Introduction: Globalization and the Latin-American Workplace

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This special issue of *International Labor and Working-Class History* focuses on how the phenomenon known as globalization has transformed work in Latin America in recent decades. The term "globalization" became widely used in history and the social sciences beginning in the 1990s, and globalization has become a popular buzzword in the media in recent years, an accepted (if controversial) part of the frame of our era. The roots of this historical process, however, go back several centuries, as does the impact of globalization on workers and work.

In Latin America, globalization began with the European Conquest five centuries ago and with the integration of the region into a global system of trade and production centered on Asia. Strictly speaking, that commercial system only became truly global with the incorporation of Latin America and fully global in the 1570s, when the Manila Galleon returned to Mexico each year laden with Chinese silks and porcelains obtained in Asia for European markets in exchange for American silver. Conscripted indigenous forced labor for the silver mines of Mexico and Peru was a consequence of that early phase of globalization, as was the massive Atlantic slave trade to provide African slave labor for the sugar plantations and gold mines of Brazil.

Another phase of globalization began with the industrial revolution and incorporated Latin America into a new system of trade, production and investment centered on the North Atlantic during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1870 and 1930, Latin American countries opened their economies to European capital, technology, manufactures, and immigrants, and oriented their economies to the export of natural resources—the products of their mines, fields, and forests—in demand in an industrializing and urbanizing Europe and United States. During this "Liberal" era, Latin-American elites embraced European doctrines of comparative advantage and laissez-faire and reaped the benefits in private profits and public "progress." In many countries, European and Asian immigrant wage labor replaced forced labor of indigenous and African origin. It was this workforce, drawn from many parts of the world, that paid the costs of this phase of globalization in low wages, high inequality and poor working and living conditions. These costs were particularly severe during the busts that followed the booms of the capitalist business cycle. Export-oriented open economies were vulnerable to external shocks that

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culminated in the Great Depression that followed the 1929 Wall Street Crash, a depression in global commerce that hit Latin America harder than any other region of the world precisely because of its dependence on international trade.

In response, Latin American leaders developed policies designed to insulate their societies from such external crises and promote "self-sustained growth." From roughly 1930 to 1970, Latin America's more dynamic economies—most notably Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—pursued strategies of import substitution industrialization (ISI).

The shock of the Great Depression, with its drastic decline in the global demand for Latin-American raw material exports, led many countries in the region to try to develop a national industrial base that could satisfy domestic demand for consumer goods and provide employment for growing urban populations. Many governments in the region turned away from Liberalism, with its open economy and laissez-faire state, which they blamed for the Depression disaster, and embraced a strategy of protected industrialization in which the state played an active role. In concert with these industrial policies, governments sought to develop adequate social welfare legislation and to legitimate and expand labor unions as a source of support for these policies and the parties or coalitions promoting them. As a consequence, the most "developed" Latin American countries created approximations (in more modest form) of the mass production-mass consumption-welfare state complex that emerged after the Second World War in North America and Europe.

During the ISI era, many countries in the region developed important industrial capacity and employment, with manufacturing often the leading sector of the economy. Although the emergence of an urban working class in Latin America began with the light manufacturing and export processing industries of the 1870–1930 Liberal era, it was during the ISI era that a large and influential industrial working class took shape in the cities of the region. Wages and working conditions in these Latin-American factories often lagged behind their European and North American counterparts, but they were usually superior to other employment opportunities, and a steady job in a unionized, state-regulated factory became the goal of urban poor and rural migrant alike.

These industrial policies, however, relied heavily on foreign loans and investment, technology, and design for both infrastructure and production, the costs of which became prohibitive as the "easy phase" of import substitution was completed and the road to self-sustained growth required the development of more complex and capital intensive industries. As a consequence, by the late 1950s, the dynamism of these industries began to sputter and inflation and balance of payments problems emerged. At the same time, Latin-American governments found it increasingly difficult to finance the social programs and state bureaucracies created during the dynamic years of import substitution industrialization, which had become central to social and political stability.

