Chapters 7 and 8, on the community's assessment of 'desert' in relation to its anger, contrasts effectively the figures of the properly angry prosecutor, who seeks to 'spend' his anger through due process and in good time, and the sycophant. The transition to the sycophant is effected through analysis of Lycurgos' attempt in *against Leocrates* to justify his impersonal and patriotic style of prosecuting—which is vulnerable where the emphasis on Lycurgos' tendency to cite poets and Spartan laws is claimed as a novelty, but in fact (as is acknowledged in a footnote) the pioneer here was Aeschines' *Timarchus*, whose many quotations of poetry and citation of an alleged Spartan speech were then capped by Demosthenes in the *Embassy* speech. The discussion of the language used to denigrate the 'sycophant' is the most interesting approach here (though not wholly convincing), as she pursues the homology of 'iretic' and 'erotic' *orgē* to connect up (e.g.) multiple sexual associations of fresh and dried figs with the idea of the well-timed expression of 'ripe' anger.

Chapter 9 has much that is novel and illuminating on the choices of different forms of punishment, and the Athenian development of a 'code of silence' about the treatment or disposal of the punished body. The last two chapters discuss, penetratingly, Plato's radical attempt to revise theories of punishment by the removal of significant rôles for anger and retaliation (except when dealing with the 'incurables' in the *Laws*), and Aristotle's more moderate set of compromises, by means of differentiated conceptualizations of justice and honour.

In conclusion, this is a fascinating, if densely written, book, full of exciting new ideas; it contains subtle analysis of comparative principles and ideologies, and much detailed argumentation about Greek moral and legal concepts and practices (including five appendixes). Errors of fact are rare, though some I noted do affect the argument. For example, the Thargelia took place not on the 'last day of the Athenian year' (p. 85), but on the 6th–7th Thargelion, the penultimate month, which affects her statement of the meaning of the scapegoat ritual; there seems little warrant for associating Semonides specifically with 'the archaic *Athenian* literary scene' (p. 119), nor for associating the wild *orgē* of some of his animal-like women especially closely with anger and revenge; in places (e.g. pp. 152, 155) she writes as if she is confusing the *logographos* with his client; and at Aeschines 1.162–3 (p. 224) the 'stoning' of a prosecutor seeking redress for non-fulfilment of a contract for homosexual services is a hypothetical scenario, not a 'previous case'.

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GREEK SLAVES

H. KLEES: *Sklavenleben im klassischen Griechenland* (Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei, Band 30.) Pp. vii + 513. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. Paper, DM 148. ISBN: 3-515-07484-8.

This, along with his earlier *Herren und Sklaven* (Wiesbaden, 1975), completes a formidable pair of works on Greek slavery. The first looked primarily at the ideology of slave owning. This has as its focus the experiences of the slave. It is perhaps the most encyclopaedic modern work on classical Greek chattel slavery (though helot and serf-like groups are not part of its remit). It discusses everything from housing and material life (Chapter 2) to sex and family life (Chapter 5), and even whether slaves were expected to speak good Greek (pp. 248-9). Its emphasis is on Athens, but there is an impressive amount of (fragmentary) non-Athenian material too. There is

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a vast accumulation of evidence (including the epigraphic and archaeological, though the stress is on the literary), which the index renders very accessible. Sometimes the more recent modern debate is not fully integrated into the text (e.g. on hubris, pp. 362–6, slave torture, pp. 389–409, or Menander, pp. 290–6), but this will nonetheless serve as a standard work of reference for years to come.

Klees is also arguing a point. While the anglophone tradition tends to be very negative about ancient slavery, K. has operated within a German tradition readier to discuss elements which allowed slave and master to live alongside one another in (relative) peace. He has, however, no time for anyone unwise enough to put the words 'humanity' and 'slavery' in the same sentence. Some, unaware of the continuing debate, might be surprised at the detail K. feels the need to muster to support his argument. K.'s methodological awareness is another element elevating this above a simple work of reference. It is best manifested in his introduction and conclusion. He makes clear the difficulties of drawing history from genres such as comedy and tragedy (pp. 15–17), warns against glib modern comparisons (p. 10), and, while recognizing that there will always be gaps in our knowledge, expresses the (entirely fulfilled) hope that he will have made some of those gaps smaller (p. vii).

