Part I.—Original Articles.

PSYCHO-PATHOLOGY AND THE HERD-INSTINCT.

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"Read much, conclude little."

Introduction.

Without psychology there can be no psycho-pathology; and any advance that psycho-pathology may have made from time to time has in no small measure depended on corresponding progress previously achieved in the realm of psychology. The reason why psycho-pathology made little headway until comparatively recently may be found in the unfruitfulness—from a medical point of view—of classical psychology.

Whether one considers the structuralist or the functionalist schools one cannot help being struck by the barrenness of their psychology when applied to living individuals. "Living," because the whole of psychological theory appears so "dead," so inanimate when equated with the living creatures whose conduct it is supposed to explain; "individuals," because classical psychology is but an abstraction based upon average minds, an abstraction descriptive of just those characteristics and processes that are not individual but are, on the contrary, factors common to all. This studying of mind—whether as a sum of mental items or as a series of mental acts succeeding one another—is incapable of yielding an explanation of human conduct, nor can it account for anything more than the similarity between one mental life and another. But from our point of view as physicians, what we require is a system that will explain just those differences that do occur, those discrepancies between "individual" and "average" conduct that are the starting-point for psycho-pathological inquiry.

One may say that a great deal of useful ground was cleared by the older psychologies, but that no living, reacting and adjusting mind could profitably be viewed merely as a particular grouping of ideas

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or as a particular sequence of faculties being put into play. It required the addition of two new concepts—or shall we say a greater application of them—to fertilize the accumulated dogmas of classical psychology.

A. The first of these concepts was that of mental energy, based upon a more active, dynamic view of nature (including mind), and resulting in the various doctrines of instinct. It became increasingly recognized that no grouping of "ideas" could ever have any compelling value, or that the various "faculties" could be brought into play, without, behind it all, some state of need, of tension, some urge definitely requiring expression.

B. The other concept was the one embodying the idea of struggle, or inner stress, in fact, of conflict; the behaviour of the human organism being regarded as a resultant of conflicting trends rather than as an expression of single and successive urges. It is true that conflict had already been put forward by Herbart, but as occurring between ideas and not between instincts.

There have been many views concerning the nature, *rôle* and number of instincts, acting as the prime movers of conduct; and in many of these, place has been found for the concept of a herd-instinct or instinct of gregariousness, though it has been variously defined and equally variously applied.

Now, if such an instinct be really one of the springs of human action, one of the factors accounting for normal conduct, then it may well be asked whether this instinct should not be brought into greater prominence than hitherto in the explanations offered for abnormal behaviour. If, on the other hand, the existence of this instinct be an assumption not sufficiently supported by evidence, then perhaps it should be denied even the small place accorded it by some writers in the production of mental derangement.

As a small contribution towards indicating the ways in which a much needed reconsideration of the question might be undertaken, we shall refer to a few of the difficulties associated with the subject of instinct, and then proceed to review the main conceptions current in applied psychology in reference to a possible "herd-instinct." Next, a glance will be given to the standard authors on psychiatry and psycho-pathology in order to see to what extent a herd-instinct is recognized by them, the light in which they consider it, and the application—if any—which they make of it. If such a survey reveals that the position of a herd-instinct in psycho-pathology is so obscure and uncertain as to require further consideration, then it will become incumbent upon us to examine more

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closely the grounds on which the theory of a herd-instinct rests, and perhaps even discuss briefly some other sociological theories relevant to our problem, in order to formulate some tentative conclusions for future guidance.

Instincts and Psycho-pathology.

1. It is not an easy task to assess the exact value of instincts in psycho-pathology, because such widely divergent views are held on the subject that the whole question bristles with difficulties. For one thing, it is only very recently that any serious attempt has been made to separate intuition from instinct; by some the two are regarded as distinct from one another, by others the former is made a derivative of the latter. Intuition was considered by Descartes as "intelligent instinct"; that kind of instinct that is peculiar to thinking Man as compared with the instinct which he shares with the lower animals, and the same concept reappears in Driesch's psychology under the guise of "entelechy." Jung defines intuition as "instinctive apprehension"; Diblee calls it "extra-conscious thinking," further dividing it into primary intuition and intuition after reflection. Where instinct ends or becomes intuition, and the relation of the latter to intelligence, is very far from clear; and though Burrow has recently tried to shed some light on the subject, it has been at the cost of creating further complications. All we can do at present is to realize the insecurity and confusion still to be found in the delineation of instinct, and be accordingly cautious in our acceptance of theories.

Some authors write of "Instinct," whereas others describe a number of separate "instincts." Similarly, those who emphasize the behaviour aspect may only recognize "instinctive behaviour" in general, or else they define and enumerate specific "instinctive acts." Instinct, which to Watson appears merely as a tendency to habit-formation, has been defined by James as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends and without previous education in the performance." Lloyd Morgan, however describes instinctive behaviour ,and says it comprises "those complex groups of co-ordinated acts which though they contribute to experience are on their first occurrence not determined by individual experience; which are adaptive, and tend to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the race . . . which are similarly performed by all members of the group,

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but are subject to variation and subsequent modification." With this definition many other authorities, *e. g.*, Hobhouse, are in general agreement. The objection must be noted, however, that the words " performed by all members of a group " debar any classification of behaviour from being applied to an isolated individual. Moreover, the definition gives prominence to the evaluation—always difficult —of what constitutes the well-being of an individual, and this must depend on the judgment of the observer, a variable factor that should be kept well in mind.

Shand takes a purely motor view of instinct, without recognizing definite instinctive trends, and bases his description upon an enumeration and classification of such single acts as can be performed instinctively. Thorndike's approach is very similar. The actual cause of such acts is regarded by some (*e. g.*, Rigano) as a biological memory or, following Semon, in the light of " inherited engrams."

2. Of far greater importance in psycho-pathology, and made of much moment in several psychiatric text-books, are the views of McDougall on instinct. He considers all instinctive activity as due to a number of innate trends, the instincts, which he groups according to the general nature of the acts which they prompt and the result that is immediately achieved. He views these trends under three aspects: the cognitive or perceptual, involving the fact that each instinct is aroused by a particular kind of situation; the affective, relating to the specific emotion that is felt when each instinct is aroused; and the conative, in reference to the actions performed. In his scheme there are some twelve specified instincts that are the prime movers of behaviour, to which are added a few general " innate tendencies " such as sympathy and suggestion.

More comprehensive still, though probably less sound psychologically, are the views of the French and allied schools, who multiply the number of instincts to an extreme degree. We might instance how Renan speaks of a political instinct, of an instinct of organization, or an instinct of copying; or Jastrow's assumption of a religious instinct, and so on. If specific affective feelings do accompany specific instincts, or are part of them, then recognition of such a large variety of instincts implies a correspondingly more numerous listing of emotions. It is true that language may be inadequate for expressing more emotions and that a richer vocabulary might assist finer shades of difference between emotions to be defined. Interestingly enough, the Fijians have eleven different words to describe all that we include under the one term " fear."

