*Aristotle Transformed* [London, 1990], pp. 297–301); and Michael Italicus 137.8–10 and 165.14–15 Gautier.

I conclude with a few miscellaneous observations. I have argued that the excerpts *ἐκ τῶν Λογγίνου* (F50) may help us recover more Longinian material from Photius: see *GRBS* 39 (1998), 271–92. In that paper (p. 275) I cite parallels in Sopater's commentary on Hermogenes to the sixth of the excerpts, here mistranslated: *ὅτι τὸ παραγράφεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν λαμπρῶν προσώπων ἄτοπόν φησι* does not mean 'il est absurde . . . d'accuser faussement des personnages illustres', but that in the case of illustrious figures it is absurd to use procedural exceptions to evade having to answer charges brought against them. It is unwise to cite Schissel's somewhat flimsy treatment of the family of Minucianus as if it were the last word on the subject (p. 151 n. 5): for Nicagoras see now *FGrH* 1076, and my discussion in *ZPE* 113 (1996), 66–70, which also (p. 68, cf. *Eranos* 96 [1998], 51) offers reason for believing that the Stoic philosopher Musonius is not wholly unknown to us (p. 146 n. 18). Is it satisfactory simply to assert (p. 154 nn. l, 5) the falsity of the attribution of *On Sublimity* to Longinus, as if this were a known and uncontested fact (see *PCPS* 45 [1999], 43–74)? The editor of Psellus' *Oratorio minora* is A. R. Littlewood, not (p. 179 n. l) 'A. Robert'. On Longinus' Homeric scholarship see A. R. Dyck, *MH* 46 (1989), 1–8. The assumption that the Harpocration of the Anonymus Seguerianus is identical with the Harpocration of the scholia to Hermogenes (p. 237 n. 3) is unsafe: even when we have excluded the lexicographer, the *Suda* attests more than one sophist of that name.

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## AESOP

C. A. Zafiropoulos: *Ethics in Aesop's Fables: the* Augustana *Collection*. Pp. xiv + 202. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2001. Cased, $78. ISBN: 90-04-11867-5.

Zafiropoulos believes the Augustana's 'pragmatic' fables, from 'a late stage in . . . Greek literature' (p. 143), demonstrate the continuity of '"popular" Greek thought' (p. 144): 'fable has ethics of its own which can be placed in the general framework of Greek thought' (p. 7).

Chapter 1 ('The Greek Fable') explains fable collections, history, function, terminology, and scholarship. Z. is comfortable with the sources (e.g. pp. 23–26 on MSS). 'Aesop's Fables' is not false advertising—the *Augustana* warrants the title (pp. 10–12). On fable in education (pp. 21–22), Z. might note post-1964 work.

Using interpretative, not 'narrative level', analysis, Z. seeks 'the level of social reality and ethics, to which the Greek fable referred allegorically' (p. 36 n. 127). Althusser surfaces ('ideology', 'recognition function': pp. 37–8), but Z. is practical, dividing the 'unsystematic network' of fable 'messages and behavioural patterns' into thematic groups ('agonistic conflict', 'reciprocity'), examining 'thematic' over 'structural homogeneity' (pp. 4–5, 8) to compare behaviour promoted or condemned with themes 'recognizable throughout the history of Greek ethics' (p. 42).

Obstacles appear insurmountable: we cannot date collection/fables (pp. 102–3). Alphabetization fragments coherent narrative into 'a different fox in each case' (p. 41). Authorship is multiple (p. 3). Epimythia (later single readers' ethical expectations: p. 7) camouflage *Ur*-text. Do we read *as a collection*? Who compiled it? Did audience (and ethics) change (pp. 19ff.)? In what sense(s) is this 'popular literature'? *Nachleben*

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obfuscates further: do the oppressed criticize their state in fables (pp. 27ff.)? Or do fables, 'mechanism of ideological oppression', reinforce the ruling class's mores (pp. 31ff.)? Do fables reflect social realities? The collection is 'terminologically deficient' in 'key terms associated with virtues and vices' (p. 181).

Z. dismisses epimythia, limiting himself to 'ethical ideas . . . drawn from . . . the plots' (pp. 7–8); but epimythia reappear when they augment Z.'s argument (p. 163 n. 44; p. 184 promises further research). Fable scholars could discard rusty hermeneutical shackles: Nøjgaard (1964) is back in favour; Z. on epimythia recalls Daly's Aesop 'without morals' (1961).

Chapter 2 ('Conflict in the *Augustana* Fables') seeks to model 'personality' from fable's 'first-order reasoning' (pp. 48ff.). Themes appear: 'survival', 'immediate action' for 'personal interest', conformity through custom, 'learning through suffering' and toil, respect for limits, and natural ability. As 'framework[s] for action' (p. 145), fable's 'ethical messages' in fact promote inaction, demonstrating moderation's positive consequences by negative examples of going, fatally, too far. The tone is bleak and conservative (p. 6): the weak can only survive, not better themselves (p. 53); the strong retain physical, social, and financial advantage; life is fickle (p. 133); keep within your status's limits; fate cannot be avoided (p. 139); appearances are deceptive (pp. 157ff.). Even the gods lack ethical significance (p. 134).

Indications of 'analytical or "philosophical" thought' are indistinct; sentiments offer 'general social application' (p. 79). Z. tries, but can offer few supplementary suggestions (pp. 78–9). A rare lapse: references on p. 79 (n. 91) do not illustrate Z.'s point; Pl. *Phdr.* 223d is incorrect.

