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Popery, trade, and universal monarchy

Why did Anglican Royalists feel that the Dutch were the economic enemy? Why, in short, should the battle against republicanism and irreligion be conducted in economic terms? The answer to these questions lies in the way Restoration Englishmen understood the workings of European politics, an understanding conceived in terms of the idiom of universal monarchy.

The English in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries had feared and loathed the King of Spain and the House of Habsburg not just because they were the current enemies, but because they pretended to a universal monarchy of all the known world. The vast territories inherited by Charles V made it possible for the first time since Charlemagne for a secular prince to reclaim the *imperium* of Rome. In English and Protestant eyes the foreign, indeed the imperial, policy of Charles V and his son Philip II was a necessary adjunct to their alliance with the Antichristian Church of Rome. "Popish and Spanish invisible arts and counsels," argued Fulke Greville in his famous *Life of Sidney*, aimed "to undermine the greatness and freedom both of secular and ecclesiastical princes ... and by their insensible fall, a raising up of the House of Austria many steps toward her long-affected Monarchy over the West." Spain's goal, opined Lord Burghley in 1590, was "to be lord and commander of all Christendom, jointly with the Pope and with no other associate." "By fraud, policy, treason, intestine divisions and wars," recalled the author of *Philanax Protestant*, "the Pope and Spaniard too" tried to reduce all Protestant princes and realms to "their long prosecuted universal monarchy." "It hath been hitherto the only business of the Spaniards," concurred one Cromwellian propagandist, "to be always in wars, that so they may be ready upon all occasions to produce that monarchy of the whole Christian world, which they have long since conceived."[1] The King of Spain was dangerous precisely because he sought universal monarchy with the ecclesiastical support of the Church of Rome.

[1] Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, *Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney* (London, 1652), pp. 29–30 – I am grateful to Wallace MacCaffrey for pointing out Greville's discussion of universal monarchy to me; BL, Lansdowne MSS 103/63/182–186 (I owe this reference to the kindness of Wallace MacCaffrey); *Philanax Protestant* (London, 1663), p. 22; *The*

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In the middle of the seventeenth century, an economic element was added to the concept of universal monarchy. The long and exhausting conflicts of the Eighty Years War and the Thirty Years War convinced most Europeans that the key to military victory was no longer martial prowess, but economic resources. "Since the wealth of the Indies came to be discovered and dispersed more and more," commented one very keen observer, "wars are managed by much treasure and little fighting, and therefore with little hazard to the richer nation." "Since the discovery of the Indies, and increase of trade," agreed Sir William Coventry, the "foundations of a vaster Empire" were "navigation and commerce." It was for this reason that the King of Spain had struggled for so long to retain control of the Low Countries, for by "conjoining their dominion, and forces by sea to his large empires, and armies upon the main, [he] would probably enforce all absolute princes to acknowledge subjection to him before their time." In the spring of 1664 Sir Henry Bennet published Thomas Mun's famous treatise, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*. This treatise, which Sir Richard Ford called "the most rational and demonstrative discourse on that subject which I ever yet heard or read," did complain of Dutch encroachment on English trade. More significantly, Mun explained the importance of trade in the context of the struggle for universal monarchy. By the wealth he had garnered in the Indies – "the very sinews of his strength" – Mun claimed, the King of Spain "is enabled not only to keep in subjection many goodly states and provinces in Italy and elsewhere, (which otherwise would soon fall from his obeisance) but also by a continual war taking his advantages doth still enlarge his dominions, ambitiously aiming at a Monarchy."[2] No longer, then, would the aspiring universal monarch express his power in terms of territorial control. The universal monarchy of the later seventeenth century would be established through control of trade.

Restoration Englishmen and women understood very well the key role that control of the sea would play in the establishment and prevention of universal monarchy. "To pretend to universal monarchy without fleets was

King of Spain's Cabinet Counsel Divulged; Or, A Discovery of the Prevarications of the Spaniards With All the Princes and States of Europe, for Obtaining the Universal Monarchy (London, 1658) Thomason: 1 October 1657, p. 88.

2 [William Petyt], *Britannia Languens: Or, A Discourse of Trade* (London, 1680), p. 11; *Englands Appeal From the Private Caballe at Whitehall to the Great Council of the Nation* (1673), pp. 6–7; Greville, *Life of Sidny*, pp. 55–56; Paul Seaward, "The House of Commons Committee of Trade and the Origins of the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1664," in *The Historical Journal* Vol. 30 No. 2 (1987), pp. 443–444 (for Bennet's role in the publication of Mun); Sir Richard Ford to Williamson, 22 March 1664, PRO, SP 29/95/15; license granted to Sir Richard Ford to print Mun, 24 March 1664, *CSPD*, p. 527; Thomas Mun, *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade* (London, 1664), p. 56. For the composition of Mun's pamphlet see B. E. Supple, "Thomas Mun and the Commercial Crisis, 1623," in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* Vol. 27 (1954), pp. 91–94. Mun's response to the economic depression of 1623 represented an Anglican court analysis as against the puritan analysis offered by [Thomas Scott], *The Belgick Pismire* (London, 1622).

