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PLOTINUS ARABUS RIDES AGAIN

ROTRAUD HANSBERGER
King's College, Cambridge CB2 1ST, United Kingdom
Email: reh66@cam.ac.uk

To my teacher Fritz Zimmermann
with gratitude and affection

Abstract. The extant texts of the Arabic Plotinus contain material from *Enneads* IV-VI without, however, covering the Plotinian treatises in their entirety, nor preserving their traditional order – a circumstance which raises questions about scope and structure of the original Arabic Plotinus source. This article aims to contribute to the discussion by presenting newly discovered fragments of an Arabic translation of *Ennead* IV.6 (*On sense-perception and memory*), one of the ten treatises that are not represented in the Arabic Plotinus corpus as it is currently known. Section I of the article introduces the text within which the new fragments are found: *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, the Arabic adaptation of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. In Section II the Arabic fragments are presented in comparison with their Greek counterparts. Section III addresses the question whether these new fragments stem from the same original translation as the other fragments of the Arabic Plotinus. Section IV discusses the implications which the appearance of the new fragments may have for our views on the Arabic Plotinus as well as on the genesis of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.

Résumé. Les textes préservés du Plotin arabe contiennent des matériaux provenant exclusivement d'*Ennéades* IV-VI. Ils ne couvrent cependant pas les traités plotiniens dans leur intégralité, ni ne préservent leur ordre traditionnel – un fait qui suscite des questions quant au projet et à la structure de la source plotinienne arabe originale. Cet article vise à enrichir la discussion, en présentant des fragments nouvellement découverts d'une traduction arabe d'*Ennéade* IV.6 (*Sur la perception sensible et la mémoire*), l'un des dix traités non représentés dans le corpus du Plotin arabe tel que nous le connaissons aujourd'hui. La Section I de l'article présente le texte contenant les nouveaux fragments: il s'agit de la *Maqāla* I du *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, l'adaptation arabe des *Parva Naturalia* d'Aristote. Dans la Section II, les fragments arabes sont comparés à leur contrepartie grecque. La Section III tente de déterminer si ces nouveaux fragments proviennent de la même traduction originale que les autres pièces du Plotin arabe. La Section IV discute les implications que l'exhumation de ces nouveaux fragments pourrait avoir sur notre vision du Plotin arabe et de la genèse du *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.

As it is currently known, the extant corpus of the Arabic Plotinus (*AP*) is constituted by three distinct groups of fragments: the *Theology of Aristotle* (*ThA*),[1] the *Letter on Divine Science* attributed to al-Fārābī

[1] I use the text published by ʿAbdurraḥmān Badawī in *Aflūṭīn ʿinda l-ʿArab* (Cairo, 1955; 3rd impr. Kuwait, 1977), pp. 3–164.

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(*DS*),[2] and the fragments transmitted as the *Sayings of the Greek Sage* (*GS*); this last group of fragments is scattered over three different textual sources: the *Oxford Anthology*[3] (preserved in a manuscript in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, MS Bodl. Or. Marsh 539), the *Kitāb al-Milal wa-al-niḥal* by al-Shahrastānī, and the *Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma*.[4] These fragments all represent material from Plotinus' *Enneads* IV-VI in a paraphrastic translation that is interwoven with material original to the Arabic version, ranging from single sentences to whole paragraphs.[5] Since Franz Rosenthal first postulated a common source for all these fragments in 1952,[6] this thesis has been firmly established and elaborated upon by subsequent scholarship, even though the exact character, origin and scope of this original Arabic Plotinus Source (**AP*) are still a matter of dispute and speculation.

There is now broad scholarly consensus that this *translation-cum-adaptation* was produced within the circle of al-Kindī,[7] and that the translation was made by the Kindī-circle translator ʻAbdalmasīḥ b. ʻAbdallah b. Nāʿima al-Ḥimsī directly from the

[2] This text is published in Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, pp. 165–83.

[3] So named by Fritz Zimmermann; see F.W. Zimmermann, 'The origins of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*', in J. Kraye, W.F. Ryan, C.B. Schmitt (eds), *Pseudo-Aristotle in the Middle Ages* (London, 1986), pp. 110–240, pp. 211–19.

[4] The fragments discovered by Franz Rosenthal are published in his 'Aš-Šaykh al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus source' I-II, *Orientalia*, N.S. 21 (1952): 461–92, 22 (1953): 370–400. They are also published in Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, pp. 186–98. The fragments identified by Geoffrey Lewis remain unpublished to date in Arabic, being available only in his English translation, with the exception of those fragments that belong to *Ennead* IV.8, which have been published by Cristina D'Ancona in *Plotino: La Discesa Dell'Anima Nei Corpi (Enn. IV 8 [6]). Plotiniana Arabica (Pseudo-Teologia Di Aristotele, Capitoli 1 e 7; "Detti Del Sapiente Greco"*) (Padova, 2003), pp. 239–46. One further fragment was discovered and published for the first time by Fritz Zimmermann in '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 221. Geoffrey Lewis' complete English translation of *AP* is available in *Plotini Opera, Tomus II: Enneades IV-V, Plotiniana Arabica* ad codem fidem anglice vertit G. Lewis, ed. P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (Paris and Brussels, 1959). A complete edition of MS Bodl. Or. Marsh 539 is currently being prepared by Elvira Wakelnig. – The *Treatise by al-Shaykh al-Yūnānī explaining the two worlds, that of the spirit and that of the body*, preserved in another Oxford manuscript, MS Bodl. Or. Ouseley 95, and published by Franz Rosenthal in the third part of his 'Aš-Šaykh al-Yūnānī' (*Orientalia*, N.S. 24 [1955]: 42–66), which appears to go back to the 'Plotinus Source' in a more indirect way, is not represented in Lewis' translation (cf. *Plotini Opera* II, ed. Henry/Schwyzer, p. xxxiv).

[5] In Lewis' English translation this is illustrated by the use of italics for text parallel to the Greek, and of a smaller font for paragraphs consisting entirely of additional material.

[6] See Rosenthal, 'Aš-Šaykh al-Yūnānī' I, pp. 467f.

[7] See Gerhard Endress, *Proclus Arabus* (Beirut, 1973), pp. 68–71, 186; Zimmermann, 'Theology of Aristotle', p. 112; Peter Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus. A Philosophical Study of the* Theology of Aristotle (London, 2002), pp. 5–26, 63–8, 171-7; Cristina D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*, chapter 1: structure and composition', *Oriens*, 36 (2001): 79–112, p. 82. A detailed overview of research up to 1989 is given by M. Aouad, 'La *Théologie d'Aristote* et autres textes du *Plotinus Arabus*', in Richard Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Paris, 1989), pp. 541–90; cf. also the summary of previous research in D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 77–85.

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Greek rather than via a Syriac intermediary.[8] However, there are diverging views on the question whether al-Ḥimsī was responsible for the translation only, or for the adaptation as a whole – the position taken by Fritz Zimmermann, and, following him, Peter Adamson[9] – and to what degree other agents, in particular al-Kindī himself, may have been involved. Thus Cristina D'Ancona has argued for a more active role for al-Kindī, as author of at least some of the original material of the adaptation, and as the person responsible for the re-ordering of material that is visible in *ThA*.[10] The different opinions on this issue are in some respects linked to the way in which scholars interpret the *Prologue* to *ThA* (which names Aristotle as author, Porphyry as commentator, al-Kindī as editor, and al-Ḥimsī as translator of the text), as well as the so-called *Headings*, a catalogue of questions based on *Ennead* IV.4 that precedes the first chapter of *ThA*.[11]

A further point of contention is the question whether **AP* preserved the order of the treatises devised by Porphyry, or whether the translator / adaptor of the text rearranged the material according to his own purposes. This is closely connected to the further question whether **AP* would have covered all of *Enneads* IV-VI (or at least all treatises of *Enneads* IV-VI, even if in excerpts only), or whether it included only selected passages from the start.[12] The textual evidence is inconclusive. Neither *DS* nor *GS* can on their own be expected to tell us much about the original structure of **AP*. With *ThA*, the largest text of the extant Arabic Plotinus corpus (*AP*), the case is different. On the one hand it provides evidence that the translation was made from a Greek manuscript containing the *Enneads* in the Porphyrian

[8] This was established by Fritz Zimmermann in '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 113–18; cf. Everett K. Rowson's review 'The *Theology of Aristotle* and some other pseudo-Aristotelian texts reconsidered', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 112 (1992): 478–84, p. 482. See now also Sebastian P. Brock, 'A Syriac intermediary for the Arabic theology of Aristotle? In search of a chimera', in Cristina D'Ancona (ed.), *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists* (Leiden/Boston, 2007), pp. 294–306. – For the rejection of the once predominant 'Porphyrian hypothesis' see Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 120–1, 125–8; 131–3, 170–77; D'Ancona, 'Porphyry, universal soul and the Arabic Plotinus', *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 9 (1999): 47–88; Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 19–21, 42. – Cf. Aouad, *'Théologie d'Aristote'*, pp. 546–57.

