery enterprise, financed and directed by Great Britain, was a subversive scheme aimed at undermining the American Union." Edward P. Crapol, *John Tyler: The Accidental President* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 70–71; Merton L. Dillon, *Slavery Attacked*, 169; Anna O. Law, "Lunatics, Idiots, Paupers, and Negro Seamen—Immigration, Federalism and the Early American State," *Studies in American Political Development* 28, no. 2 (2014): 107–18, 121–25.

215. "The Conspiracy of Fanaticism," *Camden Journal* (SC), May 24, 1850, 1; "Robert J. Breckinridge" *The Liberator* (MA), July 27, 1838, 2; "For the Pennsylvania Freeman," *Philadelphia National Enquirer*, September 27, 1838, 2; "Judge Robertson's Letters," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), November 10, 1857.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

immersion in a settler and slaveholding society, where a majority of the enfranchised were adamantly opposed to legally sanctioning or socially recognizing intimacies that would destabilize the civic hierarchies from which they benefited.

4.1. The Specter of Amalgamation in America

The frequently repeated claim in the United States that abolitionists were promoting amalgamation has generally been treated as an illogical leap, an effective slander that tapped into the "long-standing white repugnance to intermarriage," but lacking any foundation in fact.[216] It was certainly well-calculated to provoke a hostile response. But its rhetorical force rested on how abolitionists' stated goals were interpreted in light of the patterns of discourse recovered above and by their close association with the English antislavery movement.

The American movement was regularly denounced for supposedly sharing in the belief of English "ultras" that "the best plan is to put black and white men and black and white ladies upon an equal footing in the intercourse of social feelings."[217] One person regularly identified as an "ultra" was Frances Wright, the Scottish-born reformer who argued that emancipation must progress "through the feelings; and through that medium, be finally complete and entire, involving at once political equality and the amalgamation of the races." By educating children together in her Nashoba Community, sympathies would be established and distinctions erased, "to leave the affections of future generations to the dictates of free choice.[218] British abolitionists were seen as equally supportive of amalgamation. A debate in Glasgow between Robert Breckinridge and George Thompson (whose tour of America sparked several riots over accusations that he was a British agent encouraging disunion and interracial sex) saw the latter defend amalgamation, even as he repeatedly insisted that abolitionists had no interest in promoting it. He asked whether there was "any law in America forbidding ministers to celebrate marriages between Japthethite [white] American Christians and Jewesses (by birth, even if Christians by faith) and Jews, (even if Christian) to marry Japthethite, American females? If there be not; then, why may Shem and Japheth intermarry, but Ham [persons of African descent] with ne[i]ther?" And he turned to history to show that amalgamation was an effective means of resolving the supposed difficulty of heterogeneity.[219]

Another English author attacked the claim of an impassable barrier between the races, "an assertion contradicted by a thousand facts." This supposed "antipathy, of which we are as sick of hearing as the Americans [are] of abolition," was in his eyes the sublimation of an "irresistible inclination."

> [A defender of slavery] opines that but one alternative remains to America—for emigration to Liberia, beautiful as it was on its first concoction, is a failure, and public opinion would not permit the summary process of the Spartans to be applied to the American Helots—either to extirpate the blacks, or keep them in perpetual subjection. *This conclusion is the logical consequence of the hypothesis—for the position has no real foundation—that amalgamation is impossible.*[220]

British abolitionist George Smith blamed the ACS in particular for "nurturing the unhallowed prejudices which fearfully alienate the affections of the white population from their sable brethren,"[221] while Charles Stuart concluded that those who would "keep the family of man asunder" were opposing God's will.[222] In many ways, however, these abolitionists were operating within a conceptual framework they shared with the ACS, one that predicated the operation of democracy on either an amalgamation of diversity or its elimination through removal.

British observers on American slavery regularly expressed their hopes that social equality would be extended and amalgamation proceed. After a discussion on the beauty of multiracial women, Isaac Candler considered the two reasons given to him by Americans for not admitting free blacks to equal rights: The first was that they would never amalgamate, and thus "the attempt to bring about equality must be inimical to the peace and harmony of society," while the second was "directly the reverse, namely, that the establishment of equality must inevitably effect a complete amalgamation of the two races, and thus deteriorate the species." He thought the argument about deterioration to be nonsense, and hoped that "at no very distant day, marriages of one with the other will frequently take place," pointing to the Goths and Romans, Saxons and Normans:

216. Painter, "'Social Equality,' Miscegenation, Labor, and Power," 53; George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 80.

217. Robert Wickliffe, *Speech of Robert Wickliffe, in Reply to the Rev. R.J. Breckinridge* (Lexington, KY: Observer & Reporter Print., 1840), 41.

218. Frances Wright, *Fanny Wright Unmasked by her Own Pen* (New York: s.n., 1830), 10–11; *Trumpet and Universalist Magazine* March 19, 1831, 149.

219. *Report of the Discussion on American Slavery in Dr. Wardlaw's Chapel Between Mr. George Thompson and the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge* (Glasgow: David Prentice, 1836), 73–74.

220. Abdy, *American Whites and Blacks*, 41–42 emphasis added.

221. George Smith, *Facts Designed to Exhibit the Real Character and Tendency of the American Colonization Society.* (Liverpool, UK: Egerton Smith, 1833), 14.

222. Charles Stuart, *A Letter to Thomas Clarkson by Thomas Cropper, and Prejudice Vincible* (Liverpool, UK: Egerton Smith, 1832), 24.

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"the sooner the union takes place the better, for a caste in society is a dangerous evil…. When a general insurrection of the slaves occurs, a massacre of the whites must be expected, if they should then be what they are now, determined to prevent marriages by all possible means."[223]

The accusation that abolitionists were encouraging amalgamation rested also on the practices and positions of the radical antislavery movement in America, which advocated opposition to racial distinctions in law and the eradication of the prejudice which they sustained. As long as prejudice remained in the hearts of white Americans, they argued, then social intercourse as equals could not occur.[224] In 1832, William Lloyd Garrison and Lydia Maria Child launched a campaign to repeal the Massachusetts statute forbidding interracial marriage, "one of the links of that chain which binds millions of our race in servitude." Garrison argued that "if [intermarriage] is the necessary consequence of restoring that which does not belong to us, and doing justly to our fellow creatures, we cannot help it. One thing is pretty certain—there will be no compulsion; and if two persons love each other enough to be united in wedlock, it is none of my business, and I presume they would tell you it is none of yours. We have nothing to say, *pro* or *con*, on the subject of intermarriage, because it does not concern us."[225] In addition to pushing back on widespread notions of black inferiority, abolitionists in their meetings and public forums often performed for a broader public the possibility of social equality, with "black men and women [speaking] as political equals with white men and women."[226] *The Liberator* even outlined an imagined future in which "blacks and whites were mingling with perfect ease in social intercourse," where a young African American woman was the center of attraction for a biracial crowd, where some black Americans had married into "respectable white families," and where, as a result, they were "completely united into one people, and there is as little separate interests and feelings … as between tall and short, or dark eyes and blue, or between men and women."[227]