But to return to McDougall's form of instinct theory. In

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modern psycho-pathology instincts have been made considerable use of in connection with "mental mechanisms." It is common knowledge how an instinct is said to be (1) suppressed or (2) repressed; how further possible fates may befall an instinct, such as (3) regression, (4) canalization, or (5) deflection. To these common ones notable additions have been suggested, for instance by Bovet, who recognizes (6) objectivation, satisfaction in witnessing an act instead of performing it, (7) subjectivation, becoming the object of action instead of the doer, as when sadism turns into masochism, and (8) platonization, consisting of the mental consideration of the desired act without actual performance of it. These conceptions have been largely accepted (though often under different names) by psycho-pathologists, as well as by several sociological writers. Graham Wallas, for example, lays some stress on "baulked dispositions" leading to mental instability.

Among the instincts enumerated by McDougall is the herd-instinct or "instinct of gregariousness." He conceives this merely as an urge towards grouping, adding that it reinforces other instincts; in his later works, however, an implication appears that he regards this instinct as tending not only towards the formation of groups, but also towards their organization. He does not, be it noted, go as far as committing himself to any statement whether the forms of organization are instinctively determined or not. This instinct receives marked emphasis from McDougall, and yet when it comes to his theories of society, he seems to make but little use of it.

3. Very different from McDougall's classification are the schemes we must now consider; in contrast with the "multiple instincts" view just described, these are characterized by the fewness of the instincts enumerated and the breadth of their delineation.

First we have the Freudians who regard all behaviour, instinctive or otherwise, as due to either (1) ego urge or (2) sex urge. And then there are some later writers, such as Tansley, who would add (3) herd urge. Here then we have human conduct accounted for by three main urges only, these urges being recognized according to their ultimate goal and results (not their immediate, as with McDougall) and subserving respectively the ego-needs, the sex-needs and the herd-needs. These instincts appear as very broad trends, compared with the narrow and limited instincts of McDougall, and might in contrast to the latter be said to be deferred in their ends. We must recognize that whereas some authors speak of these three urges as specific and indivisible trends, others have been inclined to regard them as capable of being split up into smaller components,

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as when Freud himself speaks of sexual instincts or of instincts-inhibited-in-their-aims.

Perhaps the best position to adopt is to conceive of McDougall's instincts not as constituting three main urges but as working in their service. For instance, the instinct of pugnacity is not part of any one of these three urges, but it may work for the furtherance of each in turn; at one moment it may be tending to an end that is ultimately egoistic, or it might be furthering sexual needs, or again it might be leading to social results. In other words, the three primal needs of the race may enlist in turn any and every one of McDougall's "instincts" for their ultimate satisfaction.

A strong point in favour of this "broad" view is that it seems to give more meaning and fullness to human behaviour; it represents the organism as responding more as a whole than when its acts are split up into unitary parts and these ascribed to that or the other narrow instinct. The unfortunate fact is that some writers designate these broad trends by the same term "instinct" that is used by, say, the followers of McDougall to describe narrow tendencies. In fact, much of the misunderstanding of Freud has been due to what he calls sex being considered as a narrow instinct, largely dormant when not aroused by specific stimuli, and one leading merely to single acts of reproduction; whereas sex should, in accordance with Freud's views, be regarded as a broad urge, a state of tension, leading the individual to seek all situations in which he can behave in ways that ultimately lead to the preservation of the race.

It seems to me very likely that the regarding of instincts in the narrow way, as trends that become evident only in presence of specific stimuli and which in their absence remain presumably in a merely potential state, is what has led certain psycho-pathologists to emphasize the importance of precipitating causes in the production of mental derangement. Correspondingly, the viewing of instincts in a broad way, as urges leading to states of prolonged tension, states that require relief even in absence of related stimuli and therefore force their possessor to seek situations appropriate to an expression of such urges, is the reason why other psycho-pathologists have so stressed the predisposing cause in mental disorder.

Some criticisms of this broad classification into two or three fundamental urges, and a few constructive suggestions, will be offered in a later section; but first we have to consider—in order to dismiss them—two of the misleading and unjustifiable ways in which the term "herd-instinct" has been used by some authors.

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4. The term " herd " or " gregarious " has been applied not only to the tendency toward gregariousness but also to (*a*) those trends that are especially apt to show themselves *in* gregariousness and (*b*) those innate tendencies that *assist* or maintain gregariousness and the formation of groups, but which achieve this result so to speak incidentally and which cannot be regarded as urging directly towards, or finding complete satisfaction in such group formations. That is, trends that work to many more ends than that of producing a single group.

The former trends (*a*) that show themselves in gregariousness have caused no little confusion in psycho-pathological description, and will be referred to again in connection with psychiatry. Those of group (*b*) have been variously classified by numerous authors who either fail to distinguish them sharply from the herd-instinct proper, or else are using terms in ways different from other writers. For instance, Rivers emphasizes the sociological importance of suggestion, and he recognizes it under three aspects, cognitive, affective, and conative. Thus we may have suggestion of an idea, of an emotion, or of an action. McDougall, however, reserves " suggestion " for the cognitive aspect only and terms the suggestion of emotions " sympathy," and the suggestion of actions " imitation." (The sympathy here referred to is, of course, " primitive passive sympathy," not the active sympathy which—according to Bain—leads directly to altrusim.) Again the French schools (*e. g.*, Tarde) use the word " imitation " as Rivers does " suggestion," in order to cover the " suggestion," the " sympathy " and the " imitation " of McDougall. As an example of another description of gregarious instincts in this misleading sense we might quote Bartlett's classification into comradeship, assertiveness, submissiveness, construction and conservation, this last being probably another name for Murphy's " fatigue " factor. All these are trends that may be useful to gregariousness, or may result from gregariousness, but they do not tend towards gregariousness.

After this short mention of the ways in which we shall not use the terms " herd-instinct " or " gregarious instinct," we should now proceed to enumerate the attitude of representative psychiatrists towards this instinct, noting the extent to which it has been admitted by them, and the possible application they may have made of it in psycho-pathology; paying regard also to the way in which they conceive it, as narrow or broad, immediate or deferred.

5. The first thing we notice when reading standard books on psychiatry and psycho-pathology is the divergence of the views

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expressed. Coupled with this are two other outstanding features, namely, the tendency to ignore the more precise definitions of scientific psychology, and the failure to avoid too facile generalizations.

It is evidently impossible for us to discuss in detail all the various schools of psychiatry, and we shall have to rest content with a brief survey of the views enunciated by some of the representative authors.

Storring in his lectures on mental pathology hardly refers to instincts at all, nor does Marr; Mott seems to have little use for them, Pierce is equally silent, and Ross in his book on neuroses does not define or stress instincts any more than Hollingworth does. Koffka, the leading representative of the Gestalt school regards instincts as mere chain reflexes; he emphasizes more particularly the kind of instinctive movements performed, and speaks of such instincts as those of cleanliness, adornment, walking, etc. Koehler has much the same outlook.

