THE KOMENDA WARS, 1694–1700: A REVISED NARRATIVE

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I

Since 1990 I have been working on a critical edition of records of the Royal African Company of England (hereafter RAC), preserved in the Rawlinson collection of the Bodleian Library, Oxford.[1] This material comprises letter-books containing correspondence received at the RAC's West African headquarters, Cape Coast Castle, mainly from the Company's other factories on the Gold Coast, during the period from 1681 to 1699 (though with some gaps). Two volumes of this correspondence, covering the years 1681-83 and 1685-88, were published in 1997 and 2001; a third and final volume, presenting correspondence from 1691-99, is now published.[2]

Although attention was drawn to this material in the 1970s, only limited use has hitherto been made of it by historians.[3] The only substantial published study of the Gold Coast which makes extensive use of the Rawlinson material is that by Ray Kea (1982), which deals with general social and economic structures and their transformations, rather than with the detailed course of events.[4] The general neglect of this material has undoubtedly

[1]Rawlinson mss, C.745-747.
[2]Robin Law, ed., *The English in West Africa 1681-1683:the Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681-1699, Part 1* (London, 1997); idem., *The English in West Africa 1685-1688: the Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681-1699, Part 2* (London, 2001); *The English in West Africa 1691-1699: the Local Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England 1681-1699, Part 3*, (London, 2006): cited hereafter as "vol. i," "vol. ii," and "vol. iii."
[3]David Henige, "A New Source for English Activities on the Gold Coast, 1681-99," *THSG*, 13/2(1972), 257-60.
[4]Ray A. Kea, *Settlements, Trade and Polities in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast* (Baltimore, 1982).

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been due, in large part, to its user-unfriendly arrangement, the letters being entered according to the date of their receipt at Cape Coast, without regard for geographical provenance, which makes the process of locating documents which relate to any particular locality extremely tedious—an obstacle which its publication has now removed. The potential utility of this material in the detailed reconstruction of events on the Gold Coast is illustrated here by the case of the "Komenda Wars" of 1694-1700.

The Komenda Wars have long been recognized as an especially significant episode in the history of the Gold Coast. They were primarily a confrontation between the African kingdom of Eguafo (in which Komenda was situated)[5] and the Dutch West India Company (WIC), and as such represented "the longest-drawn-out struggle between a local state and a European company."[6] The RAC was also centrally involved as a supporter of Eguafo, so that the wars also represented an important episode in the history of Anglo-Dutch rivalry on the West African coast. Moreover, they progressively drew in other African states, as allies on either side, including not only Eguafo's immediate neighbors, Ahanta to the west, Adom to the north, and Fetu to the east, but also more remote states—Asebu, Fante, and Akron on the coast further east; and Denkyira, Wasa, Twifo, "Cabess Terra" (i.e., Etsi)[7] and Akani (Assin) in the interior. The Komenda Wars thus provide a prime example of the growing scale and intensity of warfare on the Gold Coast and in its hinterland in this period, reflecting a process of militarization of local societies, characterized by Ray Kea in terms of a transition from a "mercantile" to an "imperial" sociopolitical formation, which was in turn linked to the replacement of gold by slaves as the principal item of export from the region.

The perceived importance of the Komenda Wars also owes much to the fact that an extended account of them was included in the most influential

[5]For Eguafo see Gérard Chouin, *Eguafo: un royaume africain "au coeur françois" (1637-1688): mutations socio-économiques et politique européenne d'un État de la Côte de l'Or (Ghana) au XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1998). In European usage the kingdom was called either "Eguafo" or "Komenda;" its former capital is nowadays called Eguafo, its coastal port Komenda.

[6]Kwame Yeboah Daaku, *Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast 1600-1720: a Study of the African Reaction to European Trade* (Oxford, 1970), 83.

[7]References in contemporary sources to "Cabess Terra" have caused confusion among modern historians. It probably represents a Portuguese translation (*cabeça terra*, "head land") of the name of Etsi (from Fante *tsi*, "head"), as suggested by Albert van Dantzig, *Les Hollandais sur la Côte de Guinée à l'époque de l'essor de l'Ashanti et du Dahomey* (Paris, 1980), 129. The identification is confirmed by the Rawlinson correspondence, in which a war fought by Fante in 1693 is reported in some letters as against Cabess Terra (vol. iii, nos. 549, 706, etc.: Thomas Smith, Anashan, 25 November 1693; Edward Searle, Anomabu, 22 November 1693, etc.) but in others as against "Attee," i.e., Etsi (nos. 946 etc.: William Cooper, Egya, 3 October 1693, etc.).

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contemporary European account of the Gold Coast, by Willem Bosman, an officer of the WIC, published in 1704.[8] As Bosman makes clear, he was in part a first-hand observer of and participant in the wars, since he served as chief of the Dutch fort at Komenda during 1695, and was later involved in the highest level of local policy-making of the WIC, as Chief Merchant at the Company's headquarters at Elmina from 1699. It has long been recognized, however, that his account suffers from problems of bias.[9] Its original publication provoked an officer of the RAC to complain of its "disingenuity, partiality and malice against the English."[10] Bosman's account of the Komenda Wars, indeed, exhibits transparent bias not only against the English, but also against the leading African merchant of Komenda, John Cabess;[11] and against the two successive Directors-General of the WIC of this period, Johan Staphorst (served 1694-96) and Jan van Sevenhuysen (1696-1702), whom he blamed, in implicit self-exculpation, for the mishandling of the situation at Komenda.

The wars have been treated in detail by two modern historians, Kwame Daaku (1970) and Albert van Dantzig (1980).[12] They supplemented Bosman's account mainly with material from records of the WIC preserved in Dutch archives.[13] These include a report on the situation at Komenda by Bosman himself, made to the ruling Council of the WIC at Elmina in 1700, which interestingly differs from his published account in certain details (as noted hereafter).[14] They also drew upon records of the RAC preserved in the National Archives (NA, formerly the Public Record Office) in London, principally a letter-book containing correspondence received in England from West Africa (mainly from Cape Coast Castle).[15] The value of this material, however, is limited by the fact that the letters are preserved only in the form of brief summaries, rather than in their full original texts. This not

[8]William Bosman, *A New Account of the Coast of Guinea* (London, 1705), 26-41; subsequent references to this work are given within the main text. For discrepancies between this English translation and the original Dutch edition, see Albert Van Dantzig, "English Bosman and Dutch Bosman: a Comparison of Texts," *HA* 2(1975), 185-216.

[9]A.W. Lawrence, "Some Source Books for West African History," *JAH* 2(1961), 227-34.

[10]National Archives, London (hereafter, NA), T70/5, abstract of letters of Charles Keyes, Cape Coast Castle, 29 August 1705, 29 January, and 1 March 1706.

[11]See David Henige, "John Kabes of Komenda: an Early African Entrepreneur and Statebuilder," *JAH* 18(1977), 1-19.

[12]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 83-89; Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 106-12.

[13]Unfortunately, only a few of the relevant documents are included in Albert van Dantzig, ed., *The Dutch and the Guinea Coast 1674-1742: a Collection of Documents from the General State Archive at The Hague* (Accra, 1978).

[14]Published (in part), ibid., no.86: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 18 March 1700.

[15]NA, T70/11, Abstracts of letters received, for the Committee of Correspondence of the RAC, 1683-99. Daaku also cites entries in the financial accounts of Cape Coast Castle, in T70/374, Journals of Cape Coast Castle, 1696-9.

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only results, presumably, in the omission of much information, but also often leaves obscure the meaning and reference of what is included. For example, when the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast reported in a letter of 8 October 1695 that "[the] Dutch endeavour to renew the war," it is only in the light of additional information provided by the Rawlinson correspondence (cited in detail hereafter) that we can infer that this relates to Komenda. Also, the infrequency of dispatch of letters from Cape Coast to England often means that the precise dates of events reported are unclear: for example, the same letter refers to a Dutch attempt to murder John Cabess, and it is only from the Rawlinson correspondence that we know that this had occurred over three months earlier, on 26 June. Given the limitations of the alternative sources available to them, Daaku and Van Dantzig, although not uncritical of Bosman's account, nevertheless remained constrained within its basic framework.

The potential value of the Rawlinson material for the specific topic of the Komenda wars was already noted in the 1970s.[16] The scale of the documentation which it offers is massive, containing no fewer than 187 letters written from the English fort at Komenda during 1694-99, besides numerous references to Komenda in letters from other RAC factories—at Dixcove and Sekondi to the west, and Anashan, Anomabu, Egya and Winneba to the east. This not to deny that the material suffers from some critical limitations—most obviously, that there are substantial gaps in the sequence of correspondence, of twelve months between April 1696 and March 1697, two months in September and October 1697, and four months from September to December 1698; and the correspondence terminates in February 1699, before the end of the wars. Even apart from these gaps, there are occasionally letters missing from the sequence, presumably either because they went astray in transit and were not received at Cape Coast, or because they were mislaid after receipt and so not copied. Great caution is therefore required in applying any argument from silence from these documents. They are also limited by the fact that we possess only one side of the correspondence, lacking the input from Cape Coast to which the Komenda factors were responding. For example, a statement such as "Your worships' [letter] ... I received, and tomorrow morning shall put your orders into execution" is of little use, in the absence of any indication of what these orders were.[17]

It is also necessary to guard against any facile assumption that the factors at Komenda, as the "men on the spot," were necessarily well informed

[16]Henige, "New Source," 259.

[17]vol. iii, no. 276: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 16 December 1694. The spelling of Rawlinson documents is modernized in quotations in this paper.

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about the local situation. For anything beyond their own immediate observation, they were dependent on what they were told by African informants, and in many cases could only retail rumors, which were often contradictory, and whose truth they had little immediate means of judging. Sometimes, indeed, they honestly admitted their difficulties. With regard to events at Komenda in 1696, for example, the local factor admitted that "the true narrative of this business I cannot learn ... some say one thing & some another;" and of another report, "whether true or false I know not, we having so many uncertain reports."[18] At certain critical points in time of war, moreover, they found it difficult to obtain any information at all. In 1695, for example, the Komenda factor complained that he was probably less informed about what was happening than the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast: "we hear nothing of what the armies intends, nor cannot unless it comes from you, for here there is none but our own people;" and likewise in 1696, "we live penned up, knowing nothing, neither intelligence from camp or court," "I know not how I should hear of anything, for we have nobody comes near us."[19] Nevertheless, the very detailed (albeit uneven) documentation supplied by this correspondence offers the possibility of a decisive advance in our understanding of these events.

It should be noted that one complication in correlating English and Dutch sources is that the English in this period were still following the Julian or "Old Style" (hereafter, OS) calendar, whereas the Dutch were already using the Gregorian ("New Style", NS) calendar, which was currently ten days ahead of the former (eleven days from 1700). In this paper dates are given according to English reckoning; where New Style dates are cited from Dutch documents, the Old Style equivalent is also given.