[9] See Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 27–48; Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*'.

[10] See D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 86–112, and her 'The Greek Sage, the Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle* and the Arabic Plotinus', in R. Arnzen, J. Thielmann (eds), *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea. Studies on the sources, contents and influences of Islamic civilization and Arabic philosophy and science, Dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth birthday* (Leuven/Paris/Dudley, MA, 2004), pp. 159–76.

[11] See Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 118–28; Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 27–48.

[12] See Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 12–17; Zimmermann, 'Theology of Aristotle', pp. 125–34; D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*'.

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order,[13] naturally a *conditio sine qua non* for any possibility of its preserving this order. On the other hand, in the state in which *ThA* has come down to us it clearly does *not* preserve this order. Whether the structure of *ThA* is entirely the result of the labours of a later editor who – after a 'physical catastrophe'[14] during which chunks of **AP* were lost and the rest of it thrown into disorder – joined (parts of?) the surviving material together as best as he could, or whether (and to what extent) the present arrangement of *ThA* reflects decisions of the Kindī-circle adaptor, and hence possibly of the translator, remains a matter of dispute. Fritz Zimmermann argues for the former scenario; he assumes that al-Ḥimsī's *translation-cum-adaptation* preserved the order of the *Enneads* and included 'rather more of *Enn.* IV-VI than is covered by the extant fragments',[15] perhaps even covering *Enneads* IV-VI 'without major gaps'.[16] Peter Adamson, on the other hand, submits that the scope and structure of *ThA* are not entirely fortuitous, but reflect a conscious selection and reordering by the translator/adaptor (al-Ḥimsī) that occurred already at the level of **AP*.[17] He thinks it plausible that the material was 'divided into thematic sections', and that the translator / adaptor was 'at least to *some* extent selective in choosing what to paraphrase',[18] *i.e.* that at least some of the gaps in the text may be his responsibility. Cristina D'Ancona likewise argues that the arrangement of material in *ThA* is at least partly due to a 'process of rational editing',[19] which in her view, however, was performed by al-Kindī 'on the basis of a running translation already made'.[20]

The treatises that are missing from *AP*[21] contribute significantly to the blurring of the overall picture. Naturally, the negative evidence they offer is unreliable and subject to potential revision (of which this article shall be proof). For the moment, however, it does not sit badly with Peter Adamson's supposition that *ThA* reflects a section of **AP* devoted to the topic of 'soul'.[22] This would be consistent with

[13] This was established by H.-R. Schwyzer in 'Die pseudo-aristotelische Theologie und die Plotin-Ausgabe des Porphyrios', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 90 (1941): 216–36, pp. 222–6; cf. Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 113, Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, p. 8, D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 88–95.
[14] Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 130.
[15] Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 134.
[16] Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 152. I take this to mean that all treatises of *Enneads* IV-VI are represented, rather than the text in its entirety; cf. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 12–17 and 208 n. 23.
[17] Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 12–17.
[18] Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, p. 17.
[19] D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 85.
[20] D'Ancona, 'Pseudo-*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 95.
[21] These are: *Enneads* IV.1, IV.2, IV.6, V.7, VI.1, VI.2, VI.3, VI.5, VI.6, VI.8 (see *Plotini Opera II*, ed. Henry/Schwyzer, pp. 489–94).
[22] Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 15–17.

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the absence of, *e.g.*, *Enneads* VI.1–3 (*On the Kinds of Being*), or *Ennead* VI.6 (*On Numbers*). However, under the additional assumption (in which Peter Adamson seems to follow Fritz Zimmermann) that **AP*, whatever shape it may have taken, was part of a larger Kindī-circle collection of texts related to metaphysics,[23] there is much less reason to assume that these treatises were entirely left aside by the original translator/adaptor.

Ennead IV.6 is a different case. The treatise *On Sense-Perception and Memory* clearly falls within the domain of psychology and thus may have had a good claim to being included within a section on the soul – and of course it may well have been. On the other hand, the treatise does not, perhaps, fit the metaphysical turn of *ThA*, or indeed any 'metaphysics file'[24] **AP* may have belonged to, focussing, as it does, on two functions of the soul connected solely with its attachment to the sensible, material world: sense-perception and memory.[25] It is therefore all the more intriguing that we can find fragments of *Ennead* IV.6.1 and IV.6.3 in an Arabic text that is devoted specifically to such functions: *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, the Arabic version of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*.

I. THE SOURCE TEXT: *MAQĀLA* I OF *KITĀB AL-ḤISS WA-AL-MAḤSŪS*

Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs has come down to us in a 17th century manuscript held at the Raza Library, Rampur (India), MS Rampur 1752.[26] The acephalous text comprises three *maqālāt*, *Maqāla* I being equivalent to *De sensu et sensato*, *Maqāla* II to *De memoria et reminiscentia*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De insomniis*, and *De divinatione per somnum* (the latter three compounded in one chapter, *Bāb al-Nawm wa-al-yaqaẓa*), and *Maqāla* III to *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*. However, the Arabic text contains but little of a translation of the Aristotelian text. Most of it is made up of added material that

[23] See Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 121–6; cf. *id*., 'Proclus Arabus rides again', *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 4 (1994): 9–51, pp. 33–47; Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 21f.

[24] Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', p. 131.

[25] It does not address the question whether there is memory in the discarnate state of the soul, and whether the incarnate soul can remember its previous states – problems which are broached in *Ennead* IV.3.25–32 (not represented in *AP*) and IV.4.1–6 (IV.4.1–5 being represented in *ThA* II and VIII).

[26] For an edition and study of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* see my doctoral thesis, 'The Transmission of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic' (Oxford, 2006/7), which is currently being prepared for publication. For a brief account of the most important results of the study see Rotraud Hansberger, '*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*: Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* in Arabic guise', in Pierre-Marie Morel, Christophe Grellard (eds), *Les Parva naturalia d'Aristote. Fortune antique et médiévale* (Paris, 2010), pp. 143–62.

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appears to be original to *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.[27] This material is also Greek in character, drawing on Neoplatonic philosophy and Galenic medicine. Its most remarkable feature is a theory of the three 'spiritual faculties' of imagination (or 'formative faculty', *muṣawwir*), thought (*fikr*), and memory (*dhikr*), which also encompasses a theory of divinatory dreams.[28]

We do not know who exactly was responsible for the translation or the adaptation of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*; but there is evidence that its production was linked to the Kindī-circle.[29] The translation of the Aristotelian passages – as far as it can be assessed – was probably produced prior to the process of adaptation. It shows terminological similarities to texts like the early *De anima* translation by Ps.-Isḥāq and the doxography of Ps.-Ammonius, which has been associated with the Kindī circle.[30] It is the added material and the overall adaptation however, that in particular bear the hallmarks of Kindī-circle texts.[31] This is especially true of *Maqāla* II. Not only does it abound in the introductory, summarising and connecting phrases typical for Kindī-circle texts; more significantly (in particular for our present purposes), it shares terminological preferences and certain doctrinal propensities with the Arabic *Procliana* and *Plotiniana* in particular. This concerns first and foremost its concept of spirituality (*rūḥāniyya*), and a dualistic tendency that is accompanied by a certain disdain for the corporeal as opposed to the 'spiritual' world, with the human soul precariously posed in-between the two.

It is not *Maqāla* II however, where borrowings from *Ennead* IV.6 can be detected, but *Maqāla* I. This is unfortunate in so far as *Maqāla* I is a much more problematic text to study: its larger part is missing in the Rampur manuscript; only its last 6 1/2 pages are extant.[32] These pages do not contain any text that could be linked

[27] So far it has not been possible to pinpoint specific textual sources of the added material; they may of course yet be identified.

[28] See Hansberger, '*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*'; for the theory of divinatory dreams see further Rotraud E. Hansberger, 'How Aristotle came to believe in God-given dreams: The Arabic version of *De divinatione per somnum*', in Louise Marlow (ed.), *Dreaming Across Boundaries. The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Lands* (Cambridge, Mass./London, 2008), pp. 50–77.

[29] See Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 212–20.

[30] See Ulrich Rudolph, *Die Doxographie des Pseudo-Ammonios* (Stuttgart, 1989), p. 16; Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, pp. 71, 105f.

[31] For a summary description of the Kindī-circle style, see Gerhard Endress, 'The circle of al-Kindī. Early Arabic translations from the Greek and the rise of Islamic philosophy', in Gerhard Endress, Remke Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism. Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 43–76, esp. pp. 58f.

[32] The Rampur MS also contains a commentary that is inserted within the text (see Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', p. 6). This means that at best about half of the text on these pages belongs to *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* proper.

