7.41–2 and cf. 7.55). Here, and in the eventual conclusion to the whole, are the most interesting and fertile sections of the book.

The second and third parts are to a large extent expositional, carefully setting out and distinguishing various elements of the Stoics' categorization (e.g. Part 2, Chapter 6; 'La classification des propositions'). In general, I found these sections, while they deal comprehensively with the Stoics' theory and point where appropriate to the connections with other areas of Stoic thought, less engaging and less innovative. Some of the material in these parts will be more familiar than others, and occasionally G.'s desire to cover and explain every element within this area of Stoic philosophy leads to a sense of unnecessary repetition. Even so, the explanations are clear and the examples, drawn from the ancient texts themselves, well-deployed and illustrative. There is nevertheless a clear overlap in these sections between G.'s work and other expositions of 'Stoic logic', and despite the plausible overarching claim that this material is only here being placed in its proper context along with the rest of Stoic dialectic, this general interpretative thesis sometimes fades a little into the background. Perhaps less emphasis could have been placed in these sections on the expositional material and more on G.'s more interesting claims about the systematic interconnection of Stoic philosophy as a whole and the unity of Stoic dialectic in particular.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge JAMES WARREN

EPICTETUS

A. A. Long: *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life*. Pp. xiv + 310. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £19.99. ISBN: 0-19-924556-8.

A. A. Long has been a vital force in the revival of interest in Stoic philosophy during the last three decades. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, to find him now moving forward to explore the still relatively neglected work of the later Stoic philosopher Epictetus. Epictetan studies remain dominated by the two works by A. Bonhöffer (Stuttgart, 1890, 1894). Only two monographs in English exist: B. Hijmans (Assen, 1959; restricted in scope) and J. Xenakis (The Hague, 1969; of limited value). Recent editions and commentaries by G. Boter (Leiden, 1999) and R. Dobbin (Oxford, 1998) have made valuable contributions, but L.'s volume is the first comprehensive survey of Epictetus' philosophy in English.

This volume is aimed at a general audience, presuming no previous acquaintance with either Epictetus or Stoicism. It includes 146 numbered quotations, ranging from a single line to over a page in length, almost forming an anthology embedded within the text. Although not compromising L.'s usual high standards of scholarship, notes are kept to a minimum and each chapter ends with advice for further reading. Thus, this is very much a guidebook for those new to Epictetus, reflecting its origins in one of L.'s seminars at Berkeley. The first half (Chapters 1–4) focuses upon Epictetus' style, pedagogy, and methodology. Chapter 5 offers close readings of two extended passages (*Diss*. 1.20, 4.9). The second half (Chapters 6–9) examines a number of philosophical themes, including theism, ethics, the self, freedom, and the emotions. The volume concludes with a brief epilogue on Epictetus' later influence. Although written with the beginner in mind, with a text extending over 270 pages this is no superficial introduction.

The volume has a number of virtues. First is L.'s sensitive attention to the literary

© The Classical Association, 2003

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.65 Published online by Cambridge University Press

form of the *Discourses*. These should be read not as Cynic diatribes but rather as Socratic dialectical conversations. In particular, L. draws attention to the rôle that protreptic, elenctic, and didactic play in Epictetus' pedagogy (pp. 52–64). This focus enables L. to make his central claim, namely that Epictetus' thought has an essentially Socratic flavour. Indeed, what we find in Epictetus is 'the most creative appropriation of Socrates subsequent to the works of Plato and Xenophon' (p. 94). With these foundations laid, Epictetus the Socratic dialectician is presented as a serious philosopher worthy of our attention, rather than merely a popular moral preacher. It is L.'s insistence that we take Epictetus seriously as a philosopher that makes this volume particularly refreshing. Yet this affirmation of Epictetus as a serious philosopher does not attempt to downplay the practical orientation of much of his thought. Epictetus is at once both a thinker and a trainer, and L. does much to overcome the traditional (and perhaps false) dichotomy between 'proper philosophy' and 'popular preaching'.

There are a handful of minor points with which I would want to take issue. First, I am inclined to read many of Epictetus' comments regarding what L. calls a 'personalist' conception of God (e.g. p. 156) to be metaphorical, perhaps primarily for the benefit of his student audience brought up on traditional pagan theology. God is not the starting point of Epictetus' philosophy (p. 181); Socratic self-examination is, as is made clear in the passages quoted on p. 187. Secondly, L. suggests that one should focus upon one's προαίρεσις as only this will make one moral (p. 199), as if being moral were Epictetus' principal objective. I would suggest that the principal objective for Epictetus is the cultivation of εὐδαιμονία, and it is a happy coincidence that focusing upon one's προαίρεσις brings not only εὐδαιμονία but also a state in which one does not come into conflict with others. As Epictetus puts it (*Diss*. 4.5.32; on p. 227), 'if correct volition [προαίρεσις] is the only good and incorrect volition the only bad thing, what place is left for battle and contention?'. Indeed, L. acknowledges the non-moral and essentially self-centred character of Epictetus' thought himself on p. 236. In his rejection of 'moral character' as a translation of προαίρεσις, L. suggests that 'moral' is misleading because it is 'too closely tied to the ideas of social duty and obligation to fit Epictetus' primary concern with the achievement of happiness in terms of mental freedom and tranquillity' (p. 218). This point could also be made with regard to some of L.'s own uses of 'moral' (e.g. p. 199).

