New Books

The architecture of reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality.
By Robert Audi
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 286 pages.

Audi's aim is admirable. Epistemology, decision theory, and to some extent ethics, confront special cases of a wide question: how does a rational person think? Moreover the cases interact, since what it is rational for a particular person in a particular situation to decide or want is affected by what it is rational for her to believe. And though what it is rational for her to believe *may* be independent of what it is rational for her to want and decide, what enquiries it is rational to undertake and how it is rational to carry them out certainly do depend on what choices and desires are rational. So questions about particular kinds of rationality are best investigated with an eye to the more general case. Audi wants to put together a big picture of how a rational agent thinks, in particular of the similarities and connections between rational belief and rational desire. The result is interesting and often convincing, with many sharp points and stimulating distinctions. I recommend it to anyone interested in the fusion of epistemology and the theory of choice, or in the variety of normative concepts we apply to persons.

Any such reader will need some patience, though. The book moves very slowly and repeats itself a lot. The urge to turn pages and skip sections is irresistible. One basic cause is Audi's poor sense of what will count as news to his typical reader. One is treated to detailed expositions of thoroughly familiar points, while interesting ideas sometimes pass by in a flash. Audi rarely sums up his view in a few carefully chosen sentences labelled as definitive. Instead he slowly develops his position with a number of asides and warnings, and then usually performs a semi-retraction in which he argues that what he has been saying is compatible with various apparently opposed views. So in the end you are not sure quite how strong the claims are.

Here are some ideas he definitely is defending.

Normative concepts of justification and rationality apply to beliefs, desires, and actions. They are different: a rational belief or action is one that an agent can hold or perform without compromising her rationality, while a justified one is rationally compulsory. Scepticism, both epistemic and moral, can for many purposes be dealt with by showing that one can believe in the world or in science, or treat others decently, without thereby being irrational.

Justification is a matter of relating a state to experience. The relation is thus generally foundational, with the vital qualification that the basis is defensible: what might in the absence of other considerations justify a state may in some contexts be insufficient. Both beliefs and desires are justified

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by experience, beliefs by standard inductive reasoning (in which one experiences something and expects more of the same) and desires by something analogous where a person has a pleasant experience and comes rationally to want more of the same. The desire that is justified is for the objective features of the experience, so that a desire that someone else have a particular pleasant experience can be made reasonable by ones own appreciation of it. (I think Audi intends that such specific altruistic desires can be justified as well as reasonable, though I am not sure in my reading of him, simply in the absence of defeating considerations.) There are apriori beliefs, in the sense of beliefs which in the absence of contrary evidence it is reasonable to hold, and essentially desirable conditions, which also, other things being equal, it is reasonable to want. These too play a role in shaping the pattern of a rational agent's beliefs and desires.

There are coherent internalist conceptions of the justification of beliefs and desires. That is, justification can be understood in terms of inferential relations between purely psychological states. At various points Audi says that externalist accounts—for example reliabilist accounts of the justification of belief and analogous accounts on which a desire is justified if satisfying it does in fact tend to the satisfaction of basic needs—could also fill out his architecture, but he does not investigate what changes might be necessary. Given the adequacy of the internalist account that Audi develops, externalist considerations would become alternatives or supplements, rather than rivals. The model would be externalist accounts of knowledge, which need not challenge internalist accounts of justified belief.

These are Audi's central conclusions. In presenting them he makes many other points, connected in different ways to the theme of the general structure of reasonableness. But I shall ignore these further points and in the rest of this review I will state some ways in which I suspect Audi's architecture may be wrong. The most basic issue is his internalism. If we are considering rationality in the large, should we express it in terms of articulable reasoning whose validity can be appreciated by the person in question, or in terms of processes which in specific environments give particular kinds of good results? In the case of belief the internalism/externalism debate is now well-rehearsed. In the case of desire and action it is much newer, and it is harder to make out the possible defensible positions. In order to make the justification of desire parallel to that of belief, Audi bases justified desires on pleasant or satisfying experiences. But it is not really clear how the justification proceeds, and how it is to equip a person with a full life-supporting set of rational wants. After all, many things which we just find ourselves wanting, striving for which has good results for us, do not actually give us much pleasure. The worry intensifies when we add the distinction between rational obligation and permissibility justification versus reasonable). For there are many desires which it is perfectly alright to hold, in that they play a role in one among many possible ways one could live ones life. Need these bear any relation to fundamental experience at all, let alone one that the agent can consider and reflectively approve of?

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The most fundamental form of the worry, though, attaches to the project of combining the different domains of rational assessment. On Audi's account the justification of beliefs is more or less autonomous, while those of desires and actions depend on those of beliefs. But this is far from obviously right. Suppose that your thinking time and intelligence are limited, and you have various matters that you could investigate. You are going to have to consider some of them with intense care, some in a looser manner, and ignore some completely. The decision about which matters get which treatments surely depends in part on your fundamental desires. And the other way round, when you are revising your desires, which ones get the full Socratic treatment and which are given a quick once-over will depend in part on what you believe. Moreover the decision to expend a certain amount of your cognitive resources on revising either your beliefs or your desires depends in part on the amount you are going to expend on revising the other.