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to Aristotle's *De sensu*. As far as it is extant, *Maqāla* I consists entirely of additional material that does not have a counterpart, however tentative, in the Greek *Parva Naturalia*. Instead, major parts of the text can be traced back to chapters 1 and 3 of Plotinus' *Ennead* IV.6.

The absence of any Aristotelian text in the extant pages of *Maqāla* I does not indicate that they do not originally belong to *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*: we find extensive passages consisting solely of additional material in other parts of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* as well, and especially so in the later sections of its treatises or chapters.[33] The lack of any trace of *De sensu* in the last pages of *Maqāla* I is not, therefore, out of character.

More intriguing is perhaps the fact that the extant pages of *Maqāla* I are not very well represented in Ibn Rushd's *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. As even a cursory comparison of the *Talkhīṣ* with *Maqāla* II and III of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* can reveal, Ibn Rushd's epitome does indeed rely on the version of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia* that is transmitted in the Rampur manuscript. Given that the first part of *Maqāla* I is missing in the manuscript it is hence still our most important witness for the Arabic version of *De sensu*.[34] Granted, the *Talkhīṣ* generally does not follow its source text particularly slavishly. All the same it is bewildering how hard it is to detect any traces of the extant part of *Maqāla* I in it: they are restricted to a few rather brief references to the question, discussed on fols 7a–8a of the Rampur manuscript, whether sense-perception involves impressions in the soul (see below).[35] The remainder of the text (fols 8b–10a) is not referred to explicitly at all. That these last pages of *Maqāla* I were nevertheless present in Ibn Rushd's copy of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is, however, indicated by a faint but distinct echo that they have left at the end of the first *maqāla* of the *Talkhīṣ*, which Ibn Rushd concludes with the following words:[36]

وأمّا ما يذكر في آخر هذه المقالة من إعطاء السبب في جيدة قوّة الذكر وضعفها فالموضع اللائق به هو عند التكلّم في المقالة الثانية في القوّة الذاكرة

What he (*i.e.* Aristotle) says at the end of this *maqāla* in terms of giving the causes for excellence or weakness of the faculty of memory has its appropriate place where he discusses the memorative faculty in the second *maqāla*.

[33] See Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 16f; Hansberger, '*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*', pp. 144f.
[34] See Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 10f., 230–3; 'How Aristotle came to believe in God-given dreams', pp. 67f.
[35] Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, ed. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 21f.
[36] Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, p. 35.

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Ibn Rushd's curt remark appears to point directly to the extant pages of *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, which indeed focus more on memory than on sense-perception. The misplaced discussion of the topic may have been enough justification for Ibn Rushd to pass it over in this manner; however, additional motivation may have been provided by the fact that what is said about memory at the end of *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* does not square entirely with the presentation of the concept of memory in *Maqāla* II.[37] Both factors are due to the same cause (which will not have been discernible to Ibn Rushd): the presence, in *Maqāla* I, of material from a Plotinian treatise entitled *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ μνήμης – On Sense-Perception and Memory*.

II. FRAGMENTS FROM *ENNEAD* IV.6

Ennead IV.6 is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter Plotinus takes issue with the Aristotelian theory that sense-perceptions are impressions received by the senses as the impression of a signet ring is received in wax, an example that Aristotle uses in *De memoria* and *De anima*.[38] This is not the only treatise where Plotinus discusses the topic of sense-perception, or, indeed, mentions the image of signet ring and wax.[39] What he is particularly concerned with in *Ennead* IV.6 are the implications such an understanding of sense-perception would have for a concept of memory: as he rejects the Aristotelian idea that sense-perception leaves impressions in the soul, he will also have to reject the understanding of memory as the retention of such impressions. In the second chapter, Plotinus provides an alternative account emphasising the active role of the soul in sense-perception. In the third chapter he turns to his account of memory, again emphasising that memory is an activity of the soul rather than a passive affection.

Most key passages in the extant part of *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* – more than half of the text – have a parallel in *Ennead* IV.6.1 or IV.6.3. They will be presented here together with the corresponding passages from *Ennead* IV.6.[40]

[37] See below.

[38] Aristotle, *De memoria* 450a30–450b11, *De anima* 424a17ff. Plotinus takes Aristotle's comparison of sense-perception with the impression of a seal in wax literally. Some ancient commentators, as well as modern interpreters, argue for a metaphorical understanding of Aristotle's comparison. See Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, *Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 76f.; Richard A.H. King (tr., ann.), *Aristoteles: De Memoria* (Darmstadt, 2004), pp. 38–45, 97–9.

[39] The example is mentioned in several treatises of the *Enneads*, cf. IV.3.26, IV.5.3 and IV.7.6.

[40] Quotations from Plotinus' text (Greek and English) are taken from the Loeb edition: Plotinus, *Ennead IV, with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong* (Harvard, 1984).

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1. *Perception and physicality*

In the second paragraph of the extant part of *Maqāla* I, the text argues against the idea that sense-perceptions are literally 'formed' in the soul, by pointing to the impossibility of accommodating such physical impressions of sense objects (which would have a certain size and would exist in space) within the limits of our imagination:

i) MS Rampur 1752, fols 7a, 20 – 7b, 5:[41]

وذلك أنّهم توهّموا الصور المحمولة بالمتوسّطات جسمانيّة فإنّا نقول ألا ترى أنّ الصور الجسمانيّة تأخذ من المكان قدراً ما والصور الروحانيّة لا تمسك مكاناً والدليل على ذلك ما نقول ألا ترى أنّ العالم كلّه مصوَّر في وهمك فإن أنكرت أن يكون هذا هكذا قلنا ألا ترى أنّ في وهمك مائة صورة قد نظر إليها بصرك وشهـ[ـد عل]يها فإذا فقدتها في أخذ البصر فهي في الوهم بقدر نظرك إليها في حدّ الجرميّة فإن كانت في الوهم على قدر نظرك إليها في حدّ الجرميّة فمحال لأنّه ليس في الوهم من المكان ما تتصوّر صورة واحدة مكانيّة فقط فكيف مائة صورة

For they fancy the forms that are carried by the intermediaries to be corporeal. So we shall say: Do you not see that corporeal forms take up some measure of space, whereas spiritual forms do not lay hold of any space? Proof of that is what we shall say now: Do you not see that the whole world is formed in your imagination? If you deny that this is so, we shall say: Do you not see that there are hundred[s of] forms in your imagination which your gaze has met and witnessed? Once you do not have them within your sight [any more], they will be in [your] imagination in the [same] measure in which your gaze [has taken] them [in] in the realm of corporeality. But if they are [supposed to be] in [your] imagination in the measure in which your gaze [has taken] them [in] in the realm of corporeality, that will be absurd. For there is no space in the imagination where even a single spatial form could be formed – so how [*a fortiori*] could hundred[s of] forms [be formed there]?

A similar point is made in *Ennead* IV.6.1. As one of several difficulties associated with the theory that understands sense-perceptions as impressions in the soul, Plotinus mentions that it could not account for our ability to judge the size of objects we perceive.

[41] All quotations of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* are taken from my edition (see n. 26 above). Square brackets in the Arabic text indicate uncertain readings in the Rampur manuscript.

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Ennead IV.6.1, 26–28 (pp. 322f.):

τό τε μέγεθος αὐτοῦ, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἔξω, πῶς ἂν ὅσον ἐστὶ λέγοι, ἢ ὅτι μέγα, οἷον τὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ τύπον τοσοῦδε εἶναι οὐ δυναμένου;

And how would it [*i.e.* the soul, RH] be able to state the size as it is outside or say that it is large, to state for instance the size of the sky, when it would be impossible for as large an impression to be inside it?