Although L. is no doubt correct to draw attention to the way in which Epictetus focuses upon 'making progress' (προκοπή) rather than attaining wisdom, I would not want to follow him in claiming that here 'Epictetus is in line with Panaetius rather than Chrysippus' (p. 37). Epictetus' challenge to ordinary values that L. eloquently recounts is considerably more radical than Panaetius' watered-down Stoic ethics for the common man.

Specialists may want to note that L. accepts Arrian's report as 'largely accurate' (p. 128), *contra* the claims of Dobbin and Wirth. He also supports Hadot's correlation of Epictetus' three τόποι with the three parts of Stoic philosophy (see pp. 117–18). This, as L. acknowledges, has been a contested issue (e.g. by Dobbin and Barnes). On both of these points I am inclined to agree with L. Note also an amusing typographical error on p. 262: Justus Lipsius' character Langius in *De constantia* is cited as 'Longius'.

In sum, this volume is a most welcome addition to the literature on Stoicism and an invaluable introduction to Epictetus' thought. It benefits from L.'s considerable abilities as both a writer and a scholar. With an introductory audience in mind, L. offers an exceptionally clear account of often complex parts of Stoic theory, dealing with a number of common objections *en route*. One assumes that a paperback version will follow shortly, and this deserves to become a standard introduction as the

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.65 Published online by Cambridge University Press

evergrowing research on Hellenistic and Roman philosophy continues to percolate into the classroom.

University of Warwick JOHN SELLARS

BURNING MIRRORS

R. RASHED: *Les catoptriciens grecs. I: Les miroirs ardents. Textes établis, traduits, et commentés* (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous la patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé). Pp. xxv + 450, ills. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000. Cased. ISBN: 2-251-00481-5.

An unusual Budé: most of the texts are Arabic versions of otherwise lost Greek treatises. R.'s French is mostly clear and direct, and his mathematical expositions competent and relevant. Our map of cultural history in late antiquity and beyond is extended, the synthesis is useful, and readers of *CR* will want to know the gist from a classicist's point of view. We are concerned with a particular branch of optics and the Hellenistic geometry which goes with it. A parabolic mirror reflects rays in parallel from a light-source at its focus, as in a car's headlamps. Conversely, a sunbeam normal to the rim of such a mirror is concentrated in reflection at a focus. Some knowledge of conic sections is required to draw the cross-section for a desired focal length. This lore can be traced beyond Apollonius (second century B.C.) to Menaechmus (mid-fourth century B.C.).

R. of course rejects the story that Archimedes fired the Roman fleet in 211 B.C. with burning mirrors (pp. 317–9; it can at best be traced only back to the second century A.D. Besides, there is the problem of directing a focused sunbeam, which Anthemius (sixth century A.D.) tries to address. Princes, caliphs, and shahs were later asking 'Is there a good book about these burning mirrors?' The usual answer was 'Anthemius', but there were other specialist sources, among whom Diocles (early second century B.C.) is much the earliest and, for the student of the history of Greek mathematics, the most important. Until quite recently his work was only known at all from some citations in Eutocius. However, it survives more or less complete in an Arabic version first edited with a translation and commentary by G. J. Toomer (*Diocles on Burning Mirrors* [Berlin and New York, 1976]). Diocles' own introduction (*c*. 15% of the book) is interesting and historically important but problematic, owing to abbreviation, paraphrase, and misunderstanding on the part of the medieval Arabic translator; the rest is more coherent (R., pp. xiv–xvi; cf. Toomer, op. cit. pp. 20–23), consisting of sixteen propositions, only six of which were previously known from Eutocius; the lost diagrams can be confidently restored from the text.

Apart from Diocles (34% of the volume), R. presents previously unpublished Arabic versions of an unknown 'Dtrūms' (14%), Anthemius (24%), and a Didymus (4%), each with an introduction, text, and *apparatus criticus*, a briefly annotated French translation, and, for Diocles and Anthemius, some *notes complémentaires*. The rest is taken up by a general *glossaire arabe–français* and a *lexique arabe–grec* for Anthemius (15%), indexes of names, topics, source-references, and MSS (4%), a bibliography (3%), and contents (2%). The book is generally carefully produced, though on p. 235 the labels [Gr] and [Ar] are confused. The diagrams are clear, but it should be explained that R.'s figures in perspective are themselves modern 'translations'. The extensive

© The Classical Association, 2003

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.1.65 Published online by Cambridge University Press