'Depends on' here is surely best not considered internalistically. Agents do not often think out how they are to distribute their cognitive resources. If they did the effort would be an additional drain on those resources. They adopt balances between the different demands on them, and these balances are either satisfactory or not. So a person who accepts her everyday desires to cooperate with others in small matters, and to trust her intuitions about which people are dealing honestly with her, while getting on with her main business of working out the genetic codes of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, need not consider whether such cooperation is inherently pleasant or conducive to her well being, or whether she should be thinking more about everyday cooperation and less about genetics. As long as it works, that is: as long as her life proceeds well and her basic aims are achieved, she is proceeding in a perfectly reasonable way just by instantiating a formula that happens to fit her situation. If she were a game theorist, or a philosopher working on the other minds problem, the situation would be different.

My suspicion, then, is that global questions of rationality, in which the interaction of belief-forming, desire-forming, and act-choosing mechanisms become central, and in which questions of the allocation of resources between the different rational activities arise, will force us to ways of thinking about justification in which externalist considerations are ineliminable. Global rationality looks less like traditional epistemology than Audi thinks. This suspicion, even if I had conclusive arguments for it, would not show that Audi's project is misguided, though it would force revisions in many details. In fact it would show that Audi's project has a more fundamental importance than he claims for it. Real clarity about the rationality of beliefs, desires, or actions can only be achieved by considering all three at once.

Adam Morton

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Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness
By John Perry

In recent years philosophers have tried to use observations about consciousness to refute physicalism, the view that all phenomena are physical phenomena. Neo-Dualism is fuelled by three main arguments intended to show that some mental phenomena are non-physical:

> *The Zombie Argument*: I could have a physical twin who lacks consciousness. Hence, consciousness is neither identical with nor supervenes on physical properties.
>
> *The Knowledge Argument*: Mary, a scientist who knows every physical fact about colour perception, has spent her whole life in a black-white room. When she sees a red tomato for the first time, she learns a fact she did not know before: what it is to see red. Hence, there are (mental) facts that are not identical with physical facts.
>
> *The Modal Argument*: Imagine that we have a good proposal for reducing pain to a physical state, say, that pain is C-17 fibres firing. Now if the statement 'Pain is C-17 fibres firing' is true, it is necessarily true, since 'pain' and 'C-17 fibres firing' are rigid designators. But the statement is contingent. The reference of 'pain' is fixed by one of its essential properties: its feeling a certain way. Everything which feels like pain is pain. But in some possible worlds C-17 fibres firing doesn't feel like pain. Hence, the above statement is false in some possible worlds (it is contingently true, if true, at all) and consequently it cannot be a true *identity*-statement: pain is not C-17 fibres firing.

John Perry's book *Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness* (*KPC*) is a spirited defence of physicalism against these arguments. The leading and original idea of the book is that the Modal and the Knowledge Argument do not establish the existence of non-physical properties, but the need for a broader conception of thought content (113). Both arguments only get off the ground if one accepts a theory of thought content which makes the *subject matter assumption* that '[the] content of a belief is simply whatever is believed about whatever the belief is about' (113). Perry sees as his major innovation the introduction of an additional notion of content: *reflexive content* (35). I will mainly discuss this central strand of Perry's book.

Here is an overview over the book: Perry outlines in chapter 2 and 3 antecedent or alternatively *prima facie* physicalism and proposes an account of our common sense conception of experiences. Chapter 4 discusses the Zombie Argument and rejects the thought experiment on which it is based as flawed. Perry then turns to the Knowledge Argument (ch. 5) and uses it as a springboard to introduce his theory of thought content in chapter 6. Chapter 7 and 8 use the theory to criticize the Knowledge and the Modal Argument. In these chapters Perry also aims to show that his defence of physicalism is superior to its rivals. For example, Perry argues convincingly that the subjective aspects of experience cannot be explained

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away in terms of know-how. For the relevant know-how is a special case of propositional knowledge (ch. 7.3).

After this sketch of Perry's general line of defence, let us look more closely at the doctrine defended: *antecedent physicalism*. Antecedent physicalism collects the common sense truths about mental states and adds to this the hypothesis that these states are physical. Among the mental 'going ons' we pre-theoretically accept are experiences and thoughts. Thoughts as well as experiences are causes and effects, but only experiences, say pains, have *subjective characters*: there is something it is like to have them. The notorious experience-gap problem for physicalism is that physical states seem to lack subjective characters. So isn't antecedent physicalism inconsistent if it accepts subjective characters and holds that every mental state is nothing but a physical state?

A standard physicalist answer is *concept* dualism: there is just *one* (physical) state, but it can be known or conceived of in *two* different ways. For example, one way to conceive of pain is via its typical causal role: pain is the mental state that is typically caused by skin damage and causes folk to yell, whince, cringe etc. Physicalists have explored this conception of pain. Another way to conceive of the same state is as the state that feels like *this* (imagine me having a headache now). I can classify mental states as pains, because I can remember how it is to have *this* kind of experience. Our experience-concepts have, says Perry, a demonstrative/recognitional core (64). A demonstrative/re-cognitional concept is like a causal role concept topic-neutral: conceiving of pain as *this* kind of experience leaves the question whether the thing conceived of is physical or not open. If our concepts of experiences have demonstrative/recognitional cores, one should expect that work on indexical and demonstrative thoughts will shed light on the consciousness debate. *KPC* is built on this hypothesis.

