
The 2002 Arizona First Congressional District Race

Frederic I. Solop, *Northern Arizona University*
James I. Bowie, *Northern Arizona University*

Arizona's newly-created First Congressional District sprawls across 58,000 square miles, making it one of the nation's largest. Identified as one of the few competitive districts in the 2002 election, the open seat race attracted 15 candidates. Two political novices emerged from the primary election to claim their parties' nominations. Republican Rick Renzi financed his primary campaign from his own deep pockets, buying name recognition throughout the district. Democrat George Cordova employed a grassroots strategy and garnered support on the Navajo reservation to win a surprise primary victory that stunned and immobilized his party. In the general election, national Republican money and an intense negative advertising campaign brought big-city election tactics to rural Arizona for the first time. George Cordova found himself buried in an avalanche of Republican soft money as Rick Renzi claimed the seat.



The Colorado Street Bridge, Pasadena. Just one of the sites in the California Twenty Ninth Congressional District. Photo: caphotos.com/Gina McDaniel.

The 2002 California Twenty-Ninth Congressional District Race

Drew Linzer, *University of California, Los Angeles and Pomona College*
David Menefee-Libey, *University of California, Los Angeles and Pomona College*
Matt Muller, *University of California, Los Angeles and Pomona College*

For first-term Democratic congressman Adam Schiff, two years meant a nearly $20 million difference. In 2000, then-State Senator Schiff raised and spent $4.7 million to defeat Republican incumbent Jim Rogan, who spent $6.8 million to defend his southern California congressional seat. Estimates at the time placed spending by political parties around $5.5 million and spending by outside organizations above $2 million. As a result of the closeness of the race and the stark differences between Schiff and Rogan, the campaign was the most expensive House race in the country's history. Yet, Schiff was easily reelected in 2002 over Republican challenger Jim Scileppi, a perennial local candidate who never posed a serious threat to Schiff. In such a noncompetitive contest, outside independent advocacy groups saw no opportunity to affect the outcome of the race and, as a result, involvement by these groups was minimal. Groups that had poured resources into the district in 2000 spent their money elsewhere in 2002.

Provincialism, Personalism, and Politics: Campaign Spending and the 2002 U.S. Senate Race in Arkansas

Jay Barth, *Hendrix College*
Janine Parry, *University of Arkansas*

The only Democratic victory over a Republican incumbent in 2002's U.S. Senate races was accompanied by a level of campaign spending that dwarfed previous Arkansas records. The explanation for the spending frenzy in the contest between Republican Tim Hutchinson and Democrat Mark Pryor lies in the confluence of a set of circumstances inclusive of national, state, and individual-level factors. Nationally, of course, the one-seat margin between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Senate raised the stakes of any one contest. In Arkansas, the situation was further compounded by an increasingly-competitive partisan environment, a vulnerable incumbent, and a high-profile challenger. The outcome—an eight point margin for the challenger—was primarily a product of the state's peculiar blend of provincialism and personalism in politics, but the multi-million dollar air and ground wars were crucial in activating these factors.

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Distorted by Outside Money: National Parties and the Race for Colorado's Seventh Congressional District


Daniel A. Smith, *University of Florida*

Republican Bob Beauprez edged Democrat Mike Feeley by a mere 121 votes to win Colorado's newly created Seventh Congressional District, making it the country's closest House race in 2002. With national and local interest groups staying largely above the fray, the heavy hitting was carried out by the Republican and Democratic national congressional campaign committees and their proxies, the state parties. Using a combination of hard and soft money, the national parties not only outspent the candidates in the ground and air wars, but they also orchestrated the electoral strategies of both campaigns on a daily basis. As a result of the direct involvement of the national parties, the debate over issues of local concern became distorted, as both Beauprez and Feeley were increasingly beholden to the policy directives of their respective congressional parties, which largely financed the campaigns.

