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On apposition[1]

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This paper seeks to redefine apposition, a term that is often used in the literature with a remarkable lack of precision. Starting from paradigmatic instances of apposition (*Romulus, the legendary founder; Santiago, the capital of Galicia*), the main resemblances to the paradigm are analysed in an attempt to measure the validity of a general syntactic relation that is often put on a par with co-ordination and dependency. Paradigmatic appositions and other related nominal patterns are shown to be structures of nonrestrictive modification (i.e. not really appositions) which are best understood in reference to the concept of a Local Domain. The second unit of these structures has its scope in the local domain of the first unit, of which it is an expansion, not in the larger domain of the sentence. By contrast, most instances of non-nominal apposition (e.g. *He ran – absolutely raced – up the hill*; Burton-Roberts, 1975) are seen as true appositions, as defined in this paper, namely as structures whose two units relate independently to a Sentence Domain without forming a superordinate node in it. Crucial to the distinction between the Local and the Sentence domains is the role of intonation boundaries. These are strongly obligatory only with those structures which have been considered paradigmatic appositions in the literature (*Romulus, the legendary founder*), and their role is to isolate the second unit within them from the remainder of the sentence, thus preventing it from having a function in it. The intonation boundaries are also responsible for the most distinctive feature of these structures, namely the predicative relationship binding the two units together (Dupont, 1985; Koktová, 1985; Longrée, 1987; Forsgren, 1988).

1 Introduction

Meyer (1992) lists the following italicized sequences as instances of apposition:[2]

(1) *ENGLAND international left-winger Eddie Holliday* will never touch 'bubbly' again. (p. 14)
(2) The Association of Head Mistresses warmly welcomed *the Newsom report – 'a vital and moving human document' – . . .* (p. 18)
(3) Waterlogging leads to *three kinds of changes in the soil: physical, biological and chemical. (p. 19)*
(4) Well, *it*'s a jolly nice place, *the new university*, . . . (p. 20)
(5) . . . He spoke of *his desire to promote the abolition of slavery by peaceable means* . . . (p. 21)
(6) We might, therefore, ask *two things about a new theory of a change of state:*
    (a) *Does it give a satisfying physical picture of what is probably happening?*

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[2] Here and in what follows the two units in apposition are marked in italics.

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(b) *Is the numerical agreement with the observed facts in keeping with the number of adjustable parameters, or is the theory unduly 'forced' in this respect?* (p. 25)

(7) She was getting herself so excited at *the thought of my auntie Elsie coming and knitting and knitting and knitting and driving her mad*. (p. 26)

(8) We were willing to consider analogies but don't forget that the analogies between teaching *something relatively simple like late medieval poetry was very different from Anglo-Saxon*. (p. 27)

(9) People are beginning to *rouse themselves, stretch, you know*. (p. 32)

(10) *It could be seen that both artists used a very thick final coat of plaster, one half inch, and that both followed the traditional Italian fresco technique as described by Cennino Cennini in the 14th Century, and current in Italy to this day. That is, they used opaque color throughout, getting solid highlights with active lime white*. (p. 33)

It can be observed that Meyer takes as appositive ('in varying degrees', p. 41), among other constructions, (restrictive) pseudotitles (as in (1)), quotations (2), displaced adjectival modifiers of nouns (3), dislocations (4), infinitival complements (5), 'colon structures' (6), prepositional phrases of all kinds (7) and (8), VPs (9), whole texts (10), and so on. The commodiousness of the concept is not, however, peculiar to Meyer. From Poutsma (1904: 183 ff.), Jespersen (1909–49: vols. II, III, VII), Curme (1947: 106–7 and 121 ff.), and Hockett (1955, 1958) to Sopher (1971), Delorme & Dougherty (1972), Bitea (1977), Koktová (1985), van den Bussche (1988), and Meyer (1987, 1989, 1991) himself, the concept has proved extraordinarily elusive.[3]

This paper is an attempt to re-examine loose, or nonrestrictive, apposition, as illustrated in (1)–(10) above. For a rejection of the concept of close, or restrictive, apposition (as in *the poet Burns*, or *the word 'enigma'*), see Burton-Roberts (1975) and Acuña (1996, in preparation). Section 2 below is concerned with the criteria for apposition usually assumed in the tradition, and with the different approaches to it. Special attention will be paid to Meyer's 1992 rather unsatisfactory account, as seen, for instance, in Kortman (1994), Acuña (1994), Korrel (1995), and Schneider (1995). Section 3 contains a survey of the features of paradigmatic instances of apposition (3.1), a discussion of nominal (3.2), and non-nominal (3.3) categories in apposition, the concepts of Local versus Sentence Domain (3.5), and the Separate Constituent Analysis (3.5). Finally, a summary of the major conclusions is provided in section 4. Throughout the discussion, I have opted for an inductive method of organization that seeks to emphasize the point that current accounts of apposition cannot stand. Apposition will thus be approached as a notion whose theoretical legitimacy remains to be proved. A new theory of apposition will be proposed.

[3] Examples (1)–(10) far from exhaust the range of so-called appositive structures. Other possible patterns include 'tag exclamations' (Quirk et al., 1985: 1304), or, as they are termed in French grammar, 'dislocations qualitatives' (Forsgren, 1988: 140 ff.; Milner, 1976: 153 ff.; and Tamine, 1976: 133 ff.):

(i) *He confessed, poor lamb, that he* had *been misled.*

Consider also the pattern illustrated in *Orateur remarquable, Atticus était un écrivain médiocre* (Tesnière, 1976: 165; also Sopher, 1971: 403).

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2 Criterial properties and approaches to apposition

While grammarians who use the concept of apposition may differ as to whether a number of different constructions are or are not appositive, they do not usually question the appositive status of such constructions as (11) and (12) below:

(11) *Paris, the capital of France*, still retains a large part of its former grandeur.
(12) *Chaucer, the medieval genius*, was a source of inspiration to all group members at the time.

These have always been taken as a constant point of reference in the tradition, in the sense that whatever characterizes *paradigmatic instances* such as (11) and (12) is assumed to characterize apposition at large.

