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DEFICIENT VIRTUE IN THE *PHAEDO*

Plato seems to have been pessimistic about how most people stand with regard to virtue. However, unlike the Stoics, he did not conclude that most people are vicious. Rather, as we know from discussions across several dialogues, he countenanced decent ethical conditions that fall short of genuine virtue, which he limited to the philosopher. Despite Plato's obvious interest in this issue, commentators rarely follow his lead by investigating in detail such conditions in the dialogues. When scholars do investigate what kind of virtue, if any, Plato thinks is open to non-philosophers, they typically look to the *Republic*.[1] But in the *Republic* Plato sets out an ideal city; therefore, the virtue available to non-philosophers there is likely different from what he thinks is available to them in the real world. If we want to determine Plato's thoughts about the virtue of actual non-philosophers, we must look elsewhere. In this paper, I set my sights on the *Phaedo*.

In two passages in the *Phaedo* Socrates contrasts the true virtue of the philosopher with a deficient form of virtue available to non-philosophers. The first—call it the 'closing argument' (68b7–69e4)—comes at the end of Socrates' defence of his decision to die. In this passage Socrates compares genuine virtue with a counterfeit form of virtue, which can be labelled 'apparent virtue'. The second, the 'Reprise'[2] (80c1–84b5), finds Socrates contrasting genuine virtue with what he calls 'social virtue'. These passages seem to offer quite different characterizations and evaluations of the sort of virtue available to non-philosophers, leading some commentators to conclude that in the *Phaedo* Plato envisages two forms of deficient virtue.[3] I, however, will argue that, although these passages emphasize different aspects of deficient virtue, Socrates discusses a single condition in both. Hence, in the *Phaedo* there is only one form of deficient virtue.

My investigation will proceed as follows. First, it will lay out what Socrates says about apparent and social virtue. Second, the evidence showing that these states are distinct will be considered, beginning with evidence internal to the *Phaedo* before turning to evidence from outside of the dialogue. Third, this evidence will be

[1] For instance, R. Kamtekar, 'Imperfect virtue', *AncPhil* 18 (1998), 315–39 and J. Wilberding, 'Plato's two forms of second-best morality', *PhR* 118 (2009), 351–74. Even those treatments of non-philosophical virtue that do look at the *Phaedo* frequently do so in conjunction with this issue in the *Republic*. For instance, C. Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics* (Oxford, 2002), ch. 1; R. Kraut, 'Ordinary virtue from *Phaedo* to the *Laws*', in C. Bobonich (ed.), *Plato's* Laws (Cambridge, 2010), 51–70; I. Vasiliou, 'From the *Phaedo* to the *Republic*: Plato's tripartite soul and the possibility of non-philosophical virtue', in R. Barney, T. Brennan and C. Brittain (edd.), *Plato and the Divided Self* (Cambridge, 2012), 9–32.

[2] Adopting the name from M. Pakaluk, 'Degrees of separation in the *Phaedo*', *Phronesis* 48 (2003), 89–115, at 109.

[3] e.g. Vasiliou (n. 1).

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re-evaluated and ultimately rejected, paving the way for the interpretation that social virtue in the *Phaedo* is a species of apparent virtue. In making the case for this reading, the *Phaedo*'s discussion of social virtue will be connected with other dialogues where the topic arises, thus offering a more complete account of this condition than exists in the literature. The investigation will conclude by filling out the picture of deficient virtue in the dialogue. As we shall see, far from being philosophically implausible, the sort of deficient virtue we find in the *Phaedo* shares important points of contact with the ethical theory later developed by Epicurus.

1. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF APPARENT VIRTUE AND SOCIAL VIRTUE

Before considering how they relate to one another, we must see what Socrates says about apparent virtue and social virtue, beginning with the former.

1.1 Apparent virtue

Socrates introduces the topic of apparent virtue at the end of his defence. After concluding that a person who loves wisdom, that is, a true philosopher, will not fear death, he leverages this insight into the following discussion of virtue (68b7–69e3):