The 2002 Delaware Senate Race

Joseph A. Pika, *University of Delaware*

Lightning failed to strike Delaware twice in successive election cycles. Longtime Senate stalwart and presidential hopeful Joseph R. Biden easily won reelection to his sixth term over the same challenger he confronted in 1996. Biden, then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defeated Republican Raymond Clatworthy by a margin of 58% to 41%, dominating the challenger in every phase of the campaign. Biden faced a newcomer to politics whom he outspent by a wide margin. In 2000, however, powerful Republican incumbent William Roth, then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, lost to challenger Thomas Carper. Roth had faced a popular incumbent governor who, with the help of millions transferred from the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, managed to outspend the incumbent. In both cases, money was decisive in a state far more accustomed to retail than wholesale politics.



Unshockable? Delaware Senator Joseph R. Biden easily won reelection in 2002. Photo: AP/Terry Ashe.

Incumbent vs. Incumbent in Connecticut's Fifth Congressional District

Sandra M. Anglund, *University of Connecticut*
Sarah M. Morehouse, *University of Connecticut*

In 2002, two incumbents fought for their political lives in the newly redrawn Fifth District. The winner, 10-term Republican Nancy Johnson, spent more than any candidate elected to the House in 2002. Both Johnson and her opponent, three-term Democrat Jim Maloney, are moderates who tried to distinguish themselves on effectiveness in office. The race played out under Connecticut's unusual rules, which forbid soft money, including national party soft money transfers to state parties. Johnson's financial advantage allowed her to go on the air early and forced Maloney to rely on others, such as the DCCC and the AFL–CIO, to run ads in his behalf. When these groups went negative early on, Maloney was branded with the stigma of a negative campaigner despite the fact that he had not yet run an ad. In addition to the extremely negative air war, the intense ground war, noted for the Republican "feet in the street" efforts, highlighted the increasing importance of grassroots campaigning.

Indiana's Second Congressional District

John Roos, *University of Notre Dame*

The Indiana Second Congressional District open–seat race was a no-holds barred fight with over $5 million spent by candidate and allies, two visits by the president, intensely negative TV ads which resulted in stations pulling ads for each candidate, and finally a narrow victory for Republican Chris Chocola. In the end, both candidates raised more than $1.5 million for their campaigns, money supplemented by more than $2 million in spending on issue advocacy ads by party and interest group allies.

Democrat Jill Long Thompson portrayed herself as a fiscal conservative representing "Hoosier Values." She attacked Chocola for supporting privatization of Social Security, portraying Chocola as a representative of "corporate greed." Chocola neutralized the Social Security issue by attacking Long Thompson for "voting to raid the social security trust fund seven times" and characterized her as representing the values of Jane Fonda, Hilary Clinton, and Ted Kennedy.


While interest groups were active for both candidates, party activity dominated both the air and ground wars.

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The 2002 Iowa House and Senate Elections: The More Things Change . . .

David P. Redlawsk, *University of Iowa*
Arthur Sanders, *Drake University*

Iowans are long–accustomed to reveling in the nation's spotlight during the quadrennial presidential nominating caucuses. Off–year elections, though, are usually boring, quiet affairs with incumbents routinely piling up large margins. But due to a confluence of events—redistricting, the first Democratic gubernatorial reelection campaign in a generation, the reelection campaign of Iowa's Democratic U.S. Senator, and a closely divided state government—Iowa became the most competitive state in the country in 2002. Four of Iowa's five House seats were in play, and both Senator Harkin and Governor Vilsack faced challengers. In a very real way, Iowa was the hottest of hot spots in campaign 2002. So what happened? By some accounts, nothing, as every incumbent won. By other accounts, it was wall-to-wall politics, inundating citizens with television, mail, and telephone calls until many voters pleaded "please stop!" In this paper, we describe the events on the ground, in the air, and throughout this 2002 center of the political universe.



Hayroots? Van Hollen's grassroots approach unseated incumbent Morella. Photo: vanhollen2002.com.