2. *Focus and repetition as prerequisites for memory*

A closer correspondence between *Maqāla* I and *Ennead* IV.6 can be observed in the following passage, where the text explains how memory is supposed to come about. (The phrases have been numbered to facilitate comparison with the Greek.)

ii) MS Rampur 1752, fols 7b, 24 – 8b, 2:

فنقول (1) إنّ النفس إذا حرّكت الحسّ المشترك نحو شيء ما وألقى الحسّ المشترك بصره على ذلك الشيء الأرضيّ وأطال الحسّ إل[قـ]اء بصره على ذلك الشيء وصورته حتّى ينظر إليه البصر نظراً طويلاً في زمان طويل كانت صورة ذلك الشيء أثبت وأتقن في الوهم وكانت النفس أشدّ له ذكراً وكان المصوِّر أحسن إتقاناً لصورته لأنّها لم تشغل وهمها بشيء آخر سوى تلك الصورة (2) والدليل على هذا القول الصبيان فإنّهم أذكر للأشياء من أجل أنّهم لا يشغلون فكرهم وأوهامهم بأشياء كثيرة بل إنّما يشغلونها بذلك الشيء الذي يشهونه ويلتذّون به فقط وكذلك البصر إذا شغلته بالنظر إلى صورة ما ولم تصرفه إلى صورة غيرها حتّى ينظر إليها نظراً دائماً ويتفكّر التصوّر لإتقان تلك الصورة ويحفظها الوهم ويذكرها الذكر ثبتت تلك الصورة ورسخت فإذا طلبت أحضرت من كلّ ناحية يحضرها المصور والوهم والذكر فهي أبداً موجودة عند الحاسّ المشترك (3) فأمّا الذين يشتهون ويلتذّون إلقاء أبصارهم على صور كثيرة وإذا نظروا إلى صورة ما لم يدعوا النظر إليها حتّى يتقنها المصور ويحفظها الذكر فإنّ تلك لا يقدر صاحبها على إحضارها في كلّ وقت بل تضمحلّ وتذهب ولن يقدر على إحضارها إن طلبها إلّا كالخيال وذلك أيضاً تعب وعسر

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ومشقة ونصب وأقول أيضاً (4) لولا أنّ الصورة إنّما تؤدّيها المتوسّطات لَما كانت تضمحلّ أبداً من النفس ولا كانت تنسى صورة أبداً ولو كانت النفس هي التي تظهر حتّى تلقي بصرها على المحسوس وينطبع المحسوس في النفس لَما احتاجت النفس إلى هذه القوى الثلاث أعني الفكر والذكر والمصوِّر وذلك أنّ الصورة كانت فيها منطبعة ولكن لما صارت النفس إنّما تقبل من الحسّ المشترك وكان الحسّ المشترك إنّما يقبل الصور من المتوسّط احتاجت النفس إلى هذه القوى الثلاث لتحفظ وتذكر وتتقن الصور كيما إذا احتاجت إلى أن تحضر صورة ما أحضرتها بهذه القوى الثلاث

We shall say: (1) When the soul moves the common sense towards something, and the common sense casts its gaze on that earthly thing, and the sense casts its gaze on that thing and its form for such a long time that [its] gaze will rest on it extensively for a long while, then the form of that thing will be more firmly established and more perfect in the imagination (*wahm*), the soul will be more effective in remembering it, and the formative [faculty] (*muṣawwir*) will be better at perfecting its form. For the soul will not have been keeping its imagination occupied with anything apart from that form. (2) Evidence for this claim are the young, for they are best at remembering things, due to the fact that they do not occupy their thoughts and their imaginations with many things, but occupy them exclusively with one particular thing they desire and take pleasure in. Likewise, if you keep your gaze occupied by looking at a form, and do not avert it towards another form, so that it will look at it continuously, and so that fancy (*taṣawwur*)[42] will be deliberating in order to perfect that form, imagination will retain it and memory will remember it, then that form will be firmly established and well-rooted. Hence when it is sought, it will be made present in every aspect which the formative [faculty], imagination and memory can make present. Thus [the form] will always be found within the common sense. (3) However, persons who desire and take pleasure in casting their gaze on many forms, and who do not, when they look at a form, fix their gaze on it long enough until the formative [faculty] has perfected it and memory has retained it, will not be able to make such a form present at any and every moment, but it will vanish and go away.

[42] The term *taṣawwur* is rare in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*; what is generally used in the adaptation is *muṣawwir* (which, conversely, may well have developed out of *taṣawwur*, a more likely term to have been present in the Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia*). This makes *taṣawwur* here somewhat unlikely to be a simple scribal mistake, even though *muṣawwir* occurs twice in similar contexts in the passage. However, the text may well be corrupted as the verb – *tafakkara*, to deliberate – suggests the faculty of thought (*fikr*, or perhaps here *tafakkur*) as subject; but this option is called into question again by the parallel occurrence of *muṣawwir*. See also Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 43–5, 209.

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If they seek it, they will not be able to make it present, except as a phantasm (*khayāl*), and even that will be tiring, difficult, troublesome and laborious. I shall also say: (4) If it were not the intermediaries that conveyed the form, it would never vanish from the soul, and [the soul] would never forget a form. If it were the soul itself that emerged to cast its gaze on the perceptible, and the perceptible were [thus] imprinted in the soul, the soul would not need these three faculties – I mean [the faculty of] thought, [the faculty of] memory and the formative [faculty] – because the form would be imprinted in it. However, since it is from the common sense that the soul receives [forms], whereas the common sense receives the forms from the intermediary, the soul needs these three faculties in order to retain, remember and perfect the forms; so that when it needs to present a form it will present it by means of these three faculties.

This is paralleled in a (much briefer) passage of *Ennead* IV.6.3.

Ennead IV.6.3, 19–29 (pp. 328f.):

(1) ὅταν τοίνυν ῥωσθῇ πρὸς ὁτιοῦν τῶν φανέντων, ὥσπερ πρὸς παρὸν διάκειται ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον, τόσῳ ἀεί. (2) διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία μνημονεύειν λέγεται μᾶλλον, ὅτι μὴ ἀφίστανται, ἀλλὰ κεῖται αὐτοῖς πρὸ ὀμμάτων ὡς ἂν ὁρῶσιν οὔπω εἰς πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὀλίγα· (3) οἷς δὲ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ δύναμις, ὥσπερ παραθέουσι καὶ οὐ μένουσιν. εἰ δέ γε ἔμενον οἱ τύποι, οὐκ ἂν ἐποίησε τὸ πλῆθος ἧττον μνήμας. (4) ἔτι, εἰ τύποι μένοντες, οὐδὲν ἔδει σκοπεῖν, ἵνα ἀναμνησθῶμεν, οὐδὲ πρότερον ἐπιλαθομένους ὕστερον ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι κειμένων.

(1) When, therefore, the soul is strongly moved to anything that appears to it, it is for a long time in a state as if the object was present to it, and the more strongly it is moved, the more lasting the presence. (2) This is why children are said to be better at remembering, because they do not go away from things, but they remain before their eyes, since they do not look at a multiplicity of things, but at few; (3) but those whose thought and soul-power are directed to many things, as it were, rush past them and do not linger on them. But if the impressions remained, their multiplicity would not make memories less. (4) Further, if impressions remained, there would be no need for us to consider in order to remember, nor should we forget before and remember afterwards if the impressions were lying ready to hand.

The passage that immediately follows in *Maqāla* I again has a parallel in *Ennead* IV.6.3.

iii) MS Rampur 1752, fol. 8b, 2–5:

والدليل على ما ذكرنا وأنّ النفس قد تحتاج إلى هذه القوى الثلاث أنّها إذا سمعت شيئاً ما مرّة أو مرّتين لم تقدر على حفظه حتّى تسمعه مراراً كثيرة حتّى يبقيه الحفظ فيرسخ عنده فإذا رسخ ذلك الشيء عند الحفظ ذكره متى شاء وإذا شاءت النفس أن تحضره أحضرته

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What we have just said, *i.e.* that the soul needs these three faculties, is evident from [the following]: When [the soul] hears something once or twice it will not be able to retain it until it will have heard it so many times that retentive memory makes it remain, so that [the form] will be [firmly] rooted within it. Once that thing is [firmly] rooted in retentive memory, [retentive memory] will remember it whenever it wishes, and whenever the soul wishes to make it present it will do so.

Ennead IV.6.3, 33–38 (pp. 328ff.):

διὰ τί γὰρ ἅπαξ μὲν ἀκούσας ἢ δεύτερον οὐ μέμνηται, ὅταν δὲ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ πρότερον ἀκούσας οὐκ ἔσχε, πολλῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ μέμνηται ἤδη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ μέρη ἐσχηκέναι πρότερον τοῦ τύπου· ἔδει γὰρ τούτων μεμνῆσθαι· ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἐξαίφνης γίγνεται τοῦτο ἔκ τινος [τῆς] ὑστέρας ἀκροάσεως ἢ μελέτης.

For why, when one has heard something once or twice, does one not remember it, but [only] when one has heard it many times, and, when one has heard something before and not retained it, why does one remember it long afterwards? It is certainly not because one previously had the parts of the impression; for then one would have to remember these; but this happens with a kind of suddenness, as the result of some later hearing or exercise.

3. *Retentive memory and quickness of mind*

In *De memoria* (449b6–8), Aristotle observes that 'it is not the same people who are good at remembering and at recollecting' and that 'slow people are better at remembering, while those who are quick and learn well are better at recollecting'.[43] This point is taken up in our next passage.

iv) MS Rampur 1752, fol. 8b, 12f.:

ومن الواجب أن يكون جيّد الحفظ جيّد الذكر ولأنْ يحضر الأشياء إذا أحبّ أن يكون عارفاً بالإشارة

It is a necessary rule that a person of good retentive memory must also have good recollective memory, and that in order to make things present whenever he wishes, he must be acquainted with the [relevant] pointer.