Barwise's and Perry's work on the semantics of indexicals and demonstratives saw philosophers of language committing the *fallacy of misplaced information*: These philosophers took the proposition literally expressed by an utterance to be the only information one could acquire from the utterance.[1] In their critique Barwise and Perry argued that there is not *the* content of an utterance, but a spectrum of contents. At one end of the spectrum utterance contents are 'composed' of the things the utterance is about and the properties involved, at the other end the content involves only relational properties to the utterance itself. *KPC* takes philosophers of mind to task for committing an analogous fallacy by focusing on one sort of belief content. Perry illustrates the fallacy in chapter 5 by a series of examples that he takes to be of the same form as the Mary example in the Knowledge Argument. Consider Gary (108ff). He believes that

Salt Lake City is southwest of Little America

This belief does not help Gary very much in achieving his goal to visit Salt Lake City. Only after he has demonstratively identified the place where he

[1] Barwise/Perry, *Situations and Attitudes*, Cambridge Mass. 1983, 38.

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is as Little America and comes to believe what he would express in Little America by the words 'Salt Lake City is southwest of this place', he knows in which direction to go. But both beliefs share a content Perry calls *subject matter content*, they are both about Salt Lake City, Little America and the South West Relation. Hence, subject matter content cannot be all what counts. This brings, says Perry, *reflexive contents* in the picture. The reflexive content of Gary's non demonstrative belief is, roughly, that the belief is true iff the causal sources of the Salt Lake City notion and Little America notion involved in it are such that the first is southwest of the second. The reflexive content of the demonstrative belief is given by the following truth condition: the belief is true if Salt Lake City is southwest of the object of the current perception attached to this belief.

Similar things hold in Mary's case (cp. 146–148). Mary knew all along that a certain subjective character, Qr, is what it's like to see red, the reference of 'Qr' being fixed by a physical description. Mary's discovery consists in the acquisition of the demonstrative belief, which she would express by saying 'This (referring to an aspect of her mental state) is what it's like to see red'. The demonstrative belief differs in reflexive, but not in subject matter content from her original belief: Both beliefs are about the same aspect of a mental state. Hence, the Mary example is just another illustration of the value of recognition judgments; it has nothing to do with the existence of non-physical facts.

Perry uses reflexive content also to rebut the Modal Argument. If pain is C-17 fibres firing, it cannot be otherwise. Yet, the physicalist sees this as a contingent 'identity'. The usual strategy to explain the appearance of contingency does not work here: one cannot say that the method we use to fix the reference of pain could have picked out another state. How can the physicalist make sense of contingency here? Perry answers: The physicalist's belief that pain is C-17 fibres firing has a subject matter content that is necessarily true (false), but the belief's reflexive content, namely that the concepts involved in the belief co-refer, is only contingently true (false) (178ff.).

The notion of reflexive content does the main work in *KPC*. But Perry himself remarks: 'Reflexive content itself may still be a bit mysterious, however' (134). Unfortunately this reader agrees. Here is why. Perry is clear about a negative feature of reflexive content:

1. People do not grasp and accept the reflexive contents of their beliefs about ordinary facts. Neither Gary nor Mary need to be able to think about their mental states in order to have beliefs about Little America or red experiences! Some people will not even have the concepts required to grasp the reflexive content of their beliefs (114, 134, 212 Fn. 28).

Positively we learn:

2. The reflexive content tells us how 'the belief *itself* and its components need to be related to the world for the belief to be true.' (114, cp. also 176).

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Given 1. one will ask how reflexive content can play a role in explaining the cognitive value of recognition judgments if the thinker himself has no access to the content.

Perry addresses this worry in 6.4. He makes a good case for the thesis that we are mainly interested in subject matter contents, for these can be preserved independently of special contexts (138). That explains why we ascribe beliefs by specifying their subject matter content, but it does not answer the worry about reflexive content. Perry goes on to say that we are *attuned* to reflexive contents, attunement being a doxastic attitude like belief (135). This reader would like to know more. Is the attitude of being attuned to a reflexive content similar to what has been called 'subdoxastic' attitudes, that is states of an information processing module and not of a person? If yes, how does attunement to reflexive content help with what *Mary* came to know (in contrast with the information processed by the modules of her mind)? If not, what is attunement?

Perry hints at an alternative way of thinking about reflexive content that uses the metaphor of concepts as files that store information (180). The reflexive content of Mary's demonstrative belief informs us about the components of her recognitional belief: her introspective notion and her objective pain concept must refer to the same state for the belief to be true; after Mary's recognition these 'files' must be linked and information must flow from one to the other. Hence, the reflexive content of Mary's recognitional belief provides information about an important change in Mary's file system that took place because of things she came to know. But the proponent of the Knowledge Argument asked what *Mary* came to know, not how her file system was 're-wired'. Reflexive content does help with the file system, but not with an intuitive description of what it is that Mary came to know when she saw a red tomato for the first time.

At this point one might ask why Perry introduces reflexive content in the first place. His argument is, roughly: Subject matter content cannot explain the cognitive value of recognition judgments. Hence, we need another sort of content to do this and reflexive content is the only candidate. While Perry's criticism of subject matter content is convincing, his assumption about reflexive content is not. For there is another alternative to subject matter content. Mary's belief about her experience is, to use Perry's own terminology, 'essentially demonstrative'. There is one content of Mary's belief that can only be fully specified by using demonstratives in the right context. This *essentially* demonstrative content of Mary's belief is different from the *non indexical* subject matter content and from the *reflexive* content. The demonstrative content, it seems, is crucial in saying what Mary learns: Only if I have a red experience I can say what Mary comes to know, namely that *this* is what it is to see red. Perry is hostile to contents of limited accessibility. Mary's case might give him a reason to be more welcoming.

