DOI: 10.1017/S0008938907000878

German History from the Margins. Edited by Neil Gregor, Nils Roemer, and Mark Roseman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. Pp. 306. $49.95. ISBN 0-253-34743-2.

This book is full of surprises. Throughout the volume, for example, there are Jews in unexpected places. Yfaat Weiss presents Jewish intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century harnessing the rhetoric of racial science and positing essentialist positions to explain their cultural particularities. Similarly, Till van Rahden portrays one well-known Jewish intellectual, Moritz Lazarus, applying widespread discourses about the German *Stämme* to legitimate those same differences. He argued that Jews were one of the many German tribes at the heart of the new nation, a position Theodore Mommsen endorsed. If Jewish intellectuals were unexpectedly present in the production of these discourses of race, tribe, and nation, more general notions of Jews and Jewishness, as historians have come to expect them, were both unexpectedly absent in many arguments about decadent popular culture around the turn of the century and unpredictably present as positive examples in corresponding calls to buttress German *Kultur*. Indeed, as Gideon Reuveni argues, "the role and significance of antisemitism as a cultural code was not unequivocal," and thus we "can trace areas of social discourse that did not display any special antisemitic leanings, despite the fact that they contained elements—such as preindustrial romanticism, anti-modernism, anti-capitalism, and nationalism—commonly associated with hostility toward Jews." This insight leads Reuveni to argue further that "historians of German-Jewish relations have often oversimplified the picture, ignoring ambiguities that call into question conventional notions about the place of Jews in German history" (p. 178). Historians of the post-war period appear to have oversimplified things as well. As Atina Grossmann demonstrates, while we have grown accustomed to thinking of post-war West Germany as a place characterized by an absence of Jews, there were many more present than most scholars have imagined, more than 300,000 at one point, and they were engaged in constant interactions with other Germans in personal, private, and public places.

Such surprises, however, are not limited to Jews' presence or absence in disparate areas of modern German history. The borderlands of Eastern Prussia have much to reveal as well. During the Kaiserreich, for instance, and despite the generally accepted historiography on Catholics and Protestants in the east, Helmut Walser Smith portrays Masures, Prussian Lithuanians, and Cassubians maintaining distinct identities and building confessional ties that crossed or counteracted linguistic and ethnic bonds. Smith demonstrates that these interconnections should not be lost to narratives of national homogenization because, among other things, they remind us of the "modest, limited, rooted cosmopolitanism"

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008938907000878 Published online by Cambridge University Press

created by people in these areas, and they call into question many historiographic assumptions about German nation-building in the east. So, too, do Winson Chu's poignant arguments about the varieties of Germanness in interwar Poland, where regionalism overrode much of German nationalism even during the majority of the Nazi era.

Regionalism mattered elsewhere as well. Not the cozy regionalism of *Heimat* associations scholars have become comfortable acknowledging during the last decade, but the kinds of regionalism that caused Guelph conservatives around Hanover to wage an ongoing battle against assimilation into Prussian conservative politics and the trappings of the German state. As Frank Bösch explains, that battle persisted from the 1860s well into the Adenauer era. Similarly, Eric Kurlander depicts so much dissension between universalist, particularist, and *völkisch* liberals in Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace, where the German-speaking liberals proved unwilling to abandon their French notions of liberty for German nationalism, that it would be easy, after reading his essay, to lose any faith in the term liberal as a useful analytical rubric.

The surprises only continue in the other essays. Katharine Kennedy describes the striking continuities and lack of anti-Semitism in German textbooks before the Nazi period. Dagmar Herzog reveals the competing, contradictory, and not-so-conservative arguments about sexuality under National Socialism that, in the end, look much more like the world radicals in 1968 were arguing for rather than the one they were arguing against. Heide Fehrenbach explains in a fascinating essay on mixed-race children in the Federal Republic how political arguments about the children of black occupation soldiers allowed West Germans to "recode their attitudes toward difference and rescue them into the democratic era, albeit on the basis of highly reordered" and often ironic "taxonomies of race" (p. 17). And finally, if we are to accept Karen Schönwälder's arguments about the Federal Republic's swift change in immigration policy in 1973, historians have gotten it all wrong. Government attitudes toward guest workers did not shift because of the oil crisis, leading to a quick unilateral stop in immigration as a reaction by a government that seemed unaware of the consequences. Rather the government, torn between presenting a liberal image of West Germany to the world and struggling with the difficulties of embracing a diverse and multiethnic society, seized on the oil crisis as a means for implementing plans to halt immigration that had been on the table for quite some time.