The same point is referred to by Plotinus in *Ennead* IV.6.3:

Ennead IV.6.3, 63–69 (pp. 332f.):

γίγνονται δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι [πολλάκις], ὅτι οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις ἑκατέρου, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ αὐτὸς πυκτικὸς καὶ δρομικός· ἐπικρατοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλαι ἐν ἄλλῳ ἰδέαι. καίτοι οὐκ ἐκώλυε τὸν ἀστινασοῦν ἔχοντα πλεονεξίας ψυχῆς ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ κείμενα, οὐδὲ τὸν ταύτῃ ῥυέντα τὴν τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἔχειν τὸ πάθος ἀδυναμίαν κεκτῆσθαι.

[43] Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle On Memory*, 2nd edn (London, 2004), p. 47.

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But the same people do not as a general rule have both good memories and quick minds, because it is not the same power in each case, just as the same man is not a good boxer and a good runner: for different characteristics dominate in different people. And yet there would be nothing to prevent a man who had any kind of superiority of soul from reading off the deposited impressions, nor would a man who had a strong inclination this way have to possess an inability to be affected and to retain the affection.

While Plotinus agrees with the factual claim, but turns it into an argument against Aristotle's theory of memory as the retaining of impressions, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* here seems to claim that people with good retentive memory do have good recollective memory – in contrast to Plotinus and Aristotle, and so also to the second *maqāla* of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, which reproduces the point Aristotle makes in *De memoria*.[44]

4. *Critique of the concept of memory as retention of impressions*

Immediately afterwards, the Arabic text rephrases the leading topic of *Ennead* IV.6 in argumentative style:

v) MS Rampur 1752, fol. 9a, 5–19

فإن قال قائل إنّكم قد نفيتم أن تكون الحسائس تقبل رسوم الصور قبولاً جسمانيّاً فكيف يمكن أن نقول كما قال الأوّلون إنّ الذكر إنّما حفظ رسوم الأشياء وقد نفينا الرسوم فثبّتنا أنّ الحسائس إنّما تقبل رسوم الأشياء بمتوسّطات من غير أن تكون الرسوم تنطبع في الحسائس انطباعاً جسمانيّاً

If someone asks: You have denied that the sensory organs receive the pictures of forms in a corporeal manner; if so, how can we say, as the ancients did, that memory is the retention of the pictures of things, given that we have denied the [existence of such] pictures? [The answer is that] we have already established that the sensory organs receive the pictures of things through intermediaries only, without the pictures being imprinted in the sensory organs in a corporeal manner.

This takes up the introductory statement Plotinus sets down at the beginning of *Ennead* IV.6.1 (1–5, pp. 320f):

Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις οὐδ' ἐνσφραγίσεις λέγοντες ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲ τὰς μνήμας πάντως τε καὶ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν κατοχὰς μαθημάτων καὶ αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τοῦ τύπου μείναντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃς μηδὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγένετο.

[44] Cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 24–9, 60–6. An interesting point is that when translating *De memoria* 449b6–8 the translator confuses the two groups – a mistake that we can still see reflected in Ibn Rushd's *Talkhīṣ* (pp. 49f.). – As the manuscript is corrupt at this point the stance taken in text iv cannot be affirmed with absolute certainty.

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Since we say that sense-perceptions are not impressions or seal-stamps on the soul, we cannot say either with any sort of consistency that memories are retentions of what we have learnt or perceived while the impression remains on the soul which was not there to begin with.

Given that the problem of sense-perception, intermediaries, and the retention of pictures has been discussed in previous paragraphs already whereas now the text is turning to memory, the second part of the Arabic passage may seem somewhat out of place or redundant.[45] However, the question whether memory has anything to do with the retention of pictures in the soul is indeed touched upon again in the immediately following passage (quoted below), which goes back to *Ennead* IV.6.3. This link could be the reason why the adaptor thought it a convenient piece of text to create the transition from the topic of sense-perception to that of memory.

5. *Lapse of time between perception and memory*

vi) MS Rampur 1752, fols. 9a, 19 – 9b, 6:

وإن قال قائل إن كان الذكر يذكر الأشياء بمتوسّطات من غير أن تكون رسوم الصور الجسمانيّة عنده مرسومة فما باله لا يذكر جميع الأشياء بل إنّما يذكر واحداً بعد واحد وشيئاً بعد شيء قلنا إنّ هذه المسألة واجبة عليكم وذلك أنّكم لو قلتم إنّ صور الأشياء إنّما تدركها النفس بأن تظهر فتلقي بصرها على الشيء المحسوس فينطبع رسم تلك الصورة في النفس وقواها فإن كانت تنطبع رسوم صور الأشياء في النفس وقواها فما بالها تحتاج إلى أن تذكر شيئاً بعد شيء ولا تحضر الشيء كلّما احتاجت إلى إحضاره على الصواب لأنّ الرسوم فيها

If someone says: If memory remembers things through intermediaries, without any pictures of corporeal forms being engraved in it, then why does it not remember all things [at once] but can only remember them one by one, one thing after another?, we shall say: It is you who are obliged [to answer] this question, [not we]. For if you were saying that it was the soul that perceived the forms of things by emerging to cast its gaze on the perceptible thing, so that the picture of that form was imprinted in the soul and its faculties, why, then, if the pictures of the forms of the things were imprinted in the soul and its faculties, would [the soul] need to remember one thing after another, and could not make a thing present correctly whenever it needed to do so, given that the pictures would be inside it?

[45] Its presence at this point of the text could hence be an indication that the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* rearranged his source material.

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In *Ennead* IV.6.3, Plotinus asks why, on his own understanding of memory, we will only remember some time after having had the relevant perception.

Ennead IV.6.3, 55–59 (pp. 330f.):

ἔτι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τυπώσεων οὐκ οὐσῶν, πῶς οἷόν τε τὰς μνήμας κατοχὰς τῶν οὐκ ἐντεθέντων οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δύναμίς τις καὶ παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸ ἕτοιμον, πῶς οὐχ ἅμα, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον εἰς ἀναπόλησιν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα;

Further, when sense-perceptions are not impressions, how could memories be retentions of imprints which were never made [in the soul] at all? But if memory is a power and a preparation for readiness, why do we not come to recall the same things at once, but only later?

There is a notable difference between the two texts. The problem envisaged by Plotinus is how to explain that we remember only after time has lapsed, rather than immediately after perception. According to the text of *Maqāla* I, on the other hand, the challenge for a viable theory of memory would be to explain why we remember different forms (or impressions, according to the fictional opponents' theory) one after the other rather than all at once. This deviation could well be the result of a mistranslation of *ἅμα*, rendered by the translator as 'together at the same time' rather than as 'immediately'.

6. *The example of signet ring and wax*

As if recapitulating, the last sentence of *Maqāla* I once again turns against the proponents of the doctrine that conceives of sense-perceptions as impressions in the soul, encapsulated by Aristotle's metaphor of the imprint of a signet ring in wax.

vii) MS Rampur 1752, fol. 10a, 3–7:

وقد أخطأ أيضاً مَن زعم أنّ رسوم الأشياء قد تنطبع في النفس كانطباع نقش الخاتم في الشمع

Again, anybody who claims that the pictures of things are imprinted in the soul like the engraving of a signet ring is imprinted in wax is mistaken as well…

Aristotle's example is mentioned and criticised by Plotinus twice in *Ennead* IV.6.1:[46]

[46] A further, less explicit, reference is found in *Ennead* IV.6.1, 9–10 (pp. 320f.): ἐπειδὴ οὔτε τὸν τύπον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐγγίγνεσθαί φαμεν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τυποῦν αὐτήν – 'since we do not assert that the impression of the sense-object enters the soul and stamps it'.

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Ennead IV.6.1, 1–2 (pp. 320f.):

Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ τυπώσεις οὐδ᾽ ἐνσφραγίσεις λέγοντες ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνεσθαι

Since we say that sense-perceptions are not impressions or seal-stamps on the soul…

Ennead IV.6.1, 18–20 (pp. 320ff.):

ἅτε μηδενός, οἶμαι, τύπου ἐν αὐτῇ γενομένου ἢ γιγνομένου, οὐδέπω σφραγῖδα ὥσπερ ἐν κηρῷ δακτυλίου λαμβανούσης[47]

… since, I think, no impression has been or is being imprinted on it, nor has it yet received a seal-stamp, like the mark of a seal-ring on wax.

Either phrase could have been the basis for the Arabic, although the second one is a touch more likely, since it mentions the wax explicitly.

The parallels between the Greek and Arabic passages quoted in this section establish without doubt that Plotinus' *Ennead* IV.6 in one way or other served as the ultimate source for these parts of *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. This leads to a further question: how and in what form did the Plotinian material enter *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, and what, if anything, do these fragments have to do with *AP*?