In the opinion of some writers, such as Fries (1952: 187), Francis (1958: 301), Roberts (1962: 219), Bogacki (1973: 19), and Taboada (1978: 315 ff.), the constructions in (11) and (12) are characterized chiefly by being made up of two juxtaposed NPs which are coreferential. However, other linguists, such as Hockett (1955), Sopher (1971), and Burton-Roberts (1975), contend that what is truly remarkable about (11) and (12) is the fact that they are made up of two nonco-ordinated constituents which are functionally equivalent, irrespective of class membership. Alongside these two approaches, other grammarians believe that the appositive status of (11) and (12) depends crucially on the obligatory presence of intonation boundaries. This is why scholars such as Norwood (1954: 270), Hadlich (1973: 234), Dupont (1985: 41), C. Fuentes (1989: 225) and Lago (1991: 505 ff.) have posited that pauses, or commas in writing, are essential to apposition. In addition to the three features mentioned, another property that is often viewed as criterial for apposition is predicativity. In particular, some writers, such as Blinkenberg (1950: 128 ff.), Pignón (1961: 252–57), and Mathesius (1975: 90–4), have insisted that an appositive is a second-level predication which, detached from the sentence proper, relates to a nominal constituent of the sentence. Koktová (1985) expresses a similar opinion. Finally, a fifth feature of paradigmatic instances of apposition is the fact that they allow insertion of so-called appositive markers (such as *namely*, *to wit*, or *that is*) between the appositive units (U1 and U2 in what follows). Sopher (1971) and Burton-Roberts (1975) contend that whenever we can introduce such linking devices without damaging the grammaticality of the construction, we are dealing with an apposition. As Burton-Roberts points out (1975: 417), 'such markers, after all, make appositions'.

As can be seen, linguists have generally started from a prototype construction which has always been believed to represent apposition *par excellence*. And, by choosing different properties of the paradigm as defining ones, grammarians ended up applying the label of apposition to extremely different constructions. Thus, for instance, if what is taken to be criterial for apposition is functional equivalence, then instances such as (2) and (9) above would be appositive, but not, for instance, (3) and (4). If, by contrast, one views the nominal class of the members as essential, then

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only instances like the paradigm will be appositions, but not most others on the list, and so on. In short, the outcome of these fragmentary analyses of the paradigm are approaches to apposition which, because they are too comprehensive, become virtually meaningless.

In general, there is only one feature which is common to the majority of the structures which are rather randomly defined as appositive: namely, the fact that there is apparently no other analysis promptly available for them. In this way, apposition has become a conceptual jack-of-all-trades which can always be conveniently invoked in order to account for marginal constructions in grammar. Because of its intuitive character, the notion serves to unify a variety of structures which, not being grouped together by any single criterion, are nevertheless felt to exhibit a certain constructional relation.[4] In this respect, Matthews' sceptic recapitulary note (1981: 235) on the benefit one may draw from such a comprehensive view of apposition appears entirely justified. Writing in the early eighties, he refers to three criteria for apposition which traditional studies attribute to the paradigm: coreference, class identity, and syntactic equivalence (as seen through omission or substitution) and concludes that 'As can be seen from our survey, there is no positive property that is common to all the constructions involved.'[5] In the end, all we are left with is a paradigm case and an almost infinite number of resemblances to it which, for want of a better concept, are also called apposition:

> There is a tradition in linguistics which requires that terms should be defined with respect to our data, with necessary and sufficient conditions for their use. Apposition is a striking instance of a category that cannot be elucidated in that way.
>
> *Instead we have a paradigm use, and other uses that are linked to it by various forms of resemblances. Where the resemblances end is naturally indeterminate.* (Matthews, 1981: 236, emphasis added)

Matthews' criticism of the liberality with which the notion of apposition is usually applied is also shared by Burton-Roberts (1993: 184), who refers to apposition as 'an extremely loose kind of relation (and arguably not a genuine syntactic relation) in which the second element is offered as a parenthetical, and sometimes metalinguistic,

[4] This is not to imply that apposition has received much attention (except in French grammar), or even the attention it deserves, considering its implications and ramifications for the very heart of the linguistic system, being, as it is, intimately connected with such 'fashionable' topics as the system of determination and reference, relative clauses, the grammar of the NP, coordination, modification and complementation, dislocation, the distinction between textual and sentential grammars, and so on.

[5] 'In certain cases the first element is a complete referring expression (*your brother*, in *your brother, the poet*). This is criterial for appositional relative clauses (*your brother, who was here yesterday*), if they are so described. But it is not so in *Mount Everest* or *Joe Bloggs*. In certain cases the elements are of the same class (noun phrase *your brother* plus noun phrase *the poet*). Most grammarians take this as criterial for the relation in *Joe Bloggs* (proper noun *Joe* plus proper noun *Bloggs*). But there is no internal parallel between a phrase and a following clause (*the announcement, that Bill is leaving*). In certain cases both elements can be substituted for the whole (*I met your brother, I met the poet*). This is criterial for elements that do not refer (*he acted terribly, kept forgetting his lines*). But relative clauses cannot; nor, in general, can *that*-clauses (*They tore up the announcement*, but not *they tore up that Bill is leaving*)' (Matthews, 1981: 235–6, emphasis added).

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gloss … of the first'. Like Matthews, Burton-Roberts sees unresolved connections between apposition and no less than: 1. conjunctive (*and*)-co-ordination; 2. disjunctive (*or*)-co-ordination; 3. restrictive modification; 4. subordinative verbless absolutive clauses (e.g. *A shy man, Olsen seldom speaks*); 5. attributive NPs; 6. relative clauses; 7. complement *that*-clauses; 8. and parentheticals.

The elusiveness of apposition also explains why the literature on it offers every theory imaginable. To mention only a few:

1. Apposition as juxtaposition of coreferential NPs: Fries (1952: 187), Francis (1958: 301), Roberts (1962: 219), Bogacki (1973: 19), and Taboada (1978: 315 ff.).
2. Apposition as co-ordination (hence symmetric): Bally (1950), Hockett (1958: 185–6), Huttar (1973: 80), Allerton (1979: 127–9), and Brown & Miller (1980: 258).
3. Apposition as dependency (hence asymmetric): Poutsma (1904: 183 ff.), Curme (1947: 106–7 and 121 ff.), Manacorda (1964: 24) and Hadlich (1973: 234 ff.).
4. Apposition as a third kind of syntactic relationship (defined in various ways, but different from co-ordination and subordination): Hockett (1955), Sopher (1971), Delorme & Dougherty (1972), Bitea (1977), Koktová (1985), and Lago (1991).
5. Apposition as a spectrum, exhibiting features of both co-ordination, dependency, and sheer peripherality: Matthews (1981: 220 ff.), Quirk et al. (1985: 1301 ff.), Meyer (1992), and, to a certain extent, also Burton-Roberts (1993: 183 ff.)
6. Apposition only explainable through a mixture of levels of description: Paula-Pombar (1983; co-ordination at a deeper level, but apposition at the surface), Dupont (1985: 60 ff; co-ordination at a deeper level, but dependency at the surface), and Martinet (1973: 6–7; both co-ordination and dependency at the surface).
7. Apposition is not a syntactic relationship at all: Zemb (1968: 296), Longrée (1987: 199), and, to a certain extent, Burton-Roberts (1975, 1993).