While governments in most larger Latin-American countries supported these developmentalist and neo-Keynesian policies, which had the strong support of the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America

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(ECLA), as the "easy phase" of import substitution began to wane, some economists and government officials questioned these policies as too protectionist, statist, and social welfarist. This "Liberal" neoclassical economics countercurrent was evident in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) 1956 Klein-Saks mission to Chile, which promoted a policy of monetary stabilization and fiscal austerity designed to reduce inflation that was adopted in Chile. While these policies did not last long in a democratic Chile, they foreshadowed major changes in the region two or three decades later.[1]

During the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile experimented with economic policies modeled after the "neoliberal" ideas of University of Chicago economists Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. Chile, under the dictatorial rule of Augusto Pinochet, went furthest with these policies, which included privatization of state-owned firms, deregulation of the economy (including the financial sector), the elimination of production and consumption subsidies, tariff reductions, and monetary devaluation. By the end of the decade, the military regime had also reshaped labor laws, pension and health care systems, public education, and local government—shifting in each of these areas to a market model based on atomistic consumers rather than citizens with rights to state entitlements. These reforms led to deindustrialization, a drastic reduction of real wages, the loss of key social benefits and a dramatic drop in job quality for Chile's workers.[2] The long term effects of this early opening in Chile to a globalizing economy are explored in Gerhard Reinecke's article in this issue. He finds that while neoclassical economists might predict that more open economies will produce higher wages and better working conditions, despite the eleven year boom in economic growth known as the Chilean Miracle, Chile's experience with free-market policies has been disappointing at best with regard to job quality—as has been the experience of the rest of the region.

While Neoliberal Chile was an outlier in the Latin American setting in the 1970s, the rest of the region eventually followed suit in response to the region's devastating debt crisis of the 1980s. At bottom, this crisis was an outgrowth of the 1970s oil shocks that had seismic effects around the globe. In the wake of the hefty oil price increases of 1973–74, energy producing countries placed their windfall profits in international banks. These banks lent much of these petrodollars to developing country governments and firms on easy terms at variable interest rates that were low at the time but keyed to the Eurodollar rate. Latin-American countries such as Brazil and Mexico used these petrodollars to continue deepening their import substitution industrialization and to sustain their social programs. This strategy of "debt-led growth" counted on interest rates remaining low so that the increase in production from the investment of these loans could pay the costs of servicing them. The gamble worked until the second oil price shock of 1979–80. In response, in 1981, US Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volker, raised dollar interest rates to eighteen percent and the increased debt burdens of most Latin-American countries became unsustainable. Mexico suspended debt payments in 1982 and many

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other governments in Latin America and elsewhere were on the verge of default. During the 1980s, because of the cost of high interest rates, low export earnings, the absence of new loans from foreign creditors, and anemic foreign investment, the region experienced a net outflow of capital. The Latin-American debt crisis, in which the solvency of the major international banks was also at risk, underscored the extent to which capital—and energy—flows had become global and the international financial system asymmetrically interdependent.

The IMF played a crucial role in resolving the crisis of the globalized financial system by offering debtor nations structural adjustment programs which conditioned further loans from the agency and larger private banks on the adoption of free-market policies designed to jumpstart exports and reduce fiscal deficits, thereby providing these governments with hard currency that would allow them to repay their loans. The policies included privatization, currency devaluation, reduced government spending, and relaxation of labor and environmental regulations. In effect, the IMF would bail out Latin-American debtors under the condition that they jettisoned import substitution industrialization and the welfare state and adopted neoliberal policies instead.

After a "lost decade" of low growth, high unemployment, hyperinflation, and fiscal crisis, Latin-American governments had little choice but to accept this exchange, although some like Argentina and Brazil were able to postpone the "day of reckoning" until the 1990s by utilizing "heterodox shocks" that devalued their currencies but also froze prices of needed consumer goods.[3] The Latin-American conversion to the neoliberal gospel summarized in the so-called Washington Consensus of 1990 coincided with broader shifts in global investment and sourcing by transnational corporations based in Europe, East Asia, and North America that became central elements in the complex accelerating process that scholars, journalists, and public officials began to call "globalization." There have been important debates regarding the definition and extent of globalization, but we prefer to define this term in a straightforward fashion as the intensification of economic, social, political, and cultural connections and interactions across national borders and regional boundaries.