II

In addition to its documentation of the outbreak and course of the wars from 1694, the Rawlinson correspondence also provides some valuable information on their remoter origins. In particular, it offers hitherto neglected material on the earlier Dutch-Eguafo war of 1688, which was directly linked to those of the 1690s. The earlier war arose from a French attempt to establish a factory at Komenda, alongside the pre-existing Dutch and English factories there. The Dutch in response launched a war to force the expulsion of the French, in the face of which the English as well as the French factories in Komenda were withdrawn. In the final fighting in April 1688, the king of

[18]vol. iii, nos. 365, 373: idem., 21 January, 27 February 1696.
[19]vol. iii, nos. 319, 370, 374: Edward Searle, Komenda, 25 March 1695; Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 7 February, 3 March 1696.

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Eguafo was killed; and the principal "caboceer [chief]" of the kingdom, the Fetera, and many of its people fled to seek refuge in Cape Coast Castle.[20] The war of 1688 has previously been studied mainly on the basis of French sources, as recently usefully summarized by Gérard Chouin.[21] The Rawlinson correspondence also reports extensively on these events. For the most part, this material confirms and elaborates the French account; but in a couple of respects it adds important elements to the received version, which have a bearing on the later wars of 1694-1700.

First, the role of external African military assistance. The French sources relate that in December 1687 the Dutch were reported to be trying to secure help from "the Blacks of Adom and others" to attack Eguafo. But in January 1688 the king of Eguafo stated that he had reached agreement with the Adoms, and demanded gold from the French to pay them off.[22] These negotiations with Adom are also mentioned in the Rawlinson correspondence, which suggests another explanation for its non-intervention—that it was distracted by a war with its own northern neighbor Wasa.[23] But the Rawlinson correspondence also identifies one of the "others" whose alliance was sought by the Dutch: the Twifos, who it was reported in December 1687 would "be assisting to the Adooms," their motivation for this intervention being that they were "hindered to trade" at Komenda. Unlike Adom, moreover, Twifo did fight in the subsequent war.[24] The war of 1688 thus consolidated Twifo as well as Dutch influence at Komenda, and in particular established their access to trade there. When the English made an abortive attempt to resettle at Komenda in 1691, they found traders from Twifo operating there, and observed that the Twifos, as well as the local Caboceers, were "well affected" to the English project, though the attitude of the Eguafo authorities proved more ambivalent.[25]

Second, the role of internal dissensions within Eguafo. Daaku and Van Dantzig both describe the war of 1688 as a "civil war;" although neither clearly indicates the basis of evidence for this view, it probably derives from a report from the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast Castle, which refers to a

[20]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 12 May 1688; for the evacuation of the Fetera, see also vol. ii, nos. 334, 971: Robert Elwes, Komenda, 18 April 1688; John Bridges, On board the Guinea Frigate, Komenda, 18 April 1688. For the status of the Fetera in Eguafo as "the rank closest to the king" cf. Jean Barbot, *Barbot on Guinea: the Writings of Jean Barbot on West Africa, 1678-1712*, ed. Paul Hair, Adam Jones, and Robin Law (2 vols.: London, 1992), 2:595.
[21]Chouin, *Eguafo*, 171-81.
[22]Ibid., 174-76.
[23]vol. ii, no. 309, 317: Robert Elwes, Komenda, 22 December 1687, 31 January 1688: the latter reporting that "[t]he Wassawes have lately defeated the Adoomes."
[24]vol. ii, nos 309, 326, 334: idem., 22 December 1687, 11 March and 18 April 1688.
[25]vol. iii, nos 263: William Ronan, Komenda, 30 November 1691.

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man called "Taggee [i.e. Takyi]," who was allied with the Dutch, and who by implication became king of Eguafo as a result of the Dutch victory.[26] French sources cited by Chouin also speak of the Dutch having "stirred up a civil war against the king," and "bribed some officers" and "corrupted a part of the people of his council, and even his wives."[27] The Rawlinson correspondence provides more concrete detail about the dissident prince Takyi, including his career prior to 1688, although there is need for caution in interpreting the evidence since "Takyi" was a common name among the ruling elite of Eguafo, and there were several persons of this name active at this period.[28]

In the Rawlinson correspondence, a "Takyi" is first mentioned in 1683, in connection with a disturbance at Komenda, originating in the kidnapping of slaves of the English factory by "one of the King's cousins who lives nearby," in retaliation for which the Caboceers of Komenda took the man captive and burned down his "croom [village]," creating fears of a war between the Eguafo capital and Komenda. The English in subsequent negotiations demanded that the king should "turn his cousin Taggee out of the country."[29] In the event, no agreement was reached, and by implication, Takyi escaped exile on this occasion. The term "cousin" here should probably be understood to mean a matrilateral relative, descent in Eguafo, as in other Akan-speaking groups, being presumably traced matrilineally, although Europeans often failed to grasp this.[30]

A second reference to a "Takyi" occurs in a report of an English mission to Eguafo in 1686, which negotiated with "the King, Fettera and Taggee."[31] On the face of it, this might seem to confirm that the Takyi whose exile the English demanded in 1683 had remained part of the local ruling establishment. However, it is not certain that this is the same man. The 1686 report also gives him the fuller name "Affer Taggee," which suggests that he may be identical with a man called "Affori," listed (again, following the king and the Fetera), as a signatory to a treaty with the Dutch in January 1688, and apparently given the title "Tyani," i.e., Okyeame ("linguist," or spokesperson for the king).[32] But if so, he was distinct from another Takyi attested in

[26]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 81; Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 103-04; NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 12 May 1688.
[27]Chouin, *Eguafo*, 184-85.
[28]Kea, *Settlements*, 223, counts no fewer than five Takyis in sources for the 1680s and 1690s.
[29]vol. i, nos. 110, 112: David Harper, Komenda, 26 April, 8 May 1683.
[30]Cf. another reference in the Rawlinson correspondence (relating to Cabess Terra) to the king's "cousin that is his heir": vol. iii, no. 918: Charles Salmon, Anomabu, 3 July 1698.
[31]vol. ii, no. 206: William Cross, Komenda, 8 December 1686.
[32]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 60n114. Kea, *Settlements*, 223, appears to read this name as "Afferij Takij."

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1687-88, who was no longer a member of the ruling establishment, but an exiled dissident. In August 1687 a dispute arose between the Dutch and the king of Eguafo, when an envoy of the WIC attempted to carry goods inland to "Taggee, a rebel," but the goods were seized and the envoy killed by the king. The incident is significant, as indicating a breach between Eguafo and the Dutch, even before the French attempt to settle at Komenda later in 1687. Either now or soon after, this Takyi was physically exiled from Eguafo: in January 1688 he was reported to be with the army from Elmina which was threatening Eguafo. In negotiations between the Dutch and the Eguafos, it was at first thought likely that "Taggee ... will return to his own croom, which done the differences will be soon over." But the attempted reconciliation failed, and Takyi accompanied the Elmina army in its subsequent attack on Eguafo.[33]

It seems likely that the rebellious Takyi of 1687-88 is identical with the turbulent king's cousin of 1683. At least, it appears that the former was also a member of the Eguafo royal family, since it was evidently he who succeeded to the Eguafo throne after the war. In the immediate aftermath of the war, he apparently did not claim the throne: instead, the Fetera, who had taken refuge at Cape Coast Castle, was reportedly "courted to be king."[34] This is in conformity with other evidence that the title of Fetera in Eguafo was conferred on a member of the royal family, who might in certain (not clearly specified) circumstances succeed to the throne.[35] However, in the long run, it seems that Takyi did take the throne, being identical with the king who then reigned until 1698, generally called in English sources "Great Taggee," i.e., "Takyi Senior," evidently translating the Fante "Takyi Panin" (which form is adopted hereafter), but named in Bosman and other Dutch records as "Abe-Tecky."[36]

The principal purpose and consequence of the war of 1688 was evidently to consolidate Dutch influence; on the face of it, as Daaku observes, it left the Dutch "the undisputed masters of Komenda."[37] But in fact, although he owed his throne to Dutch support, Takyi Panin was clearly determined to

[33]vol. ii, nos. 270, 313, 320: Robert Elwes, Komenda, 12 August 1687, 15 January. and 5 February 1688.
[34]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 12 May 1688.
[35]Barbot, *On Guinea*, ii, 593, 595, 597. Barbot understood that the Fetera was chosen from among the *sons* of the previous king, but this may be an error. Chouin, *Eguafo*, 68-73, 186-87, cites this and other contemporary references to patrilineal succession in Eguafo to posit a conflict between matrilineal and patrilineal principles of inheritance. This is an attractive hypothesis, but an alternative possibility is that these represent merely uncritical European projections of their own cultural norms.
[36]The alternative name also occurs once in the Rawlinson correspondence as "Abba Taggee:" vol. iii, no. 381: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 26 March 1696.
[37]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 81.

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avoid exclusive dependence on them. Given that French interest did not revive after 1688, this in practice meant seeking to cultivate links with the English. Even in the immediate aftermath of the war, Takyi was evidently trying to implement this policy, assuring the English that their factory in Komenda would be settled again, and in January 1689, when war broke out between Fetu and Asebu, supported respectively by the Dutch and the English, he led forces to the aid of Asebu, and requested and obtained "assistance with powder" from the English.[38]

In 1691 Takyi Panin invited the RAC to reoccupy its factory at Komenda, but the English party sent there found themselves obstructed by the merchant John Cabess, who although formerly associated with the English was "now a creature of the Dutch," while Takyi Panin, after initial hesitation, forced their withdrawal, after only three days.[39] The king's *volte-face* was perhaps due merely to fear of Dutch reprisals, since in 1692 he again invited the RAC to resettle in his kingdom; but the English party on this occasion was fired on by the Dutch fort at Komenda, and did not even land.[40] There was further friendly contact between the English and Eguafo in March 1694, when the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast reported that they had advanced goods to Takyi Panin, "in hope of a trade by a peace." This probably does not refer to the situation at Komenda itself, but to Takyi's role as mediator in attempts to negotiate the end of a war between Akani and Cabess Terra, which was disrupting trade to Cape Coast, but it is evidence of his continuing determination to hold a balance between the Dutch and the English.[41]

Takyi Panin's relations with his other allies in the war of 1688, the Twifos, also subsequently became problematic. In 1693 some Twifo traders returning from trading at Cape Coast were robbed of their goods at Komenda, provoking a threat of war by Twifo against Eguafo, to avert which, the Dutch loaned the Eguafo king goods to pay compensation to Twifo.[42] In July 1694 Twifo was again threatening war against Eguafo, raising hopes

[38]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 12 May 1688, 12 February 1689. In 1691 Takyi Panin still claimed an outstanding debt from the English for his expenses in "the last Fetue war": vol. iii, no. 265: William Ronan, Komenda, 2 December 1691.
[39]NA, T70/169, f. 122, Protest of Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 11 January 1692; vol. iii, nos. 263-65: William Ronan, 30 November, 30 November, and 2 December 1691.
[40]NA, T70/169, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 22 August 1692 (also summarized in T70/11). The projected settlement was on this occasion not at Komenda itself, but at Kotobrai, further west.
[41]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 2 March 1694; cf. a later letter in the Rawlinson corpus from the Dutch Director-General, referring to his intention to call a conference involving the king of Komenda, among other rulers, to end the Akani-Cabess Terra dispute: vol.iii, no.1437: Johan Staphorst, Elmina, 6 April 1694.
[42]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no.79: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 24 November 1693.