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long since looked on, as a politick chimaera," argued the Anglican Royalist John Evelyn in a tract originally meant as his introduction to a projected history of the second Anglo-Dutch War, for "whoever commands the ocean, commands the trade of the world, and whoever commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and whoever is master of that, commands the world itself." Only when Rome had established a powerful fleet, and surpassed Carthage and Agrigentum as naval powers, could they "be said to speed conquerors of the world." "It is the sea that terrifies and masters the land," the Marquis of Newcastle explained to Charles II, it "makes great kings if not your subjects, yet subjects to you, and must subject themselves to your will." Although less learned than Evelyn, Newcastle also knew that "all story tells us, that they that have been ever strongest by sea, hath given the law to their land neighbors." "That Prince, whose flags are bow'd to on the seas, / Of all kings shores keeps in his hands the keys," argued the King in the Earl of Orrery's play *Henry V*, first performed in the summer of 1664. "No king can him, he may all kings invade; / and on his will depends their peace and trade." It was in this context that the minister Simon Ford could tell his congregation that "the engrossers [of trade], or obstructors thereof have been in all ages accounted the common enemies of mankind."[3]

Spain, however, had been forced in 1659 to sign the ignominious Treaty of the Pyrenees. As a result Englishmen no longer feared Spain's pretensions to a universal monarchy, but instead commented on her weakness. When the Spanish ambassador in Paris openly told the King of France "that the ambassador of his master shall no more contend for precedency," it prompted George Downing to remark "on the extreme weakness and lowness of the affairs of that crown." The failure of the Spanish monarchy to subdue the Portuguese campaign for independence only served to confirm its demise. After Don John of Austria's devastating defeat at the hands of the Conde De Villaflore, most Englishmen thought that "the Spanish grandeur did so sink in the fatal carnage of that field" that "it will not buoy up again (at least for some years) from that important ruin."[4] Sir Richard Fanshawe's instructions as English ambassador to Spain informed him "that the monarchy of Spain, is fallen to a great declination, more especially in all maritime strength, not only by having the whole kingdom of Portugal

[3] John Evelyn, *Navigation and Commerce, Their Original and Progress* (London, 1674), pp. 15–17, 32–33; Marquis of Newcastle, "Treatise," 1660–1661, Bod., Clar. 109, pp. 6–7, 41–42; Roger Boyle, *The History of Henry the Fifth: And the Tragedy of Mustapha, Son of Solyman the Magnificent* (London, 1668), p. 40 (I owe this reference to the kindness of Ingrid H. Tague); Simon Ford, *The Lords Wonders in the Deep*, preached in Northampton 4 July 1665 (Oxford, 1665), p. 8. For the dating of the performance of *Henry V* see Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. V, 13 August 1664, pp. 240–241.

[4] Thomas Philipot, *The Original and Growth of the Spanish Monarchy* (London, 1664), preface.

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dismembered and separated from it, with all its dependencies, but into such a decay of shipping, mariners, and indeed all means of entertaining their navigation and commerce with the West Indies." "We look on Spain as decaying" and "fear it not," commented the courtier in Algernon Sidney's "Court Maxims." "The more I see of Spain in these times," Fanshawe wrote after his arrival, "the more strongly I am of opinion it will be very hard for their monarchy to subsist long without England and against it, impossible." This reality had already forced the King of Spain to allow others to trade in the Caribbean, in short to abandon "his sole dominion in the Indies." "The vast increase in power by land and sea which other nations have made upon them since Queen Elizabeth's time," Fanshawe pointed out to Clarendon, "hath so altered the balance that Spain must no more pretend to the universal monarchy."[5]

In the absence of the old pretender to universal monarchy, the English began to ponder who would be the next aspirant. Many Europeans already feared the growing power of the young Louis XIV. In Italy, where the French military had flexed its muscle in the early 1660s, he was looked upon "as aspiring to the universal land monarchy." Despite their recent triumphant treaty with the French, the Dutch were already skeptical of Louis XIV's intentions. "It is generally talked here," reported George Downing from The Hague, "that the King of France designs to have the affairs of the Empire brought to such a condition [by the Turk] as that they may at last be forced to declare him King of the Romans and that then he will undertake their defense." In England, many Nonconformists began to comment that the King of France "has rendered himself absolute arbiter even over other kings and that everybody ought to submit blindly to his wishes in everything." Nonconformists in London were circulating copies of Comenius' prophecy that Louis XIV would become "Emperor of the whole world," much to the delight of the French ambassador.[6] Indeed public debate about the third Anglo-Dutch War centered on whether England should identify France or the United Provinces as the real claimant to the throne of the universal monarchy.[7] In the ideological context of the early

[5] Downing to Clarendon, 28 March 1662, Bod., Clar. 106, f. 168v; "Instructions for Sir Richard Fanshawe," 14 January 1664, in Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 5; Algernon Sidney, "Court Maxims," Warwickshire Record Office, f. 179; Fanshawe to Bennet, 3/13 August 1664, PRO, SP 94/46, f. 176r; newsletter, 21 November 1663, Carte 222, f. 44; Muddiman's newsletter, 14 June 1664, Bod., Tanner MSS 47, f. 167r; Richard Fanshawe to Clarendon, 30 July 1662, Bod., Clar. 77, f. 164r.