In Latin America, where the embrace of neoliberal policies has opened the region to its full frontal effects, globalization has crucially affected work and the workplace. Currency devaluations, tax breaks, and free trade zones lured foreign investment into in-bond assembly plants in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, where components of consumer goods made at the cheapest sites around the globe are assembled at low cost and then shipped to markets in the United States, Europe, or East Asia. These new plants often hired women because employers believed they would be more compliant than their male counterparts and more resistant to unionization. These *maquiladora* plants and the feminization of their workforce and low labor and environmental standards is an aspect of the impact of globalization that has been studied elsewhere and much commented on, so we have chosen not to focus on it in the articles for this special issue.[4] (A review of a new documentary feature film, *Maquilopolis*,

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appears in the "Through the Camera's Eye" column of the Reviews section of this issue.) Recent reports from Mexico, moreover, suggest that the *maquiladoras* may have peaked (in terms of employment, export share, and foreign investment) in the face of rising costs and cheaper Asian competition, although they still account for more than a million jobs and nearly half Mexico's exports.[5]

Foreign direct investment also poured into both traditional mining and energy sectors and into nontraditional agricultural and fisheries exports like Colombia's fresh-cut flower industry and Chile's salmon fisheries. Foreign and domestic private investment in export agriculture has made Brazil the world's largest exporter of soybeans, beef, and orange juice, while consolidating its traditional global leadership in the export of coffee and sugar. Cliff Welch's article in this volume traces that story and explores the successive transformations of the rural workplace that this global sourcing of food products has provoked, culminating in the recent emergence of China as a major consumer and purchaser. These rapid transformations have led to the degradation of work and provoked the rise of a powerful landless workers' movement that now contends in an important national debate over whether food production will be dominated by agribusiness or will be based on small-scale farming and the domestic market. This article offers a stunning example of how global investment and trade has transformed the character of work and workers in some national contexts at a dizzying pace.

With the privatization of health insurance and pension funds, new private service industries emerged as well, centered on the region's cities. The combination of global corporate strategies, growing availability of credit cards, the influx of inexpensive consumer goods (with lower tariffs and the rising industrial exports of Asia), and the deregulation of urban land markets also permitted the reconfiguration of the retail sector in Latin America evident in the rise of shopping malls, department stores, big-box supermarkets, fast-food chains, convenience stores, and gas station mini-markets.[6] The article by Chris Tilly and José Luis Álvarez Galván, in this special issue charts the transformation of the retail sector in Mexico during this era and analyzes its implications for Mexican workers: "Lousy Jobs, Invisible Unions."

In Latin America, the growth of these export and service sectors coincided with deindustrialization and industrial restructuring in older manufacturing firms, as well as shrinking public sector employment. Not only was there a reshuffling of employment sectors, but the nature of work has changed. Prior to the 1980s many Latin American countries had a split labor market in which a relatively small segment of unionized workers labored in highly capitalized, state-regulated firms, while the bulk of the labor force worked in small shops, as small-scale entrepreneurs, or in the informal sector. Since the 1980s, the stability of those formal sector industrial jobs has declined, and work has been intensified through automation, the increased use of subcontracting and seasonal contracts, and the application of "functional flexibility" in which rigid job descriptions are replaced by more flexible ones that require workers to become adept on a variety of machines and which allow management to

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change work assignments at will.[7] During the 1990s, these changes in work organization coincided with a trend toward stagnant or declining real wages among manual workers and small businesspersons and increasing income inequality, making Latin America the most unequal region in the world.[8] Gerhard Reinecke's article in this issue examines the impact of globalization on job quality for Latin-American manufacturing workers in general and Chile's textile, garment, and metallurgical workers in particular, concluding that globalization has not delivered on its promise of "decent jobs."

While we have suggested that the debt crisis was a crucial catalyst for the sectoral recomposition of the labor force and the reorganization of work in Latin America and other developing areas, there have also been changes in the workplace that transcend the North-South division of countries. As scholars looked beyond free-market policies themselves to the diffusion of investment and management trends across the world, an important dispute emerged about the effects of these patterns on the quality of work.

Some saw hopeful signs in the lifetime contracts and participation in production decisions accorded to core workers in Japanese enterprises, as well as in the information sharing between producers and their subcontractors. Others pointed to the greater autonomy experienced by workers and professionals in "networked" firms located in successful industrial districts like those in Northern Italy and Silicon Valley. An overlapping discussion of global commodity chains, particularly in the globalized garment industry, suggested that manufacturers lower in the "value chain" of global production networks can upgrade product quality and workers' skills and increase wages through collaboration with other local firms to develop innovative products to be sold to large global brands. These discussions suggested that heightened global competition since the 1970s has created an opportunity for innovative firms to develop creative and more autonomous jobs for their workforce than characterized monotonous mass production assembly jobs. By exploiting upmarket customers, these firms can charge premium prices for their products and pass some of the profits on to their employees, who can enjoy decent jobs.[9]