> 'Then, you have sufficient indication', he [Socrates] said, 'that any man whom you see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of body, being either a money lover, an honour lover, or both.'
>
> 'It is certainly as you say.'
>
> 'And, Simmias,' he said, 'does not what is called "courage" (ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία) belong most (μάλιστα) to men of this disposition?'
>
> 'Most certainly.'
>
> 'And the quality of temperance, which even (καί) the majority call "temperance" (οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην), that is, not to get swept off one's feet by one's appetites, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is suited only (μόνοις) to those who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?'
>
> 'Necessarily so', he said.
>
> 'If you are willing to reflect on the courage and temperance of other people (τήν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην), you will find them strange.'
>
> 'In what way, Socrates?'
>
> 'You know that they all consider death a great evil?'
>
> 'Definitely', he said.
>
> 'And the courageous among them (αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι) face death, when they do, for fear of greater evils.'
>
> 'That is so.'
>
> 'Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men courageous, except the philosophers.'
>
> 'Yet, it is illogical to be courageous through fear and cowardice.'
>
> 'It certainly is.'
>
> 'What of the temperate among them (οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν)? Is their experience not similar? Is it licentiousness of a kind that makes them temperate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this simple-minded temperance (ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην) turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so, they keep away from some pleasures because they are overcome by others. Now, to be mastered by pleasure is what they call licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them temperate.'
>
> 'That seems likely.'

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'Dear Simmias, I fear this is not the correct exchange with regard to virtue, that is exchanging pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, and fear for fear, the more for the less, just as with coins. Instead, the only correct coin for which one ought to exchange them is wisdom. And buying and selling all of these pleasures, pains, and fears for this wisdom and on the side of this we have true courage, temperance, justice, and the whole of true virtue, which is on the side of wisdom regardless of whether pleasures, pains, or any such state is present or absent. But, exchanging these things for one another disregarding wisdom is, if you like, an image of virtue (σκιαγραφία), and is slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης), lacking anything sound or true …'[4]

Several features of this passage are especially relevant to our investigation. To begin with the obvious, the deficient virtue in this passage—'apparent virtue' since it is like an image of (genuine) virtue—is based on a calculation of bodily experiences. This is made explicit in the last section of this passage where non-philosophers are said, for instance, to exchange less pleasure for more pleasure. Thus the virtuous non-philosophers use pleasure, pain and fear[5] as the ultimate standard by which they judge actions; therefore, they are hedonists.[6] It is this aspect of apparent virtue that leads Socrates to condemn it as 'slavish'.[7]

Despite being slavish, apparent virtue can none the less issue in virtuous action. As Socrates says, the 'courageous among them [non-philosophers]' face death, and the 'temperate among them [non-philosophers]' control certain bodily appetites. Moreover, he says that fear and licentiousness make non-philosophers courageous and temperate. By this, Socrates likely means that fear and licentiousness make them perform the courageous or temperate action, since he is denying that they possess (genuine) virtue. So, we can see that, although it is slavish and a counterfeit form of virtue, apparent virtue does enable people to perform virtuous action. Still, it is clear that, even when non-philosophers perform a virtuous action, they do so without the proper motivation, acting for the sake of bodily pleasure rather than for the sake of wisdom or virtue. Moreover, this makes apparent virtue inherently unstable. Because their virtuous action is merely accidental, resulting from their calculation rather than from a proper motivation, in circumstances where the calculation does not favour virtuous action, the non-philosopher will not act well.[8] Hence, although it appears that they have genuine virtue, what they have is merely apparent virtue. [9]

The foregoing should be pretty non-controversial. What is not, however, is the relationship between apparent virtue and what Socrates refers to as 'what is called virtue'.[10] Commentators tend either to ignore what is called 'virtue' or to conflate it with apparent virtue. This conflation seems plausible; given that apparent virtue is an

[4] Translations from G.M.A. Grube (transl.) and J.M. Cooper (rev.), *Plato:* Phaedo, in J.M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (edd.). *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997), occasionally modified.

[5] Throughout the dialogue Socrates treats fear, honour and shame as bodily.

[6] See J. Gosling and C. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford, 1982) and R. Weiss, 'Hedonic calculus in the *Protagoras* and the *Phaedo*', *JHPh* 27 (1989), 511–29.

[7] Kraut (n. 1), 56 takes σκιαγραφία to express an 'underdeveloped' understanding of virtue rather than as a condemnation.

[8] See Vasiliou (n. 1), 18; cf. R. Barney, 'Comments on Sarah Broadie "Virtue and beyond in Plato and Aristotle"', *SJPh* 43 (2005), 115–25, at 121–4.

[9] Although Socrates focusses on courage and temperance in this passage, he undoubtedly thinks that there are apparent forms of other virtues. Indeed, the popular view of justice in *Republic* Book 2 is that one acts justly because doing so is most profitable (δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν, 359a1), owing to the average person's lack of power. Thus this sort of justice comes from *pleonexia* and, therefore, from injustice.

[10] Generalized from what is called 'courage' and what is called 'temperance'.

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image of virtue, non-philosophers undoubtedly mistake it for virtue; therefore, they would call it 'virtue'.[11] However, this reading cannot be correct, because Socrates attributes what are called 'courage' and 'temperance' to philosophers, saying that the former belongs most (μάλιστα) to the philosopher and the latter belongs *only* (μόνοις) to them. Because philosophers have genuine virtue, which is diametrically opposed to the apparent virtue of non-philosophers, Socrates cannot think that what is called 'virtue' is the same as apparent virtue.