The Michigan Senate Race

Michael W. Traugott, *University of Michigan*

In the 2002 Michigan Senate race, the advantages of incumbency were difficult to overcome. Republicans failed to recruit three potential candidates, before finally convincing Andrew "Rocky" Raczkowski to run. Raczkowski's late start and his status as a "last resort" candidate made fundraising difficult and discouraged noncandidate groups from involvement in the race. Raczkowski's race was clearly not a priority for the state Republican Party or the NRSC. The less than $5 million spent in 2002 is in stark contrast to the almost $35 million candidates and noncandidates combined to spend in the competitive 2000 Michigan Senate race. The small amount of noncandidate group activity in 2002 was mostly limited to mail and telephone calls and mostly benefited Democrat Carl Levin. In the end, Levin beat Raczkowski by a margin of 23 percentage points.

The Maryland Eighth Congressional District

Owen Abbe, *University of Maryland*

Pundits rated Representative Connie Morella the most vulnerable Republican incumbent in the House of Representatives, but her defeat was no easy victory for state senator Chris Van Hollen. Morella was remarkably popular among voters, and Van Hollen's campaign resources were seriously depleted by a tough primary battle. Van Hollen relied on his activist base and party soft money spending to remain competitive and ultimately win the election. In the end, however, redistricting proved the most important factor in Morella's defeat. Morella won a majority of the vote in the portion of the district that she had represented in 2000 but lost in the heavily Democratic precincts added by redistricting. Van Hollen's narrow victory demonstrates the flexibility of modern party organizations. The Democrat-controlled state legislature created a winnable district, and the national party organization provided the television advertising and fundraising support necessary to secure victory.

The 2002 Mississippi Third District Race: From a Spark to a Fizzle

David A. Breaux, *Mississippi State University*

Due to redistricting, incumbents Charles "Chip" Pickering and Ronnie Shows were forced to run against each other in the Mississippi's newly configured Third Congressional District. In what turned out to be the fifth most expensive congressional seat in the 2002 midterm election and the most expensive congressional seat in the state's history, Pickering defeated Shows, 64 to 35%. The race initially attracted significant attention from party committees and interest groups. The Mississippi Democratic Party sponsored TV ads painting Pickering as a "Washington Insider," while the state Republican Party concentrated most of its effort on the ground war. Seniors' groups, such as the United Seniors Association and the Seniors Coalition, distributed mailings praising Pickering's stance on prescription drug coverage, while the AFL-CIO produced a TV ad critical of Pickering's close ties to "big business." Pickering's substantial lead in both fundraising and pre-election polls, however, caused much of the campaign activity to fizzle-out by Election Day.

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The Minnesota U.S. Senate Race and the Second Congressional District Race


William H. Flanigan, *University of Minnesota*
Joanne M. Miller, *University of Minnesota*
Jennifer L. Williams, *University of Minnesota*
Nancy H. Zingale, *University of St. Thomas*

The tragic death of Senator Paul Wellstone, just 11 days before the 2002 election, created shock waves throughout Minnesota. A five-day campaign moratorium immediately went into effect across the state, ending after the memorial service. This service, held in a sports arena on the University of Minnesota campus and attracting 20,000 people, reflected both the anguish of Wellstone's supporters and the passion of his convictions, and turned, perhaps inevitably, into a foot-stamping, fist-pumping partisan rally. The backlash was immediate; callers complained about the TV coverage and donors clamored to contribute to the GOP. Six days before the election, Walter F. Mondale was selected to fill the vacancy on the ticket. These unique and tragic events affected races across the state. Strategies were undercut and money went unspent. Thus, our analysis of the Senate and the Second Congressional District races takes into account the initial campaign period before Wellstone's death, the moratorium, and the six-day campaign before Election Day.