KPC is a joy to read, the reader is given an excellent chart of the issues and he is presented with a principle based criticism of the main contemporary arguments against physicalism. Even if Perry's theory of content

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does not work as smoothly as he supposes, he offers the reader a wealth of fruitful distinctions.

Mark Textor

Wittgenstein : Connections and Controversies
By P. M. S. Hacker
Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2001, xxiv + 375 pp.

A philosopher once told me he had had to read Miss Anscombe's *Intention* one and a half times before understanding it. His first attempt failed when he realized he was reading only the right hand pages: her style was so like Wittgenstein's, whose work, at that time, was published only in editions with the German text on the left and the English on the right. No one would make the some mistake in reading Peter Hacker, whose life's work has been devoted to scholarship in the service of understanding Wittgenstein. The present volume brings together thirteen such papers, twelve previously published, three co-authored by Gordon Baker. Yet this is not the sort of volume that Wittgenstein himself would ever have produced, and this paradox raises in an acute form the question: why read Wittgenstein? What does this book reveal of Hacker's answer?

'Wittgenstein', claims Hacker (p. x), 'is unique in the history of philosophy in having produced two powerful complete world-pictures.' The 'connections' of his title concern the relations between these 'pictures', and between them and others contemporary with them: the 'controversies' concern their interpretation. Hacker starts his book with an 'Overview' which sets out his conception of the *Tractatus* as offering a realist metaphysics which represents 'the culmination of a tradition in Western philosophy', (p. 19), and counterposes to it the *Investigations* as a break with that tradition which replaces knowledge by understanding—an understanding gained by 'the methodical examination of the use of ... words' (p. 33) that characterized late 20th century analytic philosophy.

In the second and third essays, however, Hacker presents Wittgenstein's later philosophy as establishing 'the autonomy of humanistic understanding' (p. 34), and in this sense as continuous with the work of Dilthey in opposing scientistic explanations of human action. This is illustrated by a discussion of Wittgenstein's 'Remarks on Frazer's "Golden Bough"' in which Hacker takes issue with Frank Cioffi's criticisms of this text. Magic, Hacker insists with Wittgenstein, like any human practice, can only be described, not explained, and the understanding such a description can furnish is achieved only by connecting the practice to impulses we ourselves possess, so that what stands in the way of it is blindness on our part, not unscientific error on the part of the practitioners.

The fourth, fifth and sixth essays defend, obliquely, Hacker's conception of the *Tractatus* as purveying a realist metaphysics. On the surface, of course, the claim seems absurd, for did not Wittgenstein attack the very possibility of a metaphysics of this or any other kind? It lies in the region

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of 'what we cannot speak about,' and so of what 'we must pass over in silence' (T. 7). Hacker's defence, however, is that, according to Wittgenstein, what are shown by language are the ineffable truths of such a metaphysics, and that it is precisely such truths that Wittgenstein was, in Frank Ramsey's ironic phrase, trying to 'whistle' in the *Tractatus*—even though he condemned his own elucidatory propositions as nonsensical: a ladder to be thrown away after it has been ascended, Two of this group of essays, therefore, constitute a critique of Cora Diamond's contention that Wittgenstein should be taken at his word, so that the notion of ineffable truths is itself one of the things that must be jettisoned. In a related vein the third of these essays attacks Peter Winch—an ally of Diamond—for denying that the meaning of a name in the *Tractatus* must be accounted for by reference to an independently identifiable constituent of reality. Here again, Hacker holds, a realist metaphysics *is* presupposed by the *Tractatus* account of language.

The next two essays discuss the relation between Frege's philosophy and that of the early and the later Wittgenstein respectively. Hacker, in contrast to some other commentators, emphasizes the differences between the two philosophers. From the outset Wittgenstein denied the Fregean assumption that logic describes a special subject matter, namely the nature of thoughts, conceived as abstract rather then psychological entities, and this led him eventually to a wholesale rejection of the view that indicative sentences have a uniformly descriptive role.

The ninth essay discusses the appropriation of Wittgensteinian ideas by the Vienna Circle and, in particular, their use of the notion of ostensive definition, which combined a Tractarian conception of the termini of analysis with empiricism, 'By a peculiar irony of fate,' as Baker and Hacker put it (p. 245), Wittgenstein was at the very same time attacking ostensive definition as the means by which words are correlated with things in the world, in thoughts that crystallized out as the early sections of the *Investigations*. Yet, Baker and Hacker convincingly argue, contemporary appeals to recognitional capacities as linking language to the world repeat the errors of the Vienna Circle.

The tenth and eleventh essays consist of Baker and Hacker's celebrated assault on Saul Kripke's 'sceptical' interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations' and a related piece *contra* Norman Malcolm. The burden of both essays is that it is the rules themselves, not actual agreement, which provide the standards of correctness for their application. This presupposes the existence of a practice, but not necessarily, the authors controversially claim, a social practice, so that, *pace* Kripke, Malcolm and others, the existence of a community is not needed for a language, only the possibility of others sharing its conceivably single speaker's application of words.