Practices such as this provided a germ from which elaborately exaggerated anti-abolitionist fantasies were concocted. Edward W. Clay's "amalgamation waltzes" presented black and white abolitionists dancing, singing, and otherwise fraternizing and socializing on equal terms—with mixed-race children the ultimate result—while Jerome Holgate's extraordinarily racist *A Sojourn in the City of Amalgamation* painted a future in which sexual amalgamation was in fashion. Antislavery events in which women were prominent speakers or organizers were framed in newspapers and popular imagery as brothels encouraging sexual amalgamation, the implied sexual equality almost as transgressive as the suggestion of racial equality. Incidents in which blacks and whites shared cabins or coaches were treated as scandalous: Clarissa Lawrence, an African American delegate to the Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, was attacked for sharing a return packet cabin with a white companion. When the Rev. William R. Weeks of Newark introduced a black man into his pulpit, he was said to have caught the "amalgamation infection," and his church was destroyed. The reception of black abolitionists in England was reported with special vitriol, the extension of social equality in these settings another expression of malice toward the United States. The repeated printing of images or text depicting social equality and the sexual union of white and black Americans was intended to "disgust and titillate a white male public" and to associate "abolition with Europhilic decadence and the subversion of the American republican experiment."[228] The rhetorical value of "amalgamation" was that it threatened the psychological and civic investments of white men in racial and gender hierarchy.[229]

223. Candler, *A Summary View of America*, 280–81, 287, 298, 300.

224. "Remarks of Prof. Walker," *Oberlin Evangelist* 7, no. 17 (August 14, 1845): 134.

225. "The Marriage Question," *The Liberator*, November 17, 1832, 3; "Letter from Virginia," *The Liberator*, March 31, 1832, 3.

226. Leslie M. Harris, "From Abolitionist Amalgamators to 'Rulers of the Five Points': The Discourse of Interracial Sex and Reform in Antebellum New York City," in *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*, ed. Martha Hodes (New York: New York University Press, 1999): 191–212, 194. The social intercourse demonstrated on these occasions often fell short of full equality. Angelina Grimké placed the blame for this squarely on white abolitionists. Angelina E. Grimké, *Appeal to the Women of the Nominally Free States* (Boston: Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, 1838), 62–63; "Behold, We Count Them Happy Who Endure," *The Colored American* (NY), December 16, 1837, 2.

227. T.T., "A Dream," *The Liberator*, April 2, 1831.

228. Phillip Lapsansky, "Graphic Discord: Abolitionist and Antiabolitionist Imagery," in *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women's Political Culture in Antebellum America*, ed., Jean Fagin Yellin and John C. Van Horne (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): 201–30, 227; Oliver Bolokitten, *A Sojourn in the City of Amalgamation, in the Year of Our Lord, 19—*. (New York: s.n., 1835); *Niles' Weekly Register*, July 19, 1834, 360; "Scene in New York," *Richmond Enquirer* (VA), May 18, 1847, 1; "Abolition in All its Bearings," *The Evening Star* (NY), September 10, 1835, 2; "Philadelphia," *The Emancipator* (NY), June 14, 1838, 25; "Stoweism and Blackswanism," *Alexandria Gazette* (VA), June 20, 1853, 2; "Sir Lionel Smith and the Negroes," *The Sun* (MD), September 5, 1838, 2; "Amalgamation by Steam," *Emancipator and Free American* (MA), August 31, 1843, 71; "Attempt to Amalgamate," *Saturday Morning Transcript* (MA), August 1, 1835, 191; Tavia Nyong'o, *The Amalgamation Waltz: Race, Performance, and the Muses of Memory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 82–83; McDaniel, *The Problem of Democracy in the Age of Slavery*, 55.

229. David Ruggles told of how an anti-abolitionist once explained that he used the charge of amalgamation solely as "a scare crow, because it seems to be the only thing that will reach the prejudices of the public." David Ruggles, *The 'Extinguisher' Extinguished, or, David M. Reese, M.D., 'Used Up'* (New York: D. Ruggles, 1834), 46.

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Nicholas Trist, the U.S. consul to Havana, explained to English commissioners investigating the slave trade (in which he was illicitly participating) the underlying logic that connected civil and political rights with social equality. In monarchical societies, he argued, diversity posed less of problem than in it did in democracies, as they were marked by the "distinction of ranks; where the gradation, beginning with a king, might end with a black; and the latter be habituated to regard the white man of the rank just above him with the same deference that the latter would give him the example of, by showing it to the ranks to which he was subordinate."

But democratic states relied on sympathy formed in equal social intercourse. An American "could not fail to see" that in a democracy without subordinate ranks the "certain and instant consequence [of abolition] would be, aspirations on the part of the black to a *social equality*," which if denied would "prove a source of heart-burning and hatred, altogether inextinguishable." It was for this reason that "popular instinct" had substituted "Amalgamationist" for "Abolitionist," as the proper designation of the man who would venture upon abolition without "deportation."

> [The] appropriateness of [this] any smart Philadelphia schoolboy could, after five minutes reflection, have justified…. [I]f the black race were raised to a political equality with the white, they would naturally and inevitably aspire to be received into white society, and to be accepted and sought by white maidens and youths, as husbands and wives,—that if these claims should be denied, a worse state of feeling would arise than that which belonged to the relation of master and slave,—and that … as it could not be supposed to be the design of the Abolitionist to substitute this worse state of feeling for the other, he must contemplate…that which could alone prevent it,—the amalgamation of the two races.[230]

The logical implication of equal rights, insisted Trist and other defenders of slavery, was amalgamation: "what is to qualify them to vote, save that social equality with them which involves all the horrors of amalgamation … [to] marry and intermarry with them, and establish between us and them the close and tender relations which bind society together?" It was also the logical implication of preaching against "prejudice, which after all is the only barrier between the races."[231] So long as the antislavery movement opposed prejudice and petitioned for the abolition of legal distinctions, it could be inferred that they supported amalgamation "as neither improper nor inexpedient, when voluntarily exercised."[232] "Everything looks to this. The extensive sympathy felt and expressed for the black over the white by the abolition leaders; the revolting prominence given to blacks in all public assemblages; the efforts to set the blacks at the South free, even at the risk of the massacre of the whites, all directly advocated—can have but one social aspect, and must terminate in the hideous doctrine of amalgamation."[233]

For the most part, the abolitionist movement deflected and disclaimed, a reflection of continuing prejudices within the movement but also a strategic response to the intensity of white racism. Angelina E. Grimké, who was especially attuned to questions of social intimacy and gender and racial inequality among white abolitionists, explained in an abolitionist letter to southern women that the North was not pro-slavery, but rather "most dreadfully afraid of Amalgamation."[234] Evidence of white hostility to interracial intercourse of intimacy was everywhere. Supporters of a proposed college for free blacks learned that patrons were threatening to scuttle the institution because of rumors that it would encourage amalgamation. Prudence Crandall's efforts to integrate her boarding school for young women were denounced for the same reason, as was New York Central College for allowing blacks and whites to attend.[235] American newspapers were quick to report on blacks and whites mingling in public, and "amalgamation riots" occurred throughout the 1830s.[236]

Black abolitionists had long contradicted this charge,[237] treating with contempt the suggestion that they had any desire for white women and arguing instead that amalgamation was the product of slavery.[238] When European abolitionists endorsed amalgamation, the promise was that conflict would be reduced by absorbing one people into another. Most black American writers rejected this choice, whether in the form of Martin Delany's critique of

230. *Correspondence with British Coms. at Sierra Leone, Havana, &tc., 1839-40 (Class A)*, 1840, sessional papers, vol. 46, Command Papers [265], 212 (194).