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among the English that they might be able to exploit the situation to "recover Comenda," evidently by allying with Twifo.[43] In the event, however, the situation was transformed by the subsequent breach between Eguafo and the Dutch, which precipitated a reorientation of alliances.

III

Bosman places the blame for the breakdown of relations between the Dutch and Eguafo squarely on the latter, claiming that local hostility towards the Dutch was "ready to burst out into an open war upon the least occasion," the Eguafos "only wanting a pretext of breaking with us" (p. 29). Bosman also acknowledges that the WIC Director-General Staphorst "desired nothing so much as war," but this criticism evidently relates to his overreaction to the initial provocation from Eguafo, rather than implying that he had initiated the confrontation (p. 31). This observation nevertheless inspired Daaku to turn Bosman's account on its head, suggesting that it was in fact the Dutch who were "looking for a pretext to attack Komenda."[44] Within Eguafo the initiative in the breach with the Dutch was taken by John Cabess at Komenda, although Bosman insisted that he must have been acting on "the king's express command."

Bosman reports a suggestion that Cabess was motivated by resentment at "the ill treatment he had met with from our former Governor," but dismisses this (p. 30) as "a feigned excuse." This seems to refer, not to the immediately preceding Director-General Joel Smits (served 1689-94), but to his predecessor Nicolaes Sweerts (1684-89); the reference being to 1686, when John Cabess was "panyarred" (i.e., seized to enforce a payment) on a visit to the Dutch fort at Shama, to the east.[45] It does indeed seem unlikely that John Cabess was motivated by this eight-year old grievance, given his evidently good relations with the Dutch in the interim but, as will be seen, Bosman fails to mention a more recent dispute between him and the Dutch, which was clearly critically relevant.

In narrative terms John Cabess is said to have provoked a clash by attacking a party of Dutch who were attempting to mine gold at a site near Komenda, in retaliation for which Director-General Staphorst came to Komenda "in order to take satisfaction of John Kabes for the injury," and

[43]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 2 August 1694; also vol. iii, no. 743, Edward Searle and William Cooper, Anomabu, 2 August 1694, reporting a Dutch approach to Fante, which the English suspected was "to get the Fantines to assist Great Taggee of Aguaffo against the Quifferas."
[44]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 83.
[45]Cf. Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 107 (giving the date inexactly as 1685); the episode is recorded in the Rawlinson correspondence, vol. ii, nos. 180, etc.: William Cross, Komenda, 16 September 1686, etc.

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sent a party of troops to Cabess' village, leading to a "skirmish" with his people, in which "some on both sides were very well beaten." It was in revenge for this, according to Bosman (pp. 29-31), that John Cabess then invited the English to resettle at Komenda. The Rawlinson correspondence gives, not only a different impression but a different sequential narrative of events. The attack on the Dutch gold-miners is reported, on 3 December 1694, but this in fact occurred *after* the English settlement, which had already taken place on 30 November. Evidently, John Cabess' breach with the Dutch had occurred earlier; on their arrival, the English found that he "doth protest never to be friends with [the Dutch] again," and indeed was even preparing for a possible military clash, buying arms "to secure us and himself from the Dutch." Moreover, there had already been actual fighting. The English initially settled at a village belonging to John Cabess some distance from Komenda. When they moved to a second village of his, close to the town, it was noted that "[t]his croom we are going to is all burnt down but 3 houses, John Cabess burnt it when he had the first palaver with the Dutch."[46] (Why Cabess should have burned down his own village is not explained.) It was evidently this "first palaver," rather than the later attack on the gold-miners, which occasioned the invitation to the English to resettle Komenda. This is confirmed by an abstract of a letter from the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast to the RAC in England, six days before the resettlement, reporting "a difference between the Dutch & Aguaffo [which] may put the Company in possession of Comenda."[47] This first dispute must have occurred between the date of the preceding letter from the Chief Merchants, 2 August, and 24 November 1694.

It may further be noted that the visit of Staphorst to Komenda, which Bosman reports as following the attack on the Dutch gold-miners, is also noted in the Rawlinson correspondence, on 15 December 1694, but the English understood that he came "to make up all palavers and to drink friends," and said nothing of any attack on John Cabess's village.[48] Probably, therefore, Bosman's report of a "skirmish" between the Dutch and Cabess's people conflates this visit with the earlier "palaver" in which his village was burned. The purpose of this rearrangement of events was probably to exculpate the Dutch from any share of responsibility for the breach.[49]

[46]vol. iii, nos 266, 269-70: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 30 November, 4, and 5 December 1694.

[47]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 24 November 1694.

[48]vol. iii, no. 275: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 16 December 1694. This probably relates to the payment of ransom for the release of the captured gold miners, as recalled in a later Dutch account (Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 107).

[49]It is possible that Bosman was himself personally involved in this dispute: as noted later, he was chief of the Dutch fort at Komenda by February 1695, but it is not known when he was originally appointed.

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The English party had meanwhile set about reoccupying the former English fort, but on 6 December was fired on by the Dutch fort. John Cabess sent to demand an explanation, and was told that "the English should not live there," and the exchange ended in mutual threats of violence.[50] Evidently, the Dutch now concluded that the removal of the English could only be achieved by force and, as in 1688, began to seek African allies for an attack on Eguafo. Bosman records (p. 32), baldly, that Staphorst "hired an army" from Twifo and Cabess Terra, while Fante and Asebu joined forces with the Eguafos. This is an accurate account of the ultimate outcome, but the process by which it was arrived at was protracted and tortuous.

In the Rawlinson correspondence, the first hint of Dutch planning for war was on 16 December 1694, when the English agent at Komenda reported that John Cabess had requested that the Chief Merchants should send an envoy there, to "hear the palaver that he hath to tell," which was "[something] which ... I cannot well understand, something about the Dutch giving the King of Dancra [Denkyira] a great deal of money to come down against Great Commenda [i.e., the Eguafo capital] and this place to keep the English off." The reference to Denkyira may have been a misunderstanding on the agent's part, since the Chief Merchants' envoy subsequently reported that it was Twifo to which the Dutch had sent gold. But the English later understood that the Dutch were in fact negotiating with both Denkyira and Twifo. On 15 January 1695 the Chief Merchants sent their envoy back to Komenda with a quantity of goods, which he took to the Eguafo capital, from where they were sent on to Twifo and Denkyira in an attempt to wean them from their alliance with the Dutch.[51] These Dutch negotiations with Twifo (though not with Denkyira) are confirmed in a Dutch source, a report by Staphorst to the WIC Council at Elmina on 4 January 1695 (25 December 1694 by English reckoning), which says that the Dutch had initially sent for assistance to Cabess Terra, which suggested that they should also seek the alliance of Twifo, as was eventually agreed, in return for payment in gold.[52]

Staphorst's report also claimed that, on arrival in Twifo, his emissary found that he had been preceded by envoys from the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast, offering money for Twifo's assistance against the Dutch. This is not corroborated by the Rawlinson correspondence, but it is of course possible that this earlier mission had been sent direct from Cape Coast, rather than via Komenda. However, an alternative possibility is that this

[50]vol. iii, no. 271: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 6 December 1694.
[51]vol. iii, nos. 275, 277, 283-84: idem., 16 and 17 December 1694, 23 and 24 January 1695.
[52]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 107-08.

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English approach to Twifo had occurred *before* their resettlement at Komenda on 30 November 1694, in connection with their hopes to exploit the threatened war between Eguafo and Twifo in July, noted earlier. The allegation that it was the English, rather than the Dutch, who initiated the competitive bidding for intervention by the interior kingdoms is also implicit in a later letter from Staphorst to the Chief Merchants, also included in the Rawlinson corpus: "[i]n the event that many marks gold in goods had not been sent by your Honours to the natives ... no war would ever have occurred, because the natives are only merchants who want to have a free access for trade."[53]

The reference here to the desire of "the natives" for access to trade at Komenda is also a salutary reminder of the indigenous context of the war. Although the letters in the Rawlinson correspondence (in common with Bosman) report the Twifo-Dutch alliance against Eguafo as a purely commercial arrangement, it is evident that the Twifos also had an agenda of their own to promote; indeed, their threat of war against Eguafo in July 1694 had been made at a time when the latter was still friends with the Dutch. The Dutch were thus able to exploit a pre-existing breach between the two, rather than having to create one themselves.

The English attempt to buy off the threatened attack was evidently unsuccessful, and in February 1695 an invasion of Eguafo by Twifo and Cabess Terra was thought to be imminent.[54] At this point, however, complications occurred which imposed a delay. The principal African broker of the WIC at Elmina, Aban, was an uncle of John Cabess,[55] and seems to have been blamed by the Dutch for failing to prevent the latter's rapprochement with the English. On 14 February, the RAC's factor at Komenda reported that Aban had been "panyarred" by the Dutch "about our settling here." A week later, having presumably regained his freedom, Aban was reported to have used his influence to persuade the king of Denkyira to threaten the Twifos, in order to divert them from attacking Eguafo.[56]

There followed another bout of competitive bribery, this time focused on Denkyira. On 24 February it was reported that the Denkyiras had proposed a formal agreement with Takyi Panin, whereby he should pay 80 bendas [160

[53]vol. iii, no. 1444: Johan Staphorst, Elmina, 1 March 1695.
[54]vol. iii, nos. 291, 293-94: Edward Searle, Komenda, 17, 18, and 18 February 1695.
[55]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no.97: W. de la Palma, Elmina, 26 June 1702.
[56]vol. iii, nos. 289, 296: Edward Searle, 14 and 21 February 1695. Following a further dispute with the Dutch in 1696, Aban took refuge in Cape Coast Castle and entered the service of the RAC: NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 6 January and 11 May 1696. Dutch sources also record 2 imprisonments of Aban and his flight to Cape Coast: see Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 108 (who, however, wrongly assumes that *both* incidents occurred after the defeat of the Twifo invasion in April 1695).

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ounces, value £640] of gold, in return for their promise "not to let the Quiferas come." But two days later the Dutch sent money to the Denkyira king, "that he might not hinder the Quiferas coming down to turn the English out." The issue evidently remained in doubt for some time. At the beginning of April, there were again reports that an envoy of the king of Denkyira was at Elmina; the English assumed that the Dutch were soliciting Denkyira's "assistance," but probably it was its neutrality which they sought—and evidently obtained.[57]

In addition to Twifo and Cabess Terra, the Dutch also sought assistance from another quarter, not mentioned by Bosman, Eguafo's western neighbor Ahanta. The Ahantas were already established as allies of the Dutch against the English: in June 1694, the Ahanta chief Asirifi, in alliance with the Dutch, had attacked and destroyed the English fort at Sekondi.[58] In late February 1695, there were reports that the Dutch, in view of the procrastination of the Twifos, had summoned Asirifi to Elmina, where he had taken money "to come [to Komenda] and turn [the English] out." Even when Dutch confidence in Twifo intervention revived, supplementary aid from Ahanta was still sought: in early March, Takyi Panin told the English at Komenda that the Dutch had hired the Ahantas to attack their fort, while the Twifos engaged the Eguafos.[59] Eguafo, or the English on their behalf, in turn sought allies to meet the threatened attack. In early March, the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast sent to the Adoms, apparently to solicit their assistance for Takyi Panin, but a leading chief of Adom, also called Asirifi, refused their request, allegedly because he also had been bribed by the Dutch.[60] More critically, as Bosman recorded, assistance was sought and obtained from Fante and Asebu to the east.