The 2000 Missouri Senate Race

Martha Kropf, *University of Missouri, Kansas City*
E. Terrence Jones, *University of Missouri, St. Louis*
Matt McLaughlin, *University of Missouri, St. Louis*
Dale Neuman, *University of Missouri, Kansas City*

"It's turnout, stupid" became the mantra of the Missouri Senate contest between Democrat Jean Carnahan and Republican Jim Talent. With more than four-fifths of the electorate having made their choice prior to Labor Day in a race that was tight from the beginning, each campaign sought to stimulate its base (urban, women, labor, blacks for Carnahan—rural, men, business, whites for Talent) and soften the edge among its opponents (e.g., Women for Talent, Sportsmen for Carnahan). After a record $40 million in expenditures (half by the candidates, half by the parties and independent groups), two late visits by President Bush to a pair of Republican strongholds contributed to a narrow (49.8% to 48.7%) Talent victory.



Big-name Support. President Bush's two late visits helped decide the election in Talent's favor. Photo: AP/J. Scott Applewhite.

The 2000 and 2002 Montana Senate and House Races—A Comparative Perspective

Craig Wilson, *Montana State University, Billings*

Party soft money and interest group issue advocacy activity was less important in the 2002 contests for Montana's Senate and At-Large House seats; a very different scenario than the one acted out in 2000. These races might have been competitive, but a failure to recruit viable challengers led to little campaign activity by outside groups and victories for both incumbents.

In the 2002 Senate race, the Democratic Party made significant expenditures for incumbent Max Baucus in an effort to take out his opponent, Mike Taylor, early, while the Republican Party spent little on Taylor. In an ad widely known as "Boogie Nights," Democrats alleged that Taylor had been involved in a student loan scandal. Taylor claimed that the ad insinuated that he was gay and dropped out of the race. He reentered 12 days later but still lost the election 63% to 32%. In the 2002 U.S. House race, Republican Dennis Rehberg defeated Democrat Steve Kelly by 22 percentage points.

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The New Hampshire Soft Money "Orgy" of 2002

J. Mark Wrighton, *University of New Hampshire*

The Granite State's 2002 Senate contest between political heavyweights Jeanne Shaheen and John E. Sununu and its role in determining the balance of power in the United States Senate attracted, along with an open House seat, a great deal of national interest. Because of its prominent position in the presidential nomination process, the state attracted more than its share of national political figures stumping for candidates. The October blizzard of television ads and mailers by the national party organizations and a panoply of allied groups amounted to a "soft money orgy." Television ads and mailers touted candidate positions on such issues as the environment, reproductive rights, questionable corporate practices, and taxes. Despite finishing with the eighth most expensive Senate race in the nation, all three of New Hampshire's victorious congressional candidates were outspent by their opponents. The increased activity did, however, spur a significant midterm-election voter turnout.



Who is This? Anonymous phone calls were just one unorthodox method employed in the North Carolina congressional race. Photo: istockphoto.com/Ralf Herrmann.

The Pennsylvania Fourth Congressional District Race

Chris Carmen, *University of Pittsburgh*

Pennsylvania's Fourth Congressional District races in 2000 and 2002 demonstrated that noncandidate groups are strategic actors who target their resources where they are likely to have an impact. The 2000 open-seat race between Republican Melissa Hart and Democrat Terry Van Horne saw significant noncandidate group activity. However, the 2002 race between Hart and Democratic challenger Stevan Drobac, Jr. provides a textbook example of a race between a professional politician and an untested amateur. Despite the Fourth District's Democratic advantage of 54,000 registered voters, Drobac lost. The change from 2000 to 2002 demonstrates that noncandidate groups are wise to invest in competitive elections of candidates friendly to their cause because the advantages of incumbency mean further investment is unnecessary in future elections.

The North Carolina Eighth Congressional District Race

Eric S. Heberlig, *University of North-Carolina, Charlotte*

Anonymous phone calls. A southern Republican advertising public praise from the AFL-CIO . . . and receiving praise from his party for voting against it. The National Republican Campaign Committee attacking a challenger for negative campaigning . . . before the challenger had run advertisements. Is this the textbook way to run a congressional campaign?