231. Agg, *Proceedings and Debates Pennsylvania*, vol. 10, 23, 133.

232. *Report of the Discussion on American Slavery in Dr. Wardlaw's Chapel*, 100–101; Gerrit Smith, *Letter of Gerrit Smith to Hon. Henry Clay* (New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1839), 36.

233. "Social Equality for the Negro," *The Daily Union* (Washington, DC), June 28, 1854, 2.

234. "Appeal to the Christian Women of the South," *Philadelphia National Enquirer*, October 29, 1836.

235. "College for Colored Youth," *Connecticut Journal*, October 4, 1831, 3; "Miss Prudence Crandall," *New Bedford Mercury* (CT), April 19, 1833, 1; "From the Albany State Register," *The Liberator* (MA), July 18, 1851, 1.

236. Linda K. Kerber, "Abolitionists and Amalgamators: The New York City Race Riots of 1834," *New York History* 48, no. 1 (1967): 28–39, 30.

237. See Daniel Coker's 1810 pamphlet, in Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind*, 71–72.

238. "Major 'Noah's Negroes," *Freedom's Journal*, New York, August 24, 1827, 3. See John I. Gaines in Alvin B. Tillery, "Reading Tocqueville behind the Veil: African American Receptions of *Democracy in America*, 1835–1900," *American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture* 7 (Winter 2018): 1–25, 14.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

those white abolitionists who "have for years been erroneously urging us to lose our identity as a distinct race"[239] or the *Colored American*'s opposition to any intermarriages that would separate the wealthy and most educated persons of color from their community.[240] Instead, they emphasized that there was no desire among black Americans for amalgamation, and so it would decline under freedom once black women had rights. Recognizing that the prohibition on legally sanctioned interracial unions was intended to stigmatize persons of color, however, they also insisted that that there was nothing problematic about consensual unions between free men and women of any race.

David Ruggles denied the likelihood of amalgamation under freedom and insisted that there was no natural impediment to it, only the artificial distinctions erected by prejudice. "I do not wish it, nor does any colored man or woman of my acquaintance, nor can instances be adduced where a desire was manifested by any colored person, but I deny that 'intermarriages' between the 'whites and blacks are unnatural.'" He and others drew a distinction between intermarriage, which would occur only after prejudices had abated, and social and political equality, which could be accorded immediately and whose extension would reduce prejudices by changing the education received by whites. "If prejudice is invincible," a point he refused to concede, then "amalgamation can never take place." And if it were not, then its occurrence under freedom would be the product of consensual union rather than of rape.[241]

Many white abolitionists echoed these themes, especially those on the more radical end of the antislavery movement. Sarah Moore Grimké famously helped disseminate the point made by black writers that amalgamation was daily occurring through sexual violence in the South, encouraged by laws that gave enslaved women no protection; this became a regular trope of white abolitionist writing.[242] William E. Channing's *Slavery* addressed "the most common objection [against emancipation], that a mixture of the two races will be the result." "Can this objection be urged in good faith? Can this mixture on go on faster or more criminally than at the present moment? Can the slaveholder use the word 'Amalgamation' without a blush?"[243] Garrison argued similarly. While "abolitionists do not desire to conceal" that the increased wealth and social standing of free persons of color would "probably lead to friendly and agreeable intercourse between them and the whites, and by consequence *some* intermarriages," these would be less frequent than the rapes that occurred daily in the South: "so long as there is prejudice against intermarriages, that prejudice will protect itself…. And when prejudice grows weak and perishes, if it ever should do so, then where will be the evil?" He instead suggested that the real fear expressed in howls against "amalgamation" was that "of having a degraded caste removed from that perpetual subjection to the brutality of low and lascivious whites."[244] Gerrit Smith conceded that equality would result in a "multiplication of instances of matrimonial union between the two races," but stressed that this would be a "lawful and sinless union," and besides, it would only be an offense to "*our* taste;—for we must bear in mind that, offensive as the intermixture of different races may be to us, the country or age, which practices it, has no sympathy whatever with our feeling on this point."[245]

By placing the emphasis on white prejudice, with intermarriages likely to occur only if such prejudices abated, these abolitionists left themselves open to the charge that even if they were not actively encouraging it they were certainly not opposed to it in principle. While Drayton was "unwilling to press [the] charge" that abolitionists favored "sexual amalgamation," he claimed that their support for social equality and opposition to prejudice necessarily implied otherwise: "it is well known, that the social habits of many encourage the most intimate, equal, and familiar intercourse between the two colours of different sexes. It is well known, that matrimonial connexions of the unnatural character referred to, have not been discouraged; and that, though the abolitionists have been frequently and forcibly charged with the design of encouraging such connexions, their denials have been but late, faint, and partial. From all these facts it is difficult to escape the belief that the abolitionists, if not decidedly and actively favourable to amalgamation, are by no means opposed to it."[246]

Many white abolitionists took great pains to prove otherwise. William Jay claimed it was "one of the designs falsely imputed" to the movement, and "in vain have they again and again denied any such design."[247] "In all my intercourse with my friends," wrote one abolitionist to *The Spy*, "I have never heard, either in public or in private, one word expressed in favor of encouraging intermarriages between the white and colored races…. It is seldom introduced among us; and then only to complain of the injustice of attributing to us views, which we

239. *Proceedings of the National Emigration Convention of Colored People* (Pittsburgh, PA: A.A. Anderson, 1854), 40.

240. "Can't Amalgamate," *Colored American* (NY), July 29, 1837, 2.

241. Ruggles, *The 'Extinguisher' Extinguished*, 10, 11–13, 16–17.

242. Sarah M. Grimké, *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Woman* (Boston: Isaac Knapp, 1838), 52.

243. William E. Channing, *Slavery*, 4th ed. (Boston: James Munroe, 1836), 141–42.

244. *The Liberator* (MA), March 31, 1832, 3; July 19, 1834, 3.

245. Smith, *Letter of Gerrit Smith to Hon. Henry Clay*, 36.

246. Drayton, *The South Vindicated*, 156.

247. William Jay, *Inquiry into the Character and Tendency of the American Colonization Society and American Anti-Slavery Societies* (New York: R.G. Williams, 1838), 16, 146.