The final two essays deal with Carnap's 'The Elimination of Metaphysics' and Strawson's attempted rehabilitation of it. Carnap—like Diamond later—is brought to book for taking the earlier Wittgenstein at his word and so denying the existence of ineffable necessary truths. But

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what the early Wittgenstein, unlike the later one, had failed to grasp was that sentences apparently expressing such truths are not descriptions at all, but rather linguistic rules. Strawson's 'descriptive' metaphysics, Hacker argues, does not succeed in reinstating this branch of philosophy, since it does indeed deal only with the uses of language and not with some reality beyond. 'The putative necessities in reality,' Hacker contends, 'are merely the shadows cast by rules for the use of words' (p. 362). But this lesson has not been grasped, so that 'a new form of the old disease has broken out, and the mythology of metaphysics has been revived. Its roots lie deep in *our* contemporary culture—in the science and scientism of the late twentieth century' (p. 370).

So why read Wittgenstein? Is it to escape from this mythology, as Hacker supposes the later but not the earlier Wittgenstein to have escaped? To avoid the scientism that nourishes it and which distorts humanistic understanding in, for example, the philosophy of mind? To acquire insights into the nature of language which, Hacker suggests (citing van Hofmannsthal, Joyce, Orwell, Borges, Beckett and Pinter), gives rise to 'the deepest cultural preoccupations of the last century' (p. 308)? Or to find a new way of doing philosophy? Doubtless Hacker's answer would be all of these, though how they fit together remains unclear. Yet, for this reader at least, the apparent discrepancy between his practice and that of Wittgenstein himself *is still* troubling, and the gulf between the arcane scholarly polemics of this book and the shores of a new philosophical landscape remains unbridged.

Perhaps this is because an expositor of Wittgenstein, like one who offers a summary of a poem, is moving from one genre to another, and losing what is distinctive of its mode of communication in the process. It is natural enough for such an expositor to prefer an interpretation of the text that leaves it stating a number of theses, even if its author thought he was doing otherwise—as did the early Wittgenstein. Whatever the strength of Hacker's objections, one cannot help being left with the impression that Diamond has a better grasp of the *avant garde* character of the *Tractatus*, surely not in intention, at least, the culmination of a tradition, as Hacker claims, but itself a break with it. Indeed, arguably the *Tractatus* marks a more radical break than the *Investigations*, for while the latter finds a continuing descriptive role for philosophy, the former finds none. 'Words fall to pieces in my mouth like mouldy mushrooms,' wrote the Viennese van Hofmannsthal in 1902, and one has a sense of this experience in the early Wittgenstein which Hacker does not capture.

This anxiety—a sceptical one?—that words and thoughts somehow fail to reach out to encompass any reality, rather than a general concern with the nature of language, is surely what troubled early twentieth century analytic philosophers and led them to discover in analyses which triumphantly terminate in reference to objects in the world some healing balm. Yet it took the ingenuity of Wittgenstein to give an account which does not require us to *find* those objects, in the manner of Russellian acquaintance or ostensive definition, prior to being secure in the use of

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language. 'The propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order' (T.5.5563), he famously wrote, and this implies that reference *is* made—at least when we are talking sense and not, for example, philosophy. It seems to me perverse to call this position realist, since it locates in the workings of language itself the guarantee of a connection with reality and does not, *pace* Russell, Carnap and others, look beyond it.

It is this determination to confine his enquiries to the workings of language which enabled Wittgenstein to revise and extend the results of the *Tractatus* so that much more of our thought and talk could be recuperated. What is new in the *Investigations* is the replacement of the concealed general form of propositions by the visible form of life as what provides an assurance of sensible speech. We gain a common perspective on the world with those whose form of life we share. It is this insight that the proponents of a 'communitarian' account of the rule-following considerations *à la* Kripke and Malcolm seek to elaborate. To dispute this account, like Hacker, requires an explanation of how, outside of a community, such sharing can be had. It is possible to appeal here, as Wittgenstein does in reflecting on the magical practices that Frazer aims to explain, to 'an instinct which I myself possess' (quoted p. 76). Yet a merely 'naturalistic' reading of such remarks is fraught with difficulties and leaves Wittgenstein holding a metaphysical position of a sort he would surely have disavowed.

None of this engages, of course, with the sort of exercise in which Hacker is awesomely adept. This book, like his others, is an impressive monument to his scholarship and skill. But is it more than a monument? Does it deliver us a Wittgenstein alive today? His friend Paul Engelmann reported that 'Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about' (quoted p. 129). After reading Hacker's book one may be left with the uneasy feeling that all that really matters in Wittgenstein is what Hacker is —and, perhaps because of the genre in which he chooses to write, must be —silent about.

Paul Gilbert

Thomas Reid and Scepticism: His reliabilist response
By Phillip de Bary
Routledge, London, 2002, pp. xv + 203

It is not uncommon for enthusiastic students of relatively obscure philosophers to declare them unjustly neglected, and to seek to rescue them from their obscurity. Generally it proves the case that all such efforts are in vain, and usually this is because the philosophers in question are in fact *justly* neglected. But with respect to the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, the position appears to be different. Reid was the great opponent of Hume and in his day, and for some time after, enthusiastical-

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ly and very widely regarded as much the greater philosopher of the two. Then, from about 1850 onwards, he fell into increasing neglect until by the mid-twentieth century he was known solely, if at all, for his 'brave officer' counter example to Locke's account of personal identity, and even this may not have been a counter-example originating with him.