III. MAQĀLA I OF *KITĀB AL-ḤISS WA-AL-MAḤSŪS* AND THE ARABIC PLOTINUS

The fact that we find borrowings from *Ennead* IV.6 in *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* could mean one of two things: either the passages drawing on Plotinus were already present in the Greek *Vorlage* of the Arabic translation of the *Parva Naturalia* and were translated into Arabic as part of the Greek treatise, or else they were added to the text at the Arabic end; in which case the adaptor responsible for the inclusion of these quotations must have had access to an Arabic translation of *Ennead* IV.6.

This is not the place to discuss whether *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* represents the Arabic translation of a Greek (or Syriac) adaptation of the *Parva Naturalia*, or whether its adaptation was effected in Arabic, *i.e.* after or at the same time as the translation of the Aristotelian text. A detailed analysis of *Maqāla* II that I have undertaken elsewhere[48] has shown that the text is in all likelihood the work of an Arabic adaptor who was working with an already existing translation of

[47] This passage has been emended in various ways by different editors; the differences are, however, immaterial for the point being made in our context. I follow Armstrong's suggestion.

[48] Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 23–189.

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(parts of) the *Parva Naturalia* – whatever the exact shape and state of the Greek *Vorlage* of that translation may have been.[49] This result is further supported by the circumstantial evidence of the text's relationship with several Kindī-circle texts,[50] which suggests that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is indeed another adaptation created by one or several members of this group. This very fact at the same time renders it likely that the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* had access to the Kindī-circle translation of Plotinus' *Enneads* IV–VI. Conversely, the presence of quotations from that translation in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* would once more re-enforce the thesis of its probable origin in the Kindī circle.

As mentioned before, *Ennead* IV.6 is not represented in the extant Arabic Plotinus corpus (*AP*) as it is currently known. If the Plotinian borrowings in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* could be shown to be hitherto unknown fragments not just of any rendering of Plotinus, but of the Kindī-circle translation of *Enneads* IV-VI, this would indicate that the original Plotinus source **AP* contained a translation of IV.6 (at least of chapters 1 and 3), supporting the assumption that the extant *AP* does not reflect the full coverage of the treatises in the original **AP*.

Is there anything to show that the borrowings from the *Enneads* found in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* go back to the supposed Arabic Plotinus source? In order to find out, their language and style will have to be compared with that of the extant Arabic Plotinus. One difficulty that arises in this context is that it is impossible to tell whether the adaptor of *Maqāla* I quoted literally from an Arabic translation of the *Enneads* or not. The 'Plotinian' passages in *Maqāla* I render the Greek text rather freely, and show a tendency to elaborate on certain points in a somewhat repetitive manner. This happens to be a stylistic feature of the Arabic Plotinus, too;[51] and it could, therefore, simply go back to the original Kindī-circle translation. The paraphrastic features of the quotations could thus even be counted as a point in favour of their being taken from **AP*. However, they could also have been the work of the adaptor, or even of successive adaptors, of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*: liberties with the Greek, frequent elaborations and repetitiveness are characteristics of the Arabic *Parva Naturalia* no less than of *AP*. Hence these features may not with ultimate certainty be attributed to the translation. Such uncertainty applies in equal measure where omissions from Plotinus' text are concerned: they could have occurred in the translation, but could just as well have been the result of the adaptor's selection of material.

[49] See Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 130–5, 179–89, 258.
[50] See Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 212–20.
[51] Cf. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus*, pp. 9–12; Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 112, 115.

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Notwithstanding these *caveats*, even a brief comparison indicates a likely relation between the Plotinian passages in *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* and *AP*, as I hope to show. For the comparison I have chosen a passage from *Sayings of the Greek Sage* V, corresponding to *Ennead* IV.5[29].1, 3–17 and 2, 49–50. Should the original Arabic translation indeed have followed the order of the *Enneads* (as suggested by Fritz Zimmermann), the passage would have been in close vicinity to the translation of IV.6. Being devoted to sense-perception, it is furthermore related thematically, and hence seems a suitable text to compare with the Plotinian borrowings in *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.

Sayings of the Greek Sage V (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, pp. 189f., 191):

قال الشيخ اليوناني: البصر وسائر الحسائس لا تنال المحسوس إلا أن يكون بينها وبينه جرم متوسّط. وذلك أنّ الحسّ إنّما هو من حيّز النفس. والنفس إذا كانت في المكان العقلي علمت الأشياء العقلية من غير أن تحتاج إلى شيء من الأجرام وإذا كانت في العالم الحسّي احتاجت في معرفة المحسوسات إلى الجسم. والنفس إذا اتّحدت بالأشياء المحسوسة فإنما تنال معرفتها بالأشياء الشبيهة بها القوّية على قبول الآثار المحسوسة فتحسّ النفس الأشياء المحسوسة وتعرفها بتوسّط. والبصر يدرك الألوان بمتوسّط يقبل أثر اللون أوّلاً ثم يؤديه إلى البصر [. . .] فإن قال: إن صور الأشياء المحسوسة إن لم تكن معلّقة محمولة في الهواء اضمحلّت وبادت قبل أن تأتي البصر فلا يقع عليها البصر البتّة فلذلك صار الهواء يقبل صور الأشياء المحسوسة أوّلاً ثمّ يقبلها بعد ذلك البصر بتوسّط الهواء . . . .

Al-Shaykh al-Yūnānī said: Vision and the other senses attain the objects of sense-perception only if [senses and objects] are connected through the existence of an intermediary bodi[ly substance]. Sense-perception belongs to the sphere of the soul. While the soul is in the realm of the intellect, it knows the intelligibles and has no need of any bodi[ly substance], [in order to know them]. However, while it is in the world of the senses, it needs the body, in order to know the objects of sense-perception. United with the perceptible objects, the soul attains the knowledge of them only through things which are similar to them and able to receive sensual impressions. Thus, the soul perceives and knows the objects of sense-perception through mediation. Vision achieves the perception of colours through a medium which first receives the impression of colour, and then transmits it to vision [. . .] He might say: If the forms of the objects of sense-perception are not attached to the substratum of air, they would dissolve and disappear before they come

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to vision, and they could not be seen at all. It is for this reason that the air first receives the forms of the objects of sense-perception and that, then, vision receives them through the mediation of the air. (Translation based on F. Rosenthal, 'Aš-Šayk al-Yūnānī' II, pp. 371, 373, 377, with some alterations.)

The passage contains several expressions that we have encountered in the excerpts of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* quoted above, in particular texts ii) and iii): *baṣar* ('gaze'), *nāla* / *qabila ṣuwar al-ashyā'* ('to attain / receive the forms of things'); *mutawassiṭ* ('medium' / 'intermediary'); *iḍmaḥalla* ('to vanish, dissolve'), *addā* ('to convey', *i.e.* the perception or form). This list can be supplemented with further expressions that the 'Plotinian' passages of *Maqāla* I share with other passages of *AP*:

– The characteristic expression *alqā baṣarahu* ('to cast / direct one's gaze', see text ii above) is used time and again in *AP*. Here are a few selected examples:

ThA II (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, p. 33, l. 13):

وأما النفس فإنّها تستحيل إذا أرادت علم الأشياء ، وذلك أنّها تلقي بصرها على الأشياء كلها بحركتها المائلة.

ThA II (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, p. 35, l. 10f.):

ثمّ اطّلعت على هذا العالم وألقت بصرها على شيء من الأشياء دون العقل فاستفادت الذكر هي وصارت ذات ذكر.

ThA VIII (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, p. 120, l. 9f.):

لأنّ النفس إنّما هي صنم، إلّا أنّها إذا ألقت بصرها على العالم العقلي ازدادت حسناً

– The expression *aṭāla ilqā' al-baṣar* ('to prolong one's gaze') in *Maqāla* I (see text ii above) is related to the synonymous expression *aṭāla al-naẓar* which is used in *AP*:

ThA VIII (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, p. 117, l. 15f.):

والبصر كلّما أطال النظر إلى الشيء المحسوس أضرّ به المحسوس حتى يصيّره خارجاً من الحسّ أي لا يحسّ شيئاً

– Also notable is the choice of the word *jirmiyya* ('corporeality') in text i above; *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* normally uses the term *jusmāniyya*. The Arabic Plotinus uses the cognate adjective *jirmānī* (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, *e.g.* p. 36), alongside *jusmānī* / *jusmāniyya* (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, *e.g.* pp. 34, 41, 42) and *jusdānī* (*e.g.* p. 41).

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– Finally, the word *wahm*, likewise an irregular term within *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* that is only found in *Maqāla* I, is used in the Arabic Plotinus for (the faculty of) imagination (Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, pp. 38, 193).