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never held, but have always disavowed."[248] After a riot in New York in 1834, the Anti-Slavery Society of New York felt compelled to issue a "Disclaimer" denying any intention to "promote or encourage intermarriages between white and colored persons."[249] This disclaimer seems to have disgusted foreign observers such as Edward Abdy and Gustave de Beaumont, whose own contribution to the antislavery genre—a novel detailing a romance between a white man and a young girl of one-eighth African heritage, where the options of amalgamation, extermination, or expulsion were made manifest in the different fates of the book's characters—cut against American abolitionists' tactical objectives and was largely ignored by them.[250] The riots led many white abolitionists to place even greater stress on their opposition to intermarriages or intimacy across the color line, an effort to recast the movement as sober and respectable by more directly accommodating the racism of white society and that was particularly pronounced among "the more conservative arm of the abolitionist movement, the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society."[251] "Their feelings and views, on this point, were originally expressed with more frankness," noted Drayton. "But the indignation with which the plan was received by the public, has induced them to defer its public avowal and advocacy."[252]

In strenuously denying that they encouraged amalgamation, white abolitionists found themselves accused—often with good reason—of legitimizing prejudice. James Mitchell of the ACS, for example, highlighted William Jay's rejection of amalgamation and declared "here is the *prejudice* well stated and well *defended* by a champion of the abolition cause."[253] In opposing amalgamation, wrote another colonizationist to the Virginia Legislature, abolitionists "plainly show that their sympathies are factitious and unnatural."[254]

But abolitionists also did not have a compelling response to the claim that racial diversity would result in the destruction of free government or in racial war. If "sexual amalgamation" was recognized by all thinking persons "as the only means of attaining complete social equality … the only means, under heaven, by which the races can be 'mingled, like kindred drops, in one,'" and the "sole recourse, in case of emancipation, by which the colliding races can be harmonized, their prejudices removed, and the divided and conflicting population welded into one mass," then it was also "the only plan by which the vagaries of the abolitionists can, by the most remote possibility, by realized."[255] When James Birney denied that emancipation implied social equality or amalgamation—although leaving open the possibility that it would occur "in many generations to come"—he was immediately left to answer why the slaves would not "turn around and cut our throats." His response was that slaveholders should have little to fear *if they had treated the enslaved as well as they claimed*.[256] This was hardly a compelling argument in a society where John Brown Russwurm could taunt slave owners with the question, "what mean those pistols under [your] pillow, and that loaded rifle over it?"[257]

4.2. Divorcing Social and Political Equality

The problem abolitionists confronted was at once political and theoretical: So long as they could not convincingly deny that the tendency of equal rights would be amalgamation, they were exposed to the intense racism of white America. However, they could not convincingly deny amalgamation without affirming prejudice or renouncing social equality, which would leave them without an answer to the supposed problem of diversity.[258]

The response of a growing number was to reconceptualize the meaning of social equality and its relation to democratic government. Intimations of this had long been evident. In a widely cited passage, William Jay had suggested that social equality, rather than being a prerequisite for the development of sympathy and for sustaining democratic institutions, was merely a matter of individual taste.

> We all know white men whose characters and habits render them repulsive to us, and whom no consideration would induce us to admit into our social circles; and can it be believed, that Abolitionists are willing to extend to negroes, merely on account of their color,

248. "To the Editors of the Spy," *Massachusetts Spy*, July 23, 1834, 3.

249. Kerber, "Abolitionists and Amalgamators," 35; Thomas Brothers, *The United States of North America As They Are* (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longmans, 1840), 380.

250. Kerber, "Abolitionists and Amalgamators," 35.

251. Harris, "From Abolitionist Amalgamators to 'Rulers of the Five Points,'" 199.

252. Drayton, *The South Vindicated*, 234.

253. J. Mitchell, "Thoughts on the Separation of the Races," *Indiana State Sentinel*, December 19, 1850, 3; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana*, 36th Sess. (Indianapolis: J.P. Chapman, 1851), 1035.

254. *Thirty-Second Annual Report of the American Colonization Society* (Washington, DC: C. Alexander, 1849), 40–51, 42; Samuel Davis Baldwin, *Dominion; or, the Unity and Trinity of the Human Race* (Nashville: E. Stevenson and F.A. Owen, 1858), 94–96.

255. Drayton, *The South Vindicated*, 234–36.

256. James G. Birney, *Letter on Colonization* (New York: Anti-Slavery Reporter, 1834), 61–62; "To the Ministers and Elders of the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky," *The Liberator* (MA), October 4, 1834, 2.

257. S.F.D., "People of Colour," *Christian Spectator*, March 1825, 135.

258. The "painful character" of their dilemma "was clearly evident in their tortured efforts to resolve it." Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 545.

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> courtesies and indulgences, which in innumerable instances, they withhold, and properly withhold, from their fellow white citizens. But who pretends that, because a man is so disagreeable in his manners and person that we refuse to associate with him, that therefore he ought to be denied the right of suffrage, the privilege of choosing his trade and profession, the opportunities of acquiring knowledge, and the liberty of pursuing his own happiness?… They have no right to associate with us against our will, but they have a right to participate in the blessings of education and political liberty.[259]

The scope of social equality, in this formulation, was restricted to the most intimate settings, where it could be refused at will without consequence for the political order. With the sphere of social equality restricted, the abolitionist mission of eradicating prejudice could in turn be confined to areas that more directly impinged on the livelihood of persons of color or their ability to engage in the limited form of political participation of expressing a preference at the polls. And in a rhetorical move that would be repeated for decades, Jay justified the exclusion from social intercourse by reference to inequalities among whites.

"How absurd is the distinction," wrote John Carey in response, "between political equality and social equality, granting the one and withholding the other! What is the end of political power except to secure social advantages? The first use of political predominance, will it not be to establish predominance in every thing?" He carefully explained that the question of social equality would not be important if it excluded only a small number of persons; moreover, the problem had nothing to do with individual tastes, but with the lack of sympathy between broad social classes. If social inequality and intercourse were successfully denied, as he believed white Americans would insist upon, then the result would be to bring into the body politic a large and embittered class, "bound by no sympathy, but rather disposed … to look with hatred and jealousy upon those who had once held them in bondage." Europe served as his example of what would follow: an impoverished class denied social equality bound together "by some sympathetic bond," would be "inflamed with bitter animosity against [those] … whom they stigmatize as aristocrats, monopolists, the oppressive class…. Will these men, not admitted to social equality, but possessed of full political privileges, remain quiet and peaceable? Will they submit to that social superiority and rest contended with their political rights?"[260]