What then is what is called 'virtue'? Socrates says that what is called 'temperance' is 'not [getting] swept off one's feet by one's appetites, but [treating] them with disdain and orderliness'. And, based on his comments, what is called 'courage' at least involves willingly facing death.[12] Moreover, because these conditions are what people call temperance and courage, it is pretty clear that in both cases they are what most people take these virtues to be. Thus what is called 'virtue' must be the common conception of virtue. This is distinct from apparent virtue, which is the condition that gives rise to what is called 'virtue' in non-philosophers.

Before moving on, two points about what is called 'virtue' should be underlined. First, although not wholly misguided about what virtue really is, the common conception of virtue is superficial,[13] because it disregards the underlying cognitive or conative condition of the soul.[14] We know this because whatever precisely it is, both philosophers and non-philosophers can manifest, for instance, what is called 'courage'. Thus, since we know that philosophers have genuine courage but non-philosophers (at best) have apparent courage, what is called 'courage' can result from a philosopher's genuine courage or a non-philosopher's calculation of fears. Hence what the common understanding of courage neglects is the underlying psychological condition, including motivation, for the courageous action.[15] Second, the very fact that there is something that is called 'courage' and another that is called 'temperance' indicates that there is a consensus among most people as to what these virtues are. That is, even if they are incorrect about what courage and temperance really are, Plato thinks that most people would agree about which actions are courageous and temperate.

[11] See D. Gallop, *Plato,* Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), 99 and Kraut (n. 1), 54.

[12] C. Rowe, *Plato:* Phaedo. *Text and Commentary* (New York, 1993), 146–7 suggests that what is called 'courage' is fearlessness in general (cf. R. Hackforth, *Plato's* Phaedo. *Translated with Introduction and Commentary* [Cambridge, 1955], 57), but this neglects that in a calculation there would be fears on both sides of the ledger. Moreover, because what is called 'courage' applies most to philosophers, we know that it cannot be overcoming fear, since they do not fear death. See Gosling and Taylor (n. 6) and Weiss (n. 6).

[13] Gallop (n. 11), 99 suggests that virtue terms are misapplied by non-philosophers. In so far as they do not refer to a psychological condition, this is correct. But the many do seem to track fairly reliably which actions are virtuous and which are not. The problem is that, just as we see in other dialogues, non-philosophers here (are reported to) conceive of virtues in terms that emphasize actions—facing death and not getting swept away by passions—rather than conditions in the soul that give rise to these actions. Thus non-philosophers think that courage *just is* facing death willingly, and that temperance *just is* not getting swept away by passions.

[14] J. Beere, 'Philosophy, virtue, and immortality in Plato's *Phaedo*', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 27 (2011), 253–88, at 280 thinks that, when it comes to virtue, non-philosophers do recognize the necessity of acting for the right reason, they simply fail to do it. But there is no indication here that non-philosophers would deny someone genuine temperance if she abstained from another drink tonight only in order to avoid a headache tomorrow.

[15] The same can be said about what is called 'temperance'. According to the common view, temperance is controlling bodily appetites, regardless of why or how one is doing so.

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1.2 Social virtue

In the Reprise (80c1–84b5) Socrates returns to themes set out in his defence. In doing so, he again discusses deficient virtue, this time mentioning social virtue. For our purposes, the most salient part of discussion goes as follows (82a6–c6):

> 'The happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατοι) of these [non-philosophers], who will also have the best destination, are those who have practised popular and social virtue (οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες),[16] which they call "temperance" and "justice" (ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην) and which are developed by habit and practice and without philosophy or understanding (ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ).'
>
> 'How are they the happiest?'
>
> 'Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group either of bees or wasps or ants, and then again, the same kind of human group, and so be average people.'
>
> 'That is likely.'
>
> 'No one may join the company of the gods who has not practised philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, no one but the lovers of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practise philosophy in the right way keep away from bodily passions, master them, and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority, that is, money lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonour or ill repute, like the ambitious lovers of honours, that they keep away from them.

Four points in this passage are particularly important. First, Socrates says that people with social virtue are the happiest of non-philosophers and that they will have the best destination after death. Second, Socrates says that social virtue is what people call 'temperance' and 'justice'. Thus the names 'temperance' and 'justice', as employed by non-philosophers at any rate, refer to social virtue. That is, non-philosophers are not reported here to call temperance and justice 'social virtue', but rather what they call 'temperance' and 'justice' is social virtue. Third, Socrates says that social virtue arises in the non-philosophers who have it as a result of habit and practice, not through philosophy and understanding.