In Chapter 3, 'Reciprocity in the *Augustana*', Z. argues that 'reciprocity, whether amicable or hostile, is the key code of behaviour between friends and enemies in the *Augustana* fables' (p. 116). Z.'s grasp of theory and secondary literature is excellent (pp. 81–6), his questions telling: how do fables portray social, political, economic, and divine interactions at a stage when 'shame-ethics' have been replaced by 'guilt-ethics' (p. 143); 'is the violation of amicable reciprocity wise or unwise' (p. 93)? Fables present 'dysfunctional reciprocal relationships' (p. 86); 'cautionary', 'pessimistic' messages promote conformity and pragmatism (p. 101). Personal interest prevails; negative ('faulty', pp. 107–8) reciprocity is effective. Justice (concept, terminology, institution) barely rates a mention (pp. 117ff.). Are there 'internalized sanctions'—concepts of *hubris*, self-restraint, shame, gratitude restraining individuals (pp. 119–28)? What of external sanctions: suppliant rights, divine punishment, chance, fate, community censure (pp. 133ff.)? Questions are interesting (what of altruism in fables?), but answers difficult to acquire: there *are* parallels (Platonic and sophistic: pp. 142ff.) in ethical thought for ideas perceived operating in these fables, but few overt markers of formalized ethical structures: 'the collection's ethical messages are "intuitions", "spontaneous convictions, moderately reflective but not yet theorized." This book aims only to present the explicit ethical content of the fables for comparison with other evidence from Greek ethics' (p. 144).

Chapter 4 ('The Fable as a Form of Ethical Reasoning') examines positive and negative 'inner qualities' (*aretai* and *kakiai* are 'too precise': p. 146) in the *Augustana.* We cannot know, from the collection, whether inner qualities are natural or learned (p. 157), but cautionary tales of unsuccessful social mobility point to the former. Personal responsibility has a place (pp. 175ff.), despite difficulty in drawing 'distinctions . . . in the fables' conceptual vocabulary between different degrees of knowledge' because of 'fable's stylistic demands and its analytic limitations' (p. 157; cf.

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p. 109) which focus 'on the . . . narrative chain at the expense of cognitive states' (second-order reasoning: pp. 176–7).

We cannot fault Z.'s oft-repeated conclusion that 'the collection's ethics represent general and widespread views from Greek thought' (pp. 43, 109). But, regarding 'ethics', Z. is handicapped by these conclusions being fundamentally negative: the collection 'lacks a philosophical approach to ethical life' (p. 178); it misses 'a great deal of Greek thought on inner qualities'; it does 'not often feel the need to define a specific mode of behaviour'; 'the description of inner qualities in action . . . lacks many of the aspects of Greek philosophical thought on them'; 'ethical action as a product of reasoning and will is defective' (all p. 180). Thus Z. is forced to pull out a chestnut: the ethics are simplistically rendered—'pragmatic and practical and not idealistic'—because they 'offer guidelines to the lower strata' (p. 179); it is 'a corpus of exemplary cautionary lessons on practical ethics' (p. 183). This Victorian conclusion opposes Z.'s open-mindedness in judging 'popular' literature as only 'class-oriented' (pp. 10, 37ff.).

Z. has opened up new avenues of exploration for fable scholars. Students of mores would benefit more from a scholarly commentary on the *Augustana*—a task suited to Z.'s careful scholarship (e.g. p. 168 n. 53), his acute close readings of individual fables, and his colloquial translations.

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## QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS

A. James, K. Lee: *A Commentary on Quintus of Smyrna,* Posthomerica V. Pp. x + 172. Leiden, Boston, and Cologne: Brill, 2000. Cased, $68. ISBN: 90-04-11594-3.

More than forty years on from Francis Vian's study of the manuscript tradition and his fundamental *Recherches sur les Posthomerica de Quintus de Smyrne* (both Paris, 1959), and twenty years after Malcolm Campbell's commentary on the Trojan horse episode in Book 12 (Leiden, 1981), Q. at last earns an English commentary on a second of the fourteen books of his *Posthomerica*, marking a further stage in his slow but steady rehabilitation. The long interlude, if hard to excuse, is not without benefit: J. and L. exploit the considerable intervening scholarship on later epic, taking a firm stance on disputed issues. So, despite others' reservations, Bodmer papyrus 29, the 'Vision of Dorotheus', is accepted as the work of Q.'s son, thus fixing Q.'s own date in the mid- to late third century, following the loss of the Cyclic epics perhaps in the mid-third (pp. 6–9). Keydell's view of direct imitation of Latin authors, here Ovid, *Met.* 13.1–381 (the Judgement of Arms), is favoured against the weighty counter-arguments of Vian (p. 11 with further references). Perhaps most important of all is the new suggestion (p. 30) that Q. can illuminate the techniques of Homeric composition: analysis of his formulas indicates that they do not differ in kind from those of the Homeric poems, but only—though this may be crucial?—in length (Q.'s longest verbatim repetition is apparently two lines only) and in frequency of the same combination (much lower in Q.). J. and L. accordingly endorse Hoekstra's view that Q. employs a formulaic technique like that of Homer. But Q. cannot have composed without the aid of writing. Therefore the Homeric technique is also 'fully compatible with composition aided by writing' (p. 30). The gauntlet lies at the feet of Homeric oralists.

Book 5 describes the Judgement of Arms (1–351) and Ajax's subsequent madness,

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