Cole, in his text-book, describes two instincts, calling them the desire to live and the desire to reproduce; a rather unfortunate terminology, as the idea of reproduction is not, in the primitive mind, necessarily associated with sex (see Malinowski). Craig follows Cole closely, but mentions "derived instincts." Saxby speaks of impulses and inherited engrams rather than of instincts, and denies the presence of gregariousness. Macnamara refers to instinct in general and specifies instinctive actions, but not separate instincts. Hamilton's book on psycho-pathology treats of responses rather from the behaviouristic standpoint, adopts very objective methods, and links on to Kempf's attempts at the "autonomic" interpretations of urges and major cravings.

The Freudian school, of course recognizes two groups, the ego instinct and the sexual instinct. Trotter agrees, but adds a herd-instinct in a broad sense. He regards the herd-instinct as the equivalent of Freud's "censorship," (though as a matter of fact it more nearly corresponds to the "reality principle"). Trotter's herd-instinct is really comparable to Wallas's "social heritage," and it cannot be too emphatically pointed out that Trotter is not describing an actual instinct at all, but a "community attitude." As Gordon says, this instinct is not made to appear, in this view, as a reaction of the individual, caused by instinct, for it merely designates the influence of the community on the individual. This point seems to have been missed by many (*e. g.*, Crichton Miller) who have incorporated Trotter's views with their own. Hart follows Trotter to some extent, and is inclined to trace some forms of mental disorder to the repression of the so-called herd-instinct.

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Rivers agrees with the three-fold scheme, and does make use of the herd-instinct in his psycho-pathology, as when he describes shell-shock as a compromise between ego- and herd-instincts. Sometimes, however, he uses instead of the herd-instinct, the concept of duty as conflicting with the ego trend, considering the sense of duty as a direct outcome of the herd-instinct. This is evidently very debatable.

Tansley gives extensive consideration to the herd-instinct, still in the broad sense, and includes the tendency to gregariousness within it. Suggestibility he ascribes to this tendency towards gregariousness and not—as has been done by others—to the fact of gregariousness. He evinces the old fault of arguing from animals direct to Man. The affective side of this instinct, he thinks, is the feeling of desire to be one with the herd; surely a highly organized concept to be associated with a primitive instinct. He goes on to ascribe the discomfort consequent upon disobeying moral law as due to disobeying the promptings of the herd-instinct, and he describes conflicts occurring between ego and herd, and between sex and herd tendencies. Further criticism, however, is unnecessary in view of the way he uses the term herd-complex as interchangeable with herd-instinct, and in a sense that would agree neither with Freud's nor with Jung's definitions of a complex.

McCurdy resembles Rivers in his views but recognizes narrow instincts too, grouping them under the three heads of ego, sex and herd. Stanford Read mentions a herd-instinct in a vague way; but Culpin, whose viewpoint is similar to Read's, goes rather farther, and definitely postulates a weak herd-instinct as a factor in the production of neuroses.

Stoddart recognizes four main instincts—self-nutrition, self-preservation, sex and herd. This last he describes as "a desire to comply with the wishes and customs of society," and says it is a true instinct. According to this definition it might be anything except a true instinct; the same criticism might be made here as we suggested earlier, against the describing of primitive trends in terms of highly evolved concepts; the simple savage has no instinct to obey society, and the obedience which he evinces may well be due to self-preservation against the punishment for disobedience. It is to this herd-instinct that Stoddart ascribes such traits as modesty and shame, but all through his account he is sketchy and vague and does not seem to draw any sharp distinction between the broad and narrow conceptions of instincts. Norman admits three main urges in a broad way, but makes no

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further use of them except to describe what he calls their perversions. Yellowlees uses the term "herd-instinct" for describing the influence of the herd on the individual, being thus in a safe position for showing how most instincts may conflict with the herd one, but points out that his use of the term, though perhaps inaccurate, enables him to avoid certain complications in his description of mental mechanisms. Henderson and Gillespie recognize the instincts of nutrition and of sex, and as the "so-called herd-instinct" certain later acquired reactions. Their application of it is very limited.

Cobb admits Freud in parts, and mentions conflicts of instincts, but without strictly defining them. Mainly does he emphasize the affective force of fear, anger, resentment and jealousy, thus approaching the narrow conception of multiple instincts. Platt recognizes several instincts and, incidentally, nearly accepts a group-mind, though regarding it as subhuman rather than superhuman in its characteristics. This is probably due to his following Le Bon's description of casual crowds and not of organized groups.

Bleuler is very vague: he enumerates impulses of nutrition, sex, self-preservation, and he adds an "ethical" one; but these seem to play little or no *rôle* in his psycho-pathology. Baudouin accepts a few instincts, including a "social" instinct, but after that says no more about them and follows Freud and Jung in a haphazard way. Jung recognizes patterns of behaviour but traces all innate tendencies to a mental libido corresponding in many ways with Bergson's "élan vital." Adler explains all conduct as an expression of one main urge, the "masculine protest."

Prideaux speaks vaguely of a herd-instinct and ascribes to it the formation of a "social ideal" which seems in a sense to approximate to the "ego-ideal" of psycho-analysis. Brown recognizes instincts of self-preservation, self-assertion, sex, herd, and inquiry; but at times he implies that these might after all be mere class names and be therefore subdivisible. The herd-instinct he defines as the "urge to act in accordance and harmony with one's fellows"; a rather complex tendency, we should say, difficult to conceive of apart from an already advanced conceptual stage of intelligence. Hamblin Smith, following both Freud and McDougall, tries to combine them, and speaks of conflicts between herd-instinct and sex-instinct; though he is careful to point out that the presence of a herd-instinct does not necessarily imply an inborn desire to adapt oneself to society.

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Amongst those favouring the " multiple instinct " view we have of course McDougall, who traces neuroses to the repression of fear ; with such as Hadfield and Roback. This last, however, suggests that McDougall's list of instincts should be still further subdivided into even narrower trends. Sands and Blanchard describe eight instincts, including a vague herd-instinct, but their account of them is scanty. Morton Prince seems to follow McDougall fairly closely, although denying the inevitability of the " specific perceptual inlet " factor, and utilizes the idea of conflict between instincts. In connection with instinctive activity, he holds that energy is discharged in three directions, (*a*) to cause the motor movements that will bring about satisfaction of the instinct, (*b*) to initiate visceral changes essential to preparation for action, and (*c*) to inhibit all other contrary instincts.

Sidis disagrees with McDougall and, after emphasizing the importance of fear, does not seem to have much to say about other emotions or instincts, at least not in a systematic manner. Mary Calkins, the self-psychologist, agrees with McDougall only in part, refusing to regard as essential the three " aspects " of instinct ; moreover she inclines to consider acts rather than tendencies. Yet Stout, another self-psychologist, follows McDougall more closely.

Core inclines to Jung in reducing the appearance of separate instincts to a primary vital urge. Conflict he regards not as occurring between one emotional trend and another, but as specifically due to environment. (But is this really very different ?) He includes under the term herd-instinct gregariousness plus a tendency to " conform and submit," though later on he separates them again and describes the tendency to submit as merely associated with the herd-instinct. Of the three groups of functional disorders described by him (retrogressive, progressive, and instinct distortion), the last is conditioned by the workings of the herd-instinct. Generally, he seems to combine Freud with McDougall in an obscure manner.