In contrast, others saw little cause for hope in the rise of Toyotaism, flexible specialization, and networked global firms. In contrast, these authors underscore the extent to which even "high performance" firms externalize labor costs by subcontracting a large portion of the work force, thus making work more precarious. They also emphasize the stressful character of working in a just-in-time assembly plant. In a related vein, comparative scholarship on the use of Japanese management concepts outside of Japan shows that national institutional contexts shape how and to what extent managers apply these techniques.[10] Moreover, recent reports from Japan and Italy suggest the erosion or vulnerability of their innovative high-road adjustments to globalization under pressure from corporate bottom lines and lower-cost competitors.[11]

These are issues that Reinecke's article in this volume examines within the Latin-American workplace as he seeks to answer the issue's central question: "Is Globalization Good for Workers?" He finds that in Chile, the

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textile and clothing industries are stuck in a "low wage, low productivity trap," and that while the metallurgical sector has fared somewhat better, workers have little input in production decisions and firms have engaged in little technological innovation. These conclusions do not bode well for job quality in Chile, and fit in with discouraging trends in the region. His analysis underscores that global trade and investment do not homogenize working conditions throughout the world; "high performance" production and its rewards for core workers may only be feasible in specific economic and institutional settings.

More recently, this discussion has expanded beyond manufacturing to include the retail sector. Specifically, examinations of Wal-Mart in the US suggest that this retailer's use of global sourcing has driven down wages and working conditions in manufacturing because of its oligopolistic position as a buyer. Thus, discount retailers may be critical to the erosion of wages and working conditions in the manufacturing and retail sectors at a global scale. Tilly and Álvarez analyze Wal-Mart's expansion into Mexico and its impact on the retail workplace there. Interestingly, they find that unlike the US context, where Wal-Mart pays low wages and pressures its suppliers to do the same, and vociferously opposes unions; in Mexico, Wal-Mart just fits in, offering prevailing low retail wages and accepting the same unrepresentative corporatist unions present throughout retail and manufacturing. Their results suggest, similarly to Reinecke's contribution, that large multinationals may find it easier to fit into national institutional settings than to homogenize wages and working conditions either upward or downward.

In a related article in this issue of *ILWCH*, Richard Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein follow Wal-Mart across the Pacific to China, where the next chapter in this globalization of retailing is now being written. Appelbaum and Lichtenstein set their account within the larger context of international supply chains in which the big retailers rule and Bentonville, Arkansas (Wal-Mart's headquarters) and Guangdong China are two "nerve centers" and Wal-Mart and the Communist Chinese government are virtually in a "joint venture." Their analysis of the negative implications of Wal-Mart's "low road" global sourcing push in China for Chinese workers, and in particular for the many "illegal" migrant workers in South China whom they describe as "stateless" as a Mexican or Central-American undocumented worker is in the United States, sparked a response by *ILWCH* Editorial Board member Renqiu Yu. A future issue of *ILWCH* edited by Renqiu Yu will explore the many issues involving labor in China in all their complexity.

If Wal-Mart is one US enterprise featured prominently in the antiglobalization literature, McDonald's is another. In fact, "McDonaldization" has become a code word for "Americanization." This issue includes an article by Marianne Debouzy on McDonald's in France, a country notoriously resistant to both Americanization and fast food, where McDonald's has been both a focus of the debate and the symbolic target of sometimes violent protests by the antiglobalization movement, including (most famously) by small farmers led by José Bové. Her article narrates those stories, but focuses mostly on the resistance

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of McDonald's French workers to its labor policies, including poor wages and working conditions and union-busting in violation of French labor laws.

Significantly, many of McDonald's young workers in France are children of immigrants from Africa and Asia, whose presence in France is a consequence of other aspects of globalization and whose increasingly violent protests have recently rocked Europe. The inclusion of the Appelbaum/Lichtenstein and Debouzy articles on China and France in this special issue on the impact of globalization on the Latin-American workplace provides comparative reference points for Cecilia Menjivar's article on Guatemalan workers and immigrants in the service sectors of Central America and Los Angeles.