K. is fully aware (despite the size of the book) of the inadequacy of much of our evidence. Nonetheless, he does attempt to offer a global view of Greek slave life, and that view is determinedly pessimistic, perhaps a little too much so. That is not to suggest that our view ought to be optimistic. One can easily imagine the potential horrors of the slave life. The difficulty is in the proof. Perhaps understandably, given the context in which the book was produced, he sometimes pushes the evidence a little and in so doing dilutes his many excellent arguments with just a few weaker ones. To give just one case, Herodotus describes how Histiaeus sent a secret long-distance message by tattooing it on the head of his slave, waiting for the slave's hair to grow back and sending the slave to his destination with instructions to have his head shaved. K. cites this as an example of a master's mistrust for his slave. He notes that an author from the Roman period, Aulus Gellius, supplements Herodotus by suggesting that Histiaeus had deliberately withheld from the slave the real purpose behind the tatooing (p. 278). Should this Roman material be brought in to complement the Greek? For the classical Greek author Herodotus it is Histiaeus' inventiveness and paranoia which take centre stage, not his mistrust of slaves. In addition, K. himself points out that even if Aulus Gellius were correct in adding to the original story, the unwillingness to tell the slave the truth might have more to do with the fear of what a slave might say when tortured than any lack of faith in his loyalty. One wonders whether the use of post-classical material serves only to complicate our picture unnecessarily. This is particularly true of the use of Roman comparisons to reinforce particular points: note K.'s own differing attitudes to such comparisons (pp. 99, 110–11, 172 with pp. 137, 273).

The determinedly pessimistic approach is also evident in the manner in which laws affecting slaves are considered. There is no doubt that K. is correct that Greek slaves had very little legal protection and what little they had was very difficult to apply in practice (Chapter 9), and laws do tend to indicate that there is a perceived abuse to be addressed. But there is, of course, another side to this question. The existence of a law indicates a willingness (on some level) to try to deal with an abuse. If laws were difficult to enforce, they remained statements of principle, of expectations of normative behaviour. K. does raise these issues but tends to be quite dismissive, arguing that we do not know how effective social norms were in stopping abuse (pp. 63–4, 110, 203–8, 365, 433), Theoretically, the question is left open; in practice, the reader is given a clear negative impression.

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K.'s outrage echoes through this passionate (and detailed) work. And if just occasionally he may strain too hard for his argument, that strain highlights a dilemma for any historian of ancient slavery. In the absence of slave evidence, and in a world where much of the routine life of a slave would have gone unreported, is it legitimate to leave the argument at 'not proven', and thereby gloss over (probably massive) human misery? In addition, crucially, whatever difficulties one might pose with individual pieces of evidence, his overall case is extremely strong. It is very difficult to argue with his conclusions: that slavery was an institution based on force, that the Greeks had a pretty cold-blooded and superior attitude towards their slaves, and that slavery would have been harsh for most of those who suffered it (Chapter 10). This book is indispensable both to students of slavery and to anyone interested in the way historians argue.

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MERCHANT CITIES

A. BRESSON: *La cité marchande*. Pp. 343, ills. Bordeaux: Editions Ausonius, 2000. Paper, frs. 248. ISBN: 2-910023-16-8.

This volume consists of twelve essays, six published previously and six new, that take aim at the primitivist interpretation of the Greek economy proposed by the late Sir Moses Finley. B. argues that the public/private, state/economy distinctions of the primitivists are false dichotomies. Individually, the essays are densely argued; taken together, they make a strong case for modifying many of Finley's positions.

The volume opens with two chapters on Naukratis. B. argues that Herodotus (2.178–9) is right to distinguish between residents and traders. The former constituted a community under the authority of the Pharaoh and not an independent Greek *polis*. Furthermore, the Hellenion did not arise to serve an informal mélange of Aegean traders, but was a formally constituted body regulated by representatives of member states. We end up with a minimalist view of Naukratis as a city—it is always under Egyptian authority—and a maximalist view of the Hellenion—it was more than a random grouping of traders.

Supporting evidence, however, is inconclusive and contradictory. For example, B. identifies the honorand of *IG* 12.1.760 as an Egyptian resident in Naucratis, not an Aiginetan (as in Austin's restoration). But, as a subject of Pharaoh, the honorand had no citizenship, the basis (according to B.) of proxenia. Similarly, in the Damoxenos proxeny decree, the honorand is described as dwelling in Egypt. This should make him a resident and not a member of the trading community, yet the Naucratite copy of the inscription is destined for display at the Hellenion, the sanctuary of the trading community. Rather than demonstrating the clear separation of the two groups, the inscriptions therefore support Austin's contention that the separation between town and traders was unclear.

The question of Naukratis' status has also been taken up by Mogens Hansen. B. rejects Hansen's conclusion that Naukratis was a polis by the mid-fifth century on the grounds that the coinage and inscriptions used by Hansen are all late (post-Alexander), and that the specificity claimed by the so-called *lex Hafniensis* is specious: Herodotus refers to many Egyptian towns as *poleis* and he certainly does not mean city-states. One cannot conclude that Naukratis was a *polis* in the formal sense simply because Herodotus calls it that.

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