From this necessarily scanty survey of the position of the herd-instinct in psychiatry we cannot help being impressed by the diversity of views expressed and the vagueness of conception. And so it becomes incumbent upon us to indicate some of the criticisms that can be directed against the grounds for believing at all in some kind of herd-instinct.

The Herd-instinct and the Group-mind.

1. First let us consider the broad concept of a herd-instinct, one of the three primal urges. The current way of regarding this

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instinct is of the nature of a dynamic force, an active trend to be recognized by the ultimate results that it achieves. There is a growing tendency to include McDougall's narrow instincts as working within these three main trends. As a result, the position is reached of having to recognize urges within urges, all of which—the including and the included—are still designated by the one term "instinct." This way of regarding the matter is obscure and confusing, yet we cannot seek much help from other authors, as this difficulty seems to have been shirked by most of those who have thus tried to combine broad and narrow trends in the same scheme. This difficulty may in part be due to attempting to fuse together ready-made bodies of theories rather than reconsider the whole position.

To me, however, it would seem not at all unlikely that these broad urges only appear as such when we view human conduct in certain ways. How do we know that, because we are pleased, for purposes of exposition, to classify the needs and aims of the race as ego, sex and herd, therefore there must be in every individual three corresponding unitary principles moulding his acts into these three forms? Might not this be an artefact of analysis? It surely does not follow that if we care to divide up conduct and its goals on any other basis—say an æsthetic one—and hit upon a twelve-fold classification then there must correspondingly be twelve unitary principles responsible for all behaviour. One cannot help being keenly aware, albeit in absence of much consideration of this point by standard writers, that these three "urges" may be more the products of our methods and our preferences than symbols of the true facts.

If the concept of "broad" urges is to be retained at all, I would suggest the following considerations as helping towards a solution. If there be a force responsible for the fact that conduct is mainly egoistic, sexual or social, need it be a force that itself urges towards egoistic, sexual or social results? Might it not be a more passive, guiding kind of force, one that regulates or moulds the combinations of such instinctive activities as are postulated by McDougall? If so, it might be compared to the railway pointsman who controls the setting of the lines, these exerting a resisting, passive force on the train in guiding it to a station, but without contributing in any way to the motive power of the engine. What is wanted is some term descriptive of a "configurational" factor responsible for the three main patterns of conduct, a factor that accounts for form in its complex teleological meaning, and which moulds rather than urges, guides rather than propels; in short a factor accounting for

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the " orientation " of complex instinctive activity. It seems pretty certain that such a factor cannot in itself be innate ; it must be moulded by environment, education and all that makes up personal experience.

Even though it be a personal acquisition, it may be regarded as a racial factor that has grown and expanded during the course of civilization owing to education embodying the fruits of accumulated laws and customs. Because of its very comprehensive nature it must be more than a mere complex ; moreover even though it may in part exert its influence unconsciously, yet it can never be entirely repressed, and therefore should not be termed a complex, this term being usually reserved for a repressed and unconscious constellation of ideas and sentiments. If coining a new word is to be avoided I suggest that this factor—and we are speaking of the factor responsible for the socialization of conduct—be called a " system," using the word in the sense given it by Morton-Prince, namely as an integration of sentiments and complexes.

We have next to consider the narrow way, McDougall's way, of regarding the herd-instinct. But McDougall's views are so widely quoted and have attained such an assured position in a section of English text-books, that it might be well to discuss them in their general aspect as well as in respect of the herd-instinct. For this instinct of gregariousness is only a small item in a large scheme, and it cannot carry much conviction if the general scheme of which it is a part is itself insecurely founded.

2. What is McDougall's definition of an instinct? " An inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive and pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in a particular manner, or at least to experience an impulse to such action."

We may now indicate briefly the more vulnerable points at which McDougall's theories can be attacked.

The division of all innate action into three parts—perceptual, affective, conative—is not always possible. It often rests on insufficient knowledge and it leads to a straining of facts in order to fit them in a scheme.

McDougall's definition is sometimes regarded (*e. g.*, by Dibblee) as inadequate, because it does not emphasize the immediateness and completeness so characteristic of true instinctive behaviour.

Even after listing a large number of instincts, to act as prime movers, McDougall still finds it necessary to postulate further

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"innate tendencies" such as suggestion and sympathy. Drever, and others, would be inclined to group these with instincts. It has also been urged that even these instincts are but class names for groups of reactions and do not stand for unitary principles.

This assumption of so many different instincts often provides the wrong kind of explanation, and is only description over again. To use the instance given by Ginsberg: "To say that submission is due to a submissive instinct and negative self-feeling is like saying that people are submissive because they are submissive." This fault has been well described by Dunlap when he says, "You notice a certain common characteristic in a group of phenomena; then you abstract that characteristic, give it a name, and explain the phenomena by saying they are manifestations of that abstraction you have named."

The response of an organism to its environment, in so far as it is an instinctive response, is a response as a whole. As Thouless points out, behaviour caused by this or that limited and single instinct appears rather as a partial response, involving only parts of the entire organism.

Without endorsing the French schools who are so apt to regard emotion as pathological, Shand emphasizes the fact that in many cases of normal instinctive action no emotion is present, or at least it is not subjectively perceived. McDougall himself is far from clear when, after postulating that every instinct involves an "explicity recognized emotion," he goes on to say that such an emotion is always present "whether or not it be clearly realized at the time." Shand, Drever, Rivers and others have shown how emotion is most marked when instinctive action is inhibited, and how, as long as the response can proceed freely, all attention is concentrated on the "doing," emotion being little if at all in evidence. Woodworth is therefore inclined to regard emotion as an internal response in the nature of a reaction preparatory to renewed or altered efforts in relation to the environment. This is much the view of Watson.

For Shand, emotion is therefore not part of an instinct at all, though it may accompany it, and is something separate which like instinct has a dynamic urge of its own. It is not fixed but on the contrary is very variable both as regards its ends and its means.

Even when emotion does occur, it would not appear that these emotions and responses are related to each other, in pairs, in quite the fixed manner that McDougall describes. For instance a

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particular emotion may be found linked to different instincts. Similarly a particular emotion may be associated with different responses, as when fear leads to silence, screams, immobility, shivering or flight. And in higher animals the whole process is subject to the complicating influence of intelligence, making it still more difficult of analysis.

Again, very different emotions may be found with a particular instinctive act. For example, flight may be accompanied by anger, joy, surprise, playfulness, etc. And to say that we are here describing several reactions only one of which is really flight—the kind associated with fear, would mean that we must therefore fall back on the emotional content in order to qualify the act. This must needs confuse the issue and beg the whole question.