On this, however, Bosman's account perpetrates a serious inaccuracy. He criticizes Director-General Staphorst for not attempting to "bribe" Fante and Asebu to stay out of the war, and alleges (pp. 32-33) that instead he alienated them by threatening to attack them next, once Eguafo had been dealt with. The Rawlinson correspondence directly contradicts this. On 12 March 1695 the chief of the RAC's fort at Anomabu was told that the Dutch had been "tampering with the Curranteers [chiefs of Fante]," sending them gold and liquor, "to side with them against Taggee," but they had refused the approach.[61] If Staphorst made the threat against Fante and Asebu which

[57]vol. iii, nos. 300, 302, 320: Edward Searle, Komenda, 24 and 27 February, 1 April 1695.
[58]vol. iii, nos. 251, etc.: Thomas Johnson, Sekondi, 9 June 1694, etc. Bosman records (pp. 18-19) the capture of the Sekondi fort, but without mentioning the Dutch involvement.
[59]vol. iii, nos. 298, 300, 307: Edward Searle, Komenda, 23 and 24 February, 4 March 1695.
[60]vol. iii, nos. 309, 313: idem., 7 and 12 March 1695.
[61]vol. iii, no.790: John Rootsey, Anomabu, 13 March 1695.

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Bosman records, this was presumably only after they had rejected his overtures. At any rate, the Fante now mobilized in aid of Eguafo, with munitions supplied by the English factories. Forces went from Anomabu, Anashan and Tantumkweri, and also from Akron, the eastern neighbor of Fante.[62] A rumor that the Dutch had tried to bribe the Akwamu, in the interior to the northeast, "to fall on the back of the Fanteners and Acrones," evidently to divert them from assisting Eguafo, was perhaps false—or, if true, the attempt was unsuccessful.[63]

Meanwhile, at Komenda fighting had already broken out. On 28 February 1695 a Dutch attempt to land additional soldiers for their fort was successfully resisted by John Cabess's men, and on 1 March the Komenda forces attacked the Dutch fort.[64] These episodes are also recounted (pp. 27-29) by Bosman, who was currently chief of the Dutch fort, though he is vague about when they occurred.[65] The Twifo-Cabess Terra invasion did not materialize immediately, presumably because of uncertainty about the intentions of Denkyira and Fante, as detailed above; the decisive battle against them did not take place until 28 April 1695.[66] In the Rawlinson corpus, the correspondence from Komenda does not explicitly mention the outcome,[67] but reports from other RAC factories register the defeat of the Twifos.[68]

IV

Bosman gives the impression (p. 32) that this defeat marked the end of the war: "[w]e were reduced to a miserable estate, not knowing what measures to take." The Rawlinson correspondence, however, shows that hostilities in fact continued for some time thereafter. Soon after the defeat of the Twifos, a canoe of the RAC traveling from Dixcove for Cape Coast was panyarred by Ahanta Asirifi in retaliation, while at Komenda John Cabess continued to panyar canoes from Elmina passing along the coast. The Dutch for their part hoped to organize a new attack on Eguafo. On 8 June 1695, they were

[62]vol. iii, nos. 791, 794: idem., 15 March, 3 April 1696; no. 585, William Gudge, Anashan, 21 March 1695; nos. 1104, 1106: William Cooper, Winneba, 18 March, 6 April 1695. Akron was not formally part of Fante, but under its "protection" (Bosman, 61).
[63]vol. iii, no. 1105: William Cooper, Winneba, 31 March 1695.
[64]vol. iii, nos. 303, 305: Edward Searle, Komenda, 28 February, 2 March 1695.
[65]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 108, wrongly assumed that the attack on the Dutch fort followed the defeat of the Twifo on 28 April 1695.
[66]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 14 May 1695.
[67]The return of soldiers to Komenda, followed by John Cabess himself, is reported, without comment, in vol. iii, nos. 328-29: Howsley Freeman, Komenda, 1 and 4 May 1695.
[68]vol. iii, nos. 76, 806: John Pink, Dixcove, 8 May 1695; John Rootsey, Anomabu, 27 May 1695.

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reported to have sent money to Ahanta Asirifi and Wasa "to hire them to come down & fight Tagee & John Cabess," but they declined. Shortly afterwards occurred the attempt to murder John Cabess, referred to earlier. Cabess, in conformity with the established Eguafo policy of avoiding exclusive dependence on either the Dutch or the English, had evidently re-established friendly contact with the chief of the Dutch fort at Komenda, and began holding meetings "to palaver with him." At one of these meetings on 26 June, however, the Dutch chief drew a pistol and shot at Cabess, but missed; and the Dutch fort then fired a shot into Komenda town.[69] The Dutch chief involved in this incident was Bosman, whose attempt to murder John Cabess is recalled in a later Dutch document, although (unsurprisingly) it is not mentioned in Bosman's published account. This was evidently not done in the heat of the moment, but was premeditated, since the later account specifies that Bosman had acted "on the orders" of Director-General Staphorst.[70]

The Dutch may have hoped that the elimination of John Cabess would open the way to a negotiated settlement, without the need for fighting, but, having failed to effect it, they continued to plan a new attack on Eguafo. In July 1695 it was reported that the chief of the Dutch fort at Butri, west of Komenda, had orders "to raise what force he can in these parts to oppose John Cabess & Taggee." The Dutch later claimed that they had secured promises of assistance from Twifo and Denkyira, though this seems doubtful.[71] The king of Eguafo, for his part, appealed for assistance to his allies in the late war, Fante and Asebu, urging them to attack the Dutch forts in their own territories.[72] The Dutch in turn sought to undermine this hostile coalition. Bosman alludes (p. 33), albeit vaguely, to an attempt by Director-General Staphorst, subsequent to the war of April 1695, to bribe Fante and Asebu not to support Eguafo, though this was "in vain." The Chief Merchants at Cape Coast likewise reported to London that the Dutch "endeavour to make a breach among the confederates by bribes."[73]

The Rawlinson correspondence fills out some concrete detail. On 30 July it was reported that some of the Fante caboceers were to meet the Director-General at Kormantin, and it was later understood that he had offered

[69]vol. iii, nos. 76, 329, 331-2, 337, 342: John Pink, Dixcove, 8 May 1695; Howsley Freeman, Komenda, 4, 18 and 21 May, 8, and 26 June 1695.
[70]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no 97: W. de la Palma, Elmina, 26 June 1702. Van Dantzig wrongly assumed that Bosman's attempted murder of John Cabess occurred in 1696, after the Dutch-Eguafo peace in September of that year (*Hollandais*, 109).
[71]vol. iii, nos. 84, 318: John Pink, Dixcove, 25 July 1695; William Ronan, Anomabu, 2 August 1695.
[72]vol. iii, nos. 317-18: William Ronan, Anomabu, both 2 August 1695.
[73]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 8 October 1695.

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money to Fante and Asebu to "stand neutral" in the impending war. But the Chairman of the Council of Chief Merchants of Cape Coast, William Ronan, went in person to Anomabu to counter the Dutch approach and succeeded in binding the caboceers of Fante by a ritual oath, on 3 August, to remain loyal to the king of Eguafo. The negotiations also included representatives of Asebu and Fetu, though whether these in the end also took the oaths of fidelity is not made clear. At their conclusion, Ronan reported: "I hope now & upon good grounds we need not any longer stand in fear of our neighbours' endeavours."[74] The Dutch did indeed now give up the project of renewing the war against Eguafo, but only temporarily.

V

As Bosman recalled (pp. 32-33), "[w]e should never have been able to make any fresh attempt, if the enemies themselves had not seasonably placed an opportunity into our hands by their intestine divisions." The refers to a dispute between king Takyi Panin and his younger brother, called by the Dutch "Tecki-Ankan," but by the English generally "Little Taggee," i.e., "Takyi Junior," translating the Fante "Takyi Kuma."[75] This "Little Taggee" is already mentioned in the Rawlinson correspondence in 1691, along with his brother the king, in connection with the abortive English re-establishment at Komenda, and again in 1695, in the aftermath of the repulse of the Twifo invasion, when he provoked a dispute by taking captive a Fante man—perhaps evidence that he was then already a problematic element within the victorious alliance.[76] These references do not make clear what position Takyi Kuma held, but it is likely that he was the Fetera, the second-ranking office in Eguafo.[77]

In the Rawlinson correspondence the renewed war begins abruptly, without forewarning, on 21 January 1696, when a fleet of canoes from Elmina arrived to blockade Komenda. The English were at first unclear as to the meaning of this, but among various rumors, the one which turned out to be true was that "Little Taggee is to fight Great Taggee."[78] For this purpose

[74]vol. iii, nos. 816-19: John Rootsey, Anomabu, 30 July 1695; William Ronan, Komenda, 2, 2 and 3 August 1695.
[75]The alternative name also occurs once in the Rawlinson correspondence, as "Taggee Ancram": vol. iii, no. 915: Charles Salmon, Anomabu, 4 June 1698.
[76]vol. iii, nos. 263, 806, 813: William Ronan, Komenda, 30 November 1691; John Rootsey, Anomabu, 27 May and 18 July 1695.
[77]The peace treaty made after the second Dutch-Eguafo war (1696) provided for recognition of Takyi Kuma as "second person in the kingdom," which probably refers to the office of Fetera (Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 109).
[78]vol. iii, no. 365: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 21 January 1696.

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Takyi Kuma sought external African, as well as Dutch aid. Bosman states that he received assistance from "the Accanist people," and shortly afterwards also from Adom.[79] The involvement of Adom is corroborated by the Rawlinson correspondence, which records the arrival of 140 soldiers of the Adom chief Asirifi to join Takyi Kuma's camp on 12 February, followed by "a great parcel of Adoomes" in early March. Asirifi evidently commanded these troops in person.[80]

Bosman's reference to Akani assistance is also corroborated, though less explicitly, in a report that Takyi Kuma was aided by a "Captain Dick [Diki]"; other references to this man show that he was an Akani, but evidently not based in the Akani homeland of Assin, but in one of the diasporic communities of Akani traders on the coast, since in 1697 he became Captain of Kormantin.[81] Takyi Panin, on the other hand, was again aided by the Akrons.[82] The bulk of the Fante, however, stayed neutral. As was later noted at Anomabu, the news of Takyi Panin's victory was "not welcome to some in those parts, by reason their soldiers were not there to assist, that they might [have] had the glory of the action."[83] The decisive battle, in which Takyi Kuma and his allies were again defeated, is dated by the Rawlinson correspondence to 20 March 1696. After the victory, the Eguafo forces followed up by besieging Adom Asirifi's village, on an island in the River Pra, but the hiatus in the Rawlinson correspondence from April leaves it unclear how this campaign ended.[84]

One important aspect of the war of 1696 which is clarified by the Rawlinson correspondence is that Takyi Kuma enjoyed significant support within Eguafo, especially in Komenda. As the English factor acknowledged after his defeat, "[a] great many people are revolted from [Takyi Panin], and went to Little Taggee both from this town and all the adjacent crooms, whom [Takyi Kuma] they all did hope would prove conqueror." On the other hand, a force of soldiers which John Cabess later brought to Komenda is described as "few of them Komenda people ... but most of them the king's people, or Abond's"—i.e, belonging to John Cabess's uncle Aban, formerly of Elmina, but now defected into the service of the English.[85]

[79]Van Dantzig, "English Bosman," 201; the English text (p. 33) names only the Adoms.
[80]vol. iii, nos. 371, 375, Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 13 February, 10 March 1696. Asirifi is named among those who, after their defeat, took refuge in the Dutch fort at Komenda: no. 378: idem., 20 March 1696.
[81]Diki, as well as Adom Asirifi, took refuge in the Dutch fort: for his connections with Kormantin and the Akani, see vol. iii, nos. 864, 1017: John Brown, Anomabu, 24 April 1697; John Brown, Egya, 14 March 1696.
[82]vol. iii, no. 378: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 20 March 1696.
[83]vol. iii, no. 859: John Rootsey, Anomabu, 25 March 1696.
[84]vol. iii, no. 378, 380: Thomas Wilson, Komenda, 20 and 24 March 1696.
[85]vol. iii, no. 380: idem., 24 March 1696.