But explicit denials of the relevance of social equality became increasingly common as the antislavery movement expanded. This diffusion across a widening set of antislavery writers and politicians can be read as a "critical ideational development," a "politically orchestrated enduring shift in how policy issues are predominantly conceived that advantages one political coalition over another."[261] Cassius M. Clay declared that "he did not stand there to plead amalgamation, or for *entire social equality*." While Garrison and Smith had followed black writers and orators in arguing that social equality should be extended but that amalgamation would only proceed, if at all, once prejudices had abated, Clay was arguing that social equality itself, reduced in scope, should not be extended. "Here was an important distinction which he begged his audience to note—that between equality of social condition and equality of political rights. Suppose he were to meet in the street a live Yankee, a sucker from Indiana, a corncracker from Kentucky, or even a poor miserable drunken vagabond. He might not prefer such men for associates, but … would he deprive them of all political rights?"[262] "Marriage and social intercourse," wrote Charles Olcott, "are not matters of natural right, but exist in contract and agreement merely…. In European societies it is as disgraceful for the higher ranks to associate openly and publicly with the lower, as it is in this country, for the white people to associate thus with negroes. The civil and religious equality of mankind, does not include their social equality."[263] A Free-Soiler supportive of equal political rights insisted that he was opposed to social equality: "the assumption … that we must admit into the bosom of our families, and consent to unite with our children in the most sacred ties, all those to whom we extend the right of suffrage. I take this to be a great mistake….[Are there] not many ignorant and vicious white men to whom he willingly extends the right of suffrage, that he would not receive as inmates of his family, and to whom he would not give his daughter in marriage? We all know, sir, that there are many, very many, of this class."[264] A growing number of abolitionists and their political allies were insisting that social equality bore no relation to political or civil rights, often

259. Jay, *Inquiry into the Character and Tendency of the American Colonization Society*, 147–48.

260. Carey, *Some Thoughts*, 83–84.

261. King and Smith, "'Without Regard to Race,'" 958.

262. Horace Greeley, *The Writings of Cassius Marcellus Clay* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1848), 199; "West India Mission and Emancipation," *Philadelphia National Enquirer*, February 8, 1838, 86; "Amalgamation," *Tioga County Agitator* (PA), March 31, 1859, 2.

263. Charles Olcott, *Two Lectures on the Subject of Slavery* (Massillon, OH: s.n., 1838), 115.

264. The Free Soil party dropped equal rights from its platform, but many members defended black political equality. *Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of Michigan, 1850* (Lansing, MI: R.W. Ingals, 1850), 290.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

pointing to the growing inequalities among whites for evidence.[265]

That there were "many, very many," whites who should not be extended social equality was likewise an emerging theme in American discourse after the 1830s. As one writer complained, "the fellow who blacked your boots in the morning, or groomed your horse, or it may be served you at table, sets up to be your equal in the Drawing Room, or at the Theater, even when the odor of being fresh from the kitchen or stable is upon him, and perhaps he is inclined to fisticuff you into a recognition of his social equality. Sometimes the chap who drove your carriage a few years ago gets rich by a lucky speculation and then marries your daughter."[266] Suggesting that abolitionists desired social equality with black Americans was the same as inferring that one was willing "that his daughter or sister shall marry an ignorant, illiterate fellow, or that he would invite to his parlor and table his hostler and boot-black."[267] Horace Greeley insisted that "there is no such thing as 'social equality' on earth, and never can be while some are good, others bad; some intelligent, others ignorant; some coarse and repulsive, others refined and agreeable…. Social relations are entirely matters of choice."[268] Some conservatives rejected even the possibility of social equality among whites, arguing that different abilities created distinct classes between which "there is no natural sympathy."[269] The supposed inevitability of social inequalities could also be mobilized in support of abolition. As one southern supporter of limited emancipation argued, "though [African Americans'] political equality might be admitted, the prejudice of color would deny them social equality; [and] a class would arise not yet well established in our slave States, a class of free laborers exercising handicraft occupations, and willing to accept the position of hired servants."[270] Increasing inequality among whites provided a rhetorical justification for preserving it between whites and blacks, while raising the prospect that black Americans could be safely retained post-abolition in the role of a subordinate but free working class.

This subtle separation of social and political equality preceded the Civil War, and indeed there had always been some writers who suggested that the two were not essentially linked. But as events during the war tended toward emancipation, the question of what would be the status of free persons of color gained a new urgency.[271] As more Republicans began embracing civil and political rights for freedmen, the distinction against social equality became more pressing. Some—such as Robert Dale Owen, who had once supported colonization because he believed social equality was not going to be forthcoming—now maintained that equal intercourse could occur and sympathy develop without amalgamation, and argued that Republicans must encourage this through reorganized social and political institutions.[272] A critical number, however, simply insisted that social equality was neither desirous nor necessary. C. C. Andrews argued that "as for social equality with the blacks, none but a simpleton would apprehend that giving them the suffrage will produce it. It is a matter which will regulate itself aside from political matters. Social affairs never have and probably never will be much affected or regulated by politics."[273] Charles Sumner, defending a civil rights bill that would prohibit any state-established body from discriminating on the basis of race, insisted that "there is no question of society here. The Senator may choose his associates as he pleases. They may be white or black, or between the two. That is simply a social question, and nobody would interfere with it…. How often shall I say that this [bill] is no question of taste,—it is no question of society." The bill, he said, only removed the odious distinctions that denied the possibility of such a society.[274] This would be too much for those of his colleagues who denounced the Civil Rights Act and were relieved when it was overturned by the Supreme Court.

265. "To the Editors of the Spy," *The Spy* (MA), July 23, 1834, 3; "Negro Suffrage," *Daily Morning Gazette* (WI), April 24, 1857, 2.

266. Combining the social and the economic, Scipio tied these social assertions to the fact that "employers often want help and cannot get it, or they are at best incessantly dismissing it and wrangling with it. The employees now and then band together in strikes for wages and they not infrequently desert the employer in a press of business." "Revival of the Slave Trade, No. XV," *Edgefield Advertiser* (SC), May 18, 1859, 1. See also, "Lyman Beecher," *The Liberator* (MA), August 6, 1836, 2; "A Letter from Cassius Clay," *The Liberator* (MA), March 15, 1856, 1.

267. "A White Woman Married to a Negro in Kansas," *State Record* (KS), July 29, 1863, 4.

268. Still, he claimed that there should be no prohibition on interracial marriages, and justified the denial of social equality by reference to both blacks and whites. "A man proud of his purse may scorn a poor negro as he would a poor white man," he wrote, even though "under the Constitution, in its most liberal interpretation, and admitting our cherished American doctrine of equal human rights, if a white man pleases to marry a black woman, the mere fact that she is black gives no one a right to interfere to prevent or set aside such marriage." "About Negro Equality, Amalgamation. &c., &c.," *American Citizen* (PA), August 9, 1865, 1; "Miscegenation," *New York Tribune*, March 16, 1864.

269. Elisha P. Hurlbut, *Civil Office and Political Ethics* (New York: Taylor & Clement, 1840), 16–20, 18.

270. Charles B. Shaw, *Is Slavery a Blessing? A Reply to Prof. Bledsoe's Essay on Liberty and Slavery* (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1857), 65.

271. This question had always been an important theme of antebellum debates. David A. Bateman, *Disenfranchising Democracy: Constructing the Electorate in the United States, United Kingdom, and France* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

272. Robert Dale Owen, *The Wrong of Slavery, the Right of Emancipation, and the Future of the African Race in the United States* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1864), 212.