What are readers to make of all this news? The authors underscore the immediate historiographical implications of their respective essays, and historians of Germany will want to read this volume for those revelations alone. The editors, however, make only the most modest claims for the volume's importance. At the outset of the introduction, they note that part of what the collection should do is give voice to groups and individuals that have been left out of the more general narratives of German history, much like

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working-class history had done decades ago. They stress, however, that their more central goal is to use history written "from the margins," in this case history written about ethno-religious and ethno-cultural minorities, often with an emphasis on gender or region, as a vehicle for rethinking the broader narratives of German history and, through this process, recognizing that "the margins were less dominated by the center and more constitutive of German identity than the conventional paradigm allows" (p. 2). They also hope to demonstrate that scholars as different as Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Detlef Peukert "are wrong to see modernity as necessarily reducing diversity" (p. 5), and thus their goal is "to illuminate relationships between different ethnic, religious, and social groups, and—sometimes—the relationship of these to the German state, from a variety of perspectives" (p. 7). While they succeed admirably on all three of these points, readers will search the introductory essay in vain for an explicit discussion of where the so-called center in this polycentric nation was located, what it included, and any clear theorization of the metaphor of the margin and its usefulness in German history. For some inexplicable reason, the editors have chosen to leave that task to Geoff Eley.

In the volume's final chapter, Eley makes explicit what the editors only imply: at the center of German history is the state and the politics of citizenship, and at the center of the historiography are questions and concerns about National Socialism and the Holocaust. Everything else is marginal. If we accept the editors' argument about the co-constitutive nature of the center and the margins, however, scholarly work in the margins is also important, insofar as exploring those margins continues to shed light on what Volker Berghahn recently called "the old big questions" (p. 278). Eley takes Berghahn to task for complaining that cultural historians in particular had distanced themselves from the "big old questions" while ignoring socio-economic and political power structures. He retorts that many practitioners of the new cultural history "never stopped arguing their importance," and "turned to a 'culturalist' analytic precisely to engage such larger questions more effectively" (p. 278). But this is an argument about methodology and approach, not what is ultimately important in German history. That, Eley states quite explicitly, remains determined by National Socialism. As he puts it, "the sheer enormity of the Third Reich—the scale of its destructiveness as an exceptional state—justifies the 'centering' of German historiographical interest on this particular period and its priorities." Thus "allowing the meanings of the Third Reich to structure our perceptions of what constitutes a significant question to bring to the German past more generally" seems to him "entirely understandable and appropriate" (p. 274). For Eley then, "big old questions" also exist, and they appear to be those that explore "the processes of transformation and normalization involved in the modern histories of citizenship and their imperfectly realized promises of democracy" (p. 269).

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Framed as this volume is by a chronology that runs from the founding of the modern German state through its multiple manifestations in the late twentieth century, and a geography that is tightly linked to those states, it is easy to see how the volume might support Eley's, and for that matter Berghahn's, arguments about what constitutes "significant questions." It is also easy to imagine, however, that if one extended the chronological border back by a century or more and expanded the geographical lens to include the millions of Germans who traveled widely in the world as representatives of German culture, but not necessarily the German state, one might find that the revelations of scholars such as Smith, Chu, and others are much more central, and much less marginal, to this more broadly conceived German history. Indeed, as scholars continue to engage world and global history ever more earnestly, expanding their perspectives within a wider geography and across a longer space of time, it is possible to imagine that Eley's anticipation of "the 'centeredness' of German history" being "properly unsettled and remade" (p. 282) might include National Socialism, the nation-state, the Holocaust, and the "big old questions" that have accompanied them, giving way to a set of "big new questions" that push those older ones to the margins. Such possibilities, however, are not entertained in this book.

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DOI: 10.1017/S000893890700088X

Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of Criminology in International Perspective. Publication of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. Edited by Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xiii + 492. $85.00. ISBN 0-521-81012-4.

Within two years of each other, Peter Becker and Richard Wetzell published complementary, chronologically overlapping, well-received histories of German criminological discourse and practice. Becker's *Verderbnis und Entartung*, which appeared in 2002, focuses on the nineteenth century. His work chronicles a shift in the course of that century from explanations of deviant behavior in terms of willful, immoral choices to a preoccupation with hereditary and environmental determinants. Wetzell's *Inventing the Criminal*, published in 2000, begins with the anthropological-biological-sociological debates of the late nineteenth century and concludes with radical Nazi proposals to purge society of individuals classified as habitual delinquents.

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