[6] John Finch to Lord Arlington, 15/25 August 1665, PRO, SP 98/6 (unfoliated); Joseph Kent to Williamson, 29 December 1663, PRO, SP 98/4, ff. 285v–286r; Downing to Clarendon, 30 October 1663, Bod., Clar. 106, f. 225v; Grimani to Doge and Senate, 1/11 April 1662, *CSPV*, p. 130; Comminges to De Lionne, 21/31 March 1664, PRO, PRO 31/3/113, ff. 105–102 (misfoliated); Downing to Clarendon, 12 February 1664, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 84; Thomas Clarges to Ormonde, 17 November 1663, Carte 33, f. 221v.

[7] "From Butterboxes to Wooden Shoes: The Shift in English Popular Sentiment From Anti-Dutch to Anti-French in the 1670s," in *The Historical Journal* (1995).

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1660s it was very difficult for politicians to voice their concerns about France, which was after all a true monarchy and a monarchy with which Charles II was thought to be on good terms.

The obvious heir to Spain's universal pretensions in Anglican Royalist eyes was the United Provinces. The Dutch, it seemed, like the Spanish before them, were seeking to use a trade monopoly as the foundation of a universal monarchy. The danger which the Dutch represented was not, as historians have often assumed, that they would outcompete their English rivals, but that using unfair means they would exclude everyone else from trading in the Indies. The Dutch, as Thomas Mun put it, "do hinder and destroy us in our lawful course of living, thereby taking the bread out of our mouths."[8] The English feared the political program which was perceived to motivate Dutch economic expansion, not the economic expansion itself.

Recent developments in Africa and the East Indies confirmed Dutch pretensions to universal monarchy. In early 1663 the East India trader Richard Craddock had warned George Oxenden that "the Dutches wicked intentions, [their] main drift, and utmost endeavors are to over run this coast and quite banish the English off the whole Indian trade." By that summer the worst fears of the English had been realized. The Dutch had conquered the whole of the Malabar coast. "They have proclaimed themselves lords of all the South Seas," complained three English East India merchants, "prohibiting all nations whatsoever to trade on the [Malabar] coast." When the news reached England it provoked an immediate outcry. "Great talk of the Dutch proclaiming themselves in India lords of the Southern Seas and deny traffic there to all ships but their own, upon pain of confiscation," Samuel Pepys reported from the Exchange. The newsletter-writers soon disseminated the news that the Dutch "call themselves masters of the South Sea coast of Malabar" to their Anglican Royalist readers. The Dutch in the East Indies had made clear "that whatever their masters do or say at home, they will do what they list and will be masters of all the world there, and have so proclaimed themselves sovereign of all the South Seas," Sir Thomas Chamberlain told Pepys. Not any nation "under heaven," agreed the East India merchant John Darrell, "durst then look or fall into their foresaid South Seas (as they term and challenge them) but all the nations must be subject to seizure and confiscation of men, ships, and goods, to that insolent and arbitrary government, notwithstanding any treaty or contract made here with the States of Holland to the contrary, which are but nets and snares to delude the English." The English fury was not directed at Dutch economic success, but the unfair and tyrannical means which they had used to gain control of the trade. The Dutch were "not contented with the ordinary course of a fair trade," claimed the author of

[8] Mun, *England's Treasure*, p. 29. For similar Spanish pretensions see Greville, *Life of Sidney*, pp. 127–128.

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The Dutch Drawn to the Life, but had taken "diverse islands, built several forts, and endeavored a new dominion over us." It was this pretended sovereignty, argued the Anglican Royalist merchant Richard Craddock, that occasioned "a national business ... so that in a year or two more we shall not only have a tug with the Hollanders, but I hope to see their butter boxes fly."[9]

At almost the same time in West Africa, the Dutch West India Company's director of the North Coast of Africa, John Valkenburg, proclaimed the Dutch to be "masters of the whole coast of Guinea." The Dutch, as they had done in the East Indies, were using unfair trading practices. At "every port or place on that coast where the English had any factory or trade," reported Robert Holmes, the Dutch "endeavored to engage the natives against the English and their interest with design to turn them out of all their trade there." "They still retain their old principle to use all base means whatever to hinder us," newsletter-writer Henry Muddiman told his readers. The plan, Downing thought, was for the Dutch to become "absolute sole masters of the gold and also of the negro trade and thereby also to be able to overthrow all his Majesty's plantations in the West Indies for want of slaves." The Africa Company was quick to place these developments in a worldwide context. They "discourse evidently with all," wrote one newsletter-writer, "that the Dutch will leave no stone unturned to discourage and at length ruin [the Guinea trade] as they have well near done our Turkey and East Indy trade."[10]