Meyer's recent work on the subject has not contributed much to its clarification.[6] Dissatisfied with the way in which the notion of apposition has been dealt with in the grammatical tradition, Meyer claims that apposition cannot be accounted for unless it is viewed, not as a conventional grammatical relation (such as co-ordination and modification), but as an 'undifferentiated' one (Matthews, 1981: 224), that is, as a gradable relationship. This means that positing just one constituent structure for all the types of apposition is, he claims, simply not possible. If, instead,

> apposition is considered an undifferentiated, *or gradable*, relation, we can distinguish those constructions that are most appositional – central appositions – from those that are (in varying degrees) less appositional – peripheral appositions. *The particular constituent structure we then assign to an apposition will depend on the extent to which the units of the apposition are structurally dependent on each other*. (Meyer, 1992: 41, emphasis added)

By measuring the extent to which units are structurally dependent on each other with reference to the notions of exocentrism, subordination, and co-ordination,

[6] All of Meyer's contributions to the analysis of appositive structures (Meyer, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1992) are corpus-based. In particular, his (1992) book is based on a collection of samples taken from the London–Lund Corpus of Spoken British English, the written component of the Survey of English Usage Corpus, and the Brown University Corpus of Present-Day American English. The samples comprise approximately 360,000 words.

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Meyer (1992: 41) concludes that appositions can be either co-ordinative (elements independent of each other) or subordinative (one element dependent on the other).[7] Those that are co-ordinative are central appositions; those that are subordinative are peripheral 'and on gradients between central apposition and coordination, peripheral elements (Matthews, 1981: 123 f.), modification, and complementation'. Meyer's conception of *central* and *peripheral* appositions is reminiscent of Quirk et al.'s *full* and *partial* appositions (1985: 1301 ff.).

Unfortunately, Meyer is not talking about *one* syntactic structure (as might be expected), but about *several* syntactic structures which he wishes to designate by a single name (apposition). By claiming that 'the particular constituent structure that we assign to an apposition will depend on the extent to which the units of the apposition are structurally dependent on each other' (Meyer, 1992: 41), he is in fact deviating from a basic assumption of modern syntactic analysis, namely the principle that different syntactic relations are defined in reference to different syntactic structures. In this respect, it is not clear how one can define a syntactic relation (apposition) by claiming that it adopts the form of all the other relations to which it is supposed to be in opposition (co-ordination, modification, complementation, and peripheral relations). In fact, in Meyer's system of grammatical relations, even though co-ordination and subordination do have permanent structures that characterize each separately, apposition does not. Instead, it is said to be co-ordination on some occasions, subordination on others, and even a 'peripheral' element in yet other cases (as in *A Labour stalwart, Cllr Holtom slated the council's previous Tory administration* . . ., where *A Labour stalwart* is the peripheral element, 'a noun phrase functioning as an adverbial', p. 46). It is highly contentious to claim that each and every case of relatively noncentral co-ordination, subordination, and so on always converges in just one specific direction, namely apposition. Even if that were the case, it is not clear how one could define that *convergence* as still another *relation*. In other words, Meyer's theory is one in which apposition covers everything in grammar that is not co-ordination and subordination at their clearest (i.e. unquestionable, textbook cases of subordination and co-ordination such as *the man in the corner,* where the PP modifies the noun *man*, and *the cat and the mouse* respectively). Under this interpretation, his claim that apposition figures much more prominently in his corpus than most other grammatical relations comes as no surprise.[8] It appears patently obvious that this conception of apposition is self-destructive in that it contributes to the dilution of the concept, rather than to a redefinition of it. Whatever (5) and (6) in our introduction turn out to be, for instance, it seems clear

[7] The criteria which Meyer uses to identify the co-ordinative or subordinative nature of the constructions he calls apposition are omission and interchangeability of the units (1992: 41 ff.). According to these criteria, *that crazy new dance, the Twist*, is co-ordinative (i.e. central apposition), whereas most of (1)–(10) in our introduction are subordinative (i.e. peripheral appositions).

[8] Actually, Meyer insists that only constructions realizing 'the relation of peripheral elements' occurred slightly more often than those realizing the relation of apposition in his corpus (Meyer, 1992: 133). Even Quirk et al.'s approach (1985: 1301 ff.), which is often considered as too liberal, falls short of the generosity with which Meyer uses the label apposition.

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that they cannot be the *same* thing, not even the *same* thing 'in varying degrees' (Meyer, 1992: 41). (See Kortmann, 1994; Oostdijk, 1994; Schneider, 1995; Korrel, 1995; or Acuña, 1994, for similar views of Meyer's work.)

3 Paradigmatic apposition

3.1 Introduction

Let us now consider the construction that initiated this discussion, i.e. the paradigm, a notion whose legitimacy must be proved. Here is an example:

(13) *Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist*, will soon do that job in the firm.

The structure in (13) features two juxtaposed NPs which are both definite and coreferential. Each of these NPs can independently perform the same function, and each can express the same meaning as the whole string (that is, as the structure with the two NPs present). These features have been taken to characterize a structure that cannot be explained as either co-ordination or subordination. Below, I adapt Sopher's (1971) words on the role played by U2 (where U2 is *the newly hired gynaecologist*), to show why, according to the standard argument, neither co-ordination nor dependency can account for the features of the paradigm. Sopher starts at the 'syntactical level':

> [U2] is not co-ordinate since there is no co-ordinating conjunction, nor can there be, for then [*Anne Chapman*] and [*the newly hired gynaecologist*] would constitute a double subject requiring a plural verb. (. . .) It is not subordinate since – though by position an adjunct of the subject – it is structurally independent and can itself function as subject of the sentence. (Sopher, 1971: 27)

At 'the notional level',

> [U2] is not co-ordinate, since [*Anne Chapman*] and [*the newly hired gynaecologist*] have a single referent (they refer to one and the same person). It is not subordinate, since [*Anne Chapman*] and [*the newly hired gynaecologist*] are interchangeable and we may, without change of meaning, re-write the sentence:
> [*The newly hired gynaecologist, Anne Chapman*, will soon do that job in the firm].
> [*Anne Chapman*] and [*the newly hired gynaecologist*] are therefore notionally equivalent, that is, of equal rank. (Sopher, 1971: 27)

As can be seen, the standard argument for the characterization of apposition as a grammatical relation rests on the notions of syntactic and semantic equivalence. However, (13) by itself would not appear to be enough to justify the existence of a major syntactic relationship. If a syntactic relationship of this type is to be posited, then that relationship must be applicable to a number of other constructions, and not just to one construction. In order to better understand this point, let us think for a moment of a structure of subordination such as, for instance, *the book on the table*. A brief examination of *the book on the table* reveals a structure in which one element (the PP *on the table*) is dependent on another (the noun *book*). This simple fact

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allows us to start thinking of a certain type of connection between elements in grammar. It allows us to start making generalizations. But we would not use our analysis of *the book on the table* to posit the existence of a generalized grammatical relationship *unless* that relationship were observable in a number of other different constructions. As it happens, we know that the same basic type of connection (dependency) can be observed in many other constructions. We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the relationship between *book* and *on the table* in our example above is a general grammatical relationship, and not just an idiosyncratic type or subtype.