The final point is that philosophers and non-philosophers have different motivations for mastering bodily passion. Philosophers control bodily passions so their souls can be pure, whereas non-philosophers who control bodily passions do so either for fear of wasting money (money lovers)[17] or for fear of dishonour (honour lovers). Given the way he talks here, there can be little doubt that Socrates has temperance in mind. However, it is less than clear whether he is still thinking about social virtue or has reverted to the topic of apparent temperance, or whether he thinks that social virtue and apparent virtue are the same, and hence he is thinking about both. So, let us turn now to this investigation.

2. THE CASE FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN APPARENT VIRTUE AND SOCIAL VIRTUE

Based on the foregoing, there are several reasons to think that apparent virtue differs from social virtue. First, Socrates seems to evaluate apparent virtue differently than

[16] πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν is often translated as 'political virtue'. The translation 'social virtue' is preferable because it indicates that this kind of virtue makes one a good member of a *polis* rather than an excellent politician.

[17] Socrates says 'the many *kai* money lovers'. I take the *kai* to be epexegetical. A close alternative is that Socrates is saying 'the many who are money lovers', which leaves open that some of the many are honour lovers.

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he does social virtue.[18] Whereas he disparages apparent virtue, criticizing it as slavish, Socrates seems to esteem social virtue, saying that those who possess it will be the happiest of the non-philosophers and that they will enjoy the best fates after death. Thus, given these different appraisals, it seems that Socrates distinguishes between apparent and social virtue.

Second, while Socrates says that social virtue is developed by habit and practice, he does not indicate that this is the case for apparent virtue. And given that apparent virtue amounts to exchanging bodily experiences, it may not be *acquired* at all but is perhaps the default state humans begin with and continue to have, unless we acquire some other condition, such as social virtue. Moreover, Socrates' claim that social virtue comes from habit and practice but not from understanding has led some commentators to conclude that it consists in true beliefs about the intrinsic value of virtue.[19] If this is correct, then it is a third, and decisive, difference between apparent and social virtue. Although apparent virtue enables someone to perform the virtuous action, neither is it stable nor does it consist in beliefs about virtue itself.[20] But according to the interpretation on offer, social virtue *does* involve true and stable beliefs about virtue, which then motivate the socially virtuous agent to act in accordance with these beliefs and, consequently, to perform the virtuous action.

While Plato never suggests that non-philosophers have true beliefs about virtue in the *Phaedo*, if we turn to the *Republic*, we can find support for this view. At *Resp.* 429b4–430c4, Socrates describes a type of courage that consists in the power to preserve correct beliefs, which are inculcated by laws, about what should be feared and in not abandoning these beliefs owing to pains, pleasures, desires or fears (430b1–2). Importantly for our purposes, Socrates calls this *social* courage (πολιτικήν γε, 430c4). Thus it seems that Socrates is here appealing to the distinction between social virtue and genuine virtue that he stakes out in the Reprise. And since social virtue here in the *Republic* seems to consist in true, stable beliefs about virtue, there is reason to think that this is also the case in the *Phaedo*. And if this is the case, and social virtue consists in true beliefs about virtue, then it must be distinct from apparent virtue, which does not involve true beliefs about virtue.

This passage from the *Republic* seems to provide further, even more explicit evidence that social virtue is distinct from apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*. In this passage, social courage is contrasted with a state that consists in correct beliefs about what is to be feared, but that does not come from education and has nothing to do with the law. For our purposes, what is most significant is that Glaucon says that this state is found in animals and *slavish* people (ἀνδραποδώδη). Of course, as we have seen, in the *Phaedo* Socrates criticizes apparent virtue as slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης, 69b6). Thus it seems that Plato has the same sort of state in mind in both passages, namely apparent virtue.[21] So, in the *Republic* Plato distinguishes between what he calls 'social' courage and slavish courage. Generalizing from courage to virtue, in the *Republic* there is a distinction between social virtue and slavish virtue. And since in the *Phaedo* Plato discusses social virtue and slavish (apparent) virtue, there is reason to think that he likewise distinguishes them in that dialogue.

[18] See Vasiliou (n. 1), 17–18.
[19] See Kraut (n. 1), 56.
[20] Apparent virtue does concern true beliefs about which available action is virtuous in a situation. But such beliefs are not about virtue itself or about the value of virtue.
[21] See T. Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford, 1995), 194–5, 234. Cf. Kamtekar (n. 1), 318.