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VI

The period following the second Eguafo victory in March 1696 is not illuminated by the Rawlinson correspondence, in which there is a gap between April 1696 and March 1697. Bosman relates (p. 34) that, following the replacement of Johan Staphorst by Jan van Sevenhuysen as WIC Director-General, the latter made peace with Eguafo. The Chief Merchants of Cape Coast likewise reported home in June 1696 that "[the] General of the Mina [is] sent home, his successor made overtures to Aguaffo."[86] The negotiations were evidently protracted: the text of the treaty eventually made is preserved in Dutch archives, and dated 24 September (14 September by English reckoning) 1696.[87] It provided for the payment of compensation for WIC personnel and goods taken in the war, and for reconciliation with Takyi Kuma and his return from exile. The terms are surprisingly generous to the Dutch, and presumably testimony to war-weariness and anxiety to revive trade on the side of Eguafo.[88] A critical factor (although not mentioned by Bosman) was that the Dutch fort at Komenda commanded the landing place there.[89] Short of actually expelling the Dutch, therefore, the revival of trade depended on an accommodation with them.

The peace proved short-lived. Bosman, in his published account, attributes (pp. 34-35) its failure to the intrigues of the English, who "env[ied] our happy conclusion of the war, and fear[ed] it would not much conduce to their advantage," and incited Takyi Panin by suggesting that he had made a bad deal, "that considering his two victories, he ought rather to ask than to give satisfaction." The argument which the English are said to have urged on the king sounds plausible enough, though presumably he was capable of reaching this conclusion on his own.[90] As regards the actual occasion of the breakdown, Bosman's account is vague, but unequivocal in attributing it to the king of Eguafo, who allegedly conducted a campaign of harassment against the Dutch: "[h]e renewed his old course, and did us as much mischief as ever." Initial Dutch forbearance merely encouraged the king (p. 35) to "augment his outrages" until the Dutch were obliged, in self-defense, to resolve on resort to "forcible means," for which purpose they again sought African allies, beginning with Fante (in negotiations which began in February 1697, as will be seen hereafter). Since Bosman goes on to recount the

[86]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 18 June 1696.
[87]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 109n94; but Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 85n1, gives 24 October 1696.
[88]Cf. Daaku, ibid., 84: "a time-buying device."
[89]As noted in 1694 by Thomas Phillips, "A Journal of a Voyage Made in the Hannibal of London" in Awnsham and John Churchill, *Collection of Voyages and Travels* (6 vols,: London, 1732), 6:202.
[90]Cf. Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 84.

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failure of Dutch attempts to secure allies, the impression is left that no actual fighting resulted. In his report to the Elmina Council in 1700, however, Bosman gives a different impression: "[w]e were compelled to engage ourselves in another war, in which we were as unfortunate as in the first."[91] This wording evidently implies actual fighting, in which the Dutch were defeated.

Although the Rawlinson correspondence is of no assistance in understanding the course of events at this point, summaries of letters from the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast Castle to England included in the RAC's records in the NA (although little used in earlier reconstructions) do throw some light on this question. A letter of 1 October 1696, complaining that "[the] Dutch [are] tampering with the King of Aguaffo," presumably alludes to the negotiations for peace.[92] The next letter, 16 December, reports the renewal of hostilities, blaming the Dutch, who allegedly sought to exploit the changed situation to force the English out of Komenda: "[t]he Dutch threaten them if they shall go on with their building at Comenda, calling it their country." This difference of perspective is unsurprising but, more significantly, this letter details actual acts of aggression by the Dutch, who "shot at but not into the [English] fort," destroying several canoes, and "made another attempt on Comenda," again employing forces from Elmina. This attack was evidently aimed not only at the English fort, but at the overthrow of Takyi Panin—the Elminas are described as "exasperated at their being disappointed in another design to destroy the King of Aguaffo."[93] Takyi Kuma himself took part in the attack.[94] Bosman's suppression of these events is surely deliberate, intended to obscure the Dutch share of responsibility for the failure of the peace.

VII

It was seemingly only after the failure of this first military enterprise that the Dutch turned their attention to securing African allies. The key to the situation was again seen to be Fante, but it was now proposed to recruit it as an active ally, rather than merely seeking its neutrality, as in 1695-96. Bosman's account (pp. 35-36) says that the Dutch first approached the

[91]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 86: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 10 March 1700.
[92]So also interpreted by Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 85.
[93]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 1 October, 16 December 1696; also letters from John Rootsey, Komenda, 10 December 1696 and 11 January 1697, in T70/169, ff. 128-128v.
[94]The Cape Coast accounts include a note of expenditure of gunpowder by the factor at Komenda, "when attacked by Little Taggee:" NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 30 June 1697.

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Fante, who agreed to assist against Eguafo in return for a large sum of gold; the text of this agreement is preserved in Dutch archives, and dated to 15 August (i.e., 5 August OS) 1697.[95] However, according to Bosman this was countered by the diplomacy of the RAC, which offered the Fante the same amount to remain neutral. The head of the Fante state, the Brafo, opposed the change of allegiance, but was deposed. Failing assistance from Fante, the Dutch next sought to hire assistance from Adom, and also from Akani and Cabess Terra, but these in the end did nothing. Finally, they hired the Denkyiras, but they also failed to deliver. These events are not precisely dated, but on Bosman's account all preceded the conclusion of a second Dutch-Eguafo peace, which on other evidence, as noted hereafter, was in April 1698. This produces a plausibly logical narrative, but comparison with English sources suggests that it perpetrates significant distortions. In particular, Bosman obscures the fact that negotiations with the Fante were spread over several months (February to September 1697). Also, negotiations with other potential allies (Akani, Cabess Terra, Adom) were in fact pursued concurrently with those with Fante, rather than being taken up only after the latter had failed. Finally, the Dutch negotiations with Denkyira appear to have occurred only later, after the conclusion of peace in April 1698.

The earliest stages of the negotiations with Fante took place before the resumption of the Rawlinson correspondence in April 1697. They are reported, however, in a letter from the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast (William Ronan, William Melross, and Nicholas Buckeridge) to London, which was quoted in a pamphlet published in 1709. Since this source has been neglected or misinterpreted in earlier reconstructions, it warrants quoting *in extenso*:

> By a deserter from the Mina we are informed that the Dutch Company have sent over positive orders to spare no costs to carry on the war, and drive us out of Commenda; and for that end the [Dutch] General, with a large sum of money, hath corrupted the Braffo of Fanteen and Captain of Quaman [Kwaman, one of the component states of the Fante confederacy], to assist Little-Taggee, to whom [i.e., the Fante] we had lately given several dashees, to encourage them to be true to the English, for which they had taken fetishes (or oaths) to stop that current. We are necessitated to be at considerable expense to your Honours, to assist the Captain of Abra [Abora, another of the Fante states], Kings of Agguaffo, Fetue and Saboo [Asebu], who with us are jointly resolved to depose the Braffo of

[95]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 86.

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> Fanteen and Captain of Quaman, and make the Captain of Abra Braffo in his stead.[96]

The letter as reproduced is undated, and was assumed by Van Dantzig to relate to the treaty which the Dutch made with Fante in August 1697.[97] However, it must date from before 6 April 1697, when William Melross retired from the Council of Chief Merchants and embarked from Cape Coast for England.[98] In fact, it can be identified with a letter of 25 February 1697, which is summarized in the RAC letter-book in the NA (in part) as "Dutch attempting to make a new war."[99]

On its resumption in April 1697, the Rawlinson correspondence records a second attempt by the Dutch to win over the Fante. The RAC fort at Anomabu reported on 24 April that the WIC Director-General was expected to come to the Dutch fort at Kormantin a week later: "[i]t is thought he designs once more to try if he can prevail with the natives to take money for carrying on a war against the King of Aguaffoe." The outcome of these negotiations is not explicitly recorded, but evidently the Fante remained divided. On 15 June it was reported that the Brafo was still "resolved to the assistance of Little Taggee and Captain Dickee [sc. of Kormantin, evidently again allied with Takyi Kuma, as in 1696]," but opposed by the Captain of Abora, who was "resolved to turn him out if he can." On 16 June, the Captain of Abora requested that one of the Chief Merchants might come from Cape Coast for "the settlement of the country," and William Ronan again came to Anomabu to meet him. On 12 July the RAC chief at Anomabu reported that the Captain of Abora had sent a message explaining that "he hath not as yet found a convenient opportunity for displacing the Braffoe, but does watch an occasion, which he hopes will not be long," and that the Brafo, in order to avert the threat of deposition, had publicly renounced his support for Takyi Kuma.[100] In this, however, either the Brafo was disingenuous, or he subsequently thought better of it, since five weeks later, on 5 August, as has been seen, he made a formal agreement with the Dutch to join in the projected war to install Takyi Kuma as King of Eguafo.

[96]Charles Davenant, *Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the Trade to Africa* (1709), Part II, chapter 3 in *The Political and Commercial Works of ... Charles D'Avenant*, ed. Sir Charles Whitworth (5 vols.: London, 1771), 5:198-99. A later letter in the Rawlinson correspondence confirms that the Captain of Kwaman had taken money from the Dutch "to help Little Taggee": vol. iii, no. 878: Richard Sheldon, Anomabu, 9 November 1697.

[97]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 109.

[98]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 6 April 1697.

[99]Ibid., 25 February 1697.

[100]vol. iii, nos. 864, 871-73, 875: John Brown, Anomabu, 24 April, 15, 16 June, n.d., and 12 July 1697.

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At the same time the Dutch were also prospecting the recruitment of other African allies. Whereas Bosman stresses mainly negotiations with Adom, the RAC seems to have been more concerned about the possibility of intervention by Akani, evidently referring here to the Akani homeland, the state of Assin. On 24 April 1697 the RAC chief at Anomabu reported that he had been told that "the King of the Arcanyes intends to the assistance of Little Taggee," and indeed that he was already "on the march and almost as far as Abramboe [Abrem, the northeastern neighbor of Eguafo], with a party of soldiers, it is said their design is first to fall upon Fattue"—Fetu being presumably targeted as an ally of Eguafo. It was also reported that it was the caboceers of Cabess Terra who had sent to the Captain of Abora, "to acquaint him with the Arcaneys' designs and [that they] refuse to be concerned." On the face of it, this seems to contradict Bosman's account that Cabess Terra joined Akani in promising to assist the Dutch against Eguafo, but a later report confirms that Cabess Terra, as well as Akani, was considered as a potential enemy. On 16 June, it was reported that the Captain of Abora had sent forces to surround the Dutch fort at Kormantin, in order to "stop all the ways, that Captain Dickee nor none of his confederates, nor none in Cormanteen fort, may make their way through this country to Cabes Terras nor Arcanes, to create a new war."[101] Thereafter there is no further reference in the Rawlinson correspondence to the threat of intervention by either state, but the Dutch treaty with Fante in August 1697 still assumed their assistance.