[9] "Remonstrance of the East India Merchants," 13 December 1660, Longleat House, Cov. MSS CV, ff. 18v–19r; Richard Craddock to George Oxenden, 23 April 1663, BL, Add. 40697, f. 14v; John Hunter, Henry Boye, Peter Cooke, to East India Company, 25 August 1663, IOL, E/3/28, f. 36r; De Bacquoy/Van Ruyen to Williamson, 4/14 October 1663, PRO, SP 84/168, f. 25; Privy Council Register, 25 October 1663, PRO, PC 2/56, f. 297v; George Oxenden and Henry Gary to East India Company, 28 January 1664, IOL, E/3/28, f. 99r; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. V, 29 January 1664, p. 30; Pepys, *Diary*, Vol. V, 9 February 1664, p. 41; newsletter, 9 February 1664, Carte 222, f. 51; newsletter to Sancroft, 13 February 1664, Bod., Tanner MSS 47, f. 60r; Consul Lannoy to Winchilsea, 29 August 1664, HMC, *Finch*, p. 329; Pepys, *Diary* Vol. V, 15 February 1664, pp. 49–50; John Darrell, *A True and Compendious Narration: Or (Second Part of Amboyna)* (London, 1665), pp. 8–9; *The Dutch Drawn to the Life* (London, 1664), p. 143; Richard Craddock to George Oxenden, 10 June 1663, BL, Add. 40697, f. 24r; Ed. Winter, Will. Gyfford, and Edmund Reade to East India Company, 10 December 1663, IOL, E/3/28, f. 23r. See also "Review of the Several Treaties with the Dutch," 20 March 1661, NMM, Clifford Papers, Vol. I, Dw32; Benjamin Lannoy (Aleppo) to Winchilsea, 7 September 1661, LRO, DG7/ Box 4962, Bundle V; Henry Coventry to Ormonde, 13 February 1664, Carte 47, f. 420v. Interestingly a letter from East India merchants in Bantam warning that the Dutch "call themselves Masters of all the South Sea Coast of Malabar to Cape Cammaroon" was copied verbatim in one of Joseph Williamson's newsletters: Letter from Bantam, 25 August 1663, PRO, Kew CO 77/9, f. 19r; Williamson's newsletter, 14 March 1664, Houghton Library, Gay 15.25F.

[10] Downing's Memorial, 4 August 1664, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 54r; Aitzema, "Selections," Bod., Rawl. C734, ff. 101v–102r; extract of Letter from Cormantine, 26 June 1663, PRO, Kew CO 1/17, f. 158r; Captain Stokes to Duke of York, 29 June 1663, Longleat House, Cov. MSS XCV, f. 1; Downing to Clarendon, 25 September 1663, Bod., Clar. 106, f. 206r;

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The English understood the recent success of the Dutch overseas trading companies not in the context of twentieth-century supply-and-demand curves, but in terms of the seventeenth-century idiom of universal monarchy. The English political nation invariably complained about the Dutch insatiable desire to control all of the trade, not about slight improvements in Dutch economic indicators. "They think no monarchs are friends to republics," wrote one Englishman from the United Provinces, but seek "a monopoly of trade which they make their interest." The Dutch, the Earl of Clarendon told Parliament, have "an immoderate desire to engross the whole traffic of the universe." Although the East India Company hoped the English and the Dutch could "be neighbors in situation and yet continue friends," its directors told Sir John Webster, the Dutch had "an unlimited avarice to engross all the trade of the whole world unto themselves." In a conference with the Dutch ambassador Van Goch, Charles himself fumed "that it seemed they wanted to possess all the Indies to the exclusion of all others." "The true quarrel," thought Denzil Hollis, was not about petty economic trifles, "not what is past, but what to come, the apprehension of our co-partnership in their Guinea and East India trade." "If they can vanquish his Majesty or reduce him to terms," William Morrice explained to Henry Coventry, "they think they shall easily be masters of the commerce of the universe." The Dutch, thought John Darrell, "will never be satisfied until they have subjected the trade and treasure of all countries and nations upon earth to their unlimited East-India arbitrary government." The English had to act immediately, for now the two "Dutch Companies of East and West Indies are met together, in hopes also to command from North to South, and so to cross all the subjects of emperors, kings, princes and potentates of the whole universe, save only the Narrow Seas of England which is the chief stumbling block."[11]

Letter from the ship *Charles*, 28 January 1664, BL, Add. 22920, f. 21r; Hollis to Winchilsea, 7 April 1664, HMC, *Finch*, p. 305; Holles to Downing, 7 April 1664, BL, Add. 22920, f. 35; Journal of Robert Holmes, Magdalen College Cambridge, Pepys Library, 2698, ff. 87r, 103; newsletter, 8 March 1664, Carte 222, f. 61v; Muddiman's newsletter, 21 April 1664, Bod., Tanner MSS 47, f. 127; Africa Company petition, 15 June 1664, PRO, SP 29/99/83; Downing to Clarendon, 6 November 1663, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 9v; Downing to Bennet, 3/13 January 1665, PRO, SP 84/174, f. 1r; Edward Hyde, *The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon* (Dublin, 1760), pp. 107–108; Clarendon, "A Brief Narrative of the Late Passages," [November 1664], Bod., Clar. 83, f. 397.