273. C. C. Andrews, *Suffrage the Armor of Liberty* (Washington, DC: Office of the Great Republic, 186–), 4.

274. *Congressional Globe*, 42nd Congress, 2nd Sess., 242.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

These shifts had not gone unnoticed. Both before and after the war, white antislavery politicians and activists were being called to task by black abolitionists for betraying the fight against prejudice. When Sumner spoke out against the social elevation of persons of color, for example, Frederick Douglass wrote to correct him: "I may be a little sensitive on the subject of our social position. I think I am become more so of late, because I have detected, in some of my old comrades, something like a falling away from their first love, touching the recognition of the entire manhood and social equality of the colored people."[275] Many black American writers had taken a tactical stance against the claim that ineradicable prejudices would perpetually maintain a separation of the races. As Alvin Tillery has extensively shown, before the war most African American newspaper writers had opposed the arguments of writers such as Tocqueville who insisted that social equality would be impossible.[276] The *Colored American*, for example, was adamant that "civil and political rights, equally distributed, brings men thus enjoying them, at least in the exercise of those rights, upon a social equality, together in social life. Thus bringing them into this social equality, tends to destroy caste, unite them together, and elevate them in all the other duties and relations in life."[277] For these writers, social equality could not be neatly separated from civil or political rights, even if it did not on its own tend toward an immediate amalgamation.[278] "Vote for no man for civil office, who makes your complexion a bar to political, ecclesiastic or social equality," Douglass urged the National Negro Convention. "Better die than insult yourself and insult our social equality."[279]

While insisting on social equality, and denying any interest in amalgamation, African American abolitionists could also adopt the framing of social equality as a matter for individual tastes limited to those of the same economic circumstances. Douglass emphasized that by social equality he did not mean "that every colored man, without regard to his character or attainments, shall be recognized as socially equal to white people who are in these respects superior to him." William W. Brown concurred: "Every man must make equality for himself. No society, no government, can make this equality," and abolitionists had "never demanded that you shall take the colored man, any more than that you shall take the uncultivated and uncouth white man, and place him in a certain position in society."[280]

A deliberate ambiguity was being introduced, or at least exploited, in the meaning of the term "social equality." It was being confined to matters of individual choice in their associations, rather than the relations and rights of hospitality that members of broad social classes were entitled to and expected to accord to each other. W. E. B. Du Bois would remark on this ambiguity decades later, writing that the real meaning of "social equality" was "the right of a human being to accept companionship with his fellow on terms of equal and reciprocal courtesy…. It has not been denied by any civilized man since the French Revolution. It is the foundation of democracy." But "another narrow, stilted and unreal meaning" had grown up in America, that social equality is the "right to demand private social companionship" with any particular person, up to and including marriage. When black Americans were asked, "Do you want Social Equality?," they could emphatically say "no." "But," he continued, "when the Negro said *No*, he knew that he was not answering the question the white man intended to ask and the white man knew that the Negro knew this, and that he himself had purposely asked a question of double and irreconcilable meaning." Acceptance of this ambiguity, in his account, had been a tactical decision, necessary given the force of white supremacy but one that allowed whites to pretend that some classes of black Americans might agree with the claim that no person of color "shall be permitted to associate with

275. Philp S. Foner and Yuval Taylor, *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 161, 332.

276. Similar opposition was expressed toward an agent of the British government who was looking to attract African American laborers to the West Indies. When the agent suggested that social equality was hopeless in the United States, *The Colored American* noted that only "those who have no confidence in a moral principle, to destroy and break up moral evils" believed that it would be impossible for "the two races as they are here called, (it should rather be classes,) ever [being] allowed to coexist in a state of social equality." Tillery, "Reading Tocqueville Behind the Veil," 7; "Hon. Wm. H. Burnley's Letter to Lord John Russell," *The Colored American* (NY), July 11, 1840, 2; "Editorial Correspondence," *The North Star* (NY), April 7, 1848, 2.

277. "Politics," *The Colored American* (NY), October 10, 1840.

278. There was no consensus, however, that white prejudices could be conquered. Augustine, "For the Colored American," *The Colored American* (NY), July 28, 1838.

279. Foner and Taylor, *Frederick Douglass*, 161; Howard Holman Bell, *A Survey of the Negro Convention Movement, 1830–1861* (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 47; Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, *Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 95; "The Union of the Oppressed for the Sake of Freedom," *The North Star* (NY), August 10, 1849, 2.

280. Foner and Taylor, *Frederick Douglass*, 332; William Wells Brown, *The Black Man, His Antecedents, His Genius, and His Achievements* (New York: Thomas Hamilton, 1863), 47. Post-Civil War, many black politicians adopted the premise that "social equality" meant interracial sex; but these were coupled with an insistence on the rights of "manhood," which amounted to the *substance* of social equality, that is, a recognition of equal standing in social, economic, and political spaces. "Manhood" carried its own implication of patriarchal authority. *Congressional Record*, 43rd Congress, 1st Sess., 344; Hodes, *White Women, Black Men*, 167–68; "The Old Goose," *The Colored American* (NY), July 3, 1841, 2; "Right of Suffrage in Michigan," March 20, 1841, 2.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

his fellow men on terms of equality."[281] As Du Bois would argue on that occasion, not insisting upon the foundational importance of "social equality" to democracy validated in practical political rhetoric the theoretical argument that it could be separated from civil and political equality.

As he intimated, the consequences of this conceptual separation would be important in shaping the terms by which the American state was reconstructed after the Civil War. Both the ACS as well as English abolitionists and ministries had organized their respective state-building projects around well-recognized solutions to the problem of diversity and representative government, supporting colonization, amalgamation, or the denial of representative assemblies. So long as social equality and sympathy had been seen as necessary for democracy, American abolitionists had been pressured to articulate an alternative state-building project, one that would remove illiberal distinctions and reorganize institutions to facilitate social intercourse on equal terms, not solely as an end in itself but as a means of fostering sympathy and securing the reality of freedom. Radicals such as Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens, even as they disclaimed social equality in public or privately urged Republicans not to press the matter, continued to support such a reconstruction. And as Pamela Brandwein has demonstrated, many Republicans who denounced social equality nonetheless also opposed the imposition of legal distinctions that would establish a "caste."[282] Even this conceptual differentiation, however, between the erection of a caste and the denial of social equality, rested on a firmer demarcation of civil and political life from society than had been evident in earlier antebellum discourse. Transatlantic discourse in the first half of the nineteenth century had treated social equality, the free recognition of a citizen as a social equal with the right to access all the benefits and privileges of "society," as the very essence of equality and foundation of democracy; the concept was being increasingly relegated to a nonpolitical realm.