The problem with the notion of apposition is that this simple strategy of relating a paradigmatic construction to other similar constructions cannot be carried out so easily. As a matter of fact, as soon as one tries to associate the paradigm with other structures which resemble it, a host of problems arise. These are the concern of the section that follows.

3.2 Nominal apposition

Examples such as (14) below illustrate a type of structure where the second NP has an indefinite article, instead of a definite one. Examples (15) and (16), in Spanish and Galician respectively, have no article in the second NP. Since these cases without articles concern the grammar of apposition at large, we consider them here, despite the fact that their presence in the grammar of English is rather restricted:[9]

(13) *Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist*, will soon do that job in the firm.
(14) *Anne Chapman, a gynaecologist*, will soon do that job in the firm.
(15) *Anne Chapman ginecóloga* hará pronto ese trabajo en la empresa.
Anne Chapman gynaecologist will-do soon that job in the firm.
'*Anne Chapman, gynaecologist*, will soon do that job in the firm.'
(16) *Anne Chapman xinecóloga* vai facer axiña ese traballo na empresa.
Anne Chapman gynaecologist goes to-do soon that job in-the firm.


The construction without an article cannot of course exhibit syntactic or semantic equivalence because there is an inequality both in the referential potential of the two units and in their syntactic privileges of occurrence; compare *Anne Chapman hará pronto ese trabajo* (*Anne Chapman will soon do that job*) with **Ginecóloga hará pronto ese trabajo* (**Gynaecologist will soon do that job*). As for the pattern with an indefinite article, most linguists seem to agree that the article turns the second NP into an attributive one (Sopher, 1971; Burton-Roberts, 1975; Taboada, 1978, among others), that is to say, into an NP which has a role in respect of the first NP (U1), and not in respect of the whole sentence. In both cases, i.e. without an article and with an indefinite article, the absolute functional and notional equivalence that we find in the paradigm is not present. This constitutes a problem in that the status of

[9] The construction without article is, however, common in the press genre in English; e.g. *Mr. Douglas Jay, Labour MP for Battersea North and former President of the Board of Trade* (Meyer, 1992: 13).

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the paradigm as a construction with unique properties rested precisely on the *absolute* functional and notional equivalence of its members. In other words, if even the (superficially) closest resemblances to the paradigm do not share its defining properties, we are in principle left with the paradigm as the sole instance of a major syntactic relation called apposition, which seems counterintuitive. If, by contrast, one undervalues *absolute* syntactic and semantic equivalence as in (13), one is free to conceive of a natural class of constructions which includes the three nominal types treated here (that is, (13)–(16)). I would suggest that the best analysis for these three nominal types is one in terms of nonrestrictive modification, rather than one in terms of apposition. Let us refer to the analysis I am proposing as the *External Projection Theory*, for this explicitly locates nonrestrictive modifiers of a head noun as sisters of the nominal constituent comprising the head and its restrictive modifiers, as shown in (17):[10]

(17)



In support of this theory there are facts of agreement. In Quirk et al.'s words (1985: 1304), when the apposed units appear in subject position in the sentence, 'the first (i.e. defined) appositive determines concord'. This appears to indicate that only the first NP is processed as the subject of the sentence. Examples (18) and (19) below are theirs:

(18) *Land, brains, wealth, technology* – in other words *everything we need – are/*is* plentiful in our country.
(19) *Everything we need – land, brains, wealth, technology – is/*are* plentiful in our country.

Quirk et al.'s point receives confirmation from languages such as Spanish and Galician, in which there is a fully developed gender inflection. In these languages, when the members of the presumed apposition have different genders, it is ordinarily the first of them which controls agreement with other constituents of the sentence.

[10] The tree in (17) is reminiscent of Jackendoff's analysis of restrictive and nonrestrictive relative clauses (1977: 169 ff.).

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Note (20) and (21) below in this connection, where the participle *modificado* agrees in gender with the masculine noun *velero*/*veleiro*, and not with the feminine *goleta*:

(20) *Su velero la goleta que ves ahora en el dique seco de*
His/her sailing boat the little-schooner that you-see now in the dock dry of
Nogueira está siendo modificado/*modificada para hacerlo capaz de resistir ese
Nogueira is being modified to make-it able to resist that
tipo de travesía.
kind of crossing.
'His/her sailing boat – the little schooner you can see now in Nogueira's dry dock – is being completely modified to make it able to go through that kind of crossing.'

(21) *O seu veleiro a goleta que estás a ver agora no dique*
The his/her sailing boat the little-schooner that you-are to see now in-the dock
seco de Nogueira está a ser modificado/*modificada para face-lo quen de resistir
dry of Nogueira is to be modified to make-it able to resist
ese tipo de percorrido.
that kind of crossing.

The External Projection Theory also receives support from the fact that not all definite NPs in U2 position may be said to equal the referential potential of the definite NP in U1 position. Again according to Quirk et al. (1985: 1313), some definite NPs have a distinctly 'attributive' role in respect of a previous NP. These involve instances where the article is 'cataphoric *the* introducing a definite description', as in (22)–(23) below:

(22) He introduced me to the *young man, the heir to a fortune*.
(23) 'I don't know what I would have done if I had seen him', exclaimed *Mary, the prey of violent and obscure emotions*.

Commenting on these cases, Burton-Roberts (1975: 415) points out that their attributivity is brought about by the fact that these NPs as a whole are semantically 'INdefinite' (*sic*). The reason for this is that even though *the heir* and *the prey* are morphophonemically definite, they are defined in terms of indefinite postmodification (*a fortune* and *violent and obscure emotions*, respectively). This fact, together with the cataphoric determiner, turns these examples as a whole into semantically indefinite NPs.[11] It follows from this circumstance that not even the very constrained definition of apposition as a construction made up of two juxtaposed + definite + coreferential NPs is enough to guarantee absolute syntactic and semantic equivalence. If, in the end, *full* equivalence is satisfied only by a handful of constructions (a subset of the set of definite NPs), then it would seem better not to consider it a defining property from the start.

Summing up so far, if the puzzle of apposition were to depend solely on an analysis of the nominal types dealt with above (examples (13)–(16)), we could remain moderately satisfied with the modification theory. However, there are more problems with the traditional concept of apposition than our account might have so far led us to believe. We turn our attention to these problems now.