In reviewing McDougall's theories on instinct, one cannot help feeling that he has stretched the facts to an extreme degree, and almost manufactured instincts and emotions in order to fit his theory. Thus he sometimes postulates some vague and ill-defined emotion in order to fit a well recognized instinct. At other times he assumes the presence of an instinct that is far from clear-cut and evident, in order to account for a specific emotion.

The very definitions and criteria that McDougall himself lays down are not always complied with in his further descriptions. For instance he regards pugnacity as an instinct; yet it does not appear to have any specific perceptual inlet; on the contrary it is aroused —he says—when other instincts are inhibited.

As regards emotions, he recognizes three varieties, primary, secondary and derived. These last do not seem to be associated with a particular instinct in preference to any other—a serious objection to calling them emotions. Joy, regret, remorse etc., he states, are definite emotions dependent upon the working of any strong impulse " under certain conditions." If these felt reactions were truly emotions in accordance with his earlier conceptions we should expect the " certain conditions " to be of a perceptual order, or due to a conflict of instincts, or to variations in the extent or feasibility of response. But no, these " conditions " turn out to be of a purely ideational order, such as abstract judgment, and it can well be asked whether these feelings are emotions. We know, of course, how Shand's sentiments are organized on just such an ideational basis, and in fact these derived emotions seem to stand in much the same relation to sentiments as primary emotions do to instincts. For want of a better term, I would suggest that these " derived emotions " be designated as " sentiment-tones."

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Finally, it may be argued that conduct in civilized man is not interpretable in terms of single primitive instincts only, for it is not merely a balance of inherited trends, but a new synthesis involving new adaptations. "Very little in man is pure instinct; heredity operates in interaction with capacity to assimilate, foresee and control" (Hobhouse).

3. From this brief summary of criticisms, we see how McDougall's general theory of instinct is not always agreed to by other authors, and how, in places, serious difficulties are encountered in reconciling his views with the facts. Now, many of the arguments outlined against his general theory apply equally well to his instinct of gregariousness; but a few more specific points might be touched upon as affecting the herd-instinct in particular, this instinct which impels to gregariousness, in which McDougall almost implies a trend towards organization, and which, he says, enhances other instincts.

As regards its affective aspect, there seems to be no specific emotion associated with the gregarious instinct, unless perhaps it be loneliness. Many psychologists, however, have shown how this is too complex to be regarded as a primary emotion. It is strange, too, how this emotion, picked for linking with the instinct of gregariousness, is just the one that shows itself in the absence of gregariousness—when the animal is not being gregarious; this is quite opposed to what obtains in the rest of McDougall's scheme of instincts, and we are still left to ask what is the emotion associated with the functioning—as compared with the lack of functioning—of this instinct.

As observed in the human subject, any satisfaction at being one of a crowd may well be due to factors other than the urge of a primitive instinct. For instance, it might be due to desire for recreation, for collecting or imparting news, for self-preservation, for an outlet for exhibitionism, for finding an anodyne for troubles and worries, and many other, we might say, intelligent reasons, rather than to an instinctive impulse. In fact, a sort of intellectual pragmatism will account for herding, the individual seeking the herd from conscious appreciation of the advantages that can thereby be gained. Moreover any satisfaction in herding appears enhanced through the operation of sympathy. Much of the evidence upon which a herd-instinct rests has been culled from animals—as have many theories concerning instinct—but is it safe to argue that acts performed by animals under the influence of an instinct cannot, in man, be due to a multitude of other causes?

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Men sometimes behave just like animals, though for very different reasons.

Actually this question is intimately bound up with the very complex problem of intelligence, which is said to grow within the sphere of instinct, decreasing the rigidity and fixity of instinctive activity. Thouless describes intelligence as instinct modified by thought, and allows that even the capacity to reason may also be innate. According to Myers, behaviour as seen from within, subjectively, is purposive and intelligent; but when viewed from without, objectively, it is mechanistic and instinctive. Although some deem it advisable, if only for methodological reasons, to consider instinct and intelligence as two separate principles, yet it must be remembered how the one leads to the other. Stout describes how, after the first stage of perception and instinct activity, comes the second stage, the one of free ideas, with memory and anticipation, leading to desire. (Hobhouse's "impulse qualified by an idea.") In fact the stage of sentiments, where new ends appear, distinct from the ends of primitive instinct.

And to oppose intelligence to instinct too sharply creates further difficulties. For instance Read, though agreeing with Drever that all (in man) instinctive behaviour includes intelligent factors, yet denies that all intelligent behaviour includes instinctive ones. Stout too maintains that intelligent behaviour need not be instinctively determined. The problem now is that there appears no motive force behind intelligent action once the instinctive urges have been denied co-operation; unless, of course, we fall back as a last resort upon the reduction of all action to a mere *élan vital.* In any case, it is the growth of intelligence, with the modification of ends and means, and the conception of these means, that vitiates any arguing from lower animals directly to higher man.

We need go no further in order to see how the herd-instinct, as conceived by McDougall, raises many complex questions, becomes a fruitful source of controversy, and leads to no irrefutable conclusions.

§ 4. Before turning to the discussion of certain other considerations in connection with theories of society, we should examine another concept sometimes invoked in social psychology, one with which the theory of a herd-instinct seems to me—though not, apparently, to others—to be indissolubly linked. I am referring to the possibility of there being such a thing as a "group-mind." The presence of a group-mind would go far towards answering the question: "To what end a herd-instinct?" or, to put it more comprehensively,

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" for what purpose are herds formed through the agency of a herd-instinct ? "

Of course the idea of purpose has not always been well-received in science, at least not in mechanistic science. It has, it is true, had its place in biology, physiology, etc., as when we say that the larynx and its motor mechanisms are " for the purpose " of speech, or that the heart valves are " for the purpose " of preventing regurgitation, but this is only purpose viewed in retrospect; it is only a way of describing " useful results," without commiting ourselves as to how much these results may be accidental or sought after; or how much they may have determined the events leading up to them.

If we define purpose as the " stable forms and configurations towards which differential stresses tend," we may, as we have said, regard it as mere result that has just " happened that way "; but we may, too, view it as a teleological factor that has a definite influence upon the course of an evolution that many authors are now beginning to regard as purposive (*e. g.*, Noble); or, as Lloyd Morgan would put it, purposeful. He uses the word "purposeful" to imply the presence of "design," or predetermined "ends," in the mind of some agent or "doer"—here, and in the metaphysical sense, God—and reserves the word "purposive" for the causal and mechanistic interpretation of purpose; for, as Joad reminds us, whichever way we regard development of any kind it implies advance, advance implies direction, direction implies a goal, and therefore purpose. Even when not explicitly enunciated, the concept of purpose appears clearly implied in some of the recent accounts of that " emergence " which was first stressed by Alexander, Broad and their followers. Purpose may act as efficient cause in the sense that it conditions the stages preceding its achievement; in other words, a particular emergent is to be regarded as conditioning the processes leading up to its emergence, just as much as being an inevitable result mechanistically determined. Adopting such a teleological view of nature we would describe an instinct not only as tending towards an end but also as being itself partly determined by that end.