11 W. Cooper to Nicholas, 16/26 February 1662, PRO, SP 84/166, f. 103r; *His Majesties Most Gracious Speech, Together with the Lord Chancellors, To the Two Houses of Parliament, At their Prorogation On Monday the Nineteenth of May, 1662* (London, 1662), pp. 12–13; East India Company to Sir John Webster, 3 July 1662, IOL, Home Miscellanies H/42, f. 56; Downing to Clarendon, 12 February 1664, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 86r; Van Goch to States General, 17/27 June 1664, PRO, SP 84/171, f. 208v (my translation); Hollis to Bennet, 10/20 September 1664, PRO, SP 78/119, f. 74r; Hollis to Fanshawe, 16 October 1664, *Original Letters of his Excellency Sir Richard Fanshaw* (London, 1701), p. 274; William Morrice to Henry Coventry, Longleat House, Cov. MSS LXIV, f. 5r; William De Britaine, *The Dutch Usurpation* (London, 1672), p. 18; Darrell, *A True and Compendious Narration: Or*

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Just as the Dutch were imitating the commercial policies of the Spanish, so they were seen to be following in their inhumanity. Newspapers, pamphlets, and popular poems all reminded the English political nation of the atrocities committed by the Dutch at Amboyna. The tense atmosphere of 1664 soon provided new evidence confirming the perfidy of the Dutch. The governor of the Dutch West India Company was reported to have "offered a bendy of gold apiece for so many heads of Englishmen as should be brought him by any persons whatsoever." In Newfoundland De Ruyter's fleet, after having retaken most of the Guinea Coast, committed "outrages and villanies, ravishing women and maids even before their husbands, parents, and friends' faces." Even in the Channel, the Dutch were known to be seizing English ships and throwing the crews overboard. Those that survived fared little better. "What measures they take of barbarity in Holland," John Evelyn exclaimed in a letter to Roger L'Estrange, they "have lately dragg'd some of our men fallen into their hands through their towns in chains, more like slaves than Christians."[12]

Naturally the United Provinces, as a republic, would not attempt to build up the massive standing armies normally associated with monarchies; but this would in no way hinder the Dutch in their drive for universal dominion. Religion and dynastic ties, Roger Coke pointed out, were as nothing against the interest of trade. The Dutch could keep potential enemies at peace by threatening to cut off their vital economic supplies. Indeed in case of necessity the Dutch could simply hire a mercenary army. "It is rooted in these people to strain to the utmost to get the mastery of his Majesty at sea," explained George Downing, for once they "out power his Majesty at sea then all is their own." The Dutch could achieve universal monarchy by usurping "the universal dominion of the seas." The potential consequences of such a development were already becoming clear. The result of Dutch pretensions in Africa and in the East Indies, thought Edward Adams, was "that the King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, must not treat of or conclude peace with a foreign prince, or provide for the increase of trade and privileges of his own subjects without asking the States of Holland

(Second Part of Amboyna) (London, 1665), pp. 9–10. For similar French views see De Thou to Brienne, 22 November/2 December 1660, in N. Japikse, *De Verwikkelingen Tusschen De Republiek en Engeland Van 1660–1665* (Leiden, 1900) p. iv.

12 For Spanish cruelty: *The Coppie of the Anti-Spaniard Made at Paris by a French Man, a Catholique* (London, 1590), p. 9; Greville, *Life of Sidney*, pp. 124–125; *The King of Spain's Cabinet Council Divided* (London, 1658), Thomason: 1 October 1657, pp. 89, 103–104, 133–135. For Amboyna see for example: *Dutch Drawn to the Life*, pp. 144–145; W. W, pp. 17–19, 22–23, 25; "East India Company Proposals," 1662, Bod., Clar. 92, f. 59r; Poem on the Second Dutch War, BL, Egerton MSS 2560, f. 80v; journal of Robert Holmes, Pepys Library, 2698, ff. 121r, 137r (the journal is filled with atrocity stories); Robert Holmes to William Coventry, 8 February 1664, Longleat House, Cov. MSS XCV, ff. 11r, 13v; T. Mundy, "Some Occurrences," summer 1664, Bod., Rawl. A315, p. 244r; newsletter, 18 November 1664, PRO, SP 29/105/12; Evelyn to L'Estrange, 24 February 1665, Christ Church, John Evelyn MSS Out-Letters.