Faced with the constraint of white racism, Republican politicians and writers were redefining what democracy required for a social foundation, placing less emphasis on sympathy and social solidarity than on education and elite brokerage. "We think it quite possible," wrote one, "for two races differing as widely as these races do to live peacefully and prosper under the same government." Democracy itself was a novelty that once seemed "as wildly impossible as many now consider the peaceable existence of whites and blacks side by side under the same Government." Amalgamation, they promised, would not happen; nor would social equality. Instead, the races would live alongside each other but separate, with "custom and prejudice" limiting their intercourse. "The general problem of democratic government," they concluded, "depends for its solution on education, religion, and humanity," that is, on the enlightenment of individuals rather than a sympathy that permeated an integrated and equal society.[283]

5. CONCLUSION

In 1864, an anonymous author published a pamphlet entitled *Miscegenation*, a neologism meaning "to mix genuses" that at once suggested the rise of bioessentialist race science while distinguishing a state-directed fusion of peoples from a slower process of amalgamation. "The question of miscegenetic reform should enter into the approaching presidential contest," the author argued. "If the progressive party of this country have courage, have faith in humanity and in their own doctrines, they can solve the problem which has perplexed our statesmen since the establishment of this Government. That problem is, what to do with the black race."[284]

A few abolitionists offered encouragement to the author, but also urged caution and advised them not to expect too much from the Republicans. Lucretia Mott wrote that abolitionists had "never thought it expedient to advocate such unions," limiting their attention to the removal of "all civil and social disabilities from this prescribed class, leaving nature and human affections to take care of themselves." But she stressed that this was because the abolitionists had "not yet deemed [it] expedient … to agitate the matrimonial question." Angelina Grimké was "'wholly at one' with the author," but asked whether raising "the subject of amalgamation, so detestable to many minds" would not "have a tendency to retard the preparatory work of justice and equality which is so silently, but surely, opening the way for a full recognition of fraternity and miscegenation?" James McCune Smith approved of the idea, but warned that its embrace by the Republican Party would sully it. Parker Pillsbury was the boldest, writing that "it may not be time to say this aloud; but it will yet be said, and I think not too soon … I hail your work as a true prophesy."[285]

The pamphlet was a hoax, the work of Democratic editors seeking to embarrass their partisan opponents. But it revealed some abolitionists to be off-message, endorsing positions that were unacceptable to the broader antislavery movement that had gained

281. W. E. B. Du Bois, "President Harding and Social Equality," *The Crisis* 23, no. 2, 1921): 53–56.

282. Brandwein, *Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction*, 61.

283. "The Intermarriage Bugbear," *The Nation* 5, no. 128 (December 1867): 481–82.

284. *Miscegenation: The Theory of the Blending of the Races, Applied to the White Man and Negro* (London: Trubner, 1864), 75.

285. Kaplan, "The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864."

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

a measure of power through the vehicle of the Republican Party. That the pamphlet's authors believed that this would hurt abolitionists' standing with the white electorate is hardly surprising. And yet their gambit rested on abolitionists' being willing to endorse "miscegenation" as a solution to the question of racial diversity in a democratic society, an expectation that is understandable only when connected to a specific set of ideas in which "miscegenetic reform" could appear as an exaggerated but otherwise well-recognized solution to what had long been framed as a "problem" for democratic government. This made it attractive to some of the more radical abolitionists and provided an opening to be exploited in the service of the racist Democratic Party.

The findings of this article have implications for how we approach the study of American political development. In particular, they suggest the importance of placing American discourse and development in a transnational perspective. I suggest that doing so will often help us better understand the significance of political debates to their participants, allowing us to reconstruct not only the discursive and political context in which their arguments were composed but also to recover the developmental consequences of their interventions.

Consider the "racial orders" account of King and Smith, which emphasizes recurring conflict between coalitions composed of those whose egalitarian or racist commitments lead them to take opposing positions on the central racial policy questions of a given era. This perspective rightly emphasizes the centrality of race to American political development and recovers the ways in which political coalitions have formed around it.[286] Without denying these insights, a transatlantic perspective reveals a more complex landscape. While the possibility of shared ideas across the coalitions is perfectly compatible with a racial orders account, this can be obscured by its focus on polarized coalitions pursuing distinct overarching purposes. The shared ideas recovered here were not reducible to the interests of slaveholders or their allies, however useful they were to these groups, and they could be articulated in nearly the same terms by those whom we would recognize as being more on the racially egalitarian than the anti-egalitarian pole. And yet insofar as these ideas helped naturalize a claim that diversity and democracy were incompatible, they legitimated state-building projects as different as the expulsions urged by the ACS or the amalgamation desired by the Aborigines' Protection Society.

Slotting many of the political figures or movements discussed above into one coalition or the other is possible, so long as the focus is on the specific political contests or debates in which they were engaged. But some of the exceptions revealed by any given individual or movement—such as the endorsement of social equality by the initially colonizationist Robert Dale Owen or of amalgamation by some of the otherwise white supremacist figures highlighted by Gary Nash,[287] the differing positions of Tocqueville in America versus the French Empire, or the pro-imperialist positions taken by some former abolitionists after the Civil War[288]—are perhaps better explained not only by underlying commitments on race but also by the particular state-building projects in which these actors were engaged.

Many state-builders' policy choices were undoubtedly motivated by their commitment to a particular hierarchical ordering, with social theory providing nothing more than a convenient legitimating role.[289] In the United States this might have been especially true, given quasi-democratic institutions that made state-builders highly sensitive to popular investments in racial hierarchy. But for some state-builders and theorists, the erection or leveling of racial hierarchy could be less the unique motivating impulse for their choices than a tool for advancing other institutionally and ideologically grounded commitments, such as imperial supremacy, geostrategic advantage, continental expansion, international prestige, or even what they saw as a form of democratic government. In short, they may have seen the racial and cultural organization of society not as a fixed parameter shaping tactics of rule but as a variable that could be modified in pursuit of other objectives, with ostensibly neutral social scientific theories providing the intellectual scaffolding for racial projects of expulsion and segregation.

By embedding American political discourse in a broader intellectual and political context, we are also able to better recover and understand shifts in this discourse over time, and in doing so, to connect these to patterns of institutional development. When examined from a transatlantic perspective, the late-antebellum and post–Civil War shift in how social equality was conceptually related to democracy stands out as "critical ideational development."[290] The belief that social intercourse on equal terms, with its engendering of sympathy and smoothing of opinions, was a necessary pillar of democracy was displaced by an insistence that freedom and legal equality were enough. This amounted to a divorce in

286. Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, *Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama's America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

287. Nash, "The Hidden History of Mestizo America."

288. Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 205–18.

289. The choices they made did not inevitably produce the consequences they desired. Paul Frymer, "'A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours': Territorial Expansion, Land Policy, and U. S. State Formation," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 1 (2014): 119–44, 135; Frymer, *Building an American Empire*, 14–16, 176.

290. King and Smith, "'Without Regard to Race.'"

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X19000105 Published online by Cambridge University Press

American liberal thought of social equality from political and civil equality; and sympathy, once the foundation of democracy, was in turn replaced by a conception of distinct interests and groups jostling for influence within a neutral institutional framework, upheld by educated citizens who understood its proper operation and would forebear from impinging on each others' rights.

