Figures

1.1 The chain of promissory representation *page* 9
4.1 Comparing the fulfillment of campaign promises across countries 94
4.2 The fulfillment of election promises in election programs 95
4.3 Historical trends in economic globalization 98
4.4 Economic globalization across countries 99
4.5 Globalization and the fulfillment of campaign promises 106
4.6 Predicted probabilities for the effect of globalization on promise fulfillment 107
4.7 Effect of globalization on promise fulfillment for different party ideologies 109
4.8 Predicted effect of globalization on the number of campaign promises 111
4.9 Left–right ideology, globalization, and promises to cut taxes and programs 113
4.10 Left–right ideology, globalization, and promises to expand taxes and programs 114
4.11 Globalization positively affects the numbers of expansionary pledges across the political spectrum 116
5.1 International migration to the United Kingdom 120
6.1 Unfulfilled promises and change in vote share 143
6.2 Predicted values for the effect of broken promises on change in vote share 144
6.3 Marginal effect of broken promises on change in vote share for different levels of globalization 145
6.4 Political affiliation 148
6.5 Support for tax incentives 149
6.6 Main experimental results 153

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 14 Nov 2026 at 11:47:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009749725

6.7 Globalization shock's limited benefit 156
6.8 Importance of promise keeping and retrospective sanctioning 157
6.9 Respondents' beliefs about promise keeping and retrospective sanctioning 158
7.1 Citizens' responses to position shifts (without globalization shocks) 193
7.2 Citizens' responses to position shifts (with globalization shocks) 194
7.3 Globalization and ideological extremity on the general left–right dimension 205
7.4 Globalization has a negative effect on the extremity of center-right parties' left–right positions 206
7.5 Globalization moderates the general left–right positions of rightist parties 207
7.6 Globalization moderates the socioeconomic left–right positions of rightist parties 209
7.7 Leftist and rightist parties shift rightward on the nonsocioeconomic left–right dimension as globalization deepens 210
8.1 Populist rhetoric of mainstream political parties, 1970–2019 224
8.2 Average mainstream party populism, 1970–2020 225
8.3 Globalization and political party populism 229
8.4 Predicted levels of populist rhetoric at different levels of globalization 231
8.5 Effect of globalization on populist rhetoric for different party ideologies 232
9.1 Comparing ambiguity across countries, 1960–2019 253
9.2 Political ambiguity over time 254
9.3 Political ambiguity by country 255
9.4 Political ambiguity in the United States by political party 256
9.5 Main results: globalization and ambiguity in parties' election appeals 259
9.6 Predicted levels of ambiguity at different levels of globalization 261

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 14 Nov 2026 at 11:47:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009749725

9.7 Exploring types of trade globalization and ambivalence 263
9.8 Main results by policy area 268
9.9 Effect of globalization on ambiguity for different party ideologies 270
10.1 Voter confidence about the politician's vote 280
10.2 Main experimental results 281
10.3 Is vagueness better than ambivalence? 284

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA, on 14 Nov 2026 at 11:47:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009749725