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leave." England needed to defend herself, preached Simon Ford, "except ... we can be content to change our merchant ships into sculls and oars to ply betwixt London and Amsterdam and no farther, to export our English treasure, and import what they please to allow us for it: which will (in effect) be no other, than to make them the upper and ourselves the Netherlands." The result of the "overswelling greatness of the Dutch," argued one foreign-policy memorandum almost certainly written by Sir Nicholas Crispe, was that they would soon be not only "our corrivals in trade, but if increasing as they have done this last age, in the next they will swallow us up wholly." Already, Downing thought, the King of Denmark was being brought "into an esclavage" and his subjects reduced "to mere tributaries to their merchants." "By reason of their maritime forces," he warned, the Dutch would soon be "able upon all occasions to cast the balance of Europe." "You think the narrow seas for us too much / Yet the whole globe too little for the Dutch," rhymed the Anglican Royalist publisher and poet John Crouch, "Thus, while fair liberty you give and crave / You would be free to make the world a slave."[13] One needed only look to Dutch claims in the East Indies to understand the logic of the Dutch strategy. There, William De Britaine pointed out, the Dutch styled themselves "The States General of the United Provinces of Batavia, Amboyna, T[ai]wan, and c., commanders of all the seas of the world; protectors of all the kings and princes in Europe; and supreme moderators of all the affairs of Christendom." "The Dutch now having made an absolute conquest of all the South-East Seas of Africa, half of the whole universe from Japan and China to Cape Bon-Esperanza," warned John Darrell, they now "endeavor to carry on and propagate the said old war and design into Europe and America (the other half of the whole universe)." Consequently the Dutch had to be considered "universal enemies (especially of England) ... who may compare their conquests by sea with the Great Turk by land, and allow him ten foot for one." No wonder Sir Henry Bennet thought the Anglo-Dutch war would be fought "for the dominion of the seas and the trade that belongs to it."[14]

[13] John Crouch, *Belgica Caracteristica. Or The Dutch Character* (London, 1665), p. 7.

[14] Roger Coke, *A Treatise Wherein is Demonstrated That the Church and State of England Are in Equal Danger With the Trade of It* (London, 1671), pp. 130, 135; "Paper on the Spanish Trade," 1664, PRO, SP 94/46, f. 106r; Downing to Clarendon, 12 August 1664, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 64v; Downing to Clarendon, 2 September 1664, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 173r; Downing to Clarendon, 22 September 1664, Bod., Clar. 108, f. 84r; Downing to Clarendon, 16/26 August 1661, Bod., Clar. 104, f. 252r; Downing to Clarendon, 12 February 1664, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 84r; *A Justification of the Present War against the United Netherlands* (London, 1672), sig. A3r; Edward Adams, *A Brief Relation of the Surprizing Severaly English Merchants Goods, by Dutch Men of War* (London, 1664) [May] pp. 11–12; Ford, *Lords Wonders*, pp. 12–13; De Britaine, *Dutch Usurpation*, p. 20; Darrell, *True and Compendious Narration*, pp. 34–36 (a similar comparison to the Turk is made in De Britaine, *Dutch Usurpation*, pp. 33–34); Bennet to Fanshawe, 29 September 1664, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, p. 279; Crouch, *Belgica Caracteristica*, p. 7. Even those who did not think the Dutch were seeking universal monarchy thought control of the

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Surely the identification of the Dutch as aspiring to universal monarchy must have caused some discomfort to English Protestants. Spain's insatiable desire for power seemed perfectly plausible in light of its close alliance with the Antichristian papacy. How did the English reconcile the Protestantism of the Dutch with their claims to a Papist-style universal monarchy?

For Anglican Royalists, the Dutch were simply not good Protestants. The very origin of the United Provinces lay in an ungodly rebellion. Even Grotius "confesseth" that the Dutch state was begun "by a revolt from their lawful sovereign," commented the translator of Grotius's *De Rebus*, "and the Sacred Scripture parallels rebellion to the sin of witchcraft." This touched Anglican Royalist sensibilities at their most tender point. "Those that are true Protestants abhor that disobedience to magistrates," proclaimed the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland in 1663. "The difference between the faults of the Pope and those of the Protestants about the point of obedience, is this," wrote Peter Du Moulin, "that disobedience with us is a crime, but with him it is a law." "He that rebels against his king, rebels against his God," agreed Richard Carpenter. Those Protestants who had adopted the Papal theory of resistance, thought the author of *Philanax Protestant*, were a "loose, giddy, turbulent and discontented sort of Protestants that have nothing indeed of Protestants but the name." Any government which was not a monarchy, and there could be no doubt that the United Provinces had little of monarchy in it, was not divinely approved. In the days when there was no king in Israel, argued William Goodman, "every man did that which was right in his own eyes; but that which was neither right in itself, nor in the sight of God." Any state which was not governed by a monarch, preached Simon Ford on the eve of the war, was a "state heresy."[15]

The Presbyterianism of the United Provinces was in fact no better than

United Provinces was key to that aim. "Even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now," wrote William Coventry, "all Europe hath looked upon [the United Provinces], not only as a fair step, but as the best part of the way to the Universal Monarchy." *An Appeal*, p. 29. See also James Howell, *Dodona's Grove, or the Vocall Forrest*. 3rd edition (Cambridge, 1645), p. 22; Arlington to Fanshawe, 29 September 1664, Thomas Bebington (editor), *The Right Honoourable the Earl of Arlington's Letters* ... (London, 1701), Vol. II, p. 48; Henry Coventry to Clarendon, 1/11 October 1664, Bod., Clar. 83, f. 239v; Clarendon, "A Brief Narration of the Late Passages," November 1664, Bod., Clar. 83, f. 377r.