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3. SOCIAL VIRTUE IS A SPECIES OF APPARENT VIRTUE

According to the evidence we have just considered, it seems that there is good reason to think that apparent virtue and social virtue are distinct. On this interpretation, unlike people with apparent virtue, who deal only in bodily pleasure and pain, people with social virtue are motivated by virtue and perform (or refrain from) certain actions because of their beliefs about virtue.[22] Although this reading has its appeal, the balance of evidence indicates that in the *Phaedo* social virtue is not distinct from apparent virtue but, instead, is a species of apparent virtue. This section of the paper makes the case for this claim, beginning with a re-evaluation of the evidence for distinguishing between apparent virtue and social virtue.

The first reason considered above for distinguishing between apparent virtue and social virtue was that, whereas Socrates disparages the former, he seems to judge the latter favourably. This reason is not very persuasive, though, as these different evaluations are consistent with one another; Socrates can at the same time maintain that some person has a condition that is slavish *and* that that person is the happiest of all non-philosophers. In the context of his closing argument, Socrates says that apparent virtue is fit for a slave and is an image of true virtue in order for him to highlight the value of genuine virtue. In the Reprise, though, the relevant contrast is not between deficient virtue and genuine virtue but between non-philosophers with deficient virtue and non-philosophers who lack it. That is, in the Reprise, Socrates' point is that, given the pitiful state of non-philosophers, those with apparent virtue—despite its deficiency in comparison with genuine virtue—are still in a better condition than those who do not possess it.[23]

The second reason we considered for distinguishing between apparent virtue and social virtue was that Socrates says that the latter arises from habit and practice, but does not say the same about the former. This evidence is weak for two reasons. First, we cannot infer from different origins to different conditions.[24] Second, based on what Socrates says, it is likely that apparent virtue comes from habit and practice. Consider apparent temperance, the condition that enables a non-philosopher to forego pleasure in order, for instance, to avoid pain. Surely resisting pleasure requires

[22] Vasiliou (n. 1) sets out this view in detail (cf. I. Vasiliou, *Aiming at Virtue in Plato* [Cambridge, 2008], ch. 8, sections 2 and 3). Setting aside the fact that Vasiliou identifies apparent and social virtue, there is independent reason to resist his account. In particular, he maintains that the Phaedonic philosopher does not possess genuine virtue but instead social virtue (at 15–16, 24). However, at 83e4 Socrates explicitly says that philosophers *are* temperate and courageous, which suggests that they possess these, and presumably all other, virtues. Moreover, Socrates says that philosophers will join the gods after death (69c5–d6, 82b7–c2, 114c3), but that souls with social virtue are reincarnated (82b4).

[23] Further, Socrates only says that those with social virtue are the happiest (εὐδαιμονέστατοι) of non-philosophers. In Greek as well as in English, the claim that someone is the happiest member of some group is consistent with that person being unhappy. And given that Socrates has just claimed that a person can only be happy when she is with the divine, immortal and wise (81a4), he must not think that people with social virtue are happy. At *Grg.* 473d–e Socrates says that one miserable person cannot be happier than another. This indicates that Socrates does not think that people with social virtue are miserable. Indeed, at *Phd.* 90b1 Socrates says that very few people are wicked and therefore, presumably, few people are miserable. I thank the anonymous referee for calling my attention to this *Gorgias* passage.

[24] For instance, in the *Republic* there are two ways through which someone naturally inclined to philosophy can develop into a genuine philosopher: guidance from philosophical rulers in a well-ordered state or divine dispensation (*Resp.* 492e5–7).

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self-control, which is an ability that one must develop and train. And since not every non-philosopher has it,[25] and it does not come from wisdom, this ability to resist present pleasure and engage in an exchange of pleasures and pains must come from practice and habit. Hence, a proper understanding of apparent virtue suggests that, like social virtue, it comes from habit and practice.

So much then for the possibility that apparent and social virtue have different origins. But there is still the third reason above, namely that social virtue consists in true beliefs about the value of virtue. Although this is the strongest evidence for distinguishing between apparent virtue and social virtue, it misses the mark. For, despite employing similar vocabulary, there is good reason to doubt that the passages from the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* are concerned with the same state.