[11] Burton-Roberts adds (1975: 415) that 'the overall indefinite character of these NPs' is similar to '*the core of an apple*, which is paraphrasable by *an apple core*'.

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3.3 Non-nominal categories in apposition

Consider now (24)–(27) below:

(24) He *ran* – absolutely *raced* – up the hill.
(25) They *sent him to Coventry, refused to speak to him*.
(26) Under *normal, peacetime*, conditions.
(27) They met *there, in London*.

Burton-Roberts (1975: 410) adduces (24)–(27) as appositions of 'verbs, verb phrases, adjectives, and adverbials' respectively. The first thing to notice about these constructions is that their categorial variety appears to accord with the kind of productivity one may expect from general grammatical relations. That is to say, if these constructions exhibit the properties of (13), then one is forced to conclude that (13) is not such an idiosyncratic type of construction after all. This means that positing a major syntactic relation to encompass all such constructions is then justifiable.

The appositive analysis that brings together the paradigm case in (13) and (24)–(27) above is predicated on the assumption that these latter constructions exhibit absolute syntactic and semantic equivalence. Judging from their behaviour under the simple phrase-structure tests of omission and reversal, it appears that syntactic equivalence indeed obtains:

(24) (a) He *ran* – absolutely *raced* – up the hill.
(b) He ran up the hill.
(c) He raced up the hill.
(d) He *raced* – absolutely *ran* – up the hill.
(25) (a) They *sent him to Coventry, refused to speak to him*.
(b) They sent him to Coventry.
(c) They refused to speak to him.
(d) They *refused to speak to him, sent him to Coventry*.
(26) (a) Under *normal, peacetime*, conditions.
(b) Under normal conditions.
(c) Under peacetime conditions.
(d) Under *peacetime, normal*, conditions.
(27) (a) They met *here, in London*.
(b) They met here.
(c) They met in London.
(d) They met *in London, here*.

But what about semantic equivalence? After all, as Bitea points out (1977: 454), 'it is the meaning of the units linked by the relation of apposition (appositives) that determines their syntactic status'. In principle, there appears to be a difference between the kind of meaning provided by (25), for instance, and that provided by (13), the paradigm. It has already been pointed out that in paradigmatic instances of apposition the semantic relation between U1 and U2 is, broadly speaking, an *equative* one. An indication of this is the fact that one can consistently express it in the form of an equative paraphrase (A *is* B). Thus, it would appear to be true that in

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all paradigmatic instances of apposition (such as (13), and, also, (11) and (12)) 'U1 IS, *above anything else*, U2'. In (13), *Anne Chapman IS the newly hired gynaecologist*. In (25), however, this kind of equivalence does not hold true. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to claim that (25) expresses, *above anything else*, the idea that *sent him to Coventry IS refused to speak to him*. Somehow, it seems clear that the paraphrase test does not apply to the construction.

In contrast with (13) and (25), where the applicability versus nonapplicability of the *be*-paraphrase appears to be rather clearcut, (24) and (26) exhibit different degrees of acceptance of the paraphrase. In principle, the similarity in meaning between the verbs *run* and *race* in (24) suggests that the paraphrase could easily apply. Yet, it is not clear that one should decode (24) to infer, *more than anything else*, that *ran IS (absolutely) raced*. This might explain why the interchangeability of the units in (24) results in a somewhat 'infelicitous' sentence, namely (24d) *?He raced – absolutely ran – up the hill*. In (26) the paraphrase *normal IS peaceful* does not bring about an absolutely equative meaning of the juxtaposed units. That is, there is no implication that the first unit is exactly the same as the second one. It seems, rather, that the two adjectives separately contribute to the expansion of their head noun (*condition*). Indeed, only the members of the adverbial expression in (27) behave exactly like the nouns in the paradigm: the relational meaning of (27), more than anything else, is that *there IS in London*.

In sum, as a first approximation, it would appear that the equative meaning that characterizes nominal instances of apposition is not preserved across the categorial spectrum that Burton-Roberts wishes to regard as appositive. In the light of our superficial examination of the meaning of all the preceding examples, it turns out that only the juxtaposition of adverbials exhibits the kind of relation that holds between nouns in the paradigm. The adjectives only approach that meaning, while the verbs and VPs turn progressively away from it. This fact makes it difficult to make claims about the semantic equivalence of all these constructions. Note that reference is not all that counts. In (24), for instance, one can visualize the action of 'moving very fast' as expressed linguistically by means of both *run* and *race* at the same time. Both units express 'the same ''piece of reality''' (Leech, 1981: 156). But since in all the previous examples U1 and U2 refer to the same reality, and we still perceive that only the paradigm (*Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist*,) and the adverbial type (*there, in London*,) express, *above everything else*, an equative meaning, we must conclude that there is more than just reference to the same object/person/concept in the grammar of apposition.

As a matter of fact, it is also more than the elusive notion of semantic equivalence that is involved in the meaning of the paradigm and that of the adverbial type. It has been argued above that the members of the other two nominal types ((14)–(16)) were not semantically equivalent. Yet the meaning of these constructions can readily be expressed by the *BE paraphrase*. Thus, in (14), *Anne Chapman IS a gynaecologist*; in (15), *Anne Chapman ES ginecóloga*; and in (16), *Anne Chapman É xinecóloga*. More important than the mere acceptance of the paraphrase is the fact that the three

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nominal constructions appear to be designed to express this particular relational meaning, *above anything else*. It may be useful to wonder why.[12]

3.4 Local domain versus sentence domain

I suggest that the reason why the nominal and adverbial types discussed above express an equative relationship between the units has to do with the second comma, or pause in speech, that separates U2 from the remainder of the sentence. I further suggest that this factor might be the best indication that constructions like (24)–(26) should be analyzed differently from (13) and (27) (and also from (14)–(16), the variants of the paradigm examined in section 3.2). To start with, notice that the second pause is strongly obligatory in (13b)–(16b) and (27e), but optional in (24e)–(26e), repeated below:

(13) (b) **Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist* will soon do that job in the firm.
(14) (b) **Anne Chapman, a gynaecologist* will soon do that job in the firm.
(15) (b) **Anne Chapman, ginecóloga* hará pronto ese trabajo en la empresa.
(16) (b) **Anne Chapman, xinecóloga* vai facer asiña ese traballo na ofisina.
(24) (e) He *ran*, absolutely *raced* up the hill.
(25) (e) They *sent him to Coventry, refused to speak to him* when they found out about the harassment.
(26) (e) Under *normal, peacetime* conditions.
(27) (e) *They met *there, in London* on the eve of the final. [13]