15 Hugo Grotius, *De Rebus Belgicus: Or, The Annals, and History of the Low-Countrey Warrs* (translated by T. Manley) (London, 1665), Manley's preface, sig. A4r; Lord Chief Justice of Ireland's judgement against Alex. Jephson, Richard Thompson, and Edmund Warren, 7 July 1663, Carte 32, f. 693v; Peter Du Moulin, *A Vindication of the Sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the Point of Obedience to Sovereigns* (London, 1664), pp. 109–110; Richard Carpenter, *Rome in her Fruits*, preached 5 November 1662 (London, 1663), p. 13; *Philanax Protestant*, p. 3; *Philolaus: Or, Popery Discovered to the People* (London, 1663), p. 25; William Goodman *Filius Heroum, The Son of Nobles Set Forth in a Sermon Preached at St. Mary's in Cambridge before the University, on Thursday the 24th of May 1660* (London, 1660), pp. 4–5; Ford, *Lords Wonders*, p. 13.

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disguised Popery. "Popery and Presbytery, though they look diverse ways with their heads," commented the Duke of Newcastle, "are tied together like Samson's foxes by their tails, carrying the same firebrands of covetousness and ambition, to put all into a combustion wherever they come." Indeed Presbyterianism and Jesuitism had the same ideological roots. "There have been two new sects broached within this 120 years, both the same year, both to the same end," averred Oliver Foulis, "I mean the Jesuits and the Presbyterians, the one set up by John Calvin, the other by Ignatius Loyola, the one is confessed to be the Boutefeu of Christendom, the other is known to be the incendiary of the Protestant part of it." "The Puritan-Church policy and Jesuitical society began together," agreed Bishop Owen in a tract reprinted in 1663, "they are so fast linked behind, and tail tied together with firebrands between them, that if they be not quenched by the power of Majesty, they cannot choose (when the means are fitted to their plot) but set the Church on fire, and the state in an uproar." Toleration, the chief characteristic of the religious culture of the United Provinces, was but a ploy to bring in Popery. "Universal toleration," thought the author of *Fair Warning*, was "the greatest design that [the] conclave of Rome manageth." Rutherford, Sir John Birkenhead exclaimed, even admitted that "they indeed of Rome are well affected to our cause, we are for liberty of conscience, so are they, we would restrain the overgreat power of kings, so would they; they would have the kings accountable for their actions, so would we." In the context of Anglican Royalist claims that all English Nonconformists were Papists in disguise, Dutch Presbyterianism must have been suspect indeed.[16]

Naturally the Dutch, like the English Nonconformists, had long ago lost any real religiosity. "All those true Netherland zealots who contended for religion, were either destroyed by the Spanish Inquisition or fled their

[16] Duke of Newcastle, "Treatise," 1660–1661, Bod., Clar. 109, pp. 10–11; Oliver Foulis, *Cabala*, p. 4; David Owen, *Herod and Pilate Reconciled: Or the Concord of Papists, Anabaptists, and Sectaries against Scripture, Fathers, Councils, and Other Orthodoxal Writers, for the Coercion, Deposition, and Killing of Kings* (London, 1663), sig. A3r; *Fair Warning: Or, XXV Reasons Against Toleration and Indulgence of Popery* (London, 1663), pp. 18–19; *Fair-Warning: The Second Part. Or XX Prophecies Concerning the Return of Popery* (London, 1663), p. 47; [Sir John Birkenhead], *Cabala: Or an Impartial Account of the Nonconformists Private Designs, Actings and Ways* (London, 1663), p. 24. On Dutch Presbyterianism see: Downing to Bennet, 6/16 November 1663, PRO, SP 84/168, f. 87v; Coke, *Treatise* p. 134; H. P. to John Knowles, 19 March 1664, PRO, SP 29/94/117. The literature on nonconformists as agents of Popery between 1640 and 1660 is vast. I give only a sample here: Du Moulin, *Vindication*, pp. 53, 58–61, 64; *Fair Warning*, pp. 8–9, 12; *Fair-Warning*, Vol. II, pp. 5–7, 13, 47, 51, 55, 60; Carpenter, *Rome in Her Fruits*; Thomas Pierce, *The Primitive Rule of Reformation: Delivered in a Sermon Before His Majesty at Whitehall Feb. 1 1662 [1663]* (London, 1663), sig. A4v, pp. 16, 19–20; *Poor Robin 1664: An Almanack After a New Fashion* (London, 1664), sig. B7r; *Philanax Protestant*, pp. 5–7; [Birkenhead], *Cabala*, pp. 20, 23; Foulis, *Cabala*, p. 56; *Aron-bimnucha: Or An Antidote to Cure the Clalamities of their Trembling or fear of the Ark* (London, 1663), p. 67.