All in all, the evidence does suggest a dependence of *Maqāla* I on the Arabic Plotinus source, even if it cannot ultimately prove it. Such an assumption has the further advantage of being able to explain the differences in doctrinal and linguistic details that exist between *Maqāla* I and II of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. The idea that the adaptor made use of the Kindī-circle Plotinus also suits the fact that a more general affinity to *AP* can be found in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, especially in *Maqāla* II. At the beginning of *Bāb al-Nawm wa-al-yaqaẓa*, for instance, the concepts of 'potentiality' and 'actuality' are introduced in a way that is reminiscent of the discussion of potentiality and actuality in *Mīmar* VIII of *ThA*.[52] This passage of the *Theology* has no equivalent in the Greek *Enneads*. The affinity therefore points to a connection between the two Arabic *adaptations*.[53]

IV. THE PLOTINIAN FRAGMENTS WITHIN *KITĀB AL-ḤISS WA-AL-MAḤSŪS*

When did these fragments of the Arabic Plotinus become part of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*? Had they always been an integral part of the adaptation from the start, or were they added at a later date? Since so little of the first *maqāla* of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is extant, it is hard to tell how intimately the Plotinian borrowings were connected to its other, more 'Aristotelian' parts. Ibn Rushd's testimony does not give us much to go by, for the reasons mentioned above. From what he says we can nevertheless surmise that it was a discussion of the role of the *medium* in sense-perception that may have occasioned the inclusion of the Plotinian passages. According to the *Talkhīṣ*, *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* seems to have contained an account of four different views held by 'the ancients' on this matter.[54] The central topic in the extant pages of *Maqāla* I is the question

[52] Cf. Hansberger, '*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*', pp. 153–7; 'The Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 158–63.

[53] If one wanted to maintain that the influence of the *Enneads* detectable in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* went back to its Greek archetype, one would then have to claim that the Arabic Plotinus was based on an altered Greek version as well, and that – by rare coincidence – it was this altered version of the *Enneads* that had an impact on the altered version of the *Parva Naturalia*, before both were translated into Arabic. – A survey of the history of the hypothesis of an altered Greek version of the *Enneads* is provided by Cristina D'Ancona in 'Porphyry, universal soul and the Arabic Plotinus', pp. 47–62.

[54] Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, pp. 20ff. This would have differed considerably from Aristotle's recapitulation of the views of Plato, Empedocles and Democritus in ch. 2 of *De sensu* (437a19–438b2).

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whether sense-perceptions are 'impressed' directly on the soul, or whether they are transmitted to the soul via 'intermediaries'. Dominated by the Plotinian borrowings, the text attacks the Aristotelian view that compares sense-perceptions to impressions of a seal in wax, and argues for the more Plotinian stance that the soul cannot be directly affected by objects of sense-perception but needs an intermediary organ or faculty to mediate the affection. In Plotinus' doctrine (cf. *Ennead* IV.4.23) this is so because the human soul, belonging to the intelligible realm, cannot be assimilated to the sensually perceptible and hence needs an instrument to bridge the essential difference between itself and the perceptible.[55] In *Maqāla* I, these considerations do not really transpire. In fact, there may even exist some confusion between the Plotinian 'intermediaries' and the external 'medium' (air, water) which according to Aristotelian doctrine is necessary for the transmission of sense-perception.[56] The discussion in *Maqāla* I may hence have been occasioned by a passage in the Aristotelian text referring to the external medium, with the Plotinian text being brought in by the adaptor to supply further (and different) points.

The transition to the topic of memory would have been brought about by the Plotinian borrowings: as we have seen, *Ennead* IV.6 combines the two topics of sense-perception and memory, whereas *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, following the layout of the *Parva Naturalia*, in principle reserves the latter for the first part of *Maqāla* II. In pursuing the question how memory can be said to retain the pictures (*rusūm*) of things if they are not imprinted in the soul in a physical manner, *Maqāla* I is following the lead of the Plotinian material.

What remains unclear is the motivation behind the inclusion of this material, especially as Plotinus' account of memory (and sense-perception) is not quite consistent with that of *Maqāla* II of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*: in *Maqāla* II the Aristotelian comparison to the signet ring and wax is maintained as valid, and there is talk of forms being imprinted in the soul;[57] moreover, the theory of the three spiritual faculties,[58] pervasive in *Maqāla* II, does not have an equivalent in the Plotinian text. As one can see from texts ii) and iii) quoted above, such discrepancies are smoothed over by additions

[55] Cf. Emilsson, *Plotinus*, pp. 68–72; Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 75f.

[56] Cf. *e.g. De anima* II, 7, II, 11 (419a1–b2, 423b1–26), *De sensu*, 436b18f., 438b2–16. Plotinus differentiates explicitly between the two issues in *Ennead* IV.4.23, 43ff. Both concepts could be referred to in Arabic by the term *mutawassit*. Plotinus occasionally uses the same term – (τὸ) μεταξύ – for either concept (cf. *Ennead* IV.4.23, 25; 44), which might have become a source of confusion for the Arabic translator.

[57] Cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 60–65.

[58] See pp. 62f. above.

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and alterations which adjust the Plotinian passages to the theory of the three faculties promoted in *Maqāla* II of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. In effect, Plotinus' stance against the idea that sense-perceptions are to be conceived of as impressions in the soul is turned into an argument for the necessity of the 'mediating' faculties – identified not as the sense-organs (as in Plotinus), but as the 'spiritual' faculties of imagination, thought, and memory. The text furthermore shifts the emphasis towards another issue close to the heart of the adaptor: the dichotomy between corporeality and spirituality.[59] Focussing on the point that there can be no *physical* impressions in the soul, the adaptor of our text stresses that it is, instead, *spiritual forms* that are imprinted in the soul's faculties.[60]

This manner of picking out isolated points from the 'original' text and distorting them in order to convey a different sense altogether is absolutely characteristic of the adaptor we find at work in *Maqāla* II of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. This is one reason to assume that the Plotinian borrowings were added during the 'main' stage of the adaptation process that shaped *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, and that most of the alterations to the Plotinian passages can be laid at the door of the principal adaptor – even though some remarks are likely to have been penned by later glossators or subsequent adaptors.[61] Hence the method by which the Plotinian borrowings are made to fit the adaptor's theory does not need to surprise us. Plotinus' text is treated just like Aristotle's: it is excerpted, altered and re-interpreted to support the theory of the three spiritual faculties. However, there is of course a crucial difference: given that the whole project of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* starts out with Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*, it is no wonder that even an adaptor intent on promoting a quite different theory nevertheless could not ignore this text entirely, but had to make use of it one way or another. The same would not, *prima facie*, apply to the Plotinian borrowings.

[59] Cf. Hansberger, '*Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*', pp. 146f., 154–7.

[60] For Plotinus, it is likewise the corporeal aspect of sense-perception that is at the heart of the problem. However, his solution emphasises a different aspect: in his theory, the sense-organs fulfil the task of bridging the gap between the corporeal object of perception and incorporeal perception; in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, on the other hand, the role of the sense-organs is pushed into the background, while the focus lies on the post-sensatory 'spiritual faculties', which deal with 'spiritual' rather than corporeal forms. According to *Maqāla* II, however, the passage that perceptions take through these three faculties is supposed to constitute a 'cleansing' process in which these forms are increasingly freed from their corporeal aspects. In this way these faculties could indeed be seen as 'mediating' between the corporeal and the (entirely) spiritual. Cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 68–83, and my contribution on *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* in M. Sebti, D. De Smet (eds.), *Noétique et théorie de la connaissance dans la philosophie arabo-musulmane des IX^e–XVII^e siècles*, Collection "Textes et Traditions" (Paris, forthcoming).

[61] Notably one that refers to these faculties as 'internal senses' (fol. 7b, line 3; see Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 210f. and 171–8).

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Why choose to integrate yet another text that again needed a good deal of 'editorial' work on the part of the adaptor in order to offer support to his theory? Were the points gained by including the Plotinian material really worth the adaptor's efforts in adjusting it?

Here we are entering the field of speculation. It will not be possible to say with certainty why, how and under what circumstances the Plotinian fragments entered *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. Nevertheless it is worth exploring various possible hypotheses, not least to gain a sense of how our questions concerning *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* are interwoven with those relating to the Arabic Plotinus.

In principle, there could have been two possible motivations for the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* to include an additional text: either because it offered desirable theoretical points, or else because the adaptor believed that the text in question was also authored by Aristotle. If it is questionable whether the Plotinian borrowings were in themselves useful enough for the adaptor to justify their inclusion, we may want to ask whether he may have known them as Aristotle's work. In this case it may have been quite natural not to ignore a second text on sense-perception and memory supposedly written by the Stagirite.

This again leads us to two possibilities. The source text may have been ascribed to Aristotle independently of the production of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*; or else the adaptor could have been led to assume that it was by Aristotle because he found the Arabic version of *Ennead* IV.6 in some way associated with the translation of the *Parva Naturalia* underlying *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*.