The absence of the second intonation break after U2 results in the U1s in (13b)–(16b) and (27e) being unacceptably dislocated from the remainder of their respective sentences. Without this second break, only U2 relates to the predicator. The result is unacceptability. The adverbial type, (27e), offers a peculiar instantiation of the same process. Here, the proximity of the two locative expressions (*there* and *in London*) forces us to look for an 'appositive meaning' (*there* IS *in London*; see Delorme & Dougherty, 1972: 16). Thus, having decoded U1, *there*, in the absence of a comma we tend to interpret everything that appears after *in London* (*on the eve of the final*) as also part of U2. That is, we tend to interpret the whole string *in London on the eve of the final* as U2, and the result is deviant.[14] The tendency to look for the

[12] Note that I am using the BE paraphrase to define the *broad* relational meaning that characterizes *all* the nominal types discussed here. I use the word 'broad' because the equative BE paraphrase obscures a Hallidayan distinction between identifying *be* and attributive *be* whose possible grammatical repercussions (as seen by Halliday himself) do not affect the conclusions reached in this study. For discussion, cf. Halliday (1994: 119 ff.).

[13] New constituents have been added to (25) and (27) in order for the presumed appositive pause not to coincide with the final sentence pause.


[14] This is an instance of what psycholinguists term 'the garden path effect', as the decoder is led 'up the garden path' to an incorrect parsing. See, for instance, Aitchison (1994: 215), Pinker (1994: 213 ff.) and Garman (1990: 315): 'Grammatical garden paths frequently arise through a mixture of lexical and constructional factors.' *The horse raced past the barn fell* is the classic example where backtracking is necessary.

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Anne Chapman [the gynaecologist] will soon do that job . . .

Figure 1 Retrospection



He ran / absolutely raced up the hill

Figure 2 Simultaneity

limits of U2, in order to obtain the necessary equative meaning, is accentuated if we introduce a third locative expression. Thus, in (28),

(28) *They met there, in London, by Westminster, on the eve of the final.*

failure to produce the appositive pause after U2 results in an association of *in London* with *by Westminster*, as in *they met there, *in London by Westminster, on the eve of the final*. Again, such an association is immediately established because there is no pause after U2 to clarify the length of this unit. Nothing like this happens in (24e)–(26e), which represent, in fact, probably the normal spoken version of these utterances. Indeed, the second, demarcative, strongly obligatory pause is not needed in these cases. This fact surely has a grammatical significance. I suggest that this grammatical significance can be represented by means of figures 1 and 2 above. In particular, I contend that figure 1 is a convenient illustration of the way in which the nominal and adverbial types dealt with above are processed. Figure 2, on the other hand, corresponds to instances such as (24)–(26).

Figure 1 is intended to show the linear development of a sentence structure that is interrupted by an intervening string. The sentence starts with an NP (*Anne Chapman*) after which the first pause appears on the scene. This pause signals the beginning of the interruption and introduces the intervening string (*the newly hired gynaecologist*). After this string, a second pause indicates that the interruption of the sentence has stopped, and that therefore the processing of the original sentence is resumed. As was shown above in (13b)–(16b), if we omit the second pause, the intervening string will be directly associated with the sentence structure, assuming a

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role in it, namely subject. But in that case the first NP (*Anne Chapman*) would be left out of the sentence structure in an ungrammatical, dislocated position. By contrast, when the two pauses are present, it is the contained string (*the newly hired gynaecologist*) that is isolated from the remainder of the sentence.[15] This time, however, the result is grammatical because the second pause causes the processing of the intervening string to be done in retrospect, that is, in reference to Anne Chapman, instead of forwards, in reference to the rest of the sentence. In other words, the intervening string (U2) is processed in the local domain of the first, antecedent NP (the subject of the sentence, *Anne Chapman*), instead of in the broader domain of the sentence (... *will soon do that job in the firm*).[16] Such processing manifests itself in the form of an underlying predication (U1 *is* U2) that is immediately established between the two NPs. This is the kind of meaning that linguists have been identifying as prototypically, or paradigmatically, appositive for decades now, and which has been impressionistically referred to as a 'secondary predication' (Blinkenberg, 1950: 128; Forsgren, 1988: 137–57),[17] as 'predicativity' (Wartburg & Zumthor, 1973: 20; Mathesius, 1975: 90 ff.), as a 'separate assertion' (Koktová, 1985: 39 ff.; Dupont, 1985: 331), or as an 'insertion pragmatique' (Longrée, 1987: 199).

Figure 2 represents a different kind of linear development. In particular, it is intended to illustrate a structure that begins in one way and ends in another. The sentence starts by displaying the normal word order subject + predicator (*he ran*). However, before the expected complements appear, a pause truncates the normal development of the sentence and another predicator (*raced*) 'replaces', so to speak, the first one.[18] Then the sentence goes on with the replacing constituent integrated in

[15] Unacceptable dislocation is not the only possible consequence of omitting the second pause. In the transition from (i) to (ii) below:

(i) *The newest member of the group, John Barr*, was reluctant to express his views.
(ii) *The newest member of the group, John Barr* was reluctant to express his views.

dropping the second intonational boundary does not result in lack of acceptability but in a completely different structure. In (ii) *the newest member of the group* is an attributive adjunct of the subject (*John Barr*), not the first unit in a so-called paradigmatic apposition. The same comments we made in connection with (13b) are applicable to (i). The second pause isolates U2 (*John Barr*) from the remainder of the sentence, causing it to have a role only in the local domain of U1 (*the newest member of the group*). As Sopher points out (1971: 404), agreement shows that U2 is a subject in (iii), where the second pause is absent. Not so in (iv), where it is present:

(iii) *A lazy group, the farmers* were poor. (subject = *the farmers*)
(iv) *A lazy group, the farmers*, was all that remained after the revolution. (subject = *a lazy group*)

I owe (i) and (ii) to an anonymous referee, to whom I am grateful for this point.

[16] The word 'domain' is used here in the sense of 'phrasal scope', not in the particular sense it has in the generative literature.

[17] As used in the literature on apposition, 'secondary predication' and 'secondary predicate' bear no relation to the current sense of these terms in formal grammar, where they refer to sequences involving a small clause, as in 'Jim ate *the meat PRO raw*'. For discussion, cf. Aarts (1995, 1997).

[18] Though see below, section 3.5, for an important qualification of what U2 actually does in respect of U1 in these constructions. The word 'replace' might not be the best term to explain the relationship between the two units.

