the case of Plato, the aporetic dialectician *par excellence*. Although he pays lip-service to the literary nature of Plato's dialogues, B. tends to neglect the implications of their dialogical character for interpreting Platonic philosophy.

Finally, one can hardly fail to notice that B. provides very sparse bibliographical references to publications in French, German, Italian, and Spanish, thereby lending credence to the rather unfair European jibe about all Americans being monoglots. However, he does make a few references to analytical scholars publishing in French and German, who are privileged to be included within his citation cartel. We might well contrast such parochialism with the American tradition of scholarship in the first half of the twentieth century, as represented by Shorey and Cherniss, when one could count on extensive references to the scholarly literature in all of the major European languages. By contrast, the contemporary analytical tradition in ancient philosophy at American universities has become a curiously insular affair. A telling example of this is that, while B. is very careful about his gender language, he obviously feels that it is quite all right to ignore most of the work of scholars in modern languages other than English.

Boston College/National University of Ireland, Maynooth JOHN J. CLEARY
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni242

PLATONIC ANGER

J. FRÈRE: *Ardeur et colère. Le* thumos *platonicien*. Pp. 213. Paris: Kimé, 2004. Paper, €21. ISBN: 2-84174-342-X.

Frère's work on the history of Greek psychology and the concept of *thumos* comprises three parts: 'Avant Platon' (pp. 13–89), 'Les philosophes préplatoniciens' (pp. 91–106), and 'Platon' (pp. 107–93). Apart from the 'Introduction générale' (pp. 7–9), the book contains a bibliography and an 'Index sélectif des mots grecs', which are given in the book in their Latin transcription. The footnotes are at the end of each part.

F's basic contention is that: 'c'est avec Platon que ce dualisme du *thumos* sera élaboré de façon tout à fait originale en fonction de la théorie de l'âme tripartite . . .' (p. 9) and that *thumos* is the substrate responsible for 'multiples émotions' (p. 16). F. concludes that:

> Chez Platon le *thumos* n'est plus qu'une partie de l'âme, mais la plus essentielle peut-être, plus essentielle même que le *logos* ou du moins aussi essentielle que le *logos*—principe de tous les agirs, c'est-à-dire de tous les combats . . . La grande nouveauté de Platon, c'est d'avoir donné au *thumos* une place privilégiée et centrale dans l'âme, celle d'un pouvoir personnel de réalisation . . . (pp. 187–8)

The first and second parts, taken together, are longer than the third part, which concerns Plato as given in the title. Insofar as their aim is to reconstruct the sources of the Platonic concept of *thumos*, the title of the book is somewhat misleading (a better title is to be found on p. 54: 'La place et le rôle du *thumos* en Grèce'). Alongside delineating the development of the meaning of *thumos* in Greek culture, F.'s book contains valuable insights, but these tend to be isolated and scattered, e.g. 'les Grecs ont hiérarchisé les grandes orientations du psychisme' (p. 7), the distinction 'entre principes de l'affectivité (thumos, phrên, kardia)' and 'modes de l'affectivité (peur,

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https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni243 Published online by Cambridge University Press

joie, audace)' (p. 63), emphasis on 'une tripartition hiérarchique' (p. 110), 'un pouvoir de maîtrise de soi (*thumos*)' (p. 170), or 'comme Platon oppose sain intellect et intellect imparfait et confus, il oppose désormais *thumos* hardi et mesuré, partie médiande de l'âme à *thumos* sans frein, partie dégradée ou pathos' (p. 174). Its multi-dimensional perspective, shading (e.g. six meanings of *thumos* in Homer which F. terms 'modalités', pp. 15–25; elsewhere F. writes of 'partie de l'âme', 'attribut de l'âme', 'orientation', 'activité', 'fonction', 'pouvoir', 'versant', 'substrat', 'principe'), and its taking up of a neglected theme, are the book's unquestioned strengths.

However, the reviewer cannot pass over the presentation and the editorial layout of the book. The unclear construction of the book cannot fail to be noticed: are 'Les philosophes préplatoniciens' any different from 'Avant Platon' and can they be limited to Heraclitus, Parmenides or Democritus? What about Epicharmus, Empedocles or Antiphon? What is the function of deliberations on *phrên* in Homer (pp. 25–27) or Aeschylus (pp. 58–60)?

F. also confuses perspectives: he writes of levels ('niveaux'), which he understands in a horizontal and not vertical manner as 'plan d'ordre intellectuel' (p. 53). F. uses the words 'sentiments', 'émotions', 'passions' interchangeably, together or distinctly (e.g. p. 63, p. 65, p. 145, p. 177, p. 180). In addition, how is one to distinguish between 'la colère rationnelle', 'la colère non raisonnée', 'colères irraisonnées ou déraisonnables' (p. 177)? Certain concepts also are fluid, including the central concept of *thumos*: '*thumos* "cœur en colère" ' (p. 49), ' "cœur ardent" qu'est le cœur du poète (*thumos*)' (p. 48), 'cœur ardent (*thumos*)', '*thumos* ardent' (p. 50), 'cœur ardent (*huperthumos*)' (p. 52), 'colère ardente (*thumos*)' (p. 79), '*thumos*-ardeur' (p. 111). And what is the difference between: 'l'erôs-cheval blanc' and: 'le cheval blanc-erôs' (p. 161)?