Let us begin with the condition that Glaucon in the *Republic* calls 'slavish'. Although Socrates applies similar language to apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*, there is reason to think that the conditions to which this language applies are not the same. As we know, apparent virtue in the *Phaedo* is characterized by exchanging bodily pleasures and pains. However, there is no independent indication that this is the case for the courage in this section of the *Republic*. The type of courage mentioned there is instead characterized by lack of education, in contrast to social courage, which is inculcated through education and the law.[26] Moreover, there is evidence in this passage of the *Republic* that Plato is thinking of rashness. For, in addition to saying that it is slavish, Glaucon also compares it to the courage found in animals. While such a description is notably absent from the *Phaedo* passage, it is present at *Lach.* 197b, where Nicias distinguishes between courage and rashness. For our purposes, it is significant that Nicias says that the latter is possessed by animals (as well as by children), but he does not appear to be ascribing to animals (or children) the hedonic calculus characteristic of apparent virtue.[27] More importantly, the very idea of rashness, which is characterized by haste and a lack of reflection, runs contrary to any sort of hedonic calculus, which requires consideration.[28] Furthermore, Nicias characterizes rashness as a condition that lacks sense (ἄνοια), not as a condition that aims at pleasure.[29] This is similar to what Glaucon says in the *Republic*, as he is talking

[25] Socrates refers to 'the courageous among them' and 'the temperate among them', which indicates that only some non-philosophers have apparent virtues. Thus, while some non-philosophers do exchange pleasures for other pleasures, others, perhaps most, do not. Bobonich (n. 1), 485 claims both that all non-philosophers engage in the wrong exchange and that this is sufficient for apparent virtue. But this incorrectly implies that all non-philosophers have apparent virtue. Even non-philosophers without apparent virtue give up certain pleasures by indulging in other pleasures. But they do not *exchange* (καταλλάσσω) any pleasures, which requires that one has the pleasures in hand and then trades them away, rather than simply losing out on them (cf. J. Bailly, 'Commentary on Beere', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 27 [2011], 289–300, at 296).

[26] See Kamtekar (n. 1), 318.

[27] He also reports that people confuse rashness for courage, which might be interpreted as an indication that the condition which Socrates identifies as what is called 'courage' in the *Phaedo* is rashness. However, this cannot be the case, since, as we have seen, what is called 'courage' applies (most) to those with genuine courage (philosophers), but Nicias claims that rashness opposes genuine courage.

[28] Moreover, actions such as facing death in order to protect cubs, which are popularly attributed to lions—one of the animals mentioned in the *Laches* discussion (196e3)—are not typically considered hedonistic. See also *Symp.* 207a5–c1, where animals are described as acting for the sake of love, willing to die and face starvation for their offspring.

[29] Socrates does say that apparent courage is illogical (ἄλογος, 68d11) in the *Phaedo*, but this is because it comes from its opposite rather than because it is senseless.

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about a condition mistaken for courage[30] that comes about without learning. Accordingly, although all three passages—from the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Laches*—discuss a condition mistaken for courage, the *Phaedo* discussion of apparent courage is the odd one out, differing as it does from the other two.[31]

Similarly, there are several reasons to doubt that social courage in the *Republic* passage maps onto social virtue in the *Phaedo*. One reason is that in the *Republic*, Socrates' qualification (πολιτικήν γε) of the condition referred to above as 'social courage' indicates that he is talking about the courage of the city (*polis*), in contrast to *human* courage. Indeed, at this point in the discussion in the *Republic* Socrates focusses on the virtues as they are manifested in the city.[32] So, when properly situated, the passage seems to suggest that Socrates means that social or, better yet in this context, civic courage is what makes a *city*, not an individual, courageous. However, since it is clear that the social virtue of the *Phaedo* belongs to individuals, it seems that it cannot be the same as the social/civic courage of this part of the *Republic*.

In response, one might argue that, although Socrates is referring to the courage of the city in this *Republic* passage, since it ultimately relies on the courage of the auxiliaries, he really does have in mind a sort of courage that resides in individuals. But even if this is so, there are still reasons to deny that social courage in the *Republic* is the same sort of virtue we find in the *Phaedo*. First, social courage in the *Republic* and Phaedonic social virtue differ with regard to how cognitive they are. As we have seen, in the *Republic* social courage results from education. But in the *Phaedo* social virtue results from habit and practice without understanding.[33] Thus, whereas social courage in the *Republic* necessarily has a cognitive element, this is not the case in the *Phaedo*, which suggests that they are different psychological conditions.

Another reason is that there does not seem to be any room for social courage in the *Phaedo*, as social virtue appears to be exhausted by what is called 'temperance' and 'justice'. Recall that Socrates says that social virtue is what is called 'temperance' and 'justice' (82b1). Thus he seems to restrict social virtue to some kind of temperance and justice. So, there does not appear to be the possibility of social courage in the *Phaedo*.

One might object that Socrates' omission of courage at *Phd.* 82d1 does not rule out a form of social courage comparable to social temperance and justice. However, there is good evidence from elsewhere in the corpus that social virtue in its primary sense is limited to temperance and justice. Perhaps the most striking and certainly the most extended example can be found in the *Protagoras* during Protagoras' 'Great Speech' (320c6–328d2). Throughout this speech Protagoras refers to temperance and justice as 'social virtue', but never mentions courage, as a virtue, as part of social virtue.[34]

[30] Glaucon claims that he is sure that Socrates does not make this mistake, which implies that others do.