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it (*raced up the hill*). This time there is no second pause to isolate the newly inserted constituent from the remainder of the sentence. Although the expansion is an informationally *additive* one (see Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 244 ff. and also Meyer, 1992: 92 for apposition at large as an additive relationship), as in figure 1 above, there is no retrospective process this time. The second predicator simply takes on the sentential role that had originally been intended for the first. It does not look backwards to that predicator, as an expansion of it. Instead, it looks forward in search of its complements and adjuncts. Its domain is sentential, not local. The result is not a momentary *diversion* from the sentential path and a subsequent return to it, as was the case with figure 1. Rather, the result is a *new path*. As a matter of fact, the structure in figure 2 is somehow reminiscent of anacolutha. The main difference is that the *correction* that is introduced fits in the structure that it interrupts, unlike anacolutha. Both processes are ordinarily associated with spontaneous, unplanned speech. In this, speakers usually employ synonymous words or sentences in an attempt to adequately convey the intended message.[19]

By contrast, the structure schematized in figure 1 above seems to be typically associated with the written language.[20] In this, the containing pauses provide the reader with demarcative clues about the limits of the interruption. They help us to visually identify what *is* and what *is not* 'the proper assertion of the sentence' (Koktová, 1985: 39 ff.).[21] The reason why this structure is not common in speech is that the looking-back process that the two pauses create involves extra difficulty in the processing of the message. In fact, in speech, speakers would typically resort to

[19] See Beaman (1984: 74): 'This repetitious nature of speech ... is used to make up for the lack in speaking of precision and clarity more common to writing. In written discourse, not as much identificatory material is needed to enable the reader to understand who or what is being referred to because the very nature of the written mode provides greater clarity and precision ... In written discourse the information is merely stated and not elaborated; it is left to the reader to make of it what he or she will.'

[20] In a corpus of over 360,000 words of both written and spoken English, Meyer (1992: 10) found that three-quarters of the constructions he identified as appositions 'were evenly distributed among the written samples of British and American English' and that 'a much smaller percentage (27 percent) occurred in the spoken samples'. Even though Meyer has a very liberal concept of apposition, which makes comparisons difficult, the relevance of his findings for the point I am trying to make here is that, of all the different types of apposition he recognizes, nearly 70 percent were made up of nouns only (while only 17 percent contained no nouns at all). This appears to confirm the relationship between nominal apposition and written English, referred to above. Meyer points out a communicative reason for such a relationship: appositions are predominantly used to provide new information about U1. This means that they will be typically employed by language users with little shared knowledge, and this is precisely the context that characterizes the written language. In fact, Meyer explicitly contends (1992: 92 ff.) that 'appositions containing two sentences predominated in the conversation genre, those containing noun phrases in the learned and fiction genres'.

[21] Koktová maintains that apposition does 'not [belong] *stricto sensu* to the syntactic structure of a sentence and [does not] semantically [contribute] to the proper assertion of the sentence in which it occurs'. She adds that 'apposition does not contribute to the truth conditions (intension) of the proper assertion of a sentence'. As a consequence, apposition 'is not touched by sentential negation' (1985: 41). She exemplifies her point with (i) below:

(i) A. Bill assumes that Sandra said that Joe, a famous rugby player, was a liar.
B. No, it is not true.

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mechanisms of various sorts in order to separate the local domain, where the secondary predication takes place, from the normal development of the sentence (i.e. from the main predication). Among such mechanisms are the combined use of so-called appositive markers, such as *you know*, *that is*, *say*, and so on, and thematization devices, such as left-dislocation. Examples (29) and (30) show some of these mechanisms at work in English and Spanish respectively:

(29) Anne Chapman/you know?/the gynaecologist/// well she is the one that will soon do that job.
(30) Anne Chapman/¿no sabes?/la ginecóloga/// bueno pues ella es la que pronto hará ese trabajo.

3.5 Modification and apposition: the separate constituent analysis

It is important to reiterate at this point that I have opted for an interpretation of the paradigm (i.e. (11)–(13)), and of the other nominal types ((14)–(16)) and the adverbial type (27), as constructions to be explained in terms of nonrestrictive modification, as was first proposed in section 3.2 above, and as the phrase-marker in (17) suggests.[22] The arguments adduced in sections 3.2–3.4 give compelling support to the modification theory. Specifically, there is evidence that the two containing pauses prevent U2 from having a function in respect of the rest of the sentence, unlike U1. If the two units do not have the same function there cannot be apposition. This situation contrasts with what happens in the non-nominal and nonadverbial types ((24)–(26)). In these, the absence of the second pause allows U2 to take on a sentential role, the same as that of U1, but, this time, that role is taken with no consequences for the grammaticality of the construction. U1 is not perceived as an ungrammatical dislocated constituent. It is not *left out* or superseded. Rather, it is felt to join U2 in the search for the expression of the intended meaning.

The extent to which the second constituent in these latter constructions

where the extra information that Joe is a famous rugby player is not denied. Of course, I am contending that what Koktová interprets as apposition is not in fact apposition, but the interesting point she raises remains valid all the same.

[22] The analysis of canonical appositions in terms of nonrestrictive modification leaves unresolved the further discrimination between these constructions and other nonrestrictive structures, such as loose relative clauses. Many grammarians have referred to loose relatives in ways that are analogous to some descriptions of apposition. Of interest for the conclusions reached in this paper is the theory (advocated by such authors as Lucas, 1974; McCawley, 1988: 417 ff, 1998: 467 ff.; or Fabb, 1990) that loose relatives side with parentheticals in not bearing a syntactic relation to their apparent syntactic hosts (that is, in being separate constituents; see also Huddleston, 1971: 210–62). This position is similar to the belief of some scholars that apposition is not a genuine syntactic relationship either, but some sort of parenthetical or metalinguistic correction (Zemb, 1968: 296; Burton-Roberts, 1975, 1993: 183; and Longrée, 1987: 199). The problem is that viewing all these constructions (loose relatives, canonical appositions, and true appositions as defined later in this paper) as somehow the same thing (parentheticals) leads us back to the kind of commodiousness that I criticized in the introduction. At any rate, the study of nonrestrictive relatives, and of nonrestrictive modification in general, lies outside the scope of this paper. On the similarities and differences between apposition and loose relatives see Acuña (1996: 80–7).


