prosopography; Aristophanes' characterization of Theramenes is foisted upon Clitophon, based on his association with him as a fellow student of Euripides. Clitophon votes once in agreement with Theramenes in the *Athenian Constitution* and once on his own suggests that the ancestral laws be consulted. While his actions may have produced different results in 411 and 404, Clitophon acts consistently in *Ath. Const.* and *Rep.* 1, advocating an appeal to the laws. Roochnik mentions only the act where he is associated with Theramenes in *Ath. Const*. The omission is reproduced by Kremer in his notes on the dialogue. Orwin gives both passages.

Orwin's and Blits's treatments of the dialogue are more cautious and solid, but at the same time are less committal regarding the relationship of the dialogue to *Rep* I. We do owe a profound debt to each of the papers presented in K.'s volume, and this collection ought to inspire new interest in *Clitophon*'s status and developmentalist/unitarian interpretations of Plato.

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FROM *REPUBLIC* TO *LAWS*

C. BOBONICH: *Plato's Utopia Recast. His Later Ethics and Politics*. Pp. xii + 643. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Cased, £57.28. ISBN: 0-19-925143-6.

This excessively long book is a typical product of the Anglo-American analytic approach to Plato's dialogues, displaying both its strengths and its weaknesses. It is characteristic of such an approach to read them as if they were philosophical treatises rather than as belonging to the literary genre of Socratic dialogue. Yet Christopher Bobonich never justifies this basic assumption of his own approach, although it underpins most of his interpretive claims about the dialogues as places for staking out philosophical positions. For instance, one of B.'s central claims is that there is a fundamental shift in Plato's attitude with regard to non-philosophers as citizens of an ideal polis between the *Republic* (where they are excluded) and the *Laws* (where they are included). Characteristically, B. sums up this radical shift in four claims that he thinks are denied in the *Republic* but endorsed in the *Laws:*

1. At least some non-philosophers are capable of being genuinely virtuous; i.e. not merely demotic but philosophic virtue;
2. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing virtue for its own sake; i.e. capable of believing that virtue is good for its own sake, and of desiring virtue for its own sake (and not merely instrumentally);
3. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing for its own sake the genuine well-being or happiness of others; in particular, virtue as its primary constituent;
4. At least some non-philosophers are capable of living happy lives.

In connection with these claims, it is necessary to clarify what B. calls Plato's 'Dependency Thesis'. He argues (p. 54) that a necessary condition of Dependent Goods being good for their possessors is that they have some appreciation of why they really are worth desiring; i.e. some appreciation of their value. An adequate explanation requires some grasp of how things instantiate genuine value properties.

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B. notes (p. 54) that in the *Republic* Plato does not unequivocally assert or deny the Dependency Thesis. B. claims (p. 58), however, that in both *Republic* and *Phaedo* it is philosophy alone that gives one a genuine appreciation of the fine and the good, and thus gives one a good life now and hereafter.

B. defines (p. 126) 'Dependent Goods' and 'Dependent Bads' as follows: (1) G is a Dependent Good iff G is good for a just or good person and is bad for an unjust or bad person. (2) B is a Dependent Bad iff B is bad for a just or good person and not bad for an unjust or bad person. This is what B. calls the 'Dependency Thesis', and he adds (p. 126) one refinement to capture what he considers to be Plato's intentions, though he gives little evidence to support this attribution. B. thinks that Plato need not (and does not) hold that every Dependent Good is bad for an unjust person, as what he should hold is that no Dependent Good benefits a person apart from virtue. This is true if either the Dependent Good is bad for unjust people or if it is simply not good for them. Conversely, Plato should not hold that a Dependent Bad is actually good for an unjust person, as nothing is good for him. What Plato intends is that, for example, unjust people are worse off if they are wealthy than if they are poor. Thus B. claims (p. 127) that what Plato should (and does) hold is that for an unjust person having a Dependent Bad is not good, although it is less bad than not having that Dependent Bad or than having the corresponding Dependent Good. This is a notable example of B.'s determinedly monological reading of Plato, which is fine as far as it goes, but it does not capture the dialogical spirit of Plato's philosophizing.