Applying this to our subject, we would ask " what is the goal towards which the herd-instinct tends ? what result—or emergent—is to be found that will be a sufficient justification or ' condition ' for a herd-instinct ? " And if we do not recognize a group-mind, that can thus be regarded as the goal, then our herd-instinct becomes but a barren and aimless thing, with no end to determine it. Or,

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if we admit a group-mind, then we cannot consider it as a mere incidental or side product of evolution, as a result that might just as well not have happened; it must have been led up to; some urge must be postulated tending toward the emergence of a group-mind; an urge that "seeks" (we cannot avoid anthropomorphic expressions here) after some such higher end. And a herd-instinct is what is required to supply the answer.

So it seems to me that these two concepts, herd-instinct and group-mind, must to some extent stand or fall together, and any refutation of either will do much towards weakening the position of the other.

5. The idea of the integration of human minds into something higher and all-inclusive is new neither in religion nor in philosophy, whether that higher something be conceived as a unitary super-human mind or merely as an extra-individual psychic continuum. From the standpoint of modern biology it is of more recent application, though it was suggested by Bernard as far back as 1911, in his valuable but little known work. A higher, super-mind gives meaning to evolution when regarded from the point of view of progress. Without embarking upon the problem of life and value, we may remind ourselves how we are generally agreed that any step forward in evolution is to be considered a "good" step; any development that leads to psychical progress and integration can usually be described as an improvement with positive value.

Bernard divides all evolution into five periods, the change from each to the next being dependent on a process of aggregation such as occurred, for example, when unicellular organisms first colonized to produce multicellular animals. And in the fifth period, in which man is found, it is no longer possible to conceive of any likely physical aggregation that could continue the line of progress any further; and so we are left with the possibility of psychical aggregation instead. The urge towards such aggregation, making another evolutionary step possible, would be our "instinct of gregariousness." The new organism thus produced must therefore be a psychic one that transcends its component units, and so must be something such as we might call a "super-mind."

If this super-mind be considered as nothing more than the sum of human minds, with no new faculties or characteristics of its own, then it is a concept of little value and application, and is not in keeping with present views of emergent evolution. More usually, however, it is regarded as a definite emergent, with new qualities that distinguish it from the individual minds composing it. Let us

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be clear, though, as to what we mean by " new " ; the word " new " as applied to emergence can only mean that sudden qualities have come to light which were potentially present in the constituent parts; for as Joad says, " New . . . must mean that our perception of the qualities is new, not the qualities themselves. If not, then these qualities must have existed separate from the constituents of the compound, and so to speak *in vacuo* in the universe, *i. e.*, as ' objects for thought ' even if not ' objects of thought.' "

Who is to say, however, what degree—qualitative or quantitative —of aggregational synthesis is necessary for the emergence of such a super-mind ? If such aggregation be regarded as anything short of the whole human race, then at what point does this mind first show itself ? If, on the other hand, it be made to include all humanity, then it becomes very much more comprehensive than what social psychologists have been pleased to call a group-mind.

But whichever way we regard the matter, the fact must be faced that we are inevitably limited in our speculations, our views are doomed to incompleteness and inaccuracy, simply because the part can never conceive of the transcendental whole. No human mind is capable of apprehending a super-mind of which it is only an infinitesimal part ; it can never have direct cognizance of it, even though it may speculate about it. We are like the little consciousnesses that older writers used to postulate as occurring in single parts of the brain, which were naturally and inherently unable to appreciate the consciousness of the whole brain.

Moreover, just because this super-mind is an emergent, it must be possessed of new qualities and powers foreign to a human mind. This would prevent us at the onset from knowing those very facts about a super-mind that distinguish it as a super-mind. Just as primitive man fashioned his gods after his own image, so are we left to conceive of a super-mind after the model of a single human mind, unable to ascribe to it anything more than intensified and glorified human characteristics. This, however, need not debar us from thoughtful consideration of the subject, within the limits of our understanding, and in spite of the difficulties which we must, in the very nature of things, encounter.

6. Lazarus has described the aim of folk-psychology as being " to discover the laws that come into operation whenever the many live and act "—he does not add " think "—" as one," and the postulation of a group-mind to account for some of these laws is an integral part of McDougall's theories. Just as he sees evidence for a gregarious instinct in the fact that " we behave differently towards

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those of our own group " (Giddings) so does he deduce a group-mind from the way each unit displays properties and modes of reaction not present if he remains outside the group. He is supported in this by some other authors, for example, Barker, but on the other hand such writers as Ginsberg, McIver, and Urwick, have totally rejected his theories.

This group-mind seems to be conceived by him as occupying a position intermediate between two extremes. The very emphasis he places on the way that men act and think in groups differently from how they act and think alone shows that he does not quite consider a group-mind as a mere addition of units, as a sum of individual minds; he implies, more than once, the presence of some emergent. On the other hand, in so far as he calls it a group-mind and bases its presence on the formation of groups (and not one group), he is considering it as falling very far short of a synthesis of all human minds; it is, in fact, composed only of some-at-a-time human minds.

A serious difficulty at once arises here. When a man is a member of several groups, are we to presume that his mind contributes to the formation of several group-minds? Surely this would lead to such " overlapping " of group-minds that they could no longer have attributed to them that sharpness of individuality usually associated with our idea of a mind; they could no longer be distinguished from one another without creating an artificial separation. Of course, McDougall's description is so much based on his study of organized groups that fundamental factors are very apt to be obscured altogether.

The idea of a group-mind is not, however, peculiarly McDougall's; it is to be found in much earlier writings, though under a different label. We have Rousseau's theory of " General Will," and Hegel's " Folk Soul "—a kind of mystical group-mind. A reflection of this is present in Savigny; and again in the " Collective Consciousness " of Renan, where Hegel's absolute is implied. Hartmann, and Fechner, also give consideration to this subject. Espinas, Durkheim, and Wundt, put forth the same idea but call it " Social Consciousness," and they too conceive it as something that is shared by the whole group.

An important fallacy of the French school must be noticed here, one due to a tendency towards making too sweeping and facile generalizations. When Durkheim (even without admitting a group-mind in McDougall's sense) describes his " collective representations " as aggregates of " individual representations "

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compounded into something transcendental, superior, and definitely more good and aware of good, he is confusing process with content, just as Espinas does in the case of his "social consciousness." What is really shared is not the process of being conscious or aware, but the contents of such awareness, the ideas and images present in consciousness. "Sharing" here is in relation to similarity, not identity. When a man is having the same meal as another he may be said to be sharing it, but it does not mean that they are both chewing the same morsel of food; it is merely that they are partaking of similar food at the same time. It is interesting to note how the French writers—who are so near to McDougall in some of their views—reject the group-mind in which he believes, while subscribing to a social consciousness which he denies.

A good deal of the difficulty found in trying to harmonize these different views lies in confusion of terms and paucity of concepts for mental processes. Anyway it does not seem likely that a super-mind can, at present, be postulated with enough security to provide much support for believing in any marked instinct leading up to it.

