introduction, which is one of the best summaries of the field one could want, but throughout the meticulous analyses.

Of the many rewards in H.'s masterpiece, coverage and accessibility deserve special mention. Not just poets and mythographers, but historians, philosophers, travel writers, orators, grammarians, and novelists too are scoured for stories, yielding a treasury of tales. Twelve dense index columns of ancient sources join the forty-two-page bibliography, the general index, and the 'Index of Tale Types' in the backmatter. Far from merely a reference book, the volume mirrors the multiformity of its subject, making a fine text for advanced myth classes, a resource for scholars in comparative studies, and a delightful bedside reader.

Stanford University RICHARD P. MARTIN

ANGER IN ANTIQUITY

W. V. HARRIS: *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity*. Pp. xii + 468. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Cased, $49.95. ISBN: 0-674-00618-6.

Scholars of the past do not have the benefit of the novelist's omniscience; we cannot probe the feelings of the characters we study. Yet, Harris argues in this important book, our understanding of classical culture and its complex motivations stands to lose, humanistically and intellectually, if we ignore the ancients' representations and theories of emotion—especially the fiery one that seems to have concerned them most, anger. Such is the ubiquity of anger as a theme in ancient writing that H. is able to examine a remarkable range of texts and topics, and he does so with sensitivity and great learning. His book is at once bold and prudent: bold in its successful effort to fit its vast and varied material into a coherent historical story, and prudent in its portrayal of social and political evolution in Athens and Rome.

Is it possible to define anger? In *The Body in Pain* (New York, 1985), Elaine Scarry notes the poverty of language in regard to analyzing subjective phenomena that straddle rational judgement and irrational sensation. Aristotle acknowledges that the challenge of defining anger lies both in its range of intensities, from irritation to fury, and in its special relation to reason: the type of anger he calls *thumos*, for instance, 'seems to listen to reason (*logos*) to some degree, but it hears wrong' (*Nic. Eth*. 7.6.1). H.'s survey of poetry, oratory, medicine, and philosophy from Homer to the early Christian fathers takes full account of anger's protean nature. But his book is not a catalogue—far from it. It demonstrates how what initially and intermittently appears as criticism of the effects of uncontrolled rage in Homer and the lyric poets evolves, by the Hellenistic period, into broad advocacy of the habit of restraining and even eradicating anger. This leads, in the Roman imperial period, to the full-fledged philosophical articulation of the self-governing, anger-free ideal citizen—a widespread and apparently attractive model.

The call for anger control in antiquity represents a contrast to the modern psychological approach, pop and otherwise, which treats anger as a positive pressure that demands and deserves release (more on this below). What the heart of the book seeks to explain are the political and social conditions that kindle the ancients' misgivings about anger, which H. considers virtually without parallel, though he stops short of pressing this unprovable claim. His convincing and extremely well-illustrated (if rather unsurprising) answer is that the interest in restraining personal anger for the

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good of the community, visible as far back as the archaic court culture of Homer, matures decisively in the Greek and Roman struggle to create a society governed by law and order—a civil society in the broadest sense. From the sixth century onward, in a development curve spiking with the Athenians' democratic reforms, the Peloponnesian wars, and the appearance of Hellenistic and then Roman autocracies, citizens come to view anger as best and legitimately expressed not in uncontrolled, private acts of violence, but according to deliberate, formal procedures in the public eye. Banishing rage to the lawcourt leads to its exile from the internal self.

In Part 1's analysis of anger's semantic range from *orgé* and *ira*, the philosophically most significant terms, to *ménis*, *cholos*, *thumos*, *iracundia*, *indignatio*, and others, H. tentatively singles out motifs that herald a specifically Greek and Roman perspective on anger: its felt presence as an extrasubjective force, its visibility to observers, its threat to personal and communal stability. The information-rich overview of writings on anger control in Chapters 5 and 6 (though it steals some of Part 4's thunder) helps distinguish the difference between self-control in a general sense (i.e. *sophrosuné*) and the peculiar issue of rage restraint. Part 2, the longest and most rewarding part of the book, anchors the ideology of anger in political history. Following Norbert Elias's 1939 work on manners and the state in *The Civilizing Process* (Basel, 1939), H. traces the internalization of an ideology of individual self-restraint against the causally related development of complex urban politics (though he cryptically denies any similarity to Foucault's 'hopelessly flawed' views on self-control and the state, p. 23). He rightly treats representations of female anger here in the civic context, arguing that Greek and Roman writers' demeaning characterizations of irascible women enable the wholesale delegitimation of female anger—thereby cutting off avenues of women's emotional expression and resistance against gender-based oppression.