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country," thought Edward Cliffe, "of which a good honest stock yet remains in England, but all the rest proved mere pretenders." "No, no," complained another pamphleteer, "I should injure Christendom to reckon the United Netherlands a part thereof; such are their practices, that 'tis a crime in them to profess that religion, and a great mistake in those that entitle them thereunto." The Dutch now were simply "perfidious, self-ended neighbors." This was a necessary consequence of seeking universal monarchy. From the Dutch "we may learn, that those which study to be great by any means, must by all means forget to be good: they must dismiss that puny thing called conscience." The Dutch, Sir Edward Nicholas agreed, were only concerned with interest to which they "would readily have sacrificed all other considerations to that their idol."[17]

In the early 1660s, then, it was clear to most members of the English political nation that the United Provinces were in fact following the now decayed Spanish monarchy in seeking to establish a universal dominion. "Just as the King of Spain had claimed the dominion of Asia and of Africa," commented the Orangist Van Ruyven, "so their High Mightinesses claim the same right by succession." John Evelyn, marveling at the fantastic growth of Dutch power, commented that "if it prove as solid, and permanent, as it has been speedy, Rome must herself, submit to the comparison." Already "they think themselves in the same condition as the ancient Romans were with the Carthaginians," wrote the directors of the East India Company, "when they told them they would treat of peace when they had removed their city ten miles further into the country." "They are of the former King of Spain's mind," noted Downing making a significant comparison, "*Il faut passer par l'Angleterre* first bring down his Majesty and then they shall do well enough with the French." The Dutch had succeeded in applying the principles of Popery and universal monarchy to trade. "By these steps they have climb'd up to the immense pyramids of dominion and power in the Indies, that they are become formidable to the greatest emperors and princes there," noted William De Britaine, "ever making good in their practice that Lemma of Loyola (the apostle of their state) *Cavete vobis Principes*." "These people do arrogate to themselves St. Peter's power on the Seas," wrote George Downing who had been well trained in identifying Popery at Harvard College, "it is mare liberum in the

[17] E[dward] Cliffe, *An Abbreviate of Holland's Deliverance By, and Ingratitude to the Crown of England and House of Nassau* (London, 1665), pp. 52–55; *A Justification*, pp. 2, 4; William Andrews, *Newes from the Starrs: Or an Ephemeris for the Year of Man's Redemption by Jesus Christ, 1665* (London, 1665), 29 August 1664, sig. C3v; De Britaine, *Dutch Usurpation*, p. 19; Edward Nicholas to Downing, 23 May 1662, BL, Add. 22919, f. 217r; Downing to Clarendon, 16 October 1663, Bod., Clar. 106, f. 215v. See also James Howell, *The Parly of Beasts* (London, 1660), pp. 10–11. For similar claims about English Presbyterians see: *Satyr on the Adulterate Coyn Inscribed The Common-Wealth* (London, 1661), broadside; *Presbytery Displayed* (London, 1663), p. 9.

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British Seas, but mare clausum on the coast of Africa and in the East Indies." "Being now in the exorbitant greatness of their power," the Anglican Royalist merchant Walter Travers drew the obvious conclusion, the Dutch are "grown as dogmatical in point of trade, as ... the Jesuits are in tenet and opinion." According to Richard Fanshawe the Hollanders, "with the sole commerce with the West-Indies, from the East by the Philippines, and from Guinea for Negroes ... exclusive to the whole world besides, and even to Spain it self," could now make good their "title derived to them from the King of Spain, and to his Catholic Majesty from the Pope."[18]

English concern about Dutch economic aggrandizement in the spring of 1664, then, was not a purely secular concern about profits and losses. Indeed most merchants realized quite well that the war would prove to be a short-term economic disaster. Instead the economic complaints against the Dutch were placed in the context of the rhetoric of universal monarchy. Anglican Royalists knew that English economic problems stemmed not from intolerance of Nonconformity, but from the international activities of the natural allies of the Nonconformists. War against the Dutch was necessary to prevent them from achieving what had evaded the Kings of Spain: universal monarchy. It was no doubt these "airy notions and rhetorical discourse" which William Coventry, who was already having his doubts about the wisdom of the war, thought had provoked the Anglo-Dutch conflict.[19]

[18] De Bacquoy/Van Ruyen to Bennet, 1/11 October 1664, PRO, SP 84/172, f. 115r (my translation); Evelyn, *Navigation and Commerce*, p. 62; East India Company to Sir John Webster, IOL, Home Miscellanies H42, f. 56; Downing to Bennet, 9/19 September 1664, PRO, SP 84/172, ff. 13v–14r; De Britaine, *Dutch Usurpation*, p. 23; Downing to Clarendon, 20 November 1663, Bod., Clar. 107, f. 22r; Walter Travers to George Oxenden, 5 July 1663, IOL, E/3/28, f. 17r; Fanshawe to Bennet, 23 November 1664, Nickolls, *Original Letters*, pp. 357–358 (Fanshawe concludes by suggesting the Dutch ambassador may get a Cardinal's cap). Another copy of this letter is in PRO, SP 94/47, ff. 170v–171r.

[19] William Coventry, "Paper about the Dutch Wars," 1665, BL, Add. 32094, f. 50r.

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