In any case let us not be misled into seeing, in the fact that some of the reactions of groups cannot be described except in terms of mind, an argument for a collective psyche. For as Ginsberg says "True, we can only discuss society in terms of mind, but it no more follows that society is, or has, a mind than that a house that consists of bricks is itself a brick."

7. Our next step must be to give brief consideration to some theories of society, pointing out in particular those phenomena that are so peculiar to group life, so unlike what is found in the case of the isolated individual, that they have probably been markedly influential in the acceptance by psychologists of such new concepts as herd-instincts and group-minds. Further we should see how these phenomena have nevertheless been explained by some investigators without having recourse to any new principle outside individual psychology.

The whole question of group mentality is intimately bound up in the broader one of mental evolution. The customs of primitive tribes have always been a rich field of inquiry when elucidating the genesis of early social organization; but the use to which the material thus obtained has been put has varied considerably in different schools. We need only refer to the controversy that is even now active between the "psychological" and the "diffusion" theories. According to some, myths and rituals have arisen all the

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world over as the products of primitive mind, wherever that mind was to be found. Elliot Smith, however, maintains that these have really originated in one portion of the world only, probably from the pre-dynastic Egyptians, and have thence been spread to the other nations of the earth by the wandering tribes that Perry has called the "Children of the Sun." The other races have merely accepted and perhaps modified the beliefs and customs thus brought to them. This view makes one wonder, nevertheless, why these pre-dynastic Egyptians should have been the only ones apparently capable of evolving myths, to the exclusion of all other races.

A rather different explanation of ritual has been offered by Beck. According to him it is not only a question of handing down custom, for it involves a re-interpretation. Dogmas and religions are re-interpretations of once useful practices that have survived from mere inertia (compare the "conservation" of Bartlett and the "fatigue" of Murphy). . The social merging consequent upon the sharing of primitive ritual has been regarded as the starting-point for organized social feeling and for the subsequent uniting for the common good. McCurdy, however, believes this merging for common good to have its prototype in the harmonious principle which he attributes to the foreconscious and which he calls a "unity complex"; this would account for the "quest of unity" of Murphy, and—as a beginning of a social urge—would in part correspond to Hobhouse's "effort at synthesis."

It is evident then that there are to be found in social psychology many suggestive points of view which, if sufficiently justified, might well do away with any need for a herd-instinct or group-mind. The multiplicity of lines of approach and methods of description, however, have made it very difficult to assess some of these theories at their proper value. The various accounts given of society have differed from one another largely owing to the bias of their authors and the particular fields they have investigated. For example, some describe more particularly primitive hordes; Le Bon's work is based on what one might call casual crowds, Malinowski has concentrated on early organized tribes and McDougall on more specialized groups. In addition, the several views offered are each apt to be heavily coloured under the influence of some pet principle or tendency emphasized by individual authors. Thus "telepathy" is all important in Newland's views, whereas in France and Germany we find "collective consciousness" being constantly invoked.

McDougall makes remarkably little use of the very instinct of gregariousness which he has himself postulated, and most of social

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feeling he regards as derived from the parental instinct, just as altruism is. This early appearance of other-regarding trends is much stressed by him. But it is very debatable how much one is justified in making any sharp distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding instincts when discussing the genesis of primitive groups, for this distinction seems to belong exclusively to a fairly advanced stage of development, and we must not ascribe to the primitive mind concepts that we have ourselves fashioned when viewing history in retrospect. Compared with McDougall, Trotter lays much more stress on the herd-instinct, regarding it in the "broad" way; but, as was mentioned before, he spoils his theory by including in his description of this instinct a host of reactions that are really the result of the influence of the community on the individual.

Imitation has been postulated as an instinct by Baldwin, but he is not followed in this by the English school, who see in imitation too many diverse mental processes to call it an instinct. The French, however, do so regard it, and nearly all their interpretations of society have been in terms of their suggestion-imitation theories; instance Bagehot, Tarde. Psycho-pathologists too have emphasized the importance of suggestion, *e. g.*, Rivers, and Sidis who says that "suggestibility is the cement of the herd" (suggestibility, not, we note, the herd-instinct). "Man is a social animal, but he is so because he is suggestible." Suggestibility is specially in evidence in casual crowds that have come together under the influence of two factors—(1) Community of focus of attention, (2) homogeneity of constitution and sentiment. The results accruing from such casual crowd-formation have been taken by some as affording indirect support to herd-instinct and group-mind theories, and are as follows: (*a*) Heightening of emotion; (*b*) freedom from restraint and loss of feeling of personal responsibility, especially in respect of the "lower" emotions; (*c*) a lowering of intelligence in order to include the standards of the lowest units of the group; (*d*) Le Bon adds a state of fascination resembling hypnosis; (*e*) increased suggestibility, probably due to an overflow of energy from an excitement that is not always able to find direct outlet. McDougall shows how there may be a reappearance of individual and moral traits in the group, but not until it has become highly organized under the influence of five or six conditioning factors described by him.

Another characteristic of group life that distinguishes its psychology—in the undeveloped state—from that of the individual is the one that has been so stressed by Levy-Bruhl, namely the

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phenomenon of "participation mystique." This is a tendency for the savage to ascribe identity between objects or people that are similar or else enter into close relationship with one another; and this in conjunction with "collective representations" he uses as the basis of his exposition of what he calls primitive mentality. Unfortunately he regards the primitive mind as of a peculiar kind, essentially different from the civilized mind, not even to be compared with that of a growing child of to-day. Most English authors, *e. g.*, Murphy, Marrett, McDougall, disagree with him and regard the mind of the savage merely as an undeveloped mind, not one that is inherently "different" from modern minds. Especially do they dissociate themselves from Levy-Bruhl when he goes as far as ascribing to the savage a clear realization of these two phenomena, comparable to our conception of them.

8. The Freudian school have already made valiant attempts at explaining some of the customs of primitive society along psycho-analytical lines. The laws of taboo and totemism have been traced back to a series of reactions that are typical of family life, reactions based on a universal œdipus-complex and revolt against the father. This is exemplified by the attitude of the members of the tribe towards the Old Man of the tribe, and Freud follows these family patterns into the more complex organizations of tribal life. Against this view it has sometimes been urged that tribal life may have preceded, not followed, the origins of family life; and when we remember how Freud's explanations are based on a necessarily patriarchal system of society, in spite of the fact that many workers have seriously questioned whether matriarchal organization did not appear even earlier than the patriarchal one, we see that his explanations are not always founded on uncontroversial grounds. In connection with these views it is interesting to recall how Burrow denies the œdipus-complex. Instead he invokes a "primary subjective phase" in which the child regards its mother as part of itself. This is not a case of sex attachment to the mother as an object; it is rather that the child has not yet learnt to distinguish the maternal breast as distinct from its (the child's) own body. This "primary identification" he believes to be still operative in the unconscious of adult life.