In many ways, the core of B.'s long (and repetitive) book consists of his attempt to show (in Chapter 5) how his Dependency Thesis is embodied in the ethical life of Magnesia in Plato's *Laws*. As he himself points out, this raises questions about Plato's psychology and epistemology which he discusses in Chapters 3 and 4. First, however, B. (p. 185) tries to gain a contrasting perspective by seeking to determine the perspective on the Dependency Thesis in Plato's *Republic*. The classification of goods in *Republic* 2 distinguishes between things good as ends and good as means, which is different from the distinction between Dependent and Independent Goods. But perhaps there is no real incompatibility with the Dependency Thesis here, as Plato does not say that hearing and seeing benefit people regardless of their ethical character. Still, B. (p. 186) recognizes the obstacles to any such compatibilist interpretation, especially the lack of any clear textual evidence for Plato's adoption of the Dependency Thesis in the *Republic*. Furthermore, B. admits that the Dependency Thesis sits uneasily with the rest of the *Republic* where Plato flirts with a different sort of theory, namely, an ordinal ranking of the different kinds of lives corresponding to the predominance of different parts of the soul.

In his first chapter B. argues that the ethical defects of non-philosophers originate in their epistemic limitations. In the *Republic*, the Spirited part is the home of emotions such as anger, and of the desire for honour, while the Appetitive part is the home of desires for the bodily satisfactions of food, sex, and drink. B. argues that Plato's view in the *Republic* is that we can have such emotions and desires without drawing on knowledge of the Forms, either explicitly or implicitly. In effect, we can form concepts of the objects involved, discriminate them from other kinds of objects, and engage in some forms of reasoning about them, without drawing on any awareness of the Forms. In non-philosophers the Reasoning part of the soul does not reach a higher cognitive level, i.e. in its valuing of things it draws on perception rather than an awareness of value Forms. It is only in philosophers that the Reasoning part comes to have an awareness of such Forms and thus comes to grasp the fundamental intelligible properties (and the relations among them) that must be grasped in order to

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understand whatever order and structure there is in the world, or to understand what is genuinely good, fine, or beautiful.

In subsequent chapters B. argues that, since Plato becomes more optimistic about the ethical capacities of non-philosophers in the *Laws*, then his psychology and epistemology must have changed in some important ways. For instance, in Chapter 3, B. claims that Plato in the *Laws* rejects the tripartite division of the soul in the *Republic* into agent-like parts. He still holds that the soul is complex and has both rational and non-rational elements or aspects, but in the *Laws* he recognizes only a single subject of beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on. According to B., this is an essential step towards a more optimistic understanding of non-philosophers in the *Laws*, since the defects of non-philosophers in the *Republic* stemmed from the fact that they were ruled by one of the lower parts of the soul. But it remains to be established that non-philosophers have the resources necessary for valuing virtue for its own sake, and for being genuinely virtuous. Yet it was the partitioning of the person that underlies Plato's pessimism about non-philosophers, according to B., so he undertakes three tasks in Chapter 4. First, he offers an account of Plato's later psychology that shows why it develops into the more unitary conception of the soul that he finds in the *Laws*. He claims that this account will allow us to fit together and make sense of a number of hitherto disconnected developments in Plato's later psychology and epistemology. Secondly, B. explores the implications of Plato's later views about the soul for his understanding of what sort of creatures we are and what benefits us. Finally, he examines the implications of Plato's later psychology and epistemology for his understanding of non-rational motivation, especially some aspects of his views about spirited emotions and pleasures.

I have given a brief summary of B.'s main lines of argument so as to illustrate the thrust of his rather overambitious book, which gives a developmental account of Plato's political thought between the *Republic* and the *Laws*. While downplaying the literary character of these two dialogues, however, B. also overlooks alternative unitarian accounts of Plato's thought. For instance, it is possible to view the model of Kallipolis in the *Republic* as a paradigmatic polis which is designed for the gods or god-like men, the philosopher-rulers, who are uniquely fitted to rule because they have complete rational control over their emotions and desires. Many of the literary features of the dialogue suggest that it is not presenting a realistic political proposal but rather a utopian vision that is being used to criticize existing constitutions. By contrast, the more pedestrian *Laws* represents an extended discussion between three lawgivers who are charged with founding a colony, and so they must consider the practicalities of instituting different kinds of constitutions—with the result that Magnesia is a second-best *polis* designed for human beings rather than for gods or god-like men.