Recurrent weaknesses of argument are also apparent (e.g. the analysis of the concept of *euthumia* in Democritus [pp. 102–5] is based on references to Cicero, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius and the only references to the writings of Democritus himself are frr. B3 and B189). The style of some of the conclusions reached without any academic analysis can be irritating (e.g. concerning the meaning of *thumos* in Heraclitus, p. 92). His intellectual short cuts are also opaque, especially where the author reaches false conclusions by their means (e.g. in n. 10 on p. 190 he omits *Iliad* 6.51). Short cuts are also evident in the composition of the text (e.g. the title of the subchapter on p. 29 is four lines long), and in certain expressions (e.g. 'domaine des sentiments affectueux' on p. 31, p. 71: 'C'est *pathos* comme la peur est *pathos*, comme l'espoir est *pathos*, comme audace est *pathos*', or n. 10 on p. 21). His criticism of the work of A. Cheyns lacks foundation (n. 6 on p. 86, despite the fact that in nn. 8 and 9 on pp. 86–7 F. makes use of his analysis)—and in his criticism of A. Rivaud the lack of any reference means that it is not evident which part of his work is being discussed. His convincing and correct criticisms of B. Snell are made in a completely different fashion (n. 3 on p. 86). F. has also included long series of summaries (e.g. pp. 45–7: the contents of Pindar's *Second Olympian*), chains of quotes (e.g. p. 84: from Euripides' *Medea*, p. 181: from Plato's *Republic* and *Phaedo*) or lists (p. 61: *thumos* in Aeschylus) and essays on the history of literature (e.g. p. 75 is an introduction to the work of Euripides).

Inconsistencies of style, typography and transcription also make reading very difficult (I shall only give a few examples in view of the length of the review, but they amount to a drop in the ocean). You encounter: psychê (p. 7)—psuchê (p. 104)—*psychê* (p. 110)—*psyché* (p. 146); noûs (p. 114)—'noûs' (p. 114)—nous (p. 96); Eros (p. 34)—Erôs (p. 160); zôon (p. 155)—zôôn (p. 159); le *thumos* (passim)—thymiques (p. 36); l'hybris (p. 120)—l'*hubris* (p. 133); 'dunamis'

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(p. 133)—dynamis (p. 170); random use of italics (p. 33: *Thumos* et Eris, p. 39: Les *Travaux et les Jours*, on p. 98: *Pindar* in italics suggests it is a title, just like 'l'*Iliade*' and 'l'*Odyssée*'), capital letters (p. 92: le Vrai et le Juste but p. 105: le vrai et le juste, Le *Turannos* (p. 137) but le tyran and le Tyran (p. 140), l'ardeur (p. 120) but l'Ardeur (p. 122), on p. 193: VERNANT the only name throughout the notes to be written in capitals), inconsistency in interpretation of grammatical gender (le *phrên* (passim) but la *sunesis* (p. 117)), typographical style (À (p. 72) but A (p. 101), sometimes oe, and sometimes œ (p. 81)) or omission of quotation marks (l'ardeur tourmentée' (p. 68), l'âme (p. 71)), as well as erroneous word division (p. 46: obs- ervateur, p. 131: retro- uvent etc.) and typing errors (p. 21: *kradiê kait thumos*, p. 36: noûs (instead of nous), p. 37: toutte, p. 61: Porthumeisthai, p. 78: m'on, p. 87: seonde, p. 93: thumô (whereas on p. 102: thumôi), p. 95: acérée ne contestation, p. 178, esentielle, p. 191: vuc- toire, etc.—typing errors can also be found in quotes taken from translations). The structure of the composition is heterogeneous with the titles of sections, subsections and subsubsections given in different formats. Quote references are sometimes given in the body of the text and sometimes in the footnotes (e.g. p. 49). Note 19 on p. 102 is empty. I shall pass over other editorial errors in the layout such as the omission of indentations, spaces, double spaces, lack of line spacing etc. The bibliography contains errors, e.g. LONIE, P.M., Medical History, XVII, 1973 (p. 198, the title of the article on p. 192, but without page number and with a typing error: *hearth*) or LAURENTI, R., 'L'euthumia di Democrito', Seneca, Sic. Gymn., 33, 1987 (p. 198, on p. 106 the title of the article and page number are correct, but the year of publication is wrong).

It is difficult to tell whether the above shortcomings are the result of incompetence on the part of the publisher/editors or a clumsy style on the part of the author (the fact that the price given on their web page differs from that which figures on the book's cover suggests the former). It is a shame that in F.'s work interesting insights are overcast by their negligent presentation. It is to be hoped that this should not lead to its mistaken marginalization as has happened with F.'s *Les Grecs et le désir de l'être. Des Préplatoniciens à Aristote* (1981), which, if *L'Année Philologique* is to be believed, had only one review. M. R. Wright concluded this review as follows: '. . . a topic that causes some unease, and so tends quietly to be ignored' (*CR* 33 [1983], 242). In the case of *Ardeur et courage*, this remark could unfortunately be extended to the form of the book as well. Perhaps, therefore, the editorial work should be corrected and this inspiring work should be published once again.

Institute for the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

ROBERT ZABOROWSKI

doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni243

EMOTIONS IN PLATO

L. PALUMBO: Eros, Phobos, Epithymia. *Sulla natura dell'emozione in alcuni dialoghi di Platone*. Pp. 111. Naples: Loffredo Editore, 2001. Paper, €11.36. ISBN: 88-8096-819-X.

P.'s work concerns the rarely analysed topic of feelings and emotionality in ancient philosophy in the period up to Plato. Because P. focuses on Plato, her study may be treated as a supplement to the analyses of B. Williams, who reveals his dislike of Plato (*Shame and Necessity* [Berkeley, 1993], e.g. p. 155). P. aims to analyse the conditions applying to

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https://doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni243 Published online by Cambridge University Press