The Rawlinson correspondence thus broadly confirms Bosman's account of Dutch attempts to elicit assistance from Akani and Cabess Terra, except that it shows that these were pursued simultaneously with their negotiations with Fante, rather than subsequently to them. The report of Akani forces reaching Abrem in April 1697 also refutes Bosman's assertion (p. 36) that the Akani, in common with the Adoms and Cabess Terras, "[did] not ... stir one foot from home." The Dutch were also active in trying to recruit allies from Eguafo's more immediate neighbors further west. The chief of the RAC fort at Dixcove, on 4 June, reported an approach to Ahanta, not mentioned by Bosman: "[h]ere was lately the Dutch General's boy come to make a palaver with the Antas, his business was to get them to fight Great Taggee, and offered them money," but the Ahantas rejected the offer. Later, on 5 August he reported hearing that "Shumaw [Shama] people and the Addoms are preparing to fight Great Taggee."[102] Here too, therefore, the assistance of Adom, like that of Akani, was clearly conceived as a supplement rather than an alternative to that of Fante.

[101]vol. iii, nos. 864-65, 872, idem., 24 and 28 April 1697.
[102]vol. iii, nos 114, 118: Henry Vincent, Dixcove, 4 June, 5 August 1697.

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There was apparently also competition for the allegiance of Fetu, in which Cape Coast Castle was situated. In the Komenda Wars, as Bosman related (p. 48), Fetu was divided, "part of it adhered to the Commanians, and part to our side." This was presumably the context for an obscure episode in July 1697, when Takyi Kuma's forces "plundered" the town of Cape Coast, and were opposed by forces from Eguafo, as well as Fetu, to whom the English supplied gunpowder. (This is not reported in the Rawlinson correspondence, but in the financial accounts of Cape Coast Castle.)[103]

At Komenda itself, meanwhile, the Dutch had resumed their direct challenge to the English position. On 25 May 1697 the Dutch fort fired at persons from the "English Town" who were collecting shellfish in the river. When the English factor sent for an explanation, his Dutch counterpart informed him that "it was his General's order that none should come near his landing place," and a few days later the Dutch began firing at English canoes trying to land at Komenda.[104] Bosman, unsurprisingly, again makes no mention of these Dutch provocations. Takyi Kuma, following his attack on Cape Coast, was also thought likely to attack Komenda. On 22 July the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast warned the RAC factor at Komenda that they had "intelligence of Little Taggee's being out," and presumed to be intending to attack the English fort there. A week later, they also wrote to London that "Little Taggee [is] prevented by Great Taggee [from attacking Komenda?], but succoured by the Dutch, who endeavour to reimbroil the country."[105]

The formal agreement made by the Brafo of Fante with the Dutch on $^{5}/_{15}$ August 1697 is not explicitly mentioned in the Rawlinson correspondence, owing to an unexplained hiatus in correspondence from Anomabu between mid-July and the end of August—perhaps the local factor was incapacitated by illness. It is evidently reflected, however, in the fact that on 17 August the Chief Merchants again sent to Komenda to warn of "Little Taggee's design on this place," against which the English fort undertook to prepare.[106] It also seems to be alluded to in a report sent to London on 9 September that the Dutch, in their design to expel the English from Komenda, had "corrupted some of the natives [i.e., the Fante]," and that the Chief Merchants were "at expenses to countermine them."[107] Gifts were sent to the

[103]NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 16 July 1697. A subsequent (31 August 1698) reference to the rebuilding of the town, following its being "burn'd by Great Taggee ... in the last war," is presumably a mistake for "Little Taggee."
[104]vol. iii, nos. 397, 399: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 25 and 31 May 1697.
[105]vol. iii, no. 408: idem., 28 July 1697; NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 30 July 1697.
[106]vol. iii, no. 412: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 18 August 1697.
[107]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 9 September 1697.

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Captain of Abora, to encourage him to proceed with the deposition of the Brafo. They were transmitted through Anomabu, where the RAC's factor on 3 September promised to report on "the Captain of Abora's proceedings with the Brafo," and undertook "to do what I can to persuade him to hasten to dispatch him."[108]

Unfortunately, at this point there is another gap in the Rawlinson correspondence (September-October 1697), which does not therefore explicitly document the outcome of these diplomatic maneuvers, though when the correspondence resumes in November 1697, a reference to "the late Braffoe" implies that he had in fact been removed.[109] Bosman recounts (p. 35) that "one of their [English] Governors" went from Cape Coast to Fante to secure their neutrality, and that "they soon dispatched [the Brafo] out of the way, substituting immediately another in his room."[110] The Cape Coast Castle accounts confirm this mission, again undertaken by William Ronan, in late September, and allude to fighting between the Captain of Abora and the Brafo, in which the former was assisted by soldiers sent by the King of Eguafo.[111] Evidently, as had been envisaged in the original negotiations in February, it was the Captain of Abora who now succeeded to the title of Brafo.[112]

VIII

With the deposition of the Brafo, the threat of a renewed attack on Komenda evidently faded. On 4 November 1697 the RAC's factor there reported that, as the place was now "settled", he was "in expectation of trade" and on 13 December that that they "have had no disturbances this three months"—i.e., since September.[113] For a while threats of war persisted. In October the

[108]vol. iii, no. 877: John Brown, Anomabu, 3 September 1697. These gifts are also referred to in NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 31 August and 11 September 1697; Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 87 (misquoting the reference as 1 September) says that these gifts were sent to "the Dey" (which by implication was the title held by the Captain of Abora), but this seems to be a misreading of the text.

[109]vol. iii, no. 878: Richard Sheldon, Anomabu, 9 November 1697.

[110]The original Dutch text makes explicit that the Brafo was in fact killed; "they had him murdered:" Van Dantzig, "English Bosman," 202.

[111]NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 29 and 30 September 1697. Cf. also NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 27 September 1697, reporting "their good success against the design of the Del Mina people" and "the benefits hoped for by the said treaty," the latter being presumably an agreement made with the new Brafo of Fante.

[112]Cf. NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 30 March 1698, "Capt. of Abra als. new Braffoe of Fanteen." The new Brafo is named as "Aquashee" (ibid., 12 January 1698), which was also given as the name of the Captain of Abora earlier (vol. iii, no. 1017: John Browne, Egya, 14 March 1696).

[113]vol. iii, nos. 414, 417: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 4 November, 13 December 1697.

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accounts of Cape Coast Castle reported a rumor that the Akani were coming to attack the king of Eguafo, still encamped within Fetu.[114] In early December the king made a payment to Cabess Terra "to assist him in his war" and later in the same month to Twifo to "prevent ... them making a new war."[115] The local dispute between the English and Dutch at Komenda also remained unresolved. On 4 December, the RAC factor there wrote to Cape Coast to request additional guns as protection "against the Dutch, if [we] should have any difference," and the Chief Merchants subsequently assured the Company in London that the Komenda fort was "defensible, to dispute for the landing with the Dutch."[116]

In early 1698, however, there was an accommodation. First, the RAC and the WIC reached an agreement whereby the latter "consent[ed] to the English right of landing at Comenda." This agreement was notified to the English fort at Komenda on 4 February.[117] Shortly after, moves were made for a peace between Eguafo and the Dutch. Bosman reports (p. 37) that "[w]e concluded a peace upon very honourable and just terms." English sources supply a date: in early April, the Chief Merchants reported that they had been informed that "the Dutch have orders to make a peace with Aguaffo," and the accounts of Cape Coast Castle record that on 6 April the Eguafo king went "to meet the General of the Mine to treat of peace."[118] The negotiations were conducted in Elmina Castle.[119]

[114]NA, T70/374, Journal Cape Coast Castle, 23 October 1697; cf. also T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 18 December 1697, reporting that the Akani were "holding off from the peace."

[115]NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 8 and 28 December 1697. A later Dutch account recalls that "when there was war between Abetecki and Teckiankan," Director-General Van Sevenhuysen sent money to Twifo, "to march out in aid of the mentioned Teckiankan": Van Dantzig, *The Dutch*, no.99: Testimony of Makelaer Akoe to Fiscal J. Rademacher, Elmina, 10 June 1702.

[116]vol. iii, no.416: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 4 December 1697; NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 18 December 1697.

[117]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 2/6 April 1698; vol. iii, no.420: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 9 February 1698.

[118]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 2/6 April, 28 May 1698; T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 6 April 1698. The letters from the Chief Merchants refer to "an accident in Aguaffo's camp," which it was feared "might draw them from the Company's interest," but which was "made up" by an advance of gold to the king. Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 8 n22, appears to relate this to the murder of Takyi Panin, but this occurred later (October 1698). In fact entries in the Cape Coast Journal for 6 and 22 April show that it refers to the accidental killing of the chief of "Aqua" (north of Fante), who was allied with Eguafo.

[119]A later Dutch source recalls the occasion when "King Abetecki of Commanie had come into the garden of Elmina in order to make a new peace": Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 99: Testimony of Makelaer Akoe, 10 June 1702.

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The correspondence from Komenda in the Rawlinson corpus does not record these negotiations, presumably because they took place elsewhere, but a letter of 27 May 1698 alludes to their outcome, "the palaver being ended here, and we live very peaceable." A more explicit reference occurs in a letter from the RAC's factor at Egya to the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast, on 18 April, expressing hope "that by this time your great troubles about this making peace between the King of Aguoffoe and the General of the Mina is almost over."[120] The indication here of English agency is noteworthy. Bosman's published account (p. 37) makes no reference to any such English involvement, and indeed implicitly denies it, representing the English as "disgusted" at the conclusion of the peace. However, his own earlier report to the Council at Elmina confirms that the peace was made "not without the consent of the English, who had their own representatives attending the negotiations."[121] Bosman's suppression of this information is surely deliberate, designed to support his general demonization of the English role at Komenda.

The peace of 1698 again proved short-lived. Bosman once again attributes its breakdown to the intrigues of the English, who "[grew] jealous that the King would adhere too close to us, we being his old friends, and shake them off," which caused them to contrive the king's murder—as will be seen, in October 1698. This account is plausible, and probably misleads only to the extent of telescoping events, implying that English hostility to Takyi Panin followed quickly after the conclusion of the peace, whereas the Rawlinson correspondence allows us to trace the growth of tension over time. The basic problem was evidently that Takyi Panin, in his customary balancing act, now sought to improve relations with the Dutch in order to lessen his dependence on the English. Already on 17 May the RAC's factor at Komenda reported indignantly that the former "Marine" (i.e., royal tax-collector) at Komenda, hitherto considered a friend to the English, was now building a house in the Dutch section of the town; when the English factor sent to know why he was doing so, he said "he does it by the King of Aguoffoe's order." On 19 June the King again "sent here some of his men to order all our towns people to go over and live with the Dutch," and also instructed the English factor "that what traders comes here, to send some to the Dutch." On 1 July the factor noted that the Dutch had given "great gifts" to several of the Komenda caboceers, as a result of which they were "stopping the traders coming to the [English] Castle and sending them to the Dutch, saying they had no dashes from the English to send traders." More-

[120]vol. iii, nos 431, 1038: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 27 May 1698; Charles Salmon, Egya, 18 April 1698.
[121]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 86: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 10 March 1700.