Part 3 is somewhat disconnected from the rest of the book, unfortunately, since its readings of anger in terms of the balance of power among family members (especially fathers and sons), friends, and slaves would have enriched earlier arguments about civic health and stability. H. turns lastly to a topic familiar to readers of Martha Nussbaum's *Therapy of Desire* (Princeton, 1994), the emergence of what he calls the 'absolutist' eradication of anger. Rather than consider the circumstances under which anger might be appropriate, as (for example) Aristotle had done in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, imperial Latin and Greek philosophers tend to seek its erasure through rigorous, systematic self-examination. According to H., this radical approach arises mainly from the ancient tendency to view anger as a sickness. In the linguistic blurring of physical and emotional suffering in words like *cholé* and *pathos*, the belief that the spoken word has healing power, and the (fleetingly discussed) arrival of a 'more unitary idea of the human personality' (p. 346), Hellenistic Greek and Roman philosophers invent 'anger therapy', to be applied everywhere from simple matters of domestic management to difficult cases involving vengeance and justified outrage. The trend peaks in the second century C.E., after which Christian thinkers like Augustine start to suggest that the pious soul has room for anger against sin and the sinful after all.

The book is accessible and eloquent, and for the most part, H. manages to convey the overall evolution of ideas while doing justice to his sources. References to work on anger in modern psychology and anthropology are welcome and often helpful. Some confusing repetitions result from the chapter organization (some by chronology, others by theme). Perhaps inevitably in such a wide-ranging book, some complicated issues get frustratingly brief treatment. An example: in his *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford, 1992), H. glanced at the reputation of the Roman army as a force

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driven by rage, quoting Polybius' harrowing description of Roman soldiers engaged in such furious slaughter that they sliced dogs in two (10.14.4–6). There is a great deal to say about the rôle of anger in the Romans' conflicted representations of themselves as models of both self-restraint and aggressive soldiery; but here H. simply lists another Polybius reference, with minimal comment (6.52, on p. 197). The same goes for his treatment of anger in oratory, a good example of the importance of making a big show of uncontrolled rage in certain controlled circumstances. But let these complaints stand as proof of the book's power to provoke further study.

A final note. The link H. draws between anger control and civil society (a phrase he uses in a very broad sense) is a matter of central importance nowadays to thinkers and policy makers all over the political spectrum, such as Judith Shklar and Alan Wolfe, who believe that widespread tolerance of lapses in civility, especially bursts of uncontrolled rage, creates conditions under which citizens passively accept higher rates of violence from their fellows and from the state itself. Though H. rarely mentions contemporary applications of his study (the last few pages are an exception), his writing shares with theirs an invigorating sense of relevance, even urgency. His book should be widely read.

Stanford University JOY CONNOLLY

ROMAN HONOUR

C. A. BARTON: *Roman Honor. The Fire in the Bones*. Pp. xiii + 326. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001. Cased, $47.50. ISBN: 0-520-22525-2.

This work sets out to gain insight into ancient Roman experiences of the emotions associated with *honor*, the internal flame that provided the stimulus for much Roman social interaction and behaviour. Barton collects a vast range of citations from Roman literature as raw materials for a multi-layered portrait of this aspect of Roman culture; her stated aim is to foreground this multiplicity of Roman voices and to let them 'speak for themselves' (p. 17). Her investigation of ancient culture is illuminated with juxtapositions of comparative material from diverse sources (within the first few pages: Nazi Germany, medieval Spain, contemporary America, Africa, and India), and by viewing Roman concepts variously through lenses of contemporary approaches in other disciplines, particularly anthropology and psychology.

The result is a powerful contribution to the growing body of studies concerned with investigating the inner experience of the ancient Romans. It seeks to expose the mechanisms by which such internal forces as a sense of honour and shame, desire for glory or for protection of reputation, or the need to display virtue publicly, governed society and individuals—in the absence, for instance, of a formal police force (pp. 18–28). However, the work explicitly seeks to reach beyond an audience of classicists, and to show how conclusions about the workings of Roman *honor* have broader significance for our understanding of the human race: 'I have written this book in part because I think it is possible to see through the lens of ancient Roman society the obliquities of our own notions of honour' (p. 271, see also the conclusion and the 'Philosophical Coda' of pp. 289–95). With its 'applied classics', then, this is an ambitious and exciting book, combining wide reference to ancient material with an eye for fertile interdisciplinarity and a sense of the big picture.

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