A general shortcoming of B.'s approach is his obsession with the analysis of arguments or 'positions' which are attributed to Plato but which are motivated primarily by modern debates about the sort of positions that Plato would have taken up if he were to participate in our contemporary discussions. As a hermeneutical principle, of course, there is nothing wrong with having Plato speak to our contemporary concerns, so long as sufficient attention is paid to his dialogical mode of philosophizing, which is quite different from the propositional mode of modern analytic philosophers. To ignore this difference is to fail to understand the fundamentally dialogical character of ancient philosophy, even in the case of a thinker like Aristotle, whose aporetic mode of inquiry does not lend itself very well to modern modes of argumentation in terms of 'positions'. But this is even more so in

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the case of Plato, the aporetic dialectician *par excellence*. Although he pays lip-service to the literary nature of Plato's dialogues, B. tends to neglect the implications of their dialogical character for interpreting Platonic philosophy.

Finally, one can hardly fail to notice that B. provides very sparse bibliographical references to publications in French, German, Italian, and Spanish, thereby lending credence to the rather unfair European jibe about all Americans being monoglots. However, he does make a few references to analytical scholars publishing in French and German, who are privileged to be included within his citation cartel. We might well contrast such parochialism with the American tradition of scholarship in the first half of the twentieth century, as represented by Shorey and Cherniss, when one could count on extensive references to the scholarly literature in all of the major European languages. By contrast, the contemporary analytical tradition in ancient philosophy at American universities has become a curiously insular affair. A telling example of this is that, while B. is very careful about his gender language, he obviously feels that it is quite all right to ignore most of the work of scholars in modern languages other than English.

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PLATONIC ANGER

J. FRÈRE: *Ardeur et colère. Le* thumos *platonicien*. Pp. 213. Paris: Kimé, 2004. Paper, €21. ISBN: 2-84174-342-X.

Frère's work on the history of Greek psychology and the concept of *thumos* comprises three parts: 'Avant Platon' (pp. 13–89), 'Les philosophes préplatoniciens' (pp. 91–106), and 'Platon' (pp. 107–93). Apart from the 'Introduction générale' (pp. 7–9), the book contains a bibliography and an 'Index sélectif des mots grecs', which are given in the book in their Latin transcription. The footnotes are at the end of each part.

F's basic contention is that: 'c'est avec Platon que ce dualisme du *thumos* sera élaboré de façon tout à fait originale en fonction de la théorie de l'âme tripartite . . .' (p. 9) and that *thumos* is the substrate responsible for 'multiples émotions' (p. 16). F. concludes that:

> Chez Platon le *thumos* n'est plus qu'une partie de l'âme, mais la plus essentielle peut-être, plus essentielle même que le *logos* ou du moins aussi essentielle que le *logos*—principe de tous les agirs, c'est-à-dire de tous les combats . . . La grande nouveauté de Platon, c'est d'avoir donné au *thumos* une place privilégiée et centrale dans l'âme, celle d'un pouvoir personnel de réalisation . . . (pp. 187–8)

The first and second parts, taken together, are longer than the third part, which concerns Plato as given in the title. Insofar as their aim is to reconstruct the sources of the Platonic concept of *thumos*, the title of the book is somewhat misleading (a better title is to be found on p. 54: 'La place et le rôle du *thumos* en Grèce'). Alongside delineating the development of the meaning of *thumos* in Greek culture, F.'s book contains valuable insights, but these tend to be isolated and scattered, e.g. 'les Grecs ont hiérarchisé les grandes orientations du psychisme' (p. 7), the distinction 'entre principes de l'affectivité (thumos, phrên, kardia)' and 'modes de l'affectivité (peur,

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