This is the condition in which de Bary found things, evidently, when he began the doctoral studies from which this book eventually resulted. 'Outside specialist circles' he tells us 'Reid is held in low esteem, when he is not disregarded altogether' (p. 4). It seems to me, however, that in the last five years or so this position has altered significantly. A look at the *Philosophers Index* would show, I think, that the number of essays on Reid appearing in the journals has increased dramatically. More importantly, a small number of interesting and high quality books have recently been published sufficient to suggest that perhaps Reid *has* been unjustly neglected, and that this neglect is beginning to be remedied.

Phillip de Bary's book is one of these. De Bary is an admirer of Reid, but he avoids the danger of adulation amounting to hagiography that has tended to colour writers on Reid in the past, acutely aware as they generally were of the scale and injustice of his neglect by the wider philosophical community. This is a balanced and careful treatment of Reid and as a result one which displays to very good effect the original and penetrating nature of his philosophy, as well as its limitations and internal tensions.

As the subtitle of the book makes clear from the outset, de Bary interprets Reid is a reliabilist, and identifies two theses as central to his 'common sense' reply to Humean scepticism:

(1) The Innateness Claim: 'there are certain principles ... which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—these are what we call the principles of common sense'.
(2) The Truth Claim: First principles generate, if they are not themselves already, true beliefs '... to suppose a general deviation from truth among mankind in things self-evident, of which no cause can be assigned, is highly unreasonable'. (p. 65)

On de Bary's construal this 'adds up to an account on which common beliefs are *prima facie* justified, or "innocent until proved guilty". It is, if we like, reliabilism with one epicycle: the true beliefs of common sense are justified, and so amount to knowledge, provided only that the believer have no good reason to doubt them' (p. 86). Reid's reliabilism rests upon rejecting both Cartesian foundationalism and the Lockean 'way of ideas' or mental representationalism. It is one of de Bary's principal contentions that its plausibility depends upon our distinguishing the arguments against the second from the rejection of the first far more clearly than Reid himself does.

This is what makes his book a specially valuable addition to the limited existing literature; it goes beyond mere exposition and constitutes an

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engagement with Reid and with the recurrent philosophical problem of scepticism with which he is concerned. In de Bary's hands common sense reliabilism becomes a distinctively interesting and plausible philosophical position, whatever its ultimate viability.

One qualification to the claim about the general neglect of Reid among contemporary philosophers is the attention he has received from the proponents of 'reformed epistemology', notably Alvin Plantinga. A further valuable feature of de Bary's book is its discussion of the use of Reld in this connection and his sustained and subtle examination of the relation of theism to Reid's epistemology. De Bary holds that 'for any given piece of philosophy, if in theory it can be shown to stand free of any theistic presuppositions which might in fact have informed its composition, then its appeal *as a piece of philosophy* is very significantly widened (p. 165 emphasis original). In the light of this, he works hard to disengage Reid's reliabilism from Plantinga's memorable contention that "reliabilism flourishes best in a garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics". In the end, however, it seems that he cannot quite do so.' 'Reid's reliabilism *can* survive in a naturalistic garden… But ... Reid's references to God ... are "helping" the reliabilism in some as yet unspecified way' (p. 187 emphasis original). The concluding page and a half of the book offers something by way of further specification, but not very much, and more importantly fails to return to the implications this has for our view of Reid, given the earlier claim about the preferability of theism-free philosophy. This is a pity, it seems to me, not just because of the widespread contemporary interest in the topic—the naturalization of epistemology—but because it brings to a close in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner what is in fact a highly satisfactory book.

Gordon Graham

Aspects of Reason
by Paul Grice. Edited with an introduction by Richard Warner.
Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xxxviii + 136.

Aspects of Reason is a short, but by no means easy, book made up of the typescripts that Grice used in delivering various lectures between 1976 and 1979 and the subsequent notes that he made to these typescripts up until his death in 1988. There are five chapters: the first four were used as the basis of the Immanuel Kant lectures at Stanford in 1977, the fifth was used originally for a one-off talk at a colloquium in Chapel Hill in 1976, and all five were called on when Grice gave the John Locke lectures in 1979. The title for the book and the inclusion of the Chapel Hill talk as the fifth chapter are down to Grice. Richard Warner edited the whole—an undertaking of some difficulty, I suspect—and he has provided a clear and interesting introduction.

As noted above, the book is not an easy read. Nor do I find it easy to say exactly why this is so. Certainly part of it, as Warner notes, is that the book

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lacks any obvious unity—one cannot move from chapter to chapter with any real sense of building up to something, and the title that Grice chose suggests as much. What we have are many remarks, sometimes widely scattered, about specific 'aspects' of a subject matter rather than the development of a governing thesis. Moreover, as one might perhaps expect from Grice, there is an enormous amount of detail—detail invoking labels and notation, qualifications and asides—which are each clear enough when introduced, but accumulate to the point where they make keeping one's sense of what is going on a feat in itself. But lack of unity and prodigious, technical-sounding detail, though they contribute, do not completely explain the book's difficulty. For that, we must look a little more closely at its contents, as only after that will it be possible to explain the elusive further difficulty.