As regards modern sociology, some writers have found support for the group-mind theory in such collective reactions as communism and anarchism, whereas these are regarded by other authors as kinds of "racial neuroses." Here again the psycho-analysts have not been slow in coming forward to explain the facts on their own

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hypotheses. For instance Kolnai traces the rise of socialistic thought to the same old revolt against the father. Pure communism is a partial regression to the mother with suspension of the father or authority principle. Anarchist communism goes further and leads to a permanent abolition of all laws without the subsequent erection of new ones; its success has been due to its expressing the œdipus-complex more fully and involving (in an implied reunion with the mother) the principle of common origin and therefore of universal brotherhood, with resumption of the infantile level where all personal autonomy is repudiated. In comparison, anarchist individualism is less satisfying psychologically, as it follows the œdipus trait only as far as the overthrow of the father, and does not include regression to the lower levels of irresponsibility. It proclaims, not the bondage of brotherhood, but the freedom of bolshevism and personal responsibility.

As regards some of the characteristics of crowd psychology, Freud also explains these by applying his well known theories. He regards the increase of suggestibility as a result—not a cause—of crowd formation, and the effect of "contagion" (Le Bon) may well be only secondary. The factor that he uses as a key to the whole situation is the community of interest (McDougall's "focus of attention"), and this he derives from a common attitude towards some person or object outside the group; he instances the group leader as being such a person, prominent examples being the Army and the Church with their respective heads, the Chief-in-Command and Christ. This community of interest leads to a process of identification of the members of the group with each other. Identification can occur (1) as part of an œdipus situation, (2) as a substitute for object-love, and (3) owing to the sharing of a common emotional situation, this last being the one prominent in group-formation. The original primal father (the old man of the tribe) enforced taboos sexual and otherwise on the tribe, hence the instincts-inhibited-in-their-aims that resulted formed the basis of the beginnings of tender feeling for the leader; and a re-edition of this situation is what is found in ordinary crowd psychology. If by any chance these tender feelings for the leader were suddenly disrupted and the corresponding libido set free, anxiety would appear and panic result (this is a very different explanation from McDougall's account of tender feeling and panic). The further growth of the crowd, or herd, or group, may lead to each member also identifying himself with the leader, for example in the Church as compared with the Army. This leads to a replacement of the

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individual's super-ego by the person of the leader, which would explain the lack of critical faculty (the old super-ego being in abeyance), the suggestibility and the heightened emotion. This can be compared with a nearly similar process in hypnosis and—if mixed with direct libido as well as instincts inhibited-in-their aims—in the state of being in love; here one might find an explanation for the "state of fascination comparable to hypnosis" mentioned by Le Bon. In later stages still we may get introjection, in substitution for the super-ego, of an idea instead of a personal object, so that an abstract ideal may come to take the place of a concrete leader.

Coming now to the "collective representations" of Levy-Bruhl, found also in Piaget; these are ideas of objects to which traditional sentiments of awe, fear, respect, etc., have been attached. They might be explained as having their roots in that part of the unconscious that Jung calls impersonal or collective. In so far as they are not wholly determined by education but appear to be bound up in the heredity of the race, they would correspond to his "archetypes." And because they are general and collective, they are possessed of a kind of universal validity that is responded to by all, even when unconsciously apprehended. When viewed from the angle of inherited engrams these would come within the scope of Rigano's "biological memory." The phenomenon of "participation mystique" might also be explained on much the same grounds, especially as the archaic "thought-images" of the collective unconscious naturally tend to symbolic and mystical expression.

As regards the "moral consciousness" emphasized by Rashdall, and the growth of conscience generally, Green points out that "no individual can make a conscience for himself; he always needs a society to make it for him." Nevertheless, the appearance of conscience can be regarded as a reaction of the self to environment, reinforced by influences from the super-ego that is formed during childhood and in family life. The psycho-analysts would therefore not regard a conscience as a phenomenon limited to group organization as such, but merely as due to the fact that no individual ever leads a completely isolated life.

The "telepathy" of Newlands might seem capable of explanation to those who are inclined to accept Geley's theories. He develops a view of libido or energy which he calls dynamo-psychism, comparable in a way to Schopenhauer's "will," but not—like it—the necessary cause of all things. He believes that the unconscious is

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the seat not only of lower functions but of higher ones too, and that these latter are purposively kept in abeyance during normal life. We forget, he thinks, because too much knowledge would do away with the spurring to further efforts so necessary to adaptation; a sense of limitation and deficiency is required before progress can be sought after and achieved. When such limitations are removed through their becoming unnecessary, as for example in impending death, then new faculties appear from the unconscious, the mind becomes much clearer, sharper and more all-knowing, and as a result certain manifestations such as clairvoyance and telepathy may occur.

Summary and Conclusion.

To summarize this short discussion: we have seen how complex is the subject of instinct generally and how the views concerning it are still widely divergent. There are many ways of conceiving of a herd-instinct, and in psycho-pathological works this instinct is ill-defined, vaguely described and variously applied—if applied at all. On examining more closely the grounds for believing in a herd-instinct, it appears that they are not always secure, either as regards the herd-instinct itself or in respect of the general theory of which it is a part. Further, this concept is linked to that of a group-mind, and not only is the evidence for the latter controversial too, but the very limitations of human understanding vitiate our speculations concerning it. We have further given a rapid glance to the ways in which certain phenomena that are so peculiar to group psychology as to afford a basis for the postulation of a herd-instinct or group-mind have nevertheless by some schools been explained without having recourse to such postulation.

The time has now come for us to conclude; but we have so vacillated from side to side, picking up one theory and then dropping it for another, considering this and that view only to point at its insecurity, embarking upon a promising trail without the necessary time to follow it up, that we are hard put to enunciate any but vague and tentative conclusions. We might, however, advance the view that a herd-instinct may perhaps exist as an innate tendency towards gregariousness, but that it has become so modified in man, and obscured in its real effects by the growth of intelligence, that it has become a factor of diminishing importance. It would certainly be unjustifiable to ascribe to it such further qualities as might necessarily urge towards the organization of groups or the innate

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observance of custom and law, since these can well be accounted for on other grounds. We might retain in addition the concept of a herd-system, but even this should not be taken too literally and should be regarded as a descriptive facility, a fiction of the " As If " type of Vaihinger, applied to the appearance of unitary urge occurring when the single and separate instincts are combining and acting together in complex ways to produce those results we are agreed to call social. At the most might it be regarded as an orientating factor, acquired through education and therefore not innate, which moulds conduct without producing it, and is not endowed with any such dynamic force as is ascribed to instinct.

Finally as regards psycho-pathology, there is little need in it for a mere instinct of gregariousness and as to invoking any broad herd-system as a factor in mental derangement, it would be regarding this factor as much more unitary and definite than it really is, and the very comprehensiveness and complexity of construction of such a system would make it too unwieldy for clinical explanations. Last but not least it would introduce still more complexity in those " mental mechanisms " that are already too numerous and ill-defined.

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To attempt a complete bibliography covering the whole of our subject would evidently be an impossible task. That is why the following list makes no mention of articles or papers, nor does it include works published before 1910, except in the case of a few authors. It is limited to the 100 most representative works (written in or translated into English) of only those authors, referred to in the text, which have been personally consulted.

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