When read alongside works by Pamela Brandwein and Mark Tushnet, the ideational development identified here can be seen as having provided a conceptual basis by which Republicans and racial conservatives could come to mutual terms about the proper scope to the postwar reconstruction of the constitutional order. The argument that social equality was unnecessary to sustain a democratic regime would undergird Republican ambivalence toward the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and it would become the frame within which the 14th Amendment was defended, interpreted, and ultimately narrowed. As Tushnet has noted, it was by denying the "causal indivisibility" of political and social rights that the Supreme Court could find that that "separate but equal" was a plausible doctrine in a democratic state.[291] By denying the relevance of social equality to republican government—and the social intercourse, sympathy, and destabilization of racial categories that earlier generations had expected it to bring—the Court and a growing body of social theorists gave credence to the belief that "racial separation … under white hegemony" was not only an effective solution to so-called "race friction," but was in some way compatible with democracy.[292]

More speculatively, I suggest that this ideational development fundamentally shaped the "race problem" as it emerged as a distinct object of study in turn-of-the-century social scientific discourse. This "problem" was defined as being that "two alien races must get along peaceably together under one government, and that—a government of the people," in which the possibility of using politics for social advance always existed and where, given unequal property holdings, doing so would require redistribution from the holders of capital and property to those without.[293] This framing of diversity as a problem, and the particular form this problem took, replicated widespread antebellum arguments that diversity and democracy were incompatible. But many social theorists now claimed that a resolution could be found without extermination or expulsion, or a social equality resulting in amalgamation. "Colonization" was increasingly replaced in American discourse by "segregation," a localized form of spatial separation that rested on developing the state capacity to sustain and enforce a strict social hierarchy across a "color" line.

The emerging frame of "race relations," which would serve as the public philosophy undergirding the segregationist American state, replicated earlier arguments about the incompatibility of deeply divided societies and democracy but took as given the once-contested claim that prejudicial antipathies between different "races" were insurmountable. In place of a natural sympathy produced by social equality between broad social classes, ruled out by race science and by an insistence on white supremacy, theorists of segregation argued that "friendly Conferences" between the "leading men of the two races" should be periodically organized to resolve frictions.[294] And because the "leading men" must by definition accept the fundamental premises of segregation, they were to be selected not through popular representative institutions but through white patronage, providing an additional justification for limiting the scope of black Americans' role in political life.[295] Explicit civic distinctions establishing an effective hierarchy between free citizens were being reconceptualized as not only compatible with democratic government but also essential to its maintenance within diverse societies. "So far from social separation leading to injustice," argued Charles Breckinridge Wilmer, "it is the only policy that will make justice possible."[296]

Colonization and Jim Crow segregation reflected different processes of political development and found support among distinct constituencies of interests. And yet their intellectual justifications

291. Mark Tushnet, "The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston," *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 3 (1987): 884–903, 889.

292. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 269.

293. Charles Breckinridge Wilmer, "Proposed Solutions of the Race Problem," *The Forensic Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (1910): 145–177, 157, 160–64; Robert Winston, "A Century of Law in North Carolina," *North Carolina Reports: Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court*, vol. 176, ed. Robert C. Strong (Raleigh, NC: Mitchell Printing, 1919), 787; "Comment," *Harper's Weekly*, July 18, 1903, 1177; Edgar Watkins, "Should the Legal Status of the Negro Be Changed?" *Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Session of the Texas Bar Association* (Austin, TX: Von-Boeckmann-Jones, 1907): 114–20, 118–19; Louis B. Wehle, "Isolating the Negro," *The New Republic* (November 27, 1915), 88–90; Alfred H. Stone, "Is Race Friction between Blacks and Whites in the United States Growing and Inevitable?" *American Journal of Sociology* 13, no. 5 (1908): 676–697, 682; C. A. Gardiner, "The Race Problem in the United States," *Journal of Social Science* 18 (1884): 266–75, 273; Kelly Miller, "The Modern Land of Goshen," *The Southern Workman* 29, no. 11 (1900): 601–607, 602; John M. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction: A Study in Social Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1914).

294. Wilmer, "Proposed Solutions of the Race Problem," 173; Ray Stannard Baker, "Negro Suffrage in a Democracy," *The Atlantic* 106 (November, 1910): 612–19. For an excellent account of how "leading men" could seek to reform the Jim Crow state even as they sustained its basic premises, see Kimberley S. Johnson, *Reforming Jim Crow: Southern Politics and State in the Age before* Brown (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).

295. George T. Winston, "The Relation of the Whites to the Negroes," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 18 (July 1901): 105–18, 117.

296. Wilmer, "Proposed Solutions of the Race Problem," 162.

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shared important themes; the "social scientific" rationale for segregation, as well as its enabling jurisprudence, had a lineage in long-standing debates about the consequences of diversity in democratic societies. While the physical removal of black Americans during the antebellum era had been constrained by the deficiencies of the American state, the twentieth century saw the development of a new form of local state capacity that could enforce separation in neighborhoods, in schools, in public conveyances, in occupational roles, and, with the proliferation of state anti-miscegenation laws, in socially recognized relationships. The Jim Crow patterning of society, I suggest, was not a wholly distinct project from colonization; it was a modification, one that rested on new forms of state power but which like its companion, the "melting pot," which simultaneously gained broad prominence in this era, claimed a shared goal of reducing "friction" in diverse "democratic" societies.[297]

The antebellum patterns of discourse detailed above were not broad ideological orientations; they were more analogous to social scientific theory, connecting a model of human sentiment with broad claims about the types of states and regimes that could be sustained under different social conditions. The organization in the late nineteenth century of new forms of disciplined social scientific inquiry, centered on the expanding universities, transatlantic connections, and new professional organizations, gave these revised formulations added prestige and a supposed scientific grounding. Supporters of segregation, and its concomitant of anti-miscegenation laws, could rest their policy prescriptions on sciences of politics and society that had a more definite "scientific" status than the earlier interpretations of history and comparative experience relied upon by colonizationists and others. The language through which the "color line" was drawn and defended in the United States and abroad in the early twentieth century was a distinctively social scientific one.

This should strike a note of caution. As recent work in disciplinary histories has detailed, social science has often both reflected existing racial hierarchies and provided justification for their continuation and rearticulation. Our forms of theorizing and practices of inquiry have left an imprint on the social constructions and institutional configurations of race, often times in ways that ran counter to the professed commitments of the social scientists themselves.[298] This is especially important to keep in mind today, as public commentators again ponder with anxiety the relationship between diversity and democracy and look to social science for guidance.

297. Segregation had the advantage of retaining a subordinate working class, making it acceptable to a broader range of opinion. T. Lothrop Stoddard endorsed what he called "biracialism," an intensified form of segregation, but held colonization in reserve as an alternative. Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 65–66.

298. Jessica Blatt, *Race and the Making of American Political Science* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). For an example of political theories developing through transnational channels, see Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018).

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