Given what I have said already, there is no way that summaries of the chapters could do justice to the rich detail they contain. Moreover, since in many cases the point of the chapter seems precisely to lie in the detail, summary risks being more seriously misleading. Still, and perhaps rashly putting these worries to one side, the attempt to summarize individual chapters does still seem to me necessary in this review; and if nothing else it can he seen as a kind of philosophical exercise.

In the preliminary paragraphs which open the first chapter, Grice announces:

> ... more than one philosopher [he goes on to mention Aristotle and Kant] has held the view that vitally important philosophical consequences can be reached from the idea of a rational being.

And a little later on he says:

> Now I do not know whether or not any such grand conclusions can be derived from the concept of a rational being, though I must confess that I have a sneaking hope that they can, and a nagging desire to try to find out (both citations from p. 4).

So far so good. The theme is certainly clear, and it is no less certainly central to a great deal of philosophy. (That it is not central to philosophy itself seems to me something no less interesting. There are philosophers such as Aristotle and Kant, and, among our contemporaries, Strawson and Sellars who see the main task of philosophy—if not the whole of it—as lying precisely in following the contours of the 'the logical space of reasons' or in deepening our understanding of 'our conceptual scheme', where these two are in effect variations on the Grice's theme of spinning philosophical consequences out of the notion of a rational being as such. But of course there are other philosophers, those perhaps more under the sway of science, who see concern with our conceptual scheme, or with the familiar territory of the space of reasons, or with the notion of a rational being as such, as evidence of little more than a parochialness which almost certainly will not survive the intellectual developments of scientific inquiry.)

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Also, in this short preamble to the first chapter, Grice notes that, in his trying to carry out the project, '[part] of my trouble ... is the difficulty of discovering the rules of the game' (p. 4). I will come back to this as it is crucial to understanding not merely what Grice found difficult but what I found so difficult about the book.

The substantial business of the first chapter ('Reason and Reasoning') revolves around the notion of reasoning. Since Grice's project is rationality or reason, he sees it as a good idea to investigate the connection between reason and reasoning. Forced to summarize his investigations, though not his conclusions, I would say: for Grice we should look at reasoning as an activity that can be made explicit by formal means, but that is not exhausted by the formal. Moreover, there is an important distinction between rationality in the 'flat' sense—the sense in which human beings are said to be rational—and in the 'variable' sense—the sense in which some human beings are more rational than others. This distinction sits somewhat uneasily with the chapter's earlier theme of reasoning as capturable to some extent by formal inference rules. (Grice is very tentative about this, but taken in the context of his other work, one does sometimes suspect that Grice's mind wove such intricate patterns that what he regards as a display of flat rationality in the deployment of argument would be well beyond the capabilities of most actual human beings. Nonetheless, as Warner points out, Grice did apparently think that reasoning even of an elaborate sort was somehow part of rationality, whether in speech or action of other kinds.)

The second chapter ('Reason and Reasons') opens with a survey of the territories explored in the first and then takes up the issue of flat vs variable rationality in some detail. Warner noted in his introduction that this material was one of the two more extensive additions that Grice made to the lecture typescripts; the other occurs later in this same chapter. Together, these additions obscure but do not obliterate the central topic of the chapter which is 'the general nature of reasons'. In the central sections of the chapter, Grice first sets out a scheme of three types of reason—the Explanatory, the justificatory and the Justificatory-Explanatory—and then considers the extent to which reasons for acting and reasons for thinking (or believing) are equipollent. (Note that there is a chart on p. 42 laying out the differences among the types of reason.) His own view about the latter issue is clear: *practical* and what he calls (after von Wright) *alethic* reasoning and reasons are at least analogous and almost certainly one and the same. But whilst this is certainly what he thinks, his approach to the issues here is not direct. As to his tripartite distinction amongst reasons: this is best discussed in the context of the next two chapters.

Chapters 3 and 4 ('Practical and Alethic reasons: Part I and II') begin with a clear description of the territory so far traversed:

> It seemed to me that the faculty of Reason is most closely connected (a) with Reasoning and (b) with Reasons. Reasons (justificatory) are the stuff of which reasoning is made and reasoning may be required to

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> arrive (in some cases) even at the simplest of reasons; so it seemed proper to proceed from a consideration of reasoning to a consideration of reasons' (p. 67).

And as to reasons:

> ...if someone thinks that a certain set of considerations is a *justificatory* reason for doing, intending, or believing something, and if he in fact does, intends, or believes that thing because he so thinks, then his *personal* reasons for actually doing (intending, believing) that thing is that the aforementioned set of considerations obtain; and to state that someone did (intended, believed) something for a specified personal reason is a special case of giving an *explanatory* reason for his doing (intending, believing) that thing' (p. 67).

In a nutshell, when the subject matter is human action or thought, a reason is justificatory rather than merely explanatory; when the justification is one avowed by the actor or thinker, the reason comes to be both justificatory and explanatory, though Grice now prefers the more descriptive 'personal' for this third category. (Note that these claims require qualifications, but I have resisted giving any because that way takes us out of the nutshell and in an elaborately Gricean direction.)