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over, the king had sent to the English factory, "to know why we let ... traders come here which belonged to other places."[122]

A second area of tension also emerged, over the demand of the Eguafo authorities for the payment of "customs." The issue was first raised in a letter written on behalf of John Cabess to the Chief Merchants at Cape Coast, on 17 April 1698, requesting that they would "be pleased to allow me the customs as formerly have been." On 1 July Cabess informed the English factor at Komenda that the king had sent to the Dutch fort for his customs, and was demanding that the English should also pay. On 7 July it was reported that the king "hath sent again for his custom," but meanwhile the Chief Merchants had directed that nothing should be paid. On 11 July the king's messengers were still at Komenda waiting for the customs, and John Cabess was "very earnest for payment of the same," warning that if they were not paid the king "would be a mighty hindrance of trade to this Castle and very troublesome, much against the interest of the Royal Company at this place." Again on 27 August, "the Cabbosheers are very pressing for their custom."[123] Although the precise circumstances of Takyi Panin's subsequent murder remain obscure, it evidently had a background in the deterioration of relations with the English over the preceding six months.

IX

At the same time, developments elsewhere, although not directly related to the situation at Komenda, also threatened the maintenance of peace. One important dimension of the situation which is wholly omitted in Bosman's account relates to the activities of the former ally of the Dutch, the Eguafo prince Takyi Kuma. Evidently the peace of 1698 did not, like that of 1696, provide for his restoration to Eguafo, but the assumption of Van Dantzig that the Dutch now abandoned him is unwarranted.[124] Rather he continued to operate as an ally of the Dutch, though now outside Eguafo. In April 1698 the RAC, against Dutch protests, had re-established its factory at Sekondi, abandoned since its destruction by Ahanta Asirifi in 1694. The English re-establishment there was supported by the Adoms, but again opposed by the Ahantas. On 22 May news reached the English fort at Sekondi that the Dutch Director-General had sent instructions to Takyi Kuma to join forces with the Ahanta "to fight the Adoomes and ... take the English Castle again." An army from Elmina, with Takyi Kuma in attendance, was indeed dispatched against Sekondi a few days later, and stormed

[122]vol. iii, nos 430, 438, 440: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 17 May, 21 June, 1 July 1698.
[123]vol. iii, nos 426, 440, 442-43, 451: John Cabess, Komenda, 17 April 1698; Gerard Gore, Komenda, 1, 7, and 11 July 1698; Howsley Freeman, Komenda, 27 August 1698.
[124]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 110.

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the English fort on 31 May.[125] There were fears that the army might attack the English fort at Komenda on its way back to Elmina, but it was understood that the Director-General had instructed it to avoid a clash; and when Takyi Kuma passed through Komenda on 3 June, he sent a message of greeting to the English fort, insisting that he "was not our enemy, and ... was not coming to hurt us," and claiming that he had gone to Sekondi to fight the Adoms, and had attacked the English fort only after it had first fired on him.[126] Despite this disavowal, Takyi Kuma's success at Sekondi raised the implicit threat of a similar attempt on Komenda.

The situation was further complicated by a war between Akani and Denkyira. The dispute between them had begun by February 1697, when the Chief Merchants of Cape Coast reported that the Denkyiras "are coming down to dispute their differences with the Arkanes."[127] This report proved premature, but fighting eventually broke out in 1698, and the Akani were decisively defeated in early May. The Denkyiras followed up by overrunning Cabess Terra, immediately south of Akani, and it was feared that they would go on to attack Fante also.[128] The balance of military power had been seriously disturbed, but how this might affect the situation at Komenda remained to be seen. In 1695-96, as has been seen, the Dutch had hoped to recruit the Denkyiras to their coalition against Takyi Panin, but in 1697 the RAC had anticipated that they would rather "side with the King of Aguafo."[129] In the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Akani there were contradictory fears and speculations. The English factor at Anomabu on 27 May 1698 reported various rumors as to the intentions of the Denkyiras, one of which was that they might attack Eguafo: "I hear likewise that the King of Aguoffoe is threatened by the Dankeryes for a breach of promise." The reference to "breach of promise" is not further explained, but it may be recalled that in 1695 Eguafo had promised Denkyira 80 bendas to prevent Twifo attacking it, so it may be that this payment was still outstanding. On 7 June it was reported that the kings of Eguafo and Asebu and the Brafo of Fante were to meet "to consult what is best to be done, in case the Dankerys should come upon them."[130]

[125]vol. iii, nos 260-61, William Gabb, Sekondi, 23 and 27 May 1698; nos. 431-32: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 27 May and 3 June 1698; no. 128: Henry Vincent, Dixcove, 31 May 1698.
[126]vol. iii, nos. 433-35: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 2, 3, and 3 June 1698.
[127]Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, n.d. [25 February 1697], in Davenant, *Reflections*, 199.
[128]vol. iii, nos. 909-10, 913-14, 918: Charles Salmon, Anomabu, 8, 10, and 27 May, 3 June, 3 July 1698. Some of the Fante (together with Asebu) had assisted Akani against Denkyira.
[129]Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, n.d., in Davenant, *Reflections*, 199.
[130]vol. iii, nos. 913, 916: Charles Salmon, Anomabu, 27 May, 7 June 1698.

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Although the Denkyiras may have had reasons of their own for attacking Eguafo, they were also solicited thereto by the Dutch. As noted earlier, Bosman relates that the Dutch negotiated with Denkyira for assistance against Eguafo; he records (p. 36) that they made an agreement to pay Denkyira over 8,000 guilders (£800) of gold. Bosman places this after the failure to get aid from Fante, Adom, or Akani, but before the peace made in April 1698, and it is conceivable that it might have occurred during the hiatus in the Rawlinson correspondence in September-October 1697. However, a reference to an agreement between the Dutch and Denkyira does occur in the Rawlinson correspondence, but in a later context, *after* the conclusion of the peace. On 4 June 1698 the RAC's factor at Anomabu reported that:

> I am informed by Dominee [a local merchant] that the General of the Mina hath given the Dankeryes 150 bendyes [£1200], and Adampo's mother [unidentified] hath given them two hundred bendys more, to watch a private opportunity upon the King of Aguoffoe to murder him, any way that the opportunity might permit of, the Dankeryes being to do it after some time of trade with the English [presumably, at Komenda], that they may be the least mistrusting ... Taggee Ancram [Takyi Kuma] is to be the great engineer the Dankeryes are to work with.[131]

On the face of it, the alleged plot seems implausible, since, as was seen earlier, following the peace in April, relations between the Dutch and the King of Eguafo were now improving, to the annoyance of the English. It appears, however, that this was not merely a false rumor, since a later Dutch source confirms that, some time after Denkyira's defeat of Akani in May 1698, the Dutch did make a payment, of 100 bendas (£800) to Denkyira for assistance "to extirpate Abé Tekki [Takyi Panin] and the Commanize."[132] Bosman's misplacement of this incident in his narrative may merely be testimony to his lack of interest in accurate chronology, but it also has the effect of obscuring what might reasonably be represented as an act of duplicity on the part of the Dutch. In the event, according to Bosman (p. 36), the Denkyiras were distracted from assisting the Dutch against Eguafo by "a war with their near neighbours." Daaku suggested that this might refer to the threat of war with Asante, by which Denkyira was eventually defeated in 1701;[133] a Dutch report of March 1699 states that Denkyira had been at war with Asante since June 1698, which would fit chronologically.[134]

[131]vol. iii, no. 915: idem., 4 June 1698.
[132]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no.96: Instruction for David van Nyendael, 9 October 1701.
[133]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 87.
[134]J.K. Fynn, *Asante and Its Neighbours 1700-1807* (London, 1971), 39, citing Jan van Sevenshuysen, Elmina, 1 March 1699.

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However this may be, there were now revived fears of an attack on Komenda. On 12 July 1698 Cape Coast sent to the RAC factor at Komenda, warning him to prepare for a possible siege. The warning was apparently repeated on 29 July, in response to which the Komenda factor undertook that he would "be extraordinary watchful and mindful over the Royal Company's fort."[135] Although it is not specified from whom the attack was expected, it was presumably once more Takyi Kuma, now in alliance with Denkyira. Although the prospect of Denkyira intervention faded, the armies of some of the interested states apparently remained mobilized. A letter from Anomabu on 28 August reported that the Brafo was currently at Abora, in the north of Fante, and that "he will not remove to his regal seat [Mankessim, the Fante capital] until he hath information that the King of Aguoffoe is gone to his."[136] This state of mobilization is also corroborated retrospectively by the evidence of James Barbot, super-cargo on an English ship which arrived at Gross-Friedrichsburg, at the western end of the Gold Coast on 8 April 1699, who heard of "the war among the natives ... occasion'd on account of a Black King [Takyi Panin, in October 1698] murdered by the English," but also understood that "the armies had actually been in the field for eight months," i.e., since July/August 1698.[137] This suggests that rival armies had set out to fight even before the murder of Takyi Panin precipitated a radical realignment of the forces involved.

X

The death of Takyi Panin is related by Bosman, who recalls (p. 37) that the English "murder'd him, in a manner esteemed barbarous by all Europeans, when he came to divert himself amongst them [at Cape Coast Castle], and make merry with them." He dates this to November 1698 (p.161), but it may have been late October by English reckoning, since the accounts of Cape Coast Castle already allude on 26 October to the conclusion of an alliance between the English and Takyi Kuma—although it is possible that this alliance preceded rather than followed the murder.[138] Although there is an element of hypocrisy in Bosman's account (given his own earlier attempt to murder John Cabess), there is no reason to question its basic accuracy.

[135]vol. iii, nos. 444, 448: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 13 July, 15 August 1698.
[136]vol. iii, no. 924: Charles Salmon, Anomabu, 29 August 1698.
[137]Journal of James Barbot, in Barbot, *On Guinea*, 2:343.
[138]NA, T70/374, Journal, Cape Coast Castle, 26 October 1698, recording a payment to the Brafo of Fante "to make a new league with the English and L[ittle] Taggee." Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 67, also cites this Journal as recording the receipt of a message from the King of Denkyira inquiring as to "the reason for deposeing the King of Aguaffoe" on 2 November (implying that this had occurred some days earlier), but the date should in fact be 7 December.