Given that *ThA* is transmitted under the name of Aristotle, it is an obvious question to ask whether the presence of Plotinian fragments in 'Aristotle's' *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* is in any way related to that attribution. However, to assume that an earlier version of *ThA* had included parts of *Ennead* IV.6 which then dropped out in the course of transmission seems otiose given the lack of textual evidence for such a version. Furthermore, if we want to accept the suggestion that *ThA* is not an entirely fortuitous assembly of parts of **AP* but reflects a thematic grouping of passages, as argued for by Peter Adamson and Cristina D'Ancona, it is somewhat doubtful whether the rather 'prosaic' aspects of sense-perception and memory discussed in *Ennead* IV.6 would have fitted the generally somewhat loftier metaphysical outlook of *ThA*.

It is perhaps more pertinent to ask whether the fact that we find fragments of **AP* in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* can tell us anything about the point at which the attribution to Aristotle was consolidated within the transmission. Fritz Zimmermann has argued that Aristotle's name might have been mentioned in the title of **AP* itself

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(or even in that of the 'metaphysics file'), though the actual attribution would have been the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the 'editor' of *ThA*.[62] Could the fragments in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* be a similar case? When excerpting **AP*, could the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* have misread its title so as to attribute the text to Aristotle? Somehow this does not strike one as being too likely. The adaptor would not have faced the same difficult textual situation that Zimmermann envisages for the scribe who compiled *ThA* after the disintegration of **AP*. Moreover, working with the translation of Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia* he should have been aware of the crucial theoretical differences between the two texts. And if he was indeed linked to the Kindī circle we should furthermore expect him to have had 'insider knowledge' about any Kindī-circle texts he was using.

Do the new fragments, then, indicate that the attribution to Aristotle had in fact taken place before any disintegration of **AP* and / or the compilation of *ThA*? Did copies of **AP* exist which stated that Aristotle was its author? Even if this were the case, it seems unlikely to have occurred within the Kindī circle itself.[63] Hence this scenario would cast doubts on our assumption that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* was produced in the Kindī circle in temporal proximity to **AP*, suggesting a later date for the adaptation – or at least for the inclusion of the Plotinian fragments. Due to the general uncertainty surrounding *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* this cannot be categorically excluded; but it does not appear likely.[64] And there are further questions to be asked: assuming that the adaptor did take the Plotinian fragments from **AP*, why would he only have chosen passages from *Ennead* IV.6.1 and IV.6.3,[65] if he thought that text to be by Aristotle? Why did he not use other parts of **AP*, for instance, to bolster the second *maqāla* of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*? Such uncertainties weigh all the heavier given that *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* assembles a host of other material under Aristotle's name as well. Hence it does not seem entirely necessary to explain the presence of the Plotinian fragments by the misattribution of **AP* to Aristotle: there are other possible scenarios that would explain their inclusion in the text.

One of these scenarios is in some ways analogous to Fritz Zimmermann's idea of a 'metaphysics file': the adaptor may have found the Arabic translation of *Ennead* IV.6 grouped together with that of *De sensu*, and perhaps with other thematically relevant texts

[62] See Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 119–25, 128–31, 134.
[63] Cf. Zimmermann, '*Theology of Aristotle*', pp. 118–25.
[64] Cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 130–5, 208–11.
[65] On a possible presence of fragments from *Ennead* IV.5 in the text see below.

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which subsequently found their way into *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*. There might have been, in other words, a 'file' similar to the stipulated Kindī-circle 'metaphysics file', which assembled different texts on sense-perception, or, if we consider *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* as a whole, perhaps on the 'faculties' or powers of the soul.[66] Due to some accident of transmission the adaptor may have believed it to be part of the Aristotelian text, or perhaps a further text by Aristotle on the same topic. Leaving aside the fact that this would still require us to ask further where the compiler of that file had found his texts originally, the option is not unproblematic for other reasons, too. One may again wonder whether the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* would not have recognised the crucial differences between the two texts, especially if we take into account that he used other sources as well: would he have assumed them all to have been produced by Aristotle?

The alternative assumption is that the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* knew that the passages in question were not by Aristotle. Given his prevailing practice of using several different sources which he blends together to form a single new text, this is perhaps more likely. In that case there are again two options, running parallel, as it were, to those already mentioned. The adaptor may have found *Ennead* IV.6 as a pre-selected excerpt together with the translation of the *Parva Naturalia* and other texts in a pre-arranged collection of texts; or he may himself have actively searched for related texts in additional sources, in this case probably **AP*.

Above, I have suggested that *Ennead* IV.6 may not have suited the adaptor's theory well enough *prima facie* to be considered a 'must have' for his work (whatever valuable points he manages to extract from it in the end). There might, however, have been other motivations to use the Plotinian text, even for an adaptor who knew it did not have anything to do with Aristotle. For example, he might have wanted to combine several 'Greek' philosophical texts on one and the same topic, to provide an overview of some sort. With respect to the adaptor of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, though, this cannot be the case: what he produces is not an overview or compendium. He blends the texts together, and moreover does not provide any names apart from Aristotle's. If, however, we assume that the adaptor worked from a 'file' of assembled texts on the psychic faculties, such texts would automatically have recommended themselves for use,

[66] In *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs*, sleep and waking – along with other topics of the *Parva Naturalia* – are characterised as 'faculties' or 'powers' (*quwā*). What Aristotle describes as 'phenomena common to soul and body' (*De sensu* 436b1–3) thus becomes, in the Arabic version, a question of 'faculties' (of the soul). See e.g. MS Rampur, fol. 21b, and cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 128f.

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by virtue of their presence in such a file. But we do not have to assume that the adaptor worked only with texts that had been assembled beforehand. He may well have consciously and intentionally been in the business of creating a 'syncretistic' account of what 'the Greeks' had to say on the topics represented by Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*, and so may have done the collecting of suitable texts himself. In both cases a Plotinian treatise called *On sense-perception and memory* would certainly have recommended itself for inclusion. Another text for which this would hold true is *Ennead* IV.5 (*On Sight*), which is transmitted in Arabic among the fragments of *GS*.[67] The extant part of *Maqāla* I does not contain any parallels to this text, as far as I can make out. However, one or two lines in the first *maqāla* of Ibn Rushd's *Talkhīṣ* suggest that the translation of *Ennead* IV.5 may have been used by the adaptor in other passages of *Maqāla* I.[68]

Given the overall character of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* this is perhaps the most plausible account of what spurred the adaptor: an attempt to create a 'digest', starting out from the most prominent work, *i.e.* Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*, and integrating sources from the later tradition – in a manner which, in the end, allowed him to promote a theory that appealed to him. This way of proceeding would certainly explain his 'picking and choosing', which seems to be the most likely cause, for instance, of the absence of *Ennead* IV.6.2 from the text. Whether the adaptor was relying on a collection of texts compiled by someone else, or whether he selected his sources entirely by himself, and whether he had access to **AP* as a whole, cannot be determined at this point.

The adaptor's very active role in the construction of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* means that we cannot identify accurately the sources of his Plotinian borrowings. Therefore we cannot say with any certainty what exactly his source text looked like, how close a translation or paraphrase of the Greek it was, and how much of *Ennead* IV.6 (and IV.5?) it covered. Given the level of interference that the text has suffered (probably from our adaptor, but possibly not just from him), it is impossible to determine exactly what happened to it at which stage.[69]

However, the presence of new fragments from a translation of *Ennead* IV.6 in *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* does, I believe, give some measure of support to the assumption that **AP* was a

[67] *GS* V and VI, Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, pp. 189–92.

[68] See *GS* V, Badawī, *Aflūṭīn*, p. 191: والدليل على ذلك أنه إذا وضع المحسوس على العين ولامسها لم تبصره; cf. Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, p. 9: والدلالة على حاجة هذه الحواس الثلاث إلى المتوسط أنها إذا وضعت محسوساتها على حاسة لم تدركها The question whether indications of further Plotinian borrowings can be found in the *Talkhīṣ*, and indeed what it can more generally tell us about further sources that may have been included in *Maqāla* I of *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* will have to be investigated in a separate study.

[69] Cf. Hansberger, 'Transmission of the *Parva Naturalia*', pp. 206–11.

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translation-cum-adaptation of *Enneads* IV-VI which followed the treatises in chronological order, and which contained more of the text than is extant in *AP*; and that this text was used by people of the Kindī circle (and beyond) as a kind of philosophical 'quarry': single treatises or even smaller parts of this *translation-cum-adaptation* could be copied out, 'filed' and used according to topic. Whether *this* text as a whole would have been the one included in the Kindī-circle 'metaphysics file' envisaged by Fritz Zimmermann is a question that is still worth discussing.

As with so many things to do with *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-al-maḥsūs* the actual evidence it offers is rather tentative and inconclusive. While the fragments from *Ennead* IV.6 do present a new piece of the Arabic Plotinus puzzle, this new piece does not yet give us a much clearer view of what the overall, complete picture should look like in the end. In fact, the most palpable result of its appearance might well be the realisation that this puzzle may be even larger and more complicated than we have assumed so far. Like his colleague Proclus, *Plotinus Arabus* has still some way to go.[70]

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