With this background, Grice now sets out to revisit the issue of whether 'reason' in 'reasons for thought' means the same as it does in 'reasons for action', and he does so by taking further the project of coming up with a common formal description for reasons in thought and action, one already foreshadowed in the chapter 2. The central formal elements in this project are of the form:

> Acc (|–p),
> Acc (!q),

which can be read (approximately) as:

> It is rationally acceptable that (it is the case that it snows),
> It is rationally acceptable that (let it be that I go home).

In effect, the element 'Acc' is posited as central to both reasons for thought and reasons for action, whilst Grice regards it as itself aloof from each, and the 'judicative' (|–) and 'votive' (!) markers bear the weight of distinguishing the alethic from the practical.

Among the many byways that Grice explores in these two chapters, it is clear enough that his overriding aim is to make plausible a certain thesis about the different strengths or 'modalities' with which the above acceptability judgments or demands can be made. In particular, his interest is in what he calls the 'common modals' used in these judgments, e.g. such claims as 'It *ought* to be rationally acceptable that...' or 'It *must* be rationally acceptable that...' His thesis is this: 'that the they [the common modals] are univocal across the practical/alethic divide, or, if they are multivocal, then their multivocality appears equally on each side of the

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barrier' (p. 90). His favoured name for this is the 'Equivocality thesis', and he obviously regards the establishment of this thesis as a key to the overall project of drawing out substantial conclusions from the very idea of a rational being. The implicit thought seems to be: if the thesis is true, then we can be that much more confident that rational beings are those who use a single kind of reason and reasoning, both in extending their thinking and in deciding what to do. Also in chapter 4 is a suggestion that amongst the substantial conclusions that can be got from the notion of a rational being is the idea of a rational being as someone for whom happiness (in some sense) figures importantly in the story about reasons. Finally, *pace* Kant (though siding with Aristotle), Grice clearly regards the story about happiness as fundamental to morality, though he puts considerations about happiness and morality firmly on one side.

The final chapter 5 ('Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness'), as you might expect from its title and from its having originated in a completely different way from the first four, does not fit snugly with the rest, though the scattered references to the problem of happiness in chapter 4 might be said to prepare the ground. The canvas of this chapter is Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics,* and, whilst Grice says many interesting things of an expository-justificatory kind, he does not take himself to stray very far from Aristotle. Only in the very final paragraph—in fact the last two sentences of the book—does he say anything which explicitly connects this chapter with the subject matter described in the opening of the book. He writes:

> I would like to consider the possibility that the idea of happiness-in-general might be determined by reference to the essential characteristics of a human being (rational animal); the ends involved in the idea of happiness-in-general would, perhaps, be the realization in abundance, in various forms specific to individual men, of those capacities with which a creature constructor would have to endow creatures in order to make them maximally viable in human living conditions ... (p. 134).

At this point I return to the issue of the book's difficulty—a difficulty which for me transcended the lack of unity and the provision of an overabundance of detail and digression. In the opening paragraphs of chapter 1, Grice describes himself as the under-labourer engaged 'in one or two enquiries which might help towards the clarification of the notion of reason or rationality.' This self-conscious reference to Locke, which comes just after the short Proem delivered at the start of the Locke lectures, goes to the heart of my problem with the book. Locke declared himself an under-labourer to the Newtonian project. In so doing he numbered himself—however implicitly and inconsistently—amongst the tribe of philosophers always ready to abandon our familiar space of reasons or conceptual scheme for the fresher pastures promised by developments in science. Grice is clearly not of this tribe, and his labours are not intended as under-labours to a project that might well take us outside the conceptual scheme we inhabit. And it is just here that the problem comes.

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For Grice takes himself to be an under-labourer to a project which is unclear, and with respect to which, in his own words, we do not even know the first thing about the rules of the game. Yet he is not in the least reticent in making any number of moves in some such game.

To be sure, there is a perfectly sensible way in which the overall project could be described: working out the *consequences* of the notions that figure centrally in our conceptual scheme, prominent amongst which is the notion of rationality. However, when put this way, one expects certain familiar logico-conceptual moves to constitute the rules of the *game* - moves found in the work of philosophers like Kant, Strawson and Sellars. But with Grice there is no sense that these are the moves that he considers adequate or even sometimes appropriate. The mix of introduced technicalities of a linguistic sort and the search for things that are apparently counted as empirical necessities cannot simply be counted as part of the usual under-labouring tasks of those engaged in understanding our conceptual scheme. Nor is this an issue relevant to this particular work: it is simply not easy to tell with Grice whether he is engaged in conceptual analysis of the kind we have grown used to, or is inventing a new form of it, or is breaking with it altogether. One can of course profit from reading him with this enlightenment, but it does make one's reading more difficult, and this seems especially true of *Aspects of Reason*.

I have spoken mostly about the difficulties of the book, but it also should be said there are moments, emerging from an overabundance of detail, the writing has that insistent clarity found in the best of Grice's work. And there are passages that are, at least in context, funny. (As when, in response to his having got a bit further with the equivocality thesis, Grice imagines telephoning Kant 'at his Elysian country club in order to impart to him this latest titbit of philosophical gossip' and getting the reply: 'Big deal! Isn't that what I've been telling you all along.') But overall I do not think that I have exaggerated just how demanding *Aspects of Reason* is. Still, there is no question at all that it is good to have these last works of Grice in print, and I salute Warner for the care he has taken over the project and the consideration he has given to it both before Grice's death in 1988 and after.

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