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Unfortunately, the event coincided with another of the hiatuses in the Rawlinson correspondence (September to December 1698), but it is referred to retrospectively in a report from Winneba that the local ruler had charged that "the English had killed Great Taggee."[139] It is not mentioned in the summaries of letters from Cape Coast Castle to the RAC in London preserved in the NA, which probably represents deliberate omission, rather than merely truncation of the texts;[140] but the Company learned what had happened, and wrote to reprimand the Chief Merchants for "suffering the king to be murdered in our Castle."[141]

Bosman also observes (p. 37) that Takyi Kuma had "a hand in his brother's murder," though without explaining how.[142] His involvement evidently suggests that the murder was premeditated, rather than arising out of the heat of the moment. By implication, the English intention was to place Takyi Kuma on the vacant throne. Whether they expected that he would be chosen to succeed his brother without any need for military intervention is unclear.[143] In the event he was not. According to Bosman (p. 37), Takyi Kuma now "fled from us and shelter'd himself amongst the English, and agreed with them to fall upon the Commanians with the first opportunity." This slightly telescopes events, since a contemporary Dutch report suggests that he initially intended to seek his restoration with assistance from Asebu, and took refuge at Cape Coast Castle only when the Dutch in response threatened him with counter-intervention by Twifo.[144]

According to Bosman (p. 38), the English now hired mercenary assistance from Asebu, Cabess Terra, and Akani to assist Takyi Kuma in his bid for the Eguafo throne.[145] Another Dutch account recalls that the English also tried to secure assistance from Fante, the Chairman of the Chief Merchants, Nicholas Buckeridge, going to Anomabu to offer money "in order to move the Fantynse to help him against the Commanise," but they declined.[146] Buckeridge's mission must have occurred during the hiatus in the Rawlin-

[139]vol. iii, no. 1179, Thomas Buckeridge, Winneba, 20? January 1699.
[140]NA, T70/11, Chief Merchants, Cape Coast Castle, 1 November 1698, 3 January 1699. The former makes no mention of Komenda affairs, the latter merely reports "country in wars and no trade." The RAC later complained that in the Chief Merchants' account of the war, "a great part of the occasions and reasons for it, you have conceal'd": T70/51, RAC to Chief Merchants, 29 August 1699.
[141]NA, T70/51, RAC to Chief Merchants, 6 February 1700.
[142]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 110, assumes that this means that Takyi Kuma helped lure his brother to Cape Coast Castle. This is possible, though, in the light of earlier events, it is not clear why Takyi Panin should have trusted his brother, any more than the English.
[143]As assumed by Van Dantzig, ibid.
[144]Ibid., citing Van Sevenhuysen, 1 March 1699.
[145]But Van Sevenhuysen's letter, ibid., refers only to Asebu and Cabess Terra.
[146]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 92: Van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 15 April 1700.

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son correspondence. On its resumption in January 1699, assistance from Fante was still anticipated, but the matter had again become a subject of dissension within Fante. At Anomabu the Caboceers of the town were reported to be "fully resolved to send according to your Worships' desire what assistance they can," but the central authorities of Fante were divided, the Corranteers sending word that they would soon be down, and would request the Brafo to accompany them, or if he refused "oblige him to send his soldiers with them." The RAC's factor at Egya reported that he was "of the opinion the Dutch have inveigled the Curranteers not to come to Cabo Corso Castle, or some of the King of Eguafo's friends [i.e., of the new king enthroned in place of the murdered Takyi Panin', of which there are some in this country, which pretend to be otherwise inclined."[147] In the event no assistance was sent, perhaps because the Fante were distracted by a civil war (arising from apparently unrelated issues) in early February, between the Brafo and the people of Kwaman, in which the Brafo was wounded.[148]

The attitude of the Dutch in this crisis was ambivalent. Although blaming the English for their disturbance of the peace, they opted to stay out of the conflict. Bosman records (pp. 37-38) that the English did invite the Dutch to join in supporting Takyi Kuma, but they declined, "having but too long found how fatal a war is to our commerce." Another Dutch source shows that this English approach was in fact addressed to Bosman himself, then chief factor at the Dutch fort of Mouri, by Buckeridge on his way back from his unsuccessful mission to Fante.[149] According to Bosman (p. 38), the Dutch remained "perfectly neuter" in the ensuing war. After the event, there were rumors that the Dutch had in fact also colluded in Takyi Panin's murder. Bosman suggested that these had been spread by the English in order to create division between Eguafo and the Dutch, but perhaps they arose merely from the latter's past record of support for Takyi Kuma.[150]

A letter in the Rawlinson correspondence from Komenda on 13 January 1699 reported that Takyi Kuma and his allies were on the march, and expressed confidence in the outcome, anticipating "the good news of a total rout of our enemies."[151] At this critical point, unfortunately, the Rawlinson correspondence breaks off—the last letter registered from Komenda being of 20 February, by which time no fighting had yet begun. Van Dantzig sug-

[147]vol. iii, nos. 927-28, 1040: Gerard Gore, Anomabu, 21 and 22 January 1699; Charles Salmon, Egya, 10 January 1699.
[148]vol. iii, nos. 929, 931, 1042: Gerard Gore, Anomabu, 5 and 7 February 1699; Charles Salmon, Egya, n.d..
[149]Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 92: Van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 15 April 1700.
[150]Ibid., no. 86: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 10 March 1700.
[151]vol. iii, no. 451: Howsley Freeman, Komenda, 13 January 1699.

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gests that no fighting at all eventuated on this occasion,[152] but Bosman is explicit (p. 38) that in the end Takyi Kuma's forces were "totally routed."

Bosman's account does not make clear whether Takyi Kuma enjoyed any significant local support within Eguafo, as he had in 1696. The Rawlinson collection is also unhelpful on this point, but does indicate that John Cabess had been unhappy with the pro-Dutch line adopted by Takyi Panin prior to his murder. In June 1698 he assured the English factor at Komenda that "he is very much displeased in this, that the King of Aguoffoe should endeavour for [the Dutch], and for the hindrance of trade to this Castle." By August the factor was claiming, on the contrary, that John Cabess himself was "very much Dutchified, and more for the interest and advancement of the trade to the Dutch here than to his English Castle," but this may have reflected merely a personal quarrel between the two.[153] By early 1700, at least, John Cabess was associated with the English in supporting Takyi Kuma: when some merchants from Twifo, now described as "friends to Little Taggee ... [and] assistants to Little Taggee in this fight," were panyarred on their way home by a caboceer of Adom (allegedly on the instructions of the Dutch), they were accompanied by some of John Cabess' men, who also carried the personal cane of the English factor at Komenda.[154]

XI

Since the remaining stages of the Komenda Wars are not illuminated by the Rawlinson correspondence, they will be treated here only in summary fashion. The apparently decisive victory of Eguafo was undermined by a quarrel with the Dutch, leading to the outbreak of a fourth war between them by November 1699. This was occasioned by a Dutch attack on merchants from Fetu (allies of Eguafo) while visiting the market at Elmina, in obscure circumstances.[155] Bosman blamed the WIC's chief African broker, Akim, who

[152]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 110, citing Van Sevenhuysen, 1 March [19 February OS] 1699, but this evidently does not exclude that fighting occurred subsequently to this report.

[153]vol. iii, nos. 438, 447: Gerard Gore, Komenda, 21 June and 3 August 1698. Gore's successor as factor later reported that "there hath been some difference between Mr Gore and John Cabess": no. 449: Howsley Freeman, Komenda, 20 August 1698.

[154]Gerard Gore, Komenda, 8 February 1700, in Davenant, *Reflections*, 205-06; Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 85: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 23 February 1700.

[155]In his 1700 report Bosman claimed that the Eguafos were the aggressors, by capturing some persons from Elmina, and "continu[ing] to perpetrate new acts of wantonness, which compelled the D[irector]-G[eneral] to attack them again," but in his later published account, although alluding vaguely to "injuries" perpetrated by the Eguafos against the Dutch, he cast doubt on the truth of the pretext of the alleged attack on the Elminas and condemned the Dutch attack on the Fetu traders as "perfidious and detestable:" Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 86: Resolutions of Council, Elmina, 10 March 1700); Bosman, *Description*, 38-40.

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was Van Sevenhuysen's favorite adviser, for the latter's aggressive policy,[156] and further implies (pp. 38-40) that in this Akim was acting in collusion with Takyi Kuma. The logic of the situation suggested an alliance between the Dutch and the English in support of Takyi Kuma's claim to the Eguafo throne, and on 16 February [6 February OS] 1700, van Sevenhuysen wrote to his English counterpart offering "to discuss with him ways to bring the long lasting war in the interior to an end, if possible," but the latter responded with complaints about the alleged Dutch role in the seizure of persons belonging to John Cabess, as mentioned above.[157] Nevertheless, by Bosman's account (p. 40), the division between the Dutch and Eguafo now encouraged the English and Takyi Kuma to renew their venture, and this time they were victorious—the decisive battle took place on 9 May [28 April OS] 1700.[158] Takyi Kuma thus finally became king of Eguafo.

Bosman ends his account of the Komenda Wars with Takyi Kuma's enthronement in 1700, and in this has been followed by modern historians, although in fact hostilities between the Dutch and English at Komenda recurred in the following year.[159] There were further civil wars in Eguafo after the death of Takyi Kuma in 1704, in which external African assistance was again invoked, but the Dutch and English avoided becoming so directly involved as earlier.[160] Ironically, the apparent English success, in installing their nominee as king of Eguafo, proved to be illusory. Bosman observes (p. 40) that the Dutch as well as the English "had a share of the advantage" of Takyi Kuma's victory, but this is an understatement, since it was Dutch rather than English influence which now became predominant in Eguafo. A later RAC account explains that the Dutch had won Takyi Kuma's friendship by writing off his debts to them, whereas the English alienated him by insisting on payment of what he owed them, so that he "never durst trust himself with us lest he should be detained for debt." In retrospect it seemed clear that "the concerning ourselves in the succession of their kings, on suspicion they may be more inclined to the Dutch interest than ours" had not only been expensive to both English and Dutch, but "nothing has been done

[156]The blaming of Akim for van Sevenhuysen's errors of policy was also endorsed by his successor as Director-General: Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 98: W. de la Palma, Elmina, 26 June 1702.

[157]Ibid., Minutes of Council, Elmina, 23 February 1700.

[158]Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 112. Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 88, says "September 1699," which cannot be correct.

[159]The English fort fired on the Dutch fort and its "village" after people from the latter seized water barrels belonging to an English ship: Van Dantzig, *Dutch*, no. 94: van Sevenhuysen, Elmina, 30 May 1701.

[160]Daaku, *Trade and Politics*, 89-90; Van Dantzig, *Hollandais*, 174-76.

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to less purpose on either side."[161] For the English, certainly, the whole enterprise of the Komenda Wars had been a costly fiasco.

XII

The case of the Komenda Wars thus serves as an illustration of the enormous potential value of the Rawlinson correspondence for the history of the Gold Coast in the late seventeenth century. It not only fills in additional details, but also challenges important elements in the received account, as derived principally from an uncritical reproduction of the tendentious account of Bosman. The revisions which this requires relate not only to the role of the Europeans, but also to the indigenous context of the wars, as regards both the internal politics of Eguafo and its relations with other African states which became involved in the wars. When the contribution of this material is more fully assimilated by historians, it seems certain that major revisions will be necessary or possible in our understanding of many other events, and indeed of more general social and economic conditions on the Gold Coast. The complete publication of this material now leaves no excuse for its continuing neglect.

[161]John Snow, 31 July 1705, in K.G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, 1957), 369.

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