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effectively 'corrects' the first may be a matter of controversy. Due to the acceptability of the pattern, and in order to make a distinction between these cases and cases of open reformulation (which involve a clear rejection of the first constituent, as in 'Paul Schofield just came in and just declaimed his words in a [beis] *voice*, and – [bæs] *voice* rather – and …'),[23] I suggest that U1 and U2 do share the same function in the sentence.[24] A convenient way of expressing this peculiarity is to apply to this pattern the description that Burton-Roberts proposes for apposition in general:


> Each NP in apposition to another has its function in respect of other constituents of the sentence (subject-of, object-of etc.) which it has in common with the NP it is in apposition to. But apposition as such is not a grammatical constituent of the sentence and this is reflected in the P-markers in the derivation of [*Manchester United, the champions*, play today]: in none of them is there a node corresponding to apposition that dominates only NPs. (Burton-Roberts, 1975: 410)

I will refer to Burton-Roberts' analysis as the *Separate Constituent Analysis*, but I will not apply it to what he regards as appositions (all of the constructions examined here), but only to those which have been explained here by reference to figure 2. The trees in (31)–(32) below are adaptations of this analysis to constructions such as (24)–(25) above:

(31)



(32)



[23] Not surprisingly, Meyer considers open reformulations like this as 'more or less appositional' too. The example quoted in the text is his (1987: 103).

[24] Note here Burton-Roberts' words (1985: 410–11): 'In fact, apposition could well be described as a pseudo-correction, a correction that has acquired the status of a rhetorical figure.'

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The Separate Constituent Analysis defines a structure in which two constituents perform the same function without making up a superordinate constituent. That is, they perform the same function separately. Another way of describing this structure is to say that there is a constituent slot which is filled twice. The relationship between the two constituents is not so much syntactic as merely logical, as Burton-Roberts points out. This circumstance partly reflects the intuition of some scholars that apposition is *repetition* and that it represents a nongrammatical relationship.[25] I suggest that if anything in grammar is to be called apposition, the label should be given to this construction-type only. On this view, examples (33)–(35) below would also be appositions:

(33) The woman *disappeared*, *died*, in the pursuit of her dream.
(34) After a while, Jan *tried no more, gave up any attempt to come up with a solution*.
(35) We were *amazed*, *stunned*, by an event which clearly surpassed all of us.

The Separate Constituent Analysis adequately explains the results yielded by the application of the tests of omission and interchangeability. The fact that these constructions successfully pass these tests (see (24b,c,d)–(26b,c,d) above) follows from their individual ability to perform the same function in the sentence. The important fact is that when we omit a member, or when we change its position, no latent predicative relationship is broken, because no such relationship exists between the juxtaposed members of these constructions to start with. Defined in this way, apposition is characterized by *true functional equivalence*, since its members *do* perform the same function when they appear together. By contrast, the traditional idea of apposition has rested only on the *potential* ability of the second member of the paradigm to stand alone, when the first is absent in applying the omission test. It is crucial to realize, however, that when the two units appear together (prior to the application of the test) they have clearly distinct functions (head and modifier), instead of simultaneously the same one. As has been argued, the two strongly obligatory pauses must be held accountable for the modifying function of U2 (that is, for the local domain and the retrospection process). Needless to say, the grammatically motivated role of the pauses cannot be assessed when we omit one of the members, for omission causes the pauses to disappear too, thus destroying what is most defining about the structures hitherto considered paradigmatic instances of apposition, namely the underlying predicativity which, *above anything else*, characterizes them. This is in fact the reason why the test of omission has traditionally masked the true meaning – and the structure – of the paradigm (which, as repeatedly emphasized, I have analysed as not being apposition).

[25] J. M. Zemb (1968: 296) sees apposition as a graft inside the sentence, but not as a part of the sentence. Bitea (1977: 458) and Dupont (1985: 45 ff.) make a similar point. For apposition as a 'relation non constructionnelle – et, donc, non grammaticale', see Mulder (1977: 30 ff.).

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4 Summary and conclusions

In this paper I have tried to redefine the concept of apposition. I discussed the properties usually invoked by linguists as criterial for apposition, and the radically different approaches to apposition which stem from those properties. No fewer than seven different theories can be found in the literature: 1. apposition as juxtaposition of coreferential NPs; 2. as co-ordination; 3. as dependency; 4. as a third kind of syntactic relationship (defined in various ways); 5. as a spectrum exhibiting features of both co-ordination, dependency, and sheer peripherality; 6. as explainable only through a mixture of conflicting levels of description; and 7. as not being a syntactic relationship at all. In the light of such extremely different views, I have argued that the concept has become too nebulous and, as a consequence, too unwieldy to be of any use. In this connection, Meyer's (1992) approach was seen as a good illustration of the dangers inherent in an extremely liberal conception of apposition.

In section 3.1 the concept of paradigmatic apposition was introduced (examples (11)–(13)). In section 3.2 the nominal resemblances to the paradigm ((14)–(16)) were examined, and found not to exhibit absolute functional equivalence. It was then suggested that if even the apparently closest resemblances to the paradigm do not exhibit the same defining properties (functional equivalence of U1 and U2), it would seem better to downplay the importance of those properties and explain both so-called appositions of the canonical type and their nominal resemblances in terms of non-restrictive modification. Facts of agreement were shown to support this view.

In section 3.3 non-nominal instances of presumed apposition were studied and found not to show semantic equivalence. The juxtaposition of the verbs, VPs, and adjectives examined was seen not to result in the kind of equative meaning that characterizes not only the paradigm but also the other nominal types. Only so-called adverbial appositions were found to express the same relational meaning as the paradigm. In section 3.4 it was argued that the reason why only the nominal and adverbial types were 'captured' by the *be*-paraphrase is that these are the only types which exhibit strongly obligatory intonation boundaries. Such boundaries contain and isolate U2 from the remainder of the sentence, thus preventing it from having a role in respect of the other constituents of the sentence, unlike U1. They force U2 to be processed in the local domain of U1, a retrospective process that results in the creation of an underlying predicative relationship between the two units. The concept of nonrestrictive modification was finally confirmed as the best possible analysis for these structures. By contrast, by virtue of not exhibiting strongly obligatory intonational boundaries, the other (adjectival and verbal) types could not exhibit predicativity. In these, U2 is seen as a kind of grammaticalized correction. It is not isolated from the sentence structure by containing pauses (which establish a local domain), and this allows it to take on the same role in the sentence as U1. In view of this, in section 3.5 it was argued that only these verbal and adjectival structures satisfy the criterion of functional equivalence and can, therefore, be considered true appositions. They can be explained by reference to the Separate

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Constituent Analysis. This was first proposed by Burton-Roberts (1975), but has been modified here to apply to a completely different range of structures. Under this analysis, the members of an apposition are not dominated by a superordinate node 'apposition', but instead relate to all the other sentence constituents individually. They exhibit functional equivalence *in praesentia*, whereas so-called canonical appositions show equivalence *in absentia* of one of the members, through the substitution test. I have argued that this test, in cancelling the effect of grammatically motivated intonational boundaries, destroys the predicativity that characterizes what have hitherto been regarded as paradigmatic instances of apposition. This is the reason why this test masks the true meaning – and the (local) structure – of so-called canonical appositions, which I argue do not belong to the appositive paradigm.

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