[31] Plato's view need not be inconsistent across the three passages, as the mistake may well lie with the many who have an incoherent conception of courage (cf. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 3.8).

[32] See Kamtekar (n. 1), 318 n. 7 and D. Sedley, 'Socratic intellectualism in the *Republic*'s central digression', in G. Boys-Stones, D. El Murr and C. Gill (edd.), *The Platonic Art of Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2013), 70–89, at 84–5 n. 25.

[33] In the Myth of Er at the end of the *Republic* Socrates mentions people who 'participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy' (619d1). Vasiliou (n. 1), 9 takes this to be the same sort of state as referred to as 'social courage' at 430b. However, given that in the Myth of Er these people participate in virtue through habit, it seems more likely that they are the people with social virtue in the *Phaedo* (cf. Barney [n. 8], 120).

[34] He mentions cowardice but only to say that it is avoided by keeping one's body fit (326c1).

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Thus Protagoras' understanding of social virtue, which Socrates never challenges, seems limited to temperance and justice.

If we turn to the end of Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* we find something similar. Diotima does not explicitly identify temperance and justice with social virtue, but she does characterize them as dealing with the proper ordering of cities and households (209a5), which is how Protagoras identifies social virtue prior to his speech (319a1). Thus there seems to be agreement across the *Protagoras* and the *Symposium* regarding social virtue, in particular in identifying it with forms of temperance and justice. It is also worth pointing out that, at the end of her speech, Diotima contrasts this social virtue with the genuine virtue of the philosopher. In fact, she implies that the social virtue of the best non-philosophers is an image of virtue (212a4, εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς), which is similar to what Socrates says about apparent virtue, calling it σκιαγραφία of true virtue. Thus in the *Symposium* Plato unflatteringly describes social virtue—again limited to temperance and justice—in the same way that he describes apparent virtue in the *Phaedo*.

By investigating these two passages from other dialogues,[35] we see that Plato restricts social virtue to temperance and justice. Thus we have reason to think that Plato is employing this same notion of social virtue in the *Phaedo*, where it is once again limited to temperance and justice. This, in turn, gives us good reason to think that the discussion of social/civic courage in the *Republic* differs from the discussion of social virtue in the *Phaedo*. As a result, this passage from the *Republic* does not provide us with evidence that Plato distinguishes between apparent virtue and social virtue in the *Phaedo*. Thus there is no support for this reading of deficient virtue in the dialogue.

With its rival position dispatched, we can turn to positive evidence for my interpretation that social virtue is a species of apparent virtue, in particular apparent temperance and justice. In short, the Reprise provides definitive support for my reading. This is because just after introducing social virtue Socrates mentions money lovers and honour lovers, and contrasts their motivations for controlling bodily desires (that is, performing temperate actions) with the motivations of philosophers. Recall that previously Socrates claimed that money lovers and honour lovers are species of body lovers. Moreover, he claimed that all non-philosophers are body lovers. Thus, whether they are money lovers or honour lovers, people with social virtue must be body lovers. Thus even those people with social virtue perform temperate actions in order to exchange bodily pleasures and pains, which is precisely what Socrates indicates in the Reprise. And, as we know, in his closing argument Socrates identifies apparent virtue as dealing with the exchange of bodily experiences for other bodily experiences. So, because social virtue is characterized by this very same exchange, it must be the case that social virtue is the same as, or at least a species of, apparent virtue.[36]

[35] Cf. *Resp.* 500d5, where Socrates refers to 'temperance, justice and the whole of δημοτικῆς virtue'. Recall that in the *Phaedo* Socrates employs the same word when identifying social virtue (τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν). Thus even in the *Republic* Plato appears to limit 'social virtue' to temperance and justice. See C. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge, 1996), 217–18, 223 and A. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford, 1960).

[36] See T. Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford, 1977), 162, 322 and Irwin (n. 21), 235 n. 16. Irwin (n. 21), 384 also argues that social virtue is a superior species of apparent virtue. As we shall see, there does not seem to be any space for this view in the *Phaedo*.

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And since we know that social virtue is what people call 'temperance' and 'justice', we can conclude that social virtue is apparent temperance and justice.[37]

4. AN ACCOUNT OF APPARENT VIRTUE

According to what Socrates says in his closing argument and the Reprise, social virtue is a species of apparent virtue. Thus in the *Phaedo* apparent virtue is the only form of deficient virtue. This means that the only form of virtue open to non-philosophers is based on a hedonic calculation. Before ending, I want to develop a more complete characterization of apparent virtue.