While some of the discussions on globalization and labor emphasize the homogenization of working conditions across the globe (either upward or downward), geographers and anthropologists have emphasized how globalization can heighten the importance and uniqueness of local places. Economic and political geographers coin the term "glocalization" to refer to the matching process between localities with specific assets (an educated workforce, raw materials, and transit links) and global investors. In this regard, these scholars argue that capital has become reterritorialized in specific regions rather than simply following the lowest labor costs. This argument would suggest the need for caution in heralding a uniform global pattern of workplace change.[12]

International labor migration is a significant aspect of globalization. Anthropologists and sociologists have stressed the importance of bidirectional social networks among migrants and residents of their sending communities in research and writing on international migration and its connections to work and identity. Using the term "transnationalism," these scholars examine how migrants occupy specific occupational niches in host societies and their how their work experiences interact with their preexisting cultural beliefs and practices to affect their cultural orientations toward work, gender, family, and sexuality. These scholars note the significant effects of remittances on sending and receiving communities, the cultural effects of the new lifestyles and goods migrants bring back home when they visit or return, and how some cultural habits are resistant to change.[13] This approach, too, suggests that we need to analyze specific economic and cultural circuits of migration to better understand the changing landscape of work and community in sending and receiving communities as well as the social and economic links between the two.

Cecilia Menjivar's article in this special issue, a study of service jobs in the informal sectors of both Guatemala and Latin Los Angeles, explores these concerns and their implications for women's work and gender relations through the eyes of Guatemalan migrants to California from different ethnic and class backgrounds. Significantly, Menjivar argues that irrespective of their class and ethnic backgrounds in Guatemala, in Los Angeles, all these women end up in the same low-end service jobs. She finds, however, that women's preexisting class and ethnic identities (which often overlap in Guatemala) better explain variations in their understandings of work and the practical division of household tasks between spouses than does their location in L.A. or Guatemala or their work

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in different sectors of the economy. The contradictory phenomena she identifies are significant: women's occupational positions may radically change with migration, yet gender relations in the home are remarkably resistant to change.

Most of the articles included in this issue were first presented at a mini-conference we organized at the 2004 Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congress on the theme of labor and globalization in Latin America, with the support of the Ford Foundation-LASA Special Projects Fund.[14] The idea behind the conference was to address the complex economic, social, political, and cultural changes in the world of work and labor politics wrought by globalization in the region. Together, the articles in this issue explore work in manufacturing in Latin America and Chile, the retail sector in Mexico, agribusiness in Brazil, and low-level service occupations in Guatemala and Los Angeles—as well as work in manufacturing in China and services in France. Within this larger frame, this special issue focuses on the dramatic transformations in the nature of work and the workplace in Latin America over the last several decades of accelerating globalization.

NOTES

1. See: Alan Angell, *Politics and the Labor Movement in Chile* (Oxford, 1972); Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (Oxford, 1986).

2. Alejandro Foxley, *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics* (Berkeley, 1983); Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet* (New York, 1991); Juan Gabriel Valdés, *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile* (Cambridge, 1995); Peter Winn, "The Pinochet Era," in *Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973–2002*, ed. P. Winn (Durham, NC, 2004), 14–70.

3. See: William L. Canak, ed., *Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity, and Development in Latin America* (Boulder, CO, 1989); Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., *Debt and Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO, 1989); Alejandro Portes, "Latin American Urbanization during the Years of the Crisis," *Latin American Research Review* 24.3 (1989), 7–44; Lowell Gustafson, ed., *Economic Development Under Democratic Regimes: Neoliberalism in Latin America* (Westport, CT, 1994); Carlos Vilas, "Forward Back: Capitalist Restructuring, the State, and the Working Class in Latin America," in *Whither Marxism? Global Crises in International Perspective*, ed. B. Magnus and S. Cullenberg (New York, 1995), 123–152; Alejandro Portes, and Kelly Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era," *Latin American Research Review* 38.1 (February 2003), 41–82.

4. Examples of this literature include: María Patricia Fernández-Kelly, *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier* (Albany, NY, 1983); Susan Tiano, *Patriarchy on the Line: Labor, Gender and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila Industry* (Philadelphia, 1994); Harley Shaiken, "Advanced Manufacturing and Mexico: A New International Division of Labor?" *Latin American Research Review* 29.2 (1994), 39–71; Kathryn Kopinak, *Desert Capitalism: Maquiladoras in North America's Western Industrial Corridor* (Tucson, 1996); Devon Peña, *Terror of the Machine: Technology, Work, Gender, and Ecology on the U.S.-Mexico Border* (Austin, TX, 1997); Altha Cravey, *Women and Work in Mexico's Maquiladoras* (Lanham, MD, 1998); Leslie Salzinger, *Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories* (Berkeley, 2003); Jane L. Collins, *Threads: Gender, Labor and Power in the Global Apparel Industry* (Chicago, 2003).