In a district that had lost thousands of textile jobs, Republican incumbent Robin Hayes cast a risky vote to support President Bush and fast track trade negotiating authority. Then, Democrats in the North Carolina legislature redrew his district to their favor. These factors made the district a target for both political parties and their interest group allies during the 2002 elections. This case study explores how Robin Hayes survived.

The 2002 New Mexico Federal Races

Lonna Rae Atkinson, *University of New Mexico*
Nancy Carrillo, *University of New Mexico*
Margaret C. Toulouse, *University of New Mexico*

The 2002 New Mexico federal races represent both competitive and noncompetitive contexts to examine party and interest group activity. State and national party money flows to competitive contests, even when a candidate is well funded through her own war chest. Party money and activity was crucial in understanding the negative tone, flow of information, and election outcomes in these two competitive House races. Furthermore, ideological differences between candidates and the competitive nature of the race are key factors in understanding interest group activity. Interests groups were not dominant players in the Second District's competitive contest where the candidates were ideologically similar, but were important contributors to the tone and issue debate in the First District's race where the candidates were ideologically different. The noncompetitive races, however, produced no real party or interest group activity, suggesting that both political parties and interest groups are strategic actors.

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The 2002 Pennsylvania Seventeenth Congressional District Race

Stephen K. Medvic, *Franklin and Marshall College*
Matthew M. Schousen, *Franklin and Marshall College*


The race for Pennsylvania's Seventeenth Congressional District seat was among the most closely watched in the country. It was one of four races nationally in which two incumbents faced off as a result of redistricting and was one of the three most expensive House races in 2002. Most of the spending in this race came from "outside" sources as both candidates were outspent by their own parties and allied interest groups. Combined, Republican George Gekas and his allies spent nearly $6.5 million while Democrat Tim Holden's camp spent over $4.25 million.

Despite being outspent, Holden won this largely Republican district by a margin of 51 to 49%. Internal problems in the Gekas campaign explain much of the outcome, suggesting that candidates and their campaigns still matter. Though money had an effect in keeping Gekas competitive, old style, grassroots politics prevailed in Pennsylvania Seventeen.

The South Dakota Senate and At-Large Congressional District Races

James Meader, *Augustana College*
John Bart, *Augustana College*

The 2002 South Dakota Senate race between Democratic incumbent Tim Johnson and Republican House member John Thune is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, it was very expensive given the relatively small number of voters and the inexpensive media market. The candidates and outside groups combined to spend approximately $24 million ($70 per vote cast). Second, the campaign was lengthy, beginning a year in advance and intensifying as Election Day approached. Third, the campaign was a proxy battle between Majority Leader Tom Daschle and President Bush. The president encouraged Thune to run and supported him with five visits to the state. Contrary to other races around the country, President Bush's visits actually hurt John Thune. Tim Johnson also successfully communicated the importance of his ties to Tom Daschle—something that would not have worked to his advantage had voters known Democrats would lose control of the Senate. Finally, the election was extremely close (524 votes). We chronicle the campaigns and identify the factors that allowed a Democrat to win in a Republican state on a day when Republicans seemed to have the edge in other key states.



Fertile Ground? President Bush visited the land of presidents several times, but lost his (first?) election battle with Daschle.

When Redistricting Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry: Utah's Second Congressional District

Kelly Patterson, *Brigham Young University*

The Utah Second District had all the makings of an epic incumbent/challenger struggle. Because the Utah State legislature redrew the boundaries of the district to favor Republicans, political pundits and observers anticipated a hard-fought campaign with remarkable participation from outside groups and political parties. Democratic incumbent Jim Matheson barely won re-election by less than 1% over Republican John Swallow. Yet, despite the closeness of the race, the political parties and other outside interests virtually ignored the campaign until the very end. Their reasons for ignoring the campaign demonstrate the limitations parties and interest groups face when deciding when and where to commit resources. This chapter chronicles some of the strategic miscalculations made by the Republican and Democratic parties and their interest group allies in the Second District race.

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