My particular interest here is whether people with apparent virtue can be motivated by virtue or believe that their actions are virtuous. Because, as we have seen, all non-philosophers are body lovers, and consequently are motivated only by bodily pleasure and pain, they would never be motivated by virtue itself.[38] Simply put, non-philosophers do not think that virtue is intrinsically valuable; therefore, virtue alone cannot motivate them. But might a non-philosopher value virtue instrumentally? That is, could a non-philosopher value virtue in so far as she believed that virtue maximizes pleasure, at least in the long term? If so, then a person with apparent virtue could believe an action is virtuous and perform it on account of that belief.

In order to determine whether or not this is a live possibility, we must recall the two points made about what is called 'virtue' at the end of §1.1. First, non-philosophers have a superficial conception of virtue, which focusses on actions but misses out on what virtue really is. Thus, because they do not grasp what virtue is, a non-philosopher could think that an action is virtuous without that thought in itself providing her any motivation to act. Accordingly, it is certainly possible that some people with apparent virtue could believe that their actions are virtuous, though such beliefs in themselves would not motivate them.

The second point is that there must be a consensus among non-philosophers about what virtue is. Given that at least most non-philosophers call the same actions 'courageous' and the same actions 'temperate', there is widespread agreement about what these virtues are.[39] Thus, in general, non-philosophers will recognize when someone performs virtuous or vicious actions. And for this reason it seems that people with apparent virtue would have to consider whether a prospective action is virtuous/vicious when they do their hedonic calculation. After all, painful legal punishments or negative social repercussions could follow any vicious action. Thus, in order to engage in profitable exchanges, people with apparent virtue would have to be sensitive to what is called 'virtue' and would typically have to act in accordance with what they believe is virtuous. So, it is not only possible that people with apparent virtue believe that their actions are virtuous and that they value virtue instrumentally, both must be the norm among them.

[37] One might wonder why Socrates thinks that those with social virtue in particular (and not apparent virtue in general) are the happiest non-philosophers. The most likely explanation is that Socrates thinks that there is not a unity of apparent virtue and that those who only possess apparent courage are more likely to act viciously than those with apparent temperance and justice.

[38] *Pace* Bobonich (n. 1), 17 (cf. Kraut [n. 1], 55).

[39] In light of this agreement, it seems that non-philosophers are not subjectivists. Indeed, although they are hedonistic and take pleasure as the standard of value, they do not seem to think that their own pleasure determines what is virtuous.

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If this is correct, then there seem to be striking similarities between apparent virtue and Epicurus' view of virtue that go beyond hedonism. We know from his extant works and from reports of his view that Epicurus advised honouring virtues only if they brought pleasure but abandoning them if they did not.[40] Further, Epicureans portrayed the virtues as slaves to pleasure, with the sole function of guarding a person against pain or of alerting her when a potential action might have negative social consequences.[41] Despite this disdainful attitude toward virtues, Epicurus thought that one should always perform the just action, believing that one could never be completely confident that her injustice would remain concealed.[42] Thus, on his view, virtue is not intrinsically valuable, but is instrumentally valuable, in particular, in helping one to avoid pain. It seems to me that this is the very sort of attitude that Plato attributes to the best of the non-philosophers in the *Phaedo*, namely those with apparent virtue.[43]

So, Plato attributes to non-philosophers a sophisticated form of deficient virtue in the *Phaedo*. But what does he think about those people who possess it? Based on what we have seen, Plato does not have a wholly negative view of those with apparent virtue, despite his appraisal of this condition in comparison with genuine virtue. To begin, people with apparent virtue generally avoid vicious action and perform virtuous actions. Although they do not act for the correct reasons, this does not make their actions worthless.[44] After all, whatever their reasons, people with apparent virtue can typically be counted on to do the right thing in many situations, especially in a city with enforcement of decent laws. And those with social virtue in particular can be counted on to contribute to the harmony of the city. Moreover, the apparently virtuous act well because of something about themselves, namely a certain kind of control over their passions. However, by locating value only in the bodily, no matter how much control they have over their passions or how many virtuous actions they perform, non-philosophers can at best have only deficient virtue.[45]

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[40] See A. Long and D. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume 1: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary* (Cambridge, 2007), 21M.

[41] Long and Sedley (n. 40), 21O.

[42] Long and Sedley (n. 40), 22A.

[43] This is not meant to deny that there are significant differences between the hedonism in the *Phaedo* and Epicurus' view. For instance, unlike Epicurus, the body lovers in the *Phaedo* do not identify pleasure as the absence of pain or recognize the existence of intellectual pleasure.

[44] Indeed, decent non-philosophical souls are rewarded in the afterlife for their good actions while embodied (113e1).

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