5. Enrique de la Garza T., "La polemica de la Maquila en Mexico: nuevas evidencias." Paper presented at the mini-conference on "Globalization and Labor in Latin America," held at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 5, 2004.

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6. Rosemary D.F. Bromley, "Market-place Trading and the Transformation of Retail Space in the Expanding Latin American City," *Urban Studies* 35.8 (1998), 1311–1333; Teresa P.R. Caldeira, *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo* (Berkeley, 2000); Francisco Sabatini and Federico Arenas, "Entre el estado y el mercado: resonancias geográficas y sustentabilidad social en Santiago de Chile," *EURE* 26.79 (2000), 95–113; Seth Low, *On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture* (Austin, TX, 2000); Rodrigo Salcedo, "When the Global Meets the Local at the Mall," *American Behavioral Scientist* 46.8 (April 2003), 1084–1103; Guillermo D'Andrea, E. Alejandro Stenger, and Anne Goebel-Krstelj, "Six Truths about Emerging Market Consumers," *Strategy + Business* 34 (2004), 2–12.

7. Richard Tardanico and Rafael Menjívar Larin, "Restructuring, Employment and Social Inequality," in *Global Restructuring, Employment and Social Inequality in Urban Latin America*, ed. R. Tardanico and R. Menjivar Larin (Boulder, CO, 1997), 233–269; Portes and Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures."

8. Portes and Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures," 64–65.

9. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York, 1984); James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos, *The Machine that Changed the World: Based on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5-Million Dollar 5-Year Study on the Future of the Automobile* (New York, 1990); Walter Powell, "Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12 (1990): 295–336; Walter Powell and Laurel Smith-Doerr, "Networks and Economic Life," in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, ed. N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (New York, 1994), 368–402; Charles Sabel, "Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development," in *The Handbook of Economic Sociology*, ed. N. Smelser and R. Swedberg (New York, 1994), 137–165; Jenifer Bair and Gary Gereffi, "NAFTA and the Apparel Commodity Chain: Corporate Strategies, Interfirm Networks, and Industrial Upgrading," in *Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry after NAFTA*, ed. G. Gereffi, D. Spener, and J. Bair (Philadelphia, 2002), 23–52.

10. Accounts that emphasize the exploitative character of lean production include: Bennett Harrison, *Lean and Mean: The Changing Architecture of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility* (New York, 1994); John Tomaney, "A New Paradigm of Work Organization and Technology?" in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin (Oxford, 1994), 157–194; Kumazawa Makoto, *Portraits of the Japanese Workplace: Labor Movements, Workers, and Managers*, ed. A. Gordon, trans. A. Gordon and M. Hane (Boulder, CO, 1996); Kim Moody, *Workers in a Lean World* (New York, 1997). Work demonstrating that national institutional contexts affect how and to what extent managers apply lean production concepts includes: João Carlos Ferraz, Howard Rush, and Ian Miles, *Development, Technology and Flexibility: Brazil Faces the Industrial Divide* (London, 1992); John Humphrey, "Japanese Production Management and Labour Relations in Brazil," *Journal of Development Studies* 30.1 (October 1993), 92–114; Sanford Jacoby, ed., *The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy* (Oxford, 1997); Thomas Kochan, Russell Lansbury, and John MacDuffie, eds., *After Lean Production: Evolving Employment Practices in the World Auto Industry* (Ithaca, NY, 1997); and Mauro Guillén, "Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key Debates," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001), 235–260.

11. See, for example, Leonard Schoppa, "Race to the Bottom? Japanese Multinational Firms and the Future of the Lifetime Employment System," *Japan Focus* (February 21, 2006) at www.japanfocus.org/article and David Pilling, "Japan's Wageless Recovery: Creating an Underclass of Part-Time Workers." Expanded version of article in *Financial Times* (January 27, 2005), Ibid. Both accessed on May 28, 2006; Mark Landler and Ian Fisher, "Family Businesses Fail to Cure Europe's 'Sick Man,'" *New York Times*, May 14, 2006.

12. See the contributions in Kevin Cox, ed., *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local* (New York, 1997).

13. See: Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis, 1996); Rudi Colloredo-Mansfeld, *The Native Leisure Class: Consumption and Cultural Creativity in the Andes* (Chicago, 